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ABSTRACT 
The importance of privatisation and other forms of market liberalisation as tools of 
economic and political policy is well documented, and the concepts continue to command 
prominence in a large number of economies across the globe. Most academic research 
undertaken to date has focussed upon its macro-economic motivations, the importance 
of regulation, and increasingly assessments of the economic benefits of instituting 
privatisation programmes. The literature indicates a dearth of empirical research on the 
managerial aspects of privatisation: the strategic responses of the companies emerging 
from such privatisation programmes, and the key influences which have shaped their 
strategic responses. In general, the industries which have witnessed privatisation have 
tended to be former state owned enterprises, or industries of strategic importance, where 
low performance standards and quality failures have been characterised as being endemic. 
Clearly, there is a real need to learn from existing responses, so that models of best 
practice can be established to smooth the transition of organisations encountering strategic 
reorientation, and to prevent the development of new sets of operating difficulties. In 
addition, the literature suggests that existing managerial models which aim to provide 
business decision makers with viable strategic responses to changing circumstances have 
not been adequately tested in non-traditional market conditions such as those experienced 
by companies following a major privatisation. 
Accordingly, this study aims to identify the content of corporate and business level 
strategy among a sample of recently privatised former public utilities: the Regional 
Electricity Companies of England and Wales, and to understand the nature of the strategi~ 
drivers which have helped to shape these strategic responses. In so doing, the research 
aims to create an understanding of the suitability of a range of corporate and business 
strategy combinations for application in a partially regulated environment, in order to 
enable a company: to identify and pursue the appropriate strategies in pursuit of 
competitive advantage; manage its relationships with a variety of strategic drivers; to fulfil 
-\-
its public service obligations; and in so doing to navigate a potentially uncertain 
environment in a time of profound change. 
In addition, the study aims to review a series of existing managerial models in the light of 
the experiences of the RECs, and determine the degree of confidence that can be said to 
exist in their applicability in non-traditional market situations. In particular, the thesis 
comments upon the applicability of the Miles and Snow typology of organisational 
strategy, structure and process in a regulated environment, and suggests some tentative 
amendments. This research is identified as being primarily exploratory, based as it is upon 
a study of a single industry. While the author has confidence in the validity of the findings, 
this thesis is intended to be the first stage in an extended research project which would see 
these findings subjected to rigorous verification in a wider sample of companies of this 
type. As discussed earlier, the need for research of this nature at this time is identified as 
being compelling due to the current proliferation of privatisation programmes, the severity 
of the problems that they are trying to resolve, and the unique position of UK industry to 
provide recommendations based upon practical experience. 
The research utilises a broadly phenomenological method. An extensive review of the 
literature revealed not only limitations in existing knowledge, but the work of various 
authors in identifying the available corporate and business level strategic options available 
to organisational decision makers. These lists of options provided a broad framework for 
the identification and gathering of data, and its inductive interpretation. The process of 
data collection was undertaken initially using a form of content analysis of published 
sources, against a framework derived from the literature and a series of exploratory 
interviews. From this process a series of observations, in the form of tentative 
propositions, were drawn. These propositions were then tested deductively using multiple 
in-depth interviews within three case study companies and the degree of confidence in 
each proposition established. The case study companies were selected on the basis of 
their ability to represent the industry as a whole, based upon their current approach to 
growth; the research having earlier identified three distinct sub-groupings of behaviour in 
respect of strategies for growth. 
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The research resulted in a number of key findings. Firstly, that despite expectations that 
differing patterns of strategic response would emerge following market liberalisation, the 
companies remaining within the industry appear to have gravitated towards three basic 
generic responses; broadly defined as concentrated growth, organic market development, 
and market development by acquisition. Consequently, there is a large degree of strategic 
symmetry although tactical differences do remain. Secondly, that the importance of 
regulation as a driver of strategy can not be underestimated, even in those parts of the 
industry which are theoretically free from regulatory influence. The findings suggest even 
allowing for the importance of regulation, other factors such as ownership, leadership, as 
well as other external and internal factors all need to be accounted for. The general 
conclusion here was that the impact of strategic drivers was situational. Thirdly, that 
companies have little or no flexibility in their choice of the business/competitive strategy 
that they pursue, with a combination of market regulatory and consumer expectancy 
factors dictating their terms of competition. Finally, the research suggests a need for the 
amendment of the Miles and Snow typology before it is applied in regulated environments, 
as well as suggesting that a degree of caution is exercised in the use of some other 
established and externally verified managerial models. The research produces a wide 
range of recommendations for further study. These recommendations concern (a) 
verification of conclusions drawn by the research and (b) exploration of issues which 
emerged during the research process. 
The research extends the existing literature's understanding of strategic content decisions 
among companies adapting to situations of strategic reorientation. It provides numerous 
examples of the responses organisations followed to a variety of strategic drivers, and 
identifies options which have been identified as viable in the UK energy industry as it 
currently stands. The research fills a number of gaps identified within the literature in 
relation to: the nature of organisational responses to strategic change; the relationship 
between strategic content and strategic drivers; the ability of long standing managerial 
models to perfonn in non-traditional market situations; and most importantly the viability 
of strategic responses in regulated environments. 
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There are a number of limitations which can be identified within the research. The 
qualitative nature of the research reflects a reliance upon interpretive analysis and opinion, 
either by the author or the industry managers who provide the majority of the primary 
data. However, the author has striven at all times for objectivity and has utilised 
techniques such as triangulation of data sources and collection methods to ensure 
objectivity. In addition, the focus upon a single industry may be viewed as a limitation 
upon the applicability of the findings to a wider business audience. However, in both of 
these cases, the author argues that the exploratory nature of the research and the 
acknowledgement of the need for, and intention to pursue, external verification overcomes 
any concerns that may exist in relation to these possible limitations. 
The thesis comprises thirteen chapters. Chapter One introduces the study by providing 
a brief critique of the literature and establishes the study's aims and objectives. Chapter's 
Two and Four provide a review of the relevant literature in relation to the general 
management literature and the literature concerning issues relating to privatisation. The 
methodology and research design are outlined in Chapter Three. The remaining chapters 
present the analysis and interpretation of data in two stages: the preliminary stage in 
Chapter's Five to Seven, which is summarised in Chapter Eight; and the primary stage in 
Chapter's Nine to Eleven, summarised in Chapter Twelve. The thesis is concluded in 
Chapter Thirteen where the major findings and recommendations for future study are 
annotated. 
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Chapter One Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter has four principal aims. Firstly, through a critique of the relevant literature, 
the chapter seeks to make a case for the research undertaken and reported here. The 
strength of this case depends upon the identification of a deficiency within the existing 
literature, and a recognition of a real need for this gap to be filled. This investigation 
inevitably drives the direction of the research, by suggesting a variety of key areas within 
which exploration is required. Therefore, secondly, the chapter seeks to clarify the 
research questions that the thesis seeks to pursue, to reflect the identified need for 
exploration. This involves the generation and pursuit of a series of key objectives. These 
objectives actively determine the shape and content of the thesis and therefore clarity in 
respect of these objectives is imperative. Through the establishment of these objectives, 
the intended contribution to knowledge made by the thesis is also clarified. Thirdly, the 
chapter seeks to briefly identify the methodological approach adopted throughout the 
thesis, which includes a section acknowledging any deficiencies that the research may 
have. Finally, the chapter provides details of the structure and content of the thesis, to 
guide the reader through the forthcoming analysis. 
1.1 Critique of the Literature 
The privatisation in 1989 of the United Kingdom (UK) Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) 
by the second Conservative administration of Margaret Thatcher has been portrayed as 
the "culmination of a concerted policy" (Thomas, 1996, pAO). This policy was aimed at 
achieving a reduction in the overall level of public ownership within the UK, coupled with 
an ideologically grounded attempt to move decision making within the productive sectors 
of the economy from public to private hands (Kay et at, 1986). As part of this 'concerted 
policy' most former State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) had followed a similar path into the 
private sector: British Telecommunications (BT) in 1983, British Gas (BG) in 1986, and 
the companies of the water industry in 1989. The impact upon the UK economy was 
profound. Figures from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) show that the accumulated proceeds resulting from privatisation in the UK 
between 1979 and 1991 came to £44.5 billion, equivalent to 11.9% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) over this period (quoted in Stevens, 1992). This figure had risen to more 
than £60 billion by 1997 (Martin and Parker, 1997). 
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The Conservative Party had identified privatisation as a possible solution to what it saw 
as the increasing tendency towards public ownership developing during the early 1970's 
(Bishop and Kay, 1992), with which it disagreed. Privatisation presented a solution to the 
dual problems of curbing public sector union activism, and of funding its investment 
programme without recourse to public borrowing (Bishop and Kay, 1992), and was put 
into practice after the Party's victory in 1979. It also provided an area where the 
Government could expound and test its politico-economic ideology, which authors such 
as Beesley and Littlechild (1983) identify as originating from the work of economists 
working in America in the 1970's such as De Alessi (1974) following classical economists 
like Hyack (1948, 1978) and 'The Austrian School', whose work was then adapted in the 
UK by Conservative Party ideologues like John Redwood (1980). 
However, what set the ESI apart from the earlier privatisation's, making it "the biggest 
and most radical project in the extensive UK privatisation programme" (Surrey, 1996a, 
p.3), was the emphasis placed upon the introduction of competition. The preceding BT 
and BG privatisation's had effectively replicated existing state managed monopolies within 
the private sector (Holmes, 19921, among many others). These decisions had been the 
cause of considerable debate and reproach from observers, who questioned the veracity 
of such a choice, given the rationale underlying the concept of privatisation2. 
To a degree, this criticism was shared within government circles. The then Secretary of 
State (parkinson) was reported to have fought hard against a unitary privatisation which 
"threatened merely to perpetuate a state monopoly under different colours" (Travers, 
1988, p.54). This led the Minister directly into a confrontation with the Head of the 
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), who wished for, but did not receive, the 
same treatment as his counterparts in Telecommunications and Gas. The ESI was 
therefore the first privatisation in the UK, and probably the world, where alongside the 
more normal change of ownership and industrial restructuring, competition was 
immediately forced upon the newly created companies (Burton, 1997). 
Privatisation was, and remains, a crucial element in the UK's socio-economic and political 
life at the end of the Twentieth Century, and an examination of the literature related to 
Holmes notes that one of the key aims of the electricity privatisation was "to make amends for the 
mistakes made in privatizing BG and BT" (Holmes, 1992, p.1S). 
2 
The issue of rationale is addressed in Chapter Four. 
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privatisation shows that much has been written. For example authors such as Kay et ai, 
1986; Ramanadham, 1988, 1994; Vickers and Wright, 1989; Weyman-Jones, 1989; 
Holmes, 1992; Clarke and Pitelis, 1993; Armstrong et ai, 1994 ; Jackson and Price, 1994; 
Bishop etal, 1994, 1995; Surrey, 1996a; Beesley, 1997; Martin and Parker, 1997 among 
many others, have each produced detailed analysis. However the author argues that the 
analysis conducted by these authors predominantly examines the principal macro economic 
and political motivations for privatisation, and the related issues of regulation and 
liberalisation. The academic literature has paid very little attention to the direction and 
content of the strategies such companies have followed after industrial transformation, and 
the development of a competitive environment. 
The author argues that no formal analysis of the process of strategic development among 
the companies formed by privatisation has been attempted, nor has any study been 
undertaken of their adaptive behaviour when faced with a major paradigm shift. This, the 
author argues, represents a major deficiency within the literature on industrial 
transformation, and an estimable opportunity to begin to study the dynamic relationship 
between corporate strategy under conditions of transformation, regulation and the 
introduction of competition. It is to the need for an investigation of this sort to which this 
section now turns. 
Inevitably, the speed with which text books can comment upon emergent trends is limited, 
but an examination of writings on the subjects of privatised utilities and strategy in 
academic journals shows a similar trend. InfoTrac (a product of the Gale Group) is a 
major online academic database boasting references to more than 6.3 million academic and 
business articles abstracted from leading English language academic journals, financial 
publications and newspapers published since 19803. A search of this index reveals that 
there are 17,010 references to privatisation, of which 1049 appear in refereed academic 
journals. Of these 17,010 articles, only 122 refer to privatisation in public utilities. The 
number of references to public utilities within the same database is 8713. In seeking to 
identify elements of the literature that may be relevant to the questions at hand, further 
searches were conducted4. A search using the terms 'privatisation' and 'strategy' revealed 
359 articles in refereed academic journals, while a search for 'public utilities' and 
3 
All figures circa September 2000. 
4 
It should be noted that this exercise has been conducted for the purposes of this introduction, and the 
need to reveal the deficiency in this area of the management literature. Frequent, extensive surveys of 
the literature have been conducted over the preceding six years. 
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'strategy' similarly revealed 302 articles. Of these, only a small number address directly 
the issues of the process of strategic choice, the content of strategy and its implementation 
within privati sed former public utilities, as again the emphasis is clearly placed on macro-
economic issues and the motivations for privatisation. 
Within the small number of articles that do focus upon issues of strategic direction and 
content, the deficiencies identified earlier are also discussed. An interesting perspective 
on the issue is provided by Miller, who argues that "while a considerable body of literature 
exists" on the subject of privatisation within the UK, "most of this literature examines 
individual business or industry-wide sales, focussing on the economy and society; the 
effect on employees, management and special interest groups; the legal consequences; the 
political implications; and the effect of privati sat ion on the firm's goals, strategy, structure 
and method of operation" (Miller, 1995, p.83). While the author agrees with the early 
sentiment of the statement, the latter part concerning the effect of privati sat ion 'on the 
firm's goals, strategy, structure and method of operation' is unsupportable, and it is 
interesting that Miller himself does not refer to any such studies to justify his statement. 
With the notable exception of work by the author and colleagues in the conceptualisation 
of strategy among electricity companies (see in particular Ghobadian et aI, 1998), and the 
work of Ogden and Glaister (1996) in a similar study of the water companies, the author 
is not aware of any studies of the kind described by Miller. 
There are a number of articles exploring the impact of competition on, in particular, the 
energy industry (Green and Newbery, 1997a; Burton, 1997; Green and Price, 1995; 
Currie, 1998; Thurlby, 1998). However, these articles have tended to deal with the 
question of strategy in an abstract sense, rather than conducting an in-depth analysis of 
the process of strategic choice and determination of strategic content. Ogden and 
Glaister, in identifying their work with the UK water companies as a study of 'strategic 
reorientation', argue that studies of this type are rare, as most concentrate upon 
"elaboration and refinement of existing strategies" (Ogden and Glaister, 1996, p.663) 
rather than the new strategy development or reorientation which forms the centre piece 
of this thesis. 
Essentially, therefore, this critique concerns a lack of focus upon the various aspects of 
micro level strategy within the companies formed by the privatisation offormer SOEs in 
the UK. Given the innovative nature of the electricity industry's privatisation, this lack 
of attention paid to micro strategy processes is a puzzle. In no other UK or world 
privatisation at the time had a change of ownership been accompanied by industrial 
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disintegration and forced competitions. However, it is now ten years since the ESI was 
privatised and competition in utility industries is more common, so this is a less convincing 
argument. It may therefore reflect a belief that micro issues were and are less important 
than the wider macro issues. 
Evidence gathered for this thesis suggests that when the ESI was privatised legislators 
paid very little attention to the issue of the corporate strategies of the companies created 
by the act. In an interview conducted for this research project with an officer from the 
Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) (OFFER, UK001, 1999c), the extent of the 
autonomy provided to the companies with respect to their corporate strategy is clear: 
"The 1989 Electricity Act, which set out the framework for the privatisation of the 14 
Regional Electricity Companies6 ..... was simply a framework and outline document. The 
details of what the companies were expected to do in terms of regulatory provision was 
further enhanced by a series of licences; in the main the 'Public Supplier of Electricity' 
licence. That particular document set out various tasks and necessities that the companies 
had to do in terms of their customers, and that required them on a number of fronts to 
produce certain documents which would denote the services that they were providing to 
customers. In particular customers who may have difficulty in paying debt; giving 
customers advice on energy efficiency; dealing with other vulnerable customer groups. 
And that is about as far as it went in terms of guidance that was issued from OFFER as 
to what companies were expected to do. Guidance was very much at a macro level, and 
we never got into the nitty-gritty of organizational change, organizational strategy or 
indeed how we would expect a company to deliver the services which were expected of 
them. It was left very much up to them to decide what to do" (OFFER UK001, 1999c). 
As Chapter Four aims to show, the speed with which the privatisation was prepared could 
possibly explain this decision: the legislators simply ran out of time before certain 
guidelines could be set in place. Alternatively, it may have been that the Government 
believed that it was not their place to attempt to exert influence in this way, given the 
value attached to the 'unfettered' operation of the market. However, the failure to 
consider such issues at this stage may explain a number of the difficulties that the industry 
has experienced with economic regulation over the following ten years (James et aI, 
S 
While Ogden and Glaister note that the legislators who privati sed the water industries also sought 
competition among the water companies "in fields where they can do so" (HOC, 1986), the scope for 
competition was much greater in electricity and hence an issue of greater importance. 
6 
The Twelve RECs of England and Wales plus ScottishPower and Scottish Hydro-Electric. 
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2001), and which are discussed in the chapters of this thesis presenting field work. Offer's 
statement does, however, remove any fears that may have existed in the mind of the 
author that the lack of any previous academic study in this area was due to the RECs 
being so closely regulated in relation to their strategic choice, content and implementation 
as to render any study of limited value. Indeed, the statement presented above would 
appear to identify an area related to the privatisation which was discretionary, and hence 
ofinterest to students of the evolution offormer SOE's. 
Additionally, in part the interest for conducting the research comes from the UK's 'role' 
as a test bed for privatisation, and the reality that systems and structures developed here 
have infonned developments in various countries around the world. The critique therefore 
lies in the fact that valuable lessons about how companies adapt to drastically changed 
circumstances may be lost if this question is not addressed. This issue will be returned to 
below in relation to the importance of the study. Therefore, this initial critique argues that 
the literature on privatisation is predominantly concerned with economic rather than 
managerial issues. This in itself would be of less concern if within the management 
literature compensatory sources of information existed that provided the necessary 
guidance to enable each company to affect adaptive change. 
However, in a second critique of the literature, the author contends that while the general 
management literature devotes much time to the fundamental issues of strategic choice, 
content and implementation: what it is, how it is devised, who devises it and so on 
(significant works include those by Ansoff (1965), Andrews (1971), Mintzberg (1979), 
Porter (1980), Ohmae (1983) among many others), there exist serious doubts about the 
value of this literature to companies facing the demands of strategic reorientation. The 
literature spends much time exploring how change can be managed, even in some cases 
dealing with the demands of adapting to major change. This fundamental requirement of 
the strategy literature has seen the development of prescriptive generic strategy 
typologies, both by the authors mentioned above as well as other authors such as Miles 
and Snow (1978), Abell (1980), Mintzberg (1988) and many others, which seek to 
provide a variety of viable strategic configurations, from which a company may select the 
appropriate blend of structural, leadership, resource, and tactical positions to build their 
own strategic orientation. 
However, various authors (Snow and Hrebiniak (1980), Douglas and Rhee (1989), 
Conant et al (1990), and Ketchen et al (1993) among others) have suggested, following 
empirical investigation, that the generic typologies mentioned above are subject to some 
inherent flaws. Their research has tended to suggest that such typologies should not be 
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universally applied, despite the claims of authors who believe that their concepts are 
generally applicable. In other words, while the various generic strategies are widely 
believed to be useful tools in the strategy process, they should not be regarded as 
necessarily appropriate for use in every circumstance, as some underlying assumptions 
made by their authors do not hold in all areas of business activity. For example, some 
authors have argued that approaches of this nature tend to reflect the environment in 
which they were created and hence are too American (Douglas and Rhee, 1989): that is 
culturally centred in the American business experience and so possibly unsuitable for 
application elsewhere. 
Another criticism developed by authors exploring generic classification systems concerns 
the tendency of business templates provided by the literature to explain, guide and 
influence strategy formulation in 'mature' industries; defined as industries where growth 
rates have slowed or become 'more modest' (porter, 1980, p.237), or where the 
relationship between the company, its markets, products and customers is more clearly 
understood. Effectively, in such industries, these templates provide a means by which past 
behaviour can be categorised, as they provide a post hoc rationalisation of what has 
observably occurred within that industry. Additionally, they enable a company to 
determine an approach by which companies can consolidate their positions, or possibly 
seek to change the business or competitive strategies of their organisation. Furthermore, 
the competitive strategy literature, and Porter's work in particular, provides guidance for 
companies who may be designated as 'new entrants' into 'mature' industries. The value 
of these approaches in a situation similar to the ESI is therefore questionable. 
This second part of the critique rests therefore upon whether the ESI can be said to 
represent the type of industry that lends itself to the use of existing generic strategies, and 
so would constitute a suitable case for their application. It therefore continues to question 
the viability of widely accepted concepts in an industry which does not conform to 
expected norms. Before privatisation, the ESI was not an industry in the commonly 
understood sense. It was closer to a branch of the public service. Electricity generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply were undertaken by a monopolistic state corporation 
created in 1948 with the nationalisation of all existing municipal and private electricity 
concerns (Middlemass, 1993). While the industry before 1989 did possess a 'strategy', 
it was for the most part generally imposed upon it by central government in the form of 
a number of public service obligations. The most notable of these was intended to ensure 
that there was an adequate supply of electricity to whomsoever required it (Holmes, 1992, 
p.8). The ESI was not therefore concerned with issues such as competition, efficiency or 
service quality, and effectively unaccountable for its actions. Privatisation made the ESI 
-7-
an industry; or rather made it four separate industries which were each, initially at least, 
heavily regulated. Most of the companies of the privatised ESI existed before 1989, but 
none of them in the form they would assume after privatisation. Incorporation and the 
introduction of competition made the difference, with the added accountability and 
responsibility for profitability that these demands bring. Hence, strategic reorientation. 
The author therefore argues that the companies of the ESI should be identified as new 
corporate entities required to operate in a new environment. This environment is both 
commercial and also, in parts, heavily regulated. In other words, it was an environment 
of which they had only limited experience. 
In addition, as has already been noted, existing empirical research suggests that the models 
have failed to be effective in examination of regulated industries. An example of analysis 
of this type was presented by Snow and Hrebiniak (1980), who sought to empirically test 
the Miles and Snow (1978) typology in a series of US industries in the late 19701s. Their 
conclusion was that regulation allowed for 'failure' strategies such as Miles and Snow's 
reactor to succeed, in contrast to the general expectations resulting from the model (Snow 
and Hrebiniak, 1980, p.325-326). Snow and Hrebiniak argue the need for research to 
focus upon the issue of management models in regulated environments, but to date little 
or no research of this kind has been forthcoming. 
1.2 Relevance and Importance of the Study 
The preceding section has explained why the author considers there to be a need for the 
research. This section explains why this research is of particular relevance in the current 
economic and academic environment. In exploring the question of its relevance, the 
importance of the study is reinforced. Essentially, it is perhaps possible to identify four 
key areas. The first area, underpinning all other aspects of the research, is the importance 
that the concept of privati sat ion has come to assume in the global economy. Privatisation 
has become a key topic across the world, and the author here argues that an understanding 
of all aspects of the concept is vital ifeach privatisation is to achieve its unique objectives. 
The second area of significance rests with the principal aims and objectives that 
privatisation programmes have been intended to resolve. Many of these aims involve 
improving the effectiveness of industries of strategic importance, such as public services 
or major national employers, as well as furthering a government's socio-political 
objectives. As such, the identification of viable and tested organisational strategies and 
structures is a pressing need. A third area of importance lies with the work's ability to 
review and update the debate on the value of existing business typologies and to 
contribute towards the debate around the issue of universal applicability. Finally, the 
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research provides an opportunity to develop a case study of the change evident in an 
industry which has undergone a major paradigm shift. Each of these areas are discussed 
in full in the following sections. 
1.2.1 Global Reach of Privatisation 
During the 1980's and 1990's, the attraction of privatisation as a potential remedy available 
to countries experiencing extreme problems in their socio-economic infrastructure can not 
be underestimated. The roots of privatisation are probably different depending upon where 
you stand in the world. In the advanced industrial economies of the USA and UK, the 
roots were ideological but the outcomes are competitive (Lieberman, 1993, p.11). Given 
the perceived success of the policies pursued, for example, in the UK it is not surprising 
that countries suffering chronic infra-structural problems have embraced the concept with 
such relish. Recent figure's published by the OECD (OECD, 2000) in relation to the 
revenue raised through privatisation show that many advanced European Union (EU) 
economies are heavily engaged in privatisation programmes: Italy, France, and Spain 
among them. There is also a strong representation from the emerging economies of 
central Europe: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, and a smaller representation 
from South East Asia: Japan and Korea. Perhaps the most interesting figure is that of the 
UK, given as zero and perhaps reflecting how much earlier the UK sought to introduce 
this concept to its SOE's. These figures could be interpreted as suggesting that 
privatisation is followed exclusively by the advanced economies of Europe, Asia, 
Australasia and North America. This is not the case, although the growth of privatisation 
in Africa and Latin America is inevitably of a lower magnitude. A relatively recent issue 
of the Columbia Journal of Management highlighted the spread of privatisation across the 
rest of the globe. 
One article in this edition focussed upon privatisation activity in Nigeria and Senegal, 
suggesting the growth in importance of privatisation in Africa (Drum, 1993). 
Privatisation has also been growing in importance in Central and South America. Volic 
and Draaisma (1993) identified the importance of privati sat ion in Mexico, while Luders 
(1993) in Chile, and Mooney and Griffith (1993) in Argentina, identify similar 
developments in South America. OECD and World Bank reports chronicle the use of 
privatisation for tackling reform in transition economies (Pannier, 1996). For example, 
OECD country reports on Mexico notes that despite an extensive programme of 
privatisation, much of the Country's key sectors - railroads, airports, satellite services, gas 
and electricity - were almost untouched. A number of initiatives are underway in these 
areas and it is expected that progress in these industries will follow in 2000 (OECD, 
1999). These articles suggest that there is some similarity in the rationale underlying the 
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use of privati sat ion in developed and transition economies, but that in transition economies 
the problems are more deeply embedded. 
As Section 1.1 indicated, most of these processes have been undertaken against a 
backdrop of less than certain knowledge of the most effective ways in which to manage 
operations of this kind. The importance of the industries, and privatisation processes 
discussed require that establishing 'best practice', or understanding the congruence of 
aims, objectives and company strategy, is a high priority in order to ensure that 
privatisation processes do not create more intractable problems than they are intended to 
resolve. The next section explores some of the problems that privatisation has been 
intended to overcome. 
1.2.2 Effective Management of Former SOEs 
As will become clear from a review of the literature exploring the privatisation agenda in 
the UK in the 1980's (in Chapter Four), there were many reasons for the instigation of the 
programme, some positive but mostly negative. Lieberman, in his 1993 assessment of the 
importance of privatisation in the 1990's, identified the following characteristics of SOEs 
as an explanation as to why many governments have chosen to employ the approach. 
SOE's, he notes, are generally characterised by: 
~ poor financial performance; 
~ overstaffing; 
~ dependence on subsidies and unilateral budget transfers; 
~ highly centralised and politicised organizations; 
~ exclusion of competitive imports; 
~ exclusion of domestic competitors; 
~ poor export performance; 
~ corrupt practices; and 
~ being vehicles for capital flight (Lieberman, 1993, p.1 0). 
Clearly, there are both macro and micro economic reasons behind the decision to pursue 
a privatisation approach. The full explanation is completed by a listing of the principal 
objectives that a privatisation programme will seek to achieve. These include objectives 
which: 
~ reduce the government's operating deficit; 
~ raise cash through SOE sales; 
~ generate new sources of tax revenue; 
~ reduce external debt; 
~ deepen domestic capital markets and broaden domestic equity ownership; 
~ further the "democratisation of capital"; 
~ promote domestic investment; 
~ attract direct foreign investment and new technology; 
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~ increase domestic and international business confidence; 
~ increase competition; 
~ create opportunities for employment through real growth; 
~ increase productive and operating efficiency; 
~ seek to "turn around" or restructure sick SOEs; 
~ increase exports; 
~ improve the quality of services; and 
~ reduce the role of the state in the economy (Lieberman, 1993, p.11). 
Many of these characteristics and objectives are common to the UK privatisation 
programme. However, the key issues in respect of this research are those relating to 
operational effectiveness. That includes, therefore, turning around poor financial 
performance, management of overstaffing, introduction of effective organisational and 
managerial structures, and the increase of productive and operating efficiency, with an 
improvement of the quality of services. 
Authors have noted that there should not be an automatic assumption that this change 
process will be smooth or even necessarily succeed. Holmes notes that "the fact of 
structural change does not of itself cause habits of mind to change. It will take a long time 
before the new companies find their own corporate style and habits, rather than those the 
Government's financial advisors and PR men told them to adopt" (Holmes, 1992, p. 51). 
The importance of effectiveness is simply enhanced by the fact that in many cases the 
industries which are being privati sed are public utilities, and hence their effective operation 
is an issue for each member of society. 
1.2.3 Potential Deficiencies in Prescriptive Approaches 
As was noted above, the general management literature provides business decision makers 
with a variety of tools to aide them in the decision making process. These tools, 
typologies, models and techniques aim to identifY generalizable behaviour for companies 
in specific situations, and suggest the appropriate strategic responses that these companies 
should make. Some of these tools relate strategy to structure, process and personnel to 
provide a wide ranging classification system to enable managers to more comprehensively 
understand the interrelationship of the various elements of their organisation. However, 
again as noted above, there is concern that not enough attention has been paid to the 
question of environmental context. Some authors claim that their approaches can be used 
in any given situation (Porter, 1980), while other authors who have empirically tested 
these models suggest that this is not the case, and that some models will operate only 
under specific conditions. Ketchen et al (1993) in particular note that some approaches 
intentionally adopt a single industry focus and concentrate upon maximizing internal 
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validity while sacrificing generalisability, while others seek to develop configurations 
which apply broadly and are not dependent upon particular industry contexts. 
The concern that the models will not work in regulated environments has been expressed 
(Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980). This project aims to comment upon this issue, and to 
suggest ways in which this contention can (a) be tested and (b) possibly resolved. This 
is felt to be a significant issue in respect of this research, especially given the global reach 
of privatisation, and the problems that have been experienced in transition and emerging 
economies in terms of developing appropriate managerial and organizational structures 
to drive forward privatization programmes (Dharwadkar et aI, 2000, Ramamurti, 2000, 
Shleifer, 1997, Sharp and Salter, 1997). 
1.2.4 Managing A Paradigm Shift 
The thesis will also provide a case study of an industry managing change on a major scale. 
As has been noted earlier, the literature on privatisation has not explored micro level 
managerial issues. Neither has there been a comprehensive case analysis of the impact of 
major change on a formerly state owned industry. This project will be able to comment 
upon, and so expand the fund of knowledge in relation to major change, and its effects 
upon companies7 . It will also be possible, given the changes in ownership, to comment 
upon the place of the UK ESI within the wider global electricity industry, and to speculate 
upon the future direction of that industry. 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
The project has four key objectives as well as a supporting objective, the pursuit of which 
is contingent upon the outcomes of the earlier objectives. The four key and one 
supporting objectives are as follows: 
Key Objective One 
To identifY viable corporate and business levels strategies within a regulated environment. 
This objective involves understanding the nature of the strategies developed. It also 
involves understanding (a) how different corporate and business levels strategies can be 
combined to provide an effective overall strategy, and (b) the relationship between an 
organisation's strategy and its structure. 
7 
The research does not aim to examine the impact upon consumers, as other authors have already begun 
this process. The views of such authors have been considered in Section 4.6.1. This failure to explore 
this issue may be considered a limitation on the impact of this research, and this issue will be returned 
to in Section 1.6.3. 
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Many authors, as remarked upon above, have suggested portfolio's of corporate and 
business level strategic options which they suggest are available to all businesses 
operating in competitive environments. Objective One seeks to use these eXisting 
portfolio's to identify the content of corporate and business level strategies developed 
by the RECs since privatisation. In so dOing, the achievement of this objective would 
enable the author to report upon the precise content of strategy among companies which 
have had to strategically reorient themselves. 
Key Objective Two 
To identify the factors driving the strategic direction of the RECs, as identified in 
Objective One, and to understand the nature of their impacts. 
Authors have identified a wide variety of factors which influence and shape corporate 
and business strategy decisions. The aim of this objective is to determine whether the 
factors which drive strategy in a regulated environment are the same or different from 
those which shape decisions in a traditionally competitive environment. In so doing, the 
author seeks to comment upon the structural differences between a traditional 
competitive environment and a regulated environment, and the impact that any such 
differences will have upon strategic options and directions. 
Key Objective Three 
An evaluation ofthe effectiveness of existing generic management typologies in explaining 
the strategic content identified in Objective One. 
The difficulties of employing existing management concepts, typologies and systems of 
classification in a non-traditional regulated environment have been raised above. The 
aim of this objective is to formally address these difficulties and contribute to the debate 
by the use of examples drawn from the EST 
Key Objective Four 
To elaborate a set of hypotheses that capture the key elements of the outcomes of the 
above objectives, for application in future research. 
This research is exploratory, and undertaken prior to a wider exploration of similar 
themes across a broader audience of companies who have experienced similar industrial 
transformations. The o~jective sets out, by developing a number of propositions which 
will be validated during this research, to establish viable hypotheses which will form the 
basis for future empirical research. Therefore within Key Objective Four are the 
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following two core 'propositions', which will be expanded inductively as research is 
undertaken in pursuit of Objectives One and Two: 
~ Core Proposition One: that companies will adopt different approaches 
to achieve their strategic objectives; and 
Core Proposition Two: that different influences will be felt by the 
different companies during this process. 
In establishing these core propositions, the author is not aiming, initially at least, to 
suggest a relationship between outcomes resulting from the expansion of Core 
Proposition One and Core Proposition Two. To this extent these propositions will be 
developed independently, with each aiming to fulfil self contained objectives of extending 
understanding in each area, and with no immediate objective of achieving some form of 
correlation. However, correlation of this kind is a longer term objective, and the ground 
will be prepared so that an attempt can be made once the variables related to each core 
proposition have been thoroughly reviewed, and are more definitely understood. 
Supporting Objective One 
Subject to the outcome of Key Objective Three, to make observations about the use of 
generic strategies in a regulated environment, and to suggest any amendments which may 
be necessary to amend established approaches to improve their utility for the classification 
of regulated industries. 
The weight of evidence derived from the existing literature would suggest that established 
approaches would not be appropriate to the task of adequately describing and 
understanding the change brought about by strategic reorientation. If this is the case, 
the aim of this supporting objective is to suggest any amendments the author believes to 
be necessary to modify certain existing approaches to take into accollnt the difficulties 
revealed by the earlier reported research. 
The impact of the achievement of the four principal and one supporting objectives will 
now be considered in relation to the study's contribution to knowledge. 
1.4 The Study's Contribution to Knowledge 
The study'S principal contribution to knowledge rests with an attempt to overcome the 
deficiency in the literature identified in Section 1. 1. The privati sed industries of the UK 
are of considerable strategic importance, and as such an understanding of the process of 
strategic choice, and the availability of viable strategic options open to the companies 
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created by the privatisation should arguably have commanded greater attention from 
management theorists. The recent collapse of the new electricity and gas supply company 
Independent Energy (Gribbon, 2000), and the continuing consolidation of the industry 
(Ghobadian and Viney, 2000, James et ai, 2001), show that even after ten years of 
competition, there is still uncertainty over the viability of certain strategic approaches, and 
indeed arguably the suitability of the industry as a whole for the experience of 
competition. This analysis should enable a judgement to be made as to whether 'effective' 
organisational structures and processes have developed within this industry8, and allow 
for the identification of the content. 
In understanding what strategies have developed in the industry, it is also important to 
consider why. The study's second objective therefore witt contribute towards the body 
of existing knowledge on the key drivers of corporate strategy. In particular, this section 
compares the differing views of strategic drivers evident between the main concepts of 
strategy making within the firm: the competitive forces and resource based views. 
The management of change from SOEs to privati sed entities has also become a major 
issue within the literature in recent years. The UK's position as a 'test bed' for regulatory 
and industrial reform provides the ESI with the status of a global laboratory, and as such 
the findings produced by this research witt contribute further to an improved 
understanding of what is a viable competitive strategy for recently privati sed companies. 
As has been noted previously, this is especially important as the ESI was the first industry 
to have competition forced upon it at privatisation. 
Finally, the research will provide an opportunity to comment upon the suitability and 
effectiveness of existing models of strategic evaluation. As has been noted, it has long 
been argued that such models, which claim universal applicability, struggle to be effective 
in industries which do not conform to the norm of a free market and exhibit unfettered 
competition. By exploring this question, and suggesting possible amendments to guide 
future research this project may make a meaningful contribution to a resolution of such 
long standing issues. 
1.5 Outline of Research Methodology 
This section outlines briefly the methodology by which the objectives established in 
8 
An actual assessment of this issue and determination of the question of 'success' is beyond the scope of 
this research, and will be left to future research. 
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Section 1.3 of this chapter are to be achieved9 . In particular, the decision to pursue an 
inductive approach is explained, along with the decision to use a phenomenalogical 
research design based upon the use of a case studies derived from in-depth interviews. 
The section also features a brief summary of the key elements of the thesis. 
1.5.1 An Inductive Approach 
The research adopts a broadly inductive approach in the preliminary phase. Inductive 
approaches have been defined by Gill and Johnson as involving "moving from a 'plane' 
of observation of the empirical world to the construction of explanations and theories 
about what has been observed" (Gill and Johnson, 1991, p.33). Arguably, inductive 
approaches have been the cornerstone of management research since the ground breaking 
inductive studies conducted by authors such as Chandler (1962), and Learned et ai, 
(1965). Inductive approaches focus upon exploring available information but without 
identifYing a specific objective as would be the case in a deductive approach. The focus 
of this research is, initially at least, to review behaviour based upon an analysis of the 
content of each company's strategies, and draw conclusions in respect of what has been 
observed, and then seek to explain the observation. This is not to suggest that an 
inductive approach starts from a position of ignorance about the area to be researched, 
as a framework for research has been designed using existing systems of classification. 
It is just that an inductive approach does not set out with the express objective of testing 
a specific theory. As such, this characterises the research contained in this thesis as being 
predominantly exploratory which is an accurate representation of its principal objectives. 
Chapter's Five to Seven witness the preliminary stage of the research, which is undertaken 
using both content analysis and other forms of textual analysis. The sources of 
information and opinions developed during these chapters are subject to a process of 
triangulation throughout. At the end of this process of textual analysis, a series of 
propositions about the content of REC strategies and their drivers will be developed, and 
expanded upon in Chapter Eight. The process of exploring these propositions will begin 
with the field research chapters, Chapter's Nine to Eleven, which feature in-depth case 
studies of three RECs, and continue into Chapter Twelve. As such, the research process 
pursued within this project is initially inductive, although the inductive stage is informed 
by existing knowledge of both the industry and of existing management models, and 
concludes with a deductive investigation of the propositions developed earlier. 
9 
The research methodology. process and design is discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
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The systematic framework used in the research is drawn from the management literature. 
In Chapter Two, the issue of what constitutes a strategy is explored, and a framework of 
'Grand Strategies' is presented (pearce and Robinson, 1994, p.223). Grand strategies are 
defined as providing basic direction for strategic actions: "they are the basis of co-
ordinated and sustained efforts directed toward achieving long-term business objectives" 
(Pearce and Robinson, 1994, p.223), or domain selection (Bourgeois, 1996). They 
therefore present a framework within which all possible variants of corporate strategy are 
present, and which can therefore be used as a 'checklist' when examining the observable 
activity of the sample companies. The list of grand strategies is presented in full, and 
explained, in Section 2.5.4. The framework also utilises business level systems of 
classification, as presented by authors such as Porter (1980 and Section 2.5.5.2) and 
Chrisman et al (1988, and Section 2.5.5.4), used for domain navigation (Bourgeois, 
1996), as well as organisational typologies like that suggested by Miles and Snow (1978, 
1986, 1992). 
1.5.2 Use of a Qualitative Approach 
As Chapter Three explains, there is still some debate as to the relative validity of social 
science research undertaken using non-quantitative methods. An increasingly strong body 
of the literature now argues that such research is valid (Yin, 1994), and indeed desirable 
(Hoskisson et ai, 1999, pA17), but the debate is ongoing. Essentially this debate centres 
upon the suitability of alternate available methods to adequately analyse and explain 
particular circumstances. It would appear from an observation of this debate that certain 
approaches are argued to lend themselves to the investigation of particular issues. For 
instance, the benefits from the use of qualitative approaches in looking at particularly 
complex organisational issues is argued (Yin, 1994). In other words, certain approaches 
are appropriate in certain circumstances, and arguably not in others. The author takes the 
view that a qualitative approach is the most appropriate to adopt in pursuit of the 
objectives of this thesis. This view is based upon two factors. 
The first factor concerns the complexity of this research's objectives, and the difficulty of 
pursuing these objectives using quantitative instruments. As the preceding section on the 
objectives of the research makes clear, this thesis seeks to understand which strategies a 
variety of companies came to adopt, and the reasons why. Implicit within this 
investigation is an awareness of an extremely complex interrelationship between the 
internal and external factors driving the strategy process. The author takes the view that 
a clear understanding of this interrelationship cannot be forthcoming from the use of 
quantitative instruments, as the questions necessary to untangle this relationship cannot 
be effectively reduced to a form that can be delivered by, for example, a questionnaire. 
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Largely, this concern rests upon the more persistent criticisms of quantitative methods, 
and their prospective strengths and weaknesses. Quantitative approaches are of particular 
virtue in areas of study requiring an understanding of the behaviour of large sample 
populations, and the testing of the relationship between variables through the use of 
statistical analysis. Proponents of quantitative methods argue that they are more 
inherently scientific than other possible methods, providing the necessary preparatory 
conditions have been fulfilled. However, there are inevitably areas of concern in the use 
of quantitative approaches. The validity of the use of questionnaires depends strongly 
upon the validity of the design, and the representativeness of the sample population 
(Silverman, 1993, p.10). Additionally, quantitative approaches have been criticised for 
not taking full account of the social context within which they occur (Kirk and Miller, 
1986). 
In comparison, qualitative methods possess a variety of virtues. Principally they offer a 
means of understanding a phenomena through observation and description, with the 
ultimate aim of generating hypothesis. This reflect's a general concern, held by 
proponents of qualitative approaches, that data should be gathered in a naturalistic 
environment, ensuring that when a set of hypotheses is developed, they reflect an 
observed, rather than a subjective, reality. Qualitative methods therefore seek to establish 
more than just a relationship between variables, a prescribed aim of quantitative 
approaches, through the achievement of a greater perception of the mechanisms or 
processes which affect the variables under study (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, p.20). 
The second factor concerns the size of the sample available to the researcher. There were 
only twelve companies within the REC sector at privatisation. This small potential sample 
size could be seen as mitigating against the use of a quantitative approach. Statisticians 
such as Lehman (1999) have noted that analysis of samples of cases of less than thirty do 
not produce reliable conclusions from the range of 'classical' statistical tests. Even the 
use of more qualitatively based statistical approaches such as those employing Bayesian 
methods (Gilks et ai, 1996) which allow for the analysis of smaller sample sizes, would 
view a maximum sample of twelve as too low for their application, even allowing for the 
remote possibility of achieving an 100% response rate. It would of course have been 
possible to distribute a questionnaire to a variety of potential respondents within an 
organisation, achieving a stratified sample, and in doing so achieve a more significant 
sample population, but given the nature of the first factor identified immediately above this 
option was not pursued. It does, however, remain a very real option for the proposed 
extension of this research into its confirmatory stage, following the completion of this 
exploratory stage. 
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This second factor, allied to the belief that a case-based approach was more appropriate, 
conclusively influenced the methodology adopted. Of the method employed itself, the 
following observations are made. To approximate the scientific rigour usually associated 
with quantitative approaches the secondary and primary data generated by the project was 
collected and analysed using a formal research framework. Within that process recognised 
techniques such as content analysis were employed where appropriate, although in-depth 
interviews were also deployed to provide the necessary depth and detail. In addition, a 
process of triangulation occurred to assure the validity of the findings. This process of 
triangulation occurred at both the preliminary and field stages of the research, as discussed 
at length in Section 3.2.2. The research process deployed is explored at length in 
Section's 3.2 to 3.6. 
1.5.2.1 Details of Primary Data Collection 
During the research project, a number of face-to-face interviews were conducted with 
managers from both UK and US electricity companies, and regulatory offices. Due to 
assurances of confidentiality offered to each interviewee no names will be revealed in this 
thesis. However, it is necessary for the purposes of referencing to indicate what material 
was presented to the author by primary data sources. The following schedule (Figure 1.1) 
provides details of the companies and job titles of interviewees, as well as the timing and 
location of each interview. Code numbers will be allocated to each interview This 
schedule is presented in two columns: UK and US, and ownership links noted. 
1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
Inevitably in a project of this kind, the author is aware of a number of limitations to which 
the attention of readers is necessarily drawn. This section addresses this need, and 
suggests some of the actions taken by the author to mitigate against the impact of these 
limitations. 
1.6.1 Limitations of a Case Based Approach 
The first possible limitation to be considered relates to the chosen method of data 
collection. As noted in Section 1.4 of this chapter, this research uses a design based upon 
a case approach utilising in-depth interviews. As will be discussed in Chapter Three, case 
based approaches are increasingly cited as being of real value in social science research, 
due to the degree of detail they provide allied to the opportunity they offer to understand 
complex social phenomena. Proponents argue that achieving this degree of detail and 
understanding is not always possible with other research methods (Yin, 1994). 
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Figure 1.1: Schedule of Interviews Conducted in Support of Research 
United Kingdom 
Companies! Authorities 
Regulatory Bodies 
OFFER: 
Binningham, October 1999 (UK001) 
Case Study Companies 
Eastern Group: 
London, October 1995 (UK002) 
, London, March 1998 
(UK003), and London, April 1998 (UK004) 
, Ipswich, 
June 1998, (UK005) 
,EPET, 
Ipswich, June 1998, (UK006) 
Seeboard: 
, Crawley, February 1997 (UK007), 
Crawley, March 1997 (UK008), and Crawley, 
June 1997 (UK009) 
Crawley, June 1997 (UK01O) 
, Crawley, June 1997 
(UKOll) 
, Crawley, August 
1997 (UK012) 
SWEB: 
Bristol, February 2000 (UKO 13) 
Exploratory (Non case study) Interviews 
Southern Electric: 
, Maidenhead, June 1998 (UKO 14) 
Midlands Electricity: 
, Birmingham, June 1997 
(UK015) 
Norweb: , London, June 
1997 (UK016) 
United States Companies!Authorities 
Regulatory Bodies 
FERC: ,Office of Economic Policy, 
Washington, April 1997 (US001) 
Case Study Companies 
CSW (owner of Seeboard): 
Dallas, October 1996 (US002) 
Southern Company (owner of SWEB): 
, North America Group, Atlanta, 
November 1999 (US003) 
Exploratory (Non case study) Interviews 
CINergy (then part owner of Midlands): 
, International Business Development, 
Indianapolis, October 1996 (US004) 
Duke Power: 
Charlotte, October 1996 (US005) 
Ohio Edison: 
, Akron, April 1997, (US006) 
Pacific Gas and Electric: 
, San Francisco, May 1997 (US007) 
, San Francisco, 
May 1997 (US008) 
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Despite this growing appreciation of the use of cases, authors have identified a variety 
of potential limitations to their use (Moser and Kalton, 1983; Yin, 1994). These are 
reviewed here and their impact upon the scope and representativeness of this project 
assessed. 
The first concern with the use of case studies is that of the potential for bias or inaccuracy 
in the responses of the interviewees. This is a valid concern, and while it is not possible 
to be totally assured of the validity of the responses received, it is hoped that certain 
factors can mitigate this anxiety. The research project is fundamentally seeking to identify 
organisational characteristics, many of which may be verifiable from existing published 
sources of company information. In seeking to interview senior managers, the research 
aims to understand more of the context in which these verifiable events occurred. 
Therefore, depth is provided to information which has already been gathered externally 
for the purposes of verification. This, it is here argued, reduces the chances of bias and 
inaccuracy, especially when further measures employed in this research are taken into 
consideration. The first of these concerns the timing of the research. Much of what was 
discussed in interviews was post hoc, and hence an historical analysis with little impact 
upon current commercial considerations. Consequently there would be little reason for 
the interviewee to deliberately mislead or misinterpret lO. Secondly, that strict guarantees 
of confidentiality were provided as a matter of course to all interviewees, in the hope that 
this would encourage a greater degree of openness and candour. Thirdly, when allowed 
access to an organisation, the researcher actively sought the views of a cross section of 
managers within that organisation, thus allowing the opportunity for verification to occur 
internally throughout the interview process. 
The second possible limitation, closely related to the first, is that of verification. If it is 
accepted that the findings of case based approaches may be questioned, then the 
significance of third-party verification is clearly crucial. Case based approaches are 
perceived to be difficult to validate by replication, although there is a growing view that 
there exist circumstances where this valid concern if of a lesser significance ll . The 
limitation presented by verification is of significance in this project. Given the guarantees 
of confidentiality provided to participants, it will not be possible to directly verify the data 
provided in camera, although all of the secondary sourced and data already within the 
10 
Although of course such retrospective analysis does allow the interviewee the opportunity to present 
subjective opinions. 
11 
As will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
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public domain used will be verifiable. As mentioned earlier, this limitation should not 
detract overly from the fundamental objectives of the research as the primary research data 
was sought in part to verify observable phenomena: that is to say, the primary data was 
intended in part to assist in the verification of the classifications of corporate strategies 
identified by the analysis of secondary sourced textual data. One of the areas of future 
research interest identified in the project suggests an application of the approach used here 
to other recently privati sed industries, which would provide a degree of verification. 
The third possible limitation is identified as a potential outcome of a case based approach, 
and concerns the tendency for such approaches to be over long, and lacking in focus due 
to a propensity to delve into unnecessary depth. Inevitably, this limitation is a question 
of degree. While depth was lauded as a valuable feature of a case approach earlier, it may 
also prove a handicap. The extent of that handicap, or strength, will be entirely dependent 
upon the particular case (Yin, 1994, p.IO). To reduce the potential damage offered by this 
limitation a research framework was employed during the primary data collection, to 
ensure that while additional data may have been collected, the reporting of the data would 
be wholly systematic. As such, the field study cases (Chapter's Nine to Eleven) all feature 
a framework which is principally aimed at resolving issues identified in the earlier part of 
the thesis. They do not engage in a general discussion. 
A final limitation offered by the chosen method of data collection relates to the question 
of access. This is a two fold concern. Firstly, securing access initially to: the appropriate 
companies in the requisite number; and the appropriate individuals within these companies. 
Secondly, securing access to the information held by the company or individual which may 
not necessarily be available for discussion or reporting. In respect of the first concern, the 
project needed to balance the competing demands of the level of appropriate detail with 
the constraints of time and likely access. While information derived from all of the 
companies was preferable, the likelihood of achieving access to all twelve companies was 
small. Additionally, the time required to conduct twelve in-depth cases may not have been 
available. Moreover even ifit had been possible, the demands of the process may arguably 
have actively diminished the quality of the outcomes. By trying to speak to too many 
people, the opportunity to develop in-depth understanding of a smaller number of cases 
may have been lost. Hence, the decision to pursue a maximum of three or four cases. 
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During the period prior to the beginning of the studyl2, and the start of the field stage of 
the research in 1997, the industry changed significantly, and a number of patterns of 
behaviour began to emerge. As a consequence of these developing patterns, the author 
developed a list of companies that would be approached in order of their potential 
significance to the success of the research. Principally, the author was seeking a 
representative sample from within the industry. To this end the following three groups 
of companies were identified and representatives of each targeted: firstly, those companies 
adopting aggressive market development and leading the industry (East Midlands, 
Norweb, Eastern., Yorkshire); secondly, those pursuing a more traditional REC approach 
and occupying the middle of the industry (Midlands, London, Seeboard, Southern, 
Northern); and finally, those smaller RECs perceived to be following the industry 
(SW ALEC, SWEB, Manweb). Ultimately, one REC from each group agreed to 
participate in in-depth case studies, and three others provided background information as 
part of the on-going exploratory interview process. 
Another concern was that within the case study companies access was sometimes more 
limited than the researcher would have preferred. This issue, while a limitation, has not 
in the author's opinion damaged the validity of the research. This limitation does mean 
that caution is required to be exercised with the findings and it will only be possible to 
infer patterns of behaviour in so far as the companies that did not participate are 
concerned. However, as the case studies were predominantly being used to validate 
observations made in the preliminary research; in other words to add extra depth to 
propositions developed using verifiable data, this concern is not as serious as if the case 
studies were the only analytical process the research presented. The second concern, that 
interviewees would be less than forthcoming with the required information, has been 
addressed earlier. 
1.6.2 Limitations of a Single Industry Study 
A second limitation is the question of whether a single industry study is of significance 
within the wider business community. Within the literature, there is considerable 
discussion of the virtues of a single industry study, as compared to studies which 
encompass a wider range of industry sectors (Miles and Snow, 1978; Ketchen et aI, 1993 
among others). The advantages of a single industry study include the degree to which 
understanding can be achieved, based upon a full awareness of the dominant factors at 
12 
The project commenced in October 1994, just as the second wave of competition and the first wave of 
mergers and acquisitions was sweeping the industry. See Chapter Four, Section 4.5 for a full chronology. 
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work within that industry. A single industry study is more homogeneous, and so provides 
a clear guarantee that like is being compared with like. In general, criticisms of a single 
industry study suggest that the findings can only be said to be relevant to that industry 
alone, without the due process of validation being conducted in future research. The 
question of the future direction of the research is addressed in Section 13.6. 
1.6.3 Studying the Electricity Industry 
A third limitation results from the industry chosen for study and the widespread changes 
in ownership that have occurred since the research began, which have actively conspired 
to change its original focus. However, there has been a positive outcome of this 
fluctuation, as it has opened up an arguably much wider field of study. Indeed, as a factor 
of the increasing globalization of the industry, this widespread change has arguably made 
the need for study even greater than originally anticipated. There has not been a 
consistent period of stability within the industry since the expiration of the Government's 
golden share in each company on 1 April 1995. As a result, each of the twelve original 
companies has been bought or merged at least once. This means developing an 
understanding of patterns of behaviour longitudinally over the period has not proved 
possible. However, as already noted, the change in the prevailing conditions in 1995 did 
produce a period of intense activity, and consequently a proliferation of change. This 
change has witnessed a wider range of variation on behaviour, and a wider selection of 
examples to identify and analyse. Despite, therefore, the constant change making the 
initial objectives of the research difficult to obtain, the change has presented an 
opportunity to broaden the scope of the research and to comment upon a wider context. 
The volatility therefore has widened the potential of this research to make a meaningful 
contribution. 
One major limitation has been the ability to assess success. Many of the new owners of 
the RECs have been from overseas. Consequently, the amount of financial data, and 
indeed financial analysis, that was available between 1990 and 1995 was not available in 
the latter part of this period. This makes any judgement of performance based on financial 
measures virtually impossible after 1995. Therefore, when the research identifies distinct 
strategies emerging from the industry, it is not possible to adjudge 'success' in a normal 
fashion, by comparing like with like across the industry, and by employing a variety of 
financial ratios. This explains the lack of any focus upon aspects such as these within the 
research. Work of this nature is being undertaken elsewhere (see Parker, 1995, Martin 
and Parker, 1997), and it is the author' intention to attempt to marry that work on 
organisational success with the outcomes of this research at a later date. 
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1.6.4 Use of Generic Strategies 
A final limitation relates to the use of generic business strategies. As part of Objective 
Three of this thesis, it is intended to assess the classifications evolving from the ESI on 
the basis of existing generic business strategy models. However, these existing models 
themselves have been subject to concern in relation to their application which actively limit 
the validity of the pursuit of Objective Three, and Supporting Objective One if that 
supporting objective is pursued. The literature in relation to the potential deficiencies of 
generic strategies are considered at length in Section 2.5. However, it is important here 
to highlight some of the deficiencies that may actively limit this research project, in respect 
of the general validity of generic business strategies. 
The principal concern is that such approaches contain inherent weakness. Weick argues 
that it is not possible for a model "to be simultaneously general, accurate, and simple" 
(Weick, 1979, p.35), and that its use will inevitably produce "trivial, inconclusive 
research" (Weick, 1979, p.36). Of course the converse of this argument is to attempt to 
study an infinite number of unique strategies (Chandler, 1962), so the author argues that 
some form of acceptable generalisation is a necessity, a view which enjoys widespread 
support within the literature. In order to overcome such criticism and achieve an 
acceptable generalisation, it is necessary at all times to acknowledge the limitations of 
generic approaches, and not to overstate their significance. Therefore throughout the 
thesis the contribution that generic approaches make, in providing alternative solutions to 
a variety of problems that face an organisation, is stressed. However, at the same time an 
acknowledgement is made of the necessity for companies to develop and implement 
unique solutions to their problems, rather than simply accepting any of the solutions 
provided by generic strategies. Therefore the potential difficulty is overcome by an 
acknowledgement that generic strategies should be viewed as guidelines which are 
instructive, rather than prescriptive. 
1.6.5 Focus upon Strategic Content 
The thesis adopts a focus upon the content of organisational strategy, and upon the drivers 
which influence the development of content. It does not focus upon the question of 
process. The author is mindful of Mintzberg's (1973a, 1990b) contention that the 
interrelationship of content and process is so significant that any consideration of either 
in the absence of the other provides only a limited perspective, and also notes Hinterhuber 
and Popp's (1992) view that a consideration of one without the other is impossible. In 
answer to this possible limitation, the author argues that the chosen method of data 
collection and analysis in the preliminary stage; content analysis of textual data, precludes 
an assessment of strategic process, although more emphasis upon process - for example 
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the behaviour and priorities of leaders - is presented within the field work sections of the 
work. The extension of the current work in future research would be expected to include 
a focus upon this key issue. 
1. 7 Structure of the Report 
This thesis is comprised of thirteen chapters, which can be identified as falling into four 
distinct segments. A breakdown of these segments, and their corresponding chapters is 
now presented, and readers are referred to the map of the process presented at Figure 1.2: 
Segment One: Establishing the Objectives and Methodology 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Chapter Two: Literature Survey 
Chapter Three: Methodology 
Chapter Four: Conceptual Background and Industry Context 
This chapter has introduced the study through a brief examination of the relevant 
literature, has set out the aims and objectives of the project, and provided a brief 
explanation of the research methodology. Chapter Two presents a systematic review of 
the management literature in relation to the concept of strategy, differing views of strategy 
and the firm, different drivers of strategy, and the nature of generic approaches to 
strategy. Chapter Three explores the methodology employed within this project, in 
respect to the chosen research process and the research design. Chapter Four presents a 
brief reprise of the history of privatisation in the UK, and a more detailed exploration of 
the aims, process and unique aspects of the privatisation of the ESI. 
Segment Two: Undertaking Analysis, Stage One 
Chapter Five: The Northern Industrial RECs 
Chapter Six: The Midland and Agricultural RECs 
Chapter Seven: The Southern Suburban RECs 
Chapter Eight: Mapping the Industry: Concluding the Preliminary Stage 
In Chapters Five, Six and Seven of this segment, textual data is analysed in pursuit of 
Objective'S One and Two of this thesis. The content of each company's strategy is 
explored, analysed, and conclusions are drawn. This investigation is presented in four 
sub-samples, representing the geographical breakdown of the RECs, and additionally 
exploring the impact of a company's location upon its strategy. The conclusions drawn 
are reviewed in Chapter Eight, in preparation for a more detailed analysis through 
extended case studies. 
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Segment Three: Undertaking Analysis, Stage Two 
Chapter Nine: Case Study of Eastern Group 
Chapter Ten: Case Study of Seeboard 
Chapter Eleven: Case Study of SWEB 
In each of the chapters of this segment, primary data derived from in-depth interviews is 
analysed in pursuit of the ten propositions developed in Chapter Eight. Data has been 
collected in a series of in-depth interviews in three of the RECs. 
Segment Four: Analysis and Conclusions 
Chapter Twelve: Discussions, Review and Impact upon Generic Strategies 
Chapter Thirteen: Summary and Conclusions 
In this segment, the preceding analysis is summarised, and a map of the industry drawn. 
This includes the development of a classification for each of the RECs. The findings of 
the research are compared against existing generic management approaches, and 
amendments suggested and justified. The project is summarised, contributions made are 
underlined and suggestions for future research outlined. 
Note: All references to the job title of managers interviewed for this research have been 
removed from this version of the thesis, which will be in the public domain. This has been 
done in order to fulfil obligations of confidentiality provided to each manager interviewed. 
Similarly, the interviews contained in Appendix Two have also been removed. 
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Figure 1.2: A Map of the Thesis 
Chapter Five: 
Preliminary # 1 
Chapter Nine 
Eastern 
Chapter Six: 
Preliminary #2 
Chapter Eight: 
Mapping 
Chapter Ten 
Seeboard 
Chapter Twelve 
Analysis 
Chapter Thirteen 
Conclusion 
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Chapter Seven: 
Preliminary #3 
Chapter Eleven 
SWEB 
Chapter Two Survey of Literature 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to explore the current management literature in relation to the question 
of the content of corporate and business strategy. Therefore, the chapter explores 
different concepts of strategy in relation to the firm, identifies and examines possible 
drivers of corporate and business strategy, and addresses other significant issues, like 
structure, which impinge upon the debate. Principally, however, this chapter considers 
systems of classification and the potential they offer to identify, group and measure the 
content of corporate and business strategy. This focus, and in particular the decision to 
explore these issues at some length, is justified on the basis of the key aims and objectives 
of the research. These aims, as made clear in the preceding chapter involved identifying 
and understanding the drivers of strategic content in the selected industry sample, and also 
examining the appropriateness of existing systems of classification to describe what is 
observed in the case study industry. 
Consequently, the following are sought from this review: 
~ an understanding of the concept of strategy; 
~ an appreciation of theories relating to the factors influencing strategy; 
~ an awareness of the means of classifying strategy and identifying strategic content; 
and 
an assessment of predictive management models and theories. 
The strategy literature is extensive, and in order to do justice to the key issues related to 
this research, the author has inevitably had to be selective in decisions regarding: (a) which 
areas of the literature to explore, and (b) the depth of that exploration. Further 
explanation of the decisions taken follow throughout this chapter. 
To achieve its objectives, the chapter it is structured in five sections. In Section 2.1 a 
debate concerning the nature of strategy is presented, which addresses the questions of 
what strategy is, why various notable writers have adopted distinctly different views as to 
the nature of strategy, and why the concept itselfis of importance. Section 2.2 begins the 
discussion of what influences firms strategy decisions by reference to competing concepts 
of how strategy should be made. This section therefore presents a discussion of the 
features and relative merits of two key models of strategy: the 'competitive forces' 
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approach championed by authors such as Porter (1980) and the resource based approach 
championed by authors such as Grant (1991). Section 2.2 also draws attention to the key 
drivers behind corporate and business strategy, and identifies and discusses these drivers 
relative to the competing views discussed earlier. Leadership is inevitably a key driver, 
recognised by any competing theory of strategy making, and this area of the literature is 
reviewed in Section 2.3, while Section 2.4 discusses the issue of the relationship between 
strategy and structure. 
Section 2.5 is the most important section of this chapter, reflected by the detail of the 
review and its length relative to other sections. This degree of attention is justified by the 
section's core importance to the research, which can be demonstrated by identifying five 
key tasks that this review of systems of classification performs. The section, therefore: 
(i) provides an understanding of the various systems of classification and their aims 
and objectives, explores the vocabulary of classification, and seeks an 
understanding of the methodological detail underpinning the use of such systems. 
It also clarifies the particular aims and objectives of the various differing systems 
discussed; 
(ii) explores the views of writers with respect to the benefits and difficulties that exist 
with the use of systems of classification; 
(iii) provides a distinction between the different levels of strategic decision making and 
the aims and objectives of models designed for these different levels within a firm; 
(iv) provides key analytical frameworks and concepts which will be employed 
throughout the research; and 
(v) finally provides evidence of gaps in the management literature with respect to 
systems of classification, which helps to justify a need for the research, and helps 
to qualify the contribution the research aims to make. 
Section 2.6 completes the chapter with concluding remarks. This is an important section, 
as it clarifies: the gaps identified by the author in the existing literature, and hence the need 
for the research; and the existing management concepts that will be used to shape the 
collection and analysis of data throughout the remainder of the research. It also identifies 
any amendments to existing concepts that the author believes appropriate and wishes to 
raise as part of the research's continuing objectives. 
As the above review of the structure shows, this chapter performs a number of roles of 
importance within the thesis. It establishes the area of management where the research 
is located, and also establishes the areas of the general management literature within which 
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the project will seek to make a contribution. In addition, the review provides concepts 
and frameworks of analysis which will be applied throughout the research. The chapter 
is, however, only one part of the review of relevant literature. A second literature review 
chapter, presenting the context within the research has been undertaken is presented in 
Chapter Four. This provides the reader with an analysis of the development of 
privatisation, and the origins of the companies which form the centre of this investigation. 
2.1 The Concept of Strategy 
This section aims to provide an understanding of the concept of strategy in a business 
setting to inform this research, and will be accomplished by means of an examination of 
the views of a selection of key management writers of the last four decades. The section 
aims to understand why these writers have adopted sometimes contrary views as to the 
scope of the concept of strategy. The section also considers the differing perspectives of 
writers with respect to the question of whether strategy is prescriptive or emergent, which 
follows on from this discussion. 
2.1.1 Strategy Defined 
There still exists within the management literature considerable confusion over what 
exactly is meant by the word' Strategy'. Commonly writers on business strategy note the 
derivation of the word, and its constant association with matters military, but then proceed 
to apply definitions which often confuse 'Strategy' with the concept of 'Tactics', or which 
seek to encapsulate both of these concepts in one term. In many texts, the word 
'Strategy' is used to communicate the notion of a process!, rather than that suggested by 
a literal definition which is much closer to a plan2. 
To clarifY this question and to provide a literal definition, the author turns to the Oxford 
English Dictionary (1933, p.1 087). In this edition, the noun 'strategy' is defined as "the 
art of a commander-in-chief; the art of projecting and directing the larger military 
movements and operations of a campaign - usually distinguished from tactics, which is the 
art of handling forces in battle, or in the immediate presence of the enemy". In the same 
volume, a key distinction is made between' strategy' and 'tactics', in that the former is 
divided from the latter by the act of contact, originally with an enemy but in a business 
'Process' defined as "a series of actions or events; a sequence of operations or changes undergone" 
(Chambers English Dictionary, 1997, p.857) 
2 
'Plan' defined as "a scheme for accomplishing a purpose; an intended method" (Chambers English 
Dictionary, 1997 p.819) 
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sense by the engagement and operationalisation of the strategy. 
How then does this literal definition compare to the many provided by writers talking 
about 'strategy' in the management, rather than military, arena? Table 2.1 exhibits the 
definitions presented by a variety of highly regarded management writers over the past 
four decades. 
Table 2.1: Definitions of Strategy 
Peter Drucker "A business must be managed by setting objectives for it. These objectives must 
(1954, p.58) be set according to what is right and desirable for the enterprise. They must not 
be based on the expedient or on adaptation to the economic tides ..... (and while 
detours are often necessary) setting objectives enables a business to get where 
it should be going ratller tllan be the plaything of weather, winds and accidents" 
Alfred Chandler "The detennination oftlle long-run goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the 
(1962, p.l3) adoption of courses of action and tIle allocation of resources necessary for 
carrying out tllese goals" 
Igor Ansoff "Objectives represent tlle ends which tIle finn is seeking to attain, while strategy 
(1965, p.l04) is tIle means to these ends. Strategy is an elusive and sometimes abstract 
concept" 
Kenneth Andrews "Strategy is the pattern of objectives, purposes, or goals and the major policies 
(1971, p.28) and plans for achieving these goals, stated in such a way as to define what 
business the company is in or is to be in and the kind of company it is or is not 
to be" 
Jay Galbraith and "Strategy is a specific action, usually but not always accompanied by the 
Daniel NatIlanson development of resources, to achieve an objective decided upon in strategic 
(1978, p.3) planning" 
Charles Hofer and "The fundamental pattern of present and planned resource deployments and 
Dan Schendal environmental interaction that indicates how an organisation will achieve its 
(1978, p.25) objectives" 
Raymond Miles "Strategy is more a pattern or stream of major and minor decisions about an 
and Charles organisation's possible future domains. Furtller, tIlese decisions take on meaning 
Snow only as they are implemented tllrough tlle organization's structure and processes. 
(1978, p.7) In other words, an organization's strategy can best be inferred from its 
behaviour, though one can conceptually associate strategy with intent and 
structure with action" 
James Brian "A Strategy is the pattern or plan that integrates an organisation's major goals, 
Quinn (1980, p.7) policies and action sequences into a cohesive whole. A well-fonnulated strategy 
helps marshal and allocate an organisation's resources into a unique and viable 
posture based upon its relative internal competencies and shortcomings, 
anticipating changes in the environment, and contingent moves by intelligent 
opponents" 
Michael Porter "Developing a competitive strategy is developing a broad formula for how 
(1980, p.xvi) business is going to compete, what its goals should be, and what policies will be 
needed to carry out those goals" 
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William Glueck "Strategy is a unified, comprehensive, and integrated plan relating the 
(1980, p.9) strategic advantages of the finn to the challenges of the environment. It is 
designed to ensure that the basic objectives of the enterprise are achieved" 
Kenichi Ohmae "What business strategy is all about is, in a word, competitive advantage .... the 
(1983, p.36) sole purpose of strategic planning is to enable a company to gain, as effectively 
as possible, a sustainable edge over its competitors. Corporate strategy thus 
implies an attempt to alter a company's strength relative to that of its competitors 
in the most efficient way" 
Lawrence "Strategy fonnulation is a decision process focussing on the development of long-
Hrebiniak and term objectives and the alignment of organisational capabilities and 
William Joyce environmental contingencies so as to obtain them" 
(1984, p.29) 
Henry Mintzberg "Strategy is a pattern - specifically, a pattern in a stream of actions" 
and James Waters 
(1985, p.257) 
Gary Hamel "Strategy as stretch is strategy by incrementalism to the extent that top 
and C.K. management cannot predetennine every single step of the journey to the future. 
Prahalad Strategy as stretch recognises the essential paradox that while leadership cannot 
(1994, p.160) be entirely planned for, neither does it happen in the absence of a clearly 
articulated and widely shared aspiration" 
Robert Grant "Strategy is not a detailed plan or program of instructions: it is a unifying 
(1998, p.3) theme that gives coherence and direction to the actions and decisions of an 
individual or organization" 
To distinguish between the various definitions of strategy, of which only a few are 
presented here, Mintzberg identified five main classifications, his Five Ps for Strategy 
(Mintzberg, 1987b). In order to illustrate the differences in views relating to strategy, this 
framework is employed here. The Five Ps are as follows: strategy as plan, ploy, pattern, 
position, and perspective. 
2.1.1.1 Strategy as Plan 
Mintzberg argues that for most people a strategy is a plan: a "consciously intended course 
of action, a guideline (or set of guidelines) to deal with a situation" (Mintzberg, 1987b, 
p.ll). To associate strategy with planning is to revert very clearly to the original, military 
campaign definition associated with order and precision. Writers describing 'objectives' 
(Drucker, 1954, Chandler, 1962), or 'a means to an end' (Ansoff, 1965) suggesting a 
broad, long term and goal focussed approach would tend towards adopting a 'strategy 
as plan' approach. While adopting a plan is not synonymous with total rigidity, and 
indeed Drucker acknowledges that to reach objectives "detours may have to be made 
around obstacles" (Drucker, 1954, p.58), the importance of a plan in defining and 
identifying a final location is stressed. Planning approaches often consider the question 
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of resource allocation as part of the strategy process3, hence Glueck's "unified, 
comprehensive and integrated plan" (Glueck, 1980, p.9), or Hrebiniak and Joyce's 
"alignment of organisational capabilities and environmental contingencies" (Hrebiniak and 
Joyce, 1984, p.29) to obtain the strategic objective. To Mintzberg himself, the concept 
of strategy as plan is a dangerous one. Planning, he argues, is the outcome of an 
obsession with controlling risk and does not take into account the problems of using such 
an approach to manage risk in times that are increasingly turbulent (Mintzberg, 1993, 
p.33). His own preferred approach will be considered below. 
2.1.1. 2 Strategy as Ploy 
Mintzberg notes that plans may be either general or specific, and further notes that an 
alternative sort of plan can be the ploy. A ploy is intended to mislead a competitor as to 
the real intentions of your strategy, by suggesting actions that you have no intention of 
following. The use of the strategy as ploy approach is clearly associated with writers 
seeking to emphasise the need for aggressive strategy making, and Mintzberg quotes 
Porter (1980) and Schelling (1980) as advocates of this philosophy. The definition 
provided by Galbraith and Nathanson (1978, p.3) also fits this perspective, as their 
argument that strategy should be seen as a specific action, following "an objective decided 
upon in strategic planning" suggests a ploy, or 'manoeuver' designed to advance the 
company's intended objectives. 
2.1.1. 3 Strategy as Pattern 
In discussing the concept of strategy as pattern, Mintzberg addresses the issue of relating 
process to strategy, and emphasising consistency. This is the definition of strategy that 
Mintzberg himself most favours and underpins the debate he himself has lead about the 
differences between intended and realised strategy, as discussed in Section 2.1.2. 
Mintzberg believes that for a strategy to be 'truly deliberate', that is to be realised in every 
detail, is "a tall order" (Mintzberg, 1996a, p.12). However, he further argues that for a 
strategy to be truly emergent, by which he means that the strategy would have developed 
with no stated intention and yet was still successful, was also unlikely. Mintzberg 
therefore takes the view that most strategies are neither truly prescriptive nor truly 
emergent, and that therefore strategies tend to fall somewhere in between, hence the view 
that strategy is a pattern. In this analysis Mintzberg is supported by Miles and Snow 
3 
Throughout this thesis, the following definition of 'strategy process' has been adopted: the strategy 
process involves all of the activities leading up to and supporting a choice of strategy (Huff and Reger, 
1987; Ketchen et ai, 1996). This process would include the process of crafting strategy (Mintzberg, 
1987a), which involves environmental scanning, interpretation, and decision making. 
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(1978), Quinn (1980), and arguably Hamel and Prahalad (1994) whose 'strategy as 
stretch' concept is arguably guided incrementalism. 
2.1.1. 4 Strategy as Position 
The concept underlying strategy as position holds that strategy should be seen as the 
means by which an organisation locates itself within its operating environment 
(Mintzberg, 1987b, p.15). Mintzberg points towards Hofer and Schendal' s (1978) view 
of an organisation's correct interaction with its environment. This view of strategy is 
compatible with either the strategy as plan or strategy as position concepts previously 
described. It also is consistent for use in a highly competitive environment where more 
than one competitor may be evident. 
2.1.1. 5 Strategy as Perspective 
Authors arguing for a strategy as perspective approach are taking a more philosophical 
view of the concept, wherein strategy is not narrowly defined like a plan, but more like 
a vision, as described by Grant: "it is a unifying theme that gives coherence and direction 
to the actions and decisions of an individual or organization" (Grant, 1998, p.3). Strategy 
would therefore provide an organisation with its character (Selznick, 1957, p.47), its 
culture, or world view. Mintzberg argues that this definition is therefore a concept, as 
opposed to the more mechanistic definitions that have been discussed to date. He argues 
that the key issue of the strategy as perspective concept is that it is a shared view, 
providing the 'unifying theme' mentioned by Grant. 
It is clear from these definitions, and from Mintzberg's analysis that many influential 
writers have remained mindful of the original meaning of the term, and adapted their 
definitions accordingly. However, others have sought to produce definitions with more 
meaning, by widening the concept and incorporating such additional factors as tactics, or 
culture. There seems to be a clear distinction between the views of writers who see 
strategy as an explicit activity: 'we make strategy, we plan, we allocate resources', and 
those who see strategy as more implicit: 'strategy informs, strategy moulds and shapes 
perspective'. Mintzberg expands upon this variation by suggesting a variety of different 
kinds of strategy, which fall within the boundaries of being neither prescriptive nor 
emergent, and these are presented at Table 2.2. 
The table further reinforces the argument that a wide variation of possible definitions of 
strategy are in common usage within the management literature. The classifications 
provided by Mintzberg demonstrate some of the potential variations that can be witnessed 
in relation to how business actually make strategy, rather than the theory of strategy itself. 
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Table 2.2: Mintzberg's Various Kinds of Strategies, from Rather Deliberate to Mostly Emergent 
Planned Strategy 
Entrepreneurial 
Strategy 
Ideological 
Strategy 
Umbrella 
Strategy 
Process Strategy 
Disconnected 
Strategy 
Consensus 
Strategy 
Precise intentions are formulated and articulated by a central leadership, and 
backed up by fonnal controls to ensure their surprise-free implementation in an 
environment that is benign, controllable, or predictable; these strategies are 
highly deliberate 
Intentions exist as the personal, unarticulated vision of a single leader, and so 
are adaptable to new opportunities; the organisation is under the personal control 
of the leader and located in a protected niche in its environment; these strategies 
are relatively deliberate but can emerge 
Intentions exist as the collective vision of all members of the organisation, 
controlled through strong shared norms; the organisation is often proactive vis-
a-vis its environment; these strategies are rather deliberate 
A leadership in partial control of organizational actions defines strategic targets 
or boundaries within which others must act; as a result, strategies are partly 
deliberate and partly emergent; this strategy can also be called deliberately 
emergent, in that the leadership purposefully allows others the flexibility to 
manoeuver and form patterns within these boundaries 
The leadership controls the process aspects of strategy, leaving the actual content 
of strategy to others; strategies are again partly deliberate and partly emergent, 
and deliberately emergent 
Members or subunits loosely coupled to the rest of the organisation produce 
patterns in the streams of their own actions in the absence of, or in direct 
contradiction to the central or common intentions of the organisation at large; 
the strategies can be deliberate for those who make them 
Through mutual adjustment, various members converge on patterns that pervade 
the organisation in the absence of central or common intentions; these strategies 
are emergent in nature 
Imposed Strategy The external environment dictates patterns in actions, either through direct 
imposition or through implicitly preempting or bounding organisational choice; 
these strategies are organizationally emergent, although they may be internalized 
and made deliberate 
Source: Mintzberg and Waters, 1985, p. 270 
The effect is to demonstrate how strategy in a workplace environment can evolve as it is 
subject to the unique variations of organisational life. This point ably emphasises that 
strategy within an organisation is not an 'exact science', but situational and in constant 
flux. 
2.1.2 Importance of Strategy 
The attention paid to the concept of strategy would suggest very strongly that it is of key 
importance to the operation of a business. In essence, the fundamental purpose of this 
thesis is to explore the question of the importance of strategy, but it is perhaps necessary 
to briefly establish why writers on strategy have paid so much attention to a concept that 
they can not agree upon a single definition for, but mostly agree as to its importance. 
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It is important to start this brief review by saying that the importance of strategy is not 
universally recognised by all strategy writers. Some, like for example Hamel, who in 
1996 argued that strategy is revolution (Hamel, 1996, p.70), or other writers like Peters 
who suggest that organisations should thrive on chaos (peters, 1988), propose an anti-
strategy viewpoint which appears to be the antithesis of many of the views on strategy 
that have been reviewed to date. To such writers, the' strategy as plan' viewpoint is 
prosaic, inflexible and unsuitable to the modem economy which is flexible, and uncertain. 
Strategic planning isn't strategic (Hamel, 1996, p.70), in the sense of the definition of 
strategy as 'projecting and directing .. .in the immediate presence of the enemy' provided 
above. Strategic planning presumes that the enemy will be predictable and immobile. 
Strategy should be concerned with strategizing, which is essentially a quest (Hamel, 1996, 
p. 71) for a successful vision, or formula, and it must not be restrained or limited if the 
quest is to succeed. This view is largely at odds with more traditional views of strategy 
making, as defined here by Andrews (1971), who argues that the characteristic of a 
strategic decision is that it will be "effective over long periods of time, affect the company 
in many ways, and focus and commit a significant portion of its resources to the expected 
outcome" (Andrews, 1971). Whether this role is performed through a plan (Glueck, 
1980), or a pattern (Andrews, 1971), this is clearly at odds with the more nebulous 
concept presented by Hamel. 
In asking why strategy is important, the work of Mintzberg is again reviewed and in 
particular attention is focussed upon a companion piece to his' 5 P's for strategy' article 
(Mintzberg, 1987b). This article reviewed the question of why organizations needed 
strategy (Mintzberg, 1987c), and explored both sides of the question. Mintzberg 
identifies four principal reasons why an organisation is said to require a strategy: 
~ to set its direction; 
~ to focus its effort; 
~ to define itself; and 
~ to provide consistency. 
In essence, Mintzberg draws attention to the shifting fashions of management thought, 
which wil1 be discussed below. He notes that of the above reasons justifying the need for 
a strategy, the first three can act as a restraint upon an organisation, rather than enabling 
it. Directions can be too precise, which detract from the overal1 aims of an organisation 
if conditions change (Mintzberg, 1987c, p.26). Focussed effort may be too constricting 
and harmful ifthere is a need for change (Mintzberg, 1987c, p.27). Defining the business, 
while it can provide clear benefits, can also offer clear dis-benefits if an error has been 
made in choosing an identity for the organisation (Mintzberg, 1987c, p.28). Mintzberg 
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himself believes that the key to strategy is through its ability to offer consistency, and to 
reduce uncertainty (Mintzberg, 1987c, p.28), and the nature of either of these concepts 
will almost inevitably be situational. 
Mintzberg critiques the views of authors such as Hamel, Peters, and indeed Miller and 
Friesen (1982), and argues that strategy is not about change and flexibility, which he 
argues is strategy making, and more about providing stability and consistency. This 
concept fits with any of the concepts of strategy discussed above and fulfils the human 
need for some degree of certainty, whether that certainty is a product of planning, or of 
a shared vision which establishes the boundaries of acceptable, and accepted behaviour. 
He also notes another important aspect of strategy: that it enables an organisation to 
exploit fully its existing resources to maximise the rewards for its endeavours (Mintzberg, 
1987c, p.30). 
Therefore, strategy is viewed as important because it acts as an enabler for an 
organisation. The form that strategy takes will probably be situational: there is no one 
recipe that works for all possible situations. Some situations may require a highly 
prescriptive planning led process, others a more emergent vision led process. Strategy's 
importance is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in its absence. Writers have often 
identified types of organisation where a strategy is missing, such as Miles and Snow's 
(1978) Reactor, or where a strategy is muddled or ill-thought, such as Porter's (1980) 
'stuck-in-the-middle' organisation, and characterised them as representing failure. 
Throughout the remainder of the thesis, concepts of strategy are discussed with reference 
in particular to how organisation's establish the content of strategy, at various different 
levels of the firm. Implicitly, therefore, the author subscribes to concepts that argue that: 
strategy is necessary; strategy involves making decisions; organisations may take different 
decisions in relation to strategy; and the reasons why organisations take a particular set 
of strategic decisions and what set of options constitute those decisions can tell us a great 
deal about those organisations. 
2.1.2.1 Levels of Strategy Making 
One extra confusion that may arise from this discussion is that strategy making can occur 
at different levels of an organisation. There is an inevitable assumption that strategy 
making of the kind discussed above occurs exclusively at a corporate level, especially if 
one assumes that strategy emerges from a planned strategy model, as described in Table 
2.2. However, the author believes that such a view would be erroneous. Strategy can 
also be made at a business level (Buzzell and Gale, 1987, Hofer and Schendal, 1978, 
among many), and at an operational level (Abell, 1980, Hamermesh, 1986, among many). 
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Buzzell and Gale, in seminal work, identify the existence of what they term strategic 
business units (SBU's), which are either single-product firms or separate divisions within 
larger parent companies. They contend that each SBU will have a distinct, separate 
strategy which would be related to a group strategy, or rather not independent of a group 
strategy, which would create a distinct, but partial strategy within what they term as "a 
boarder framework" (Buzzell and Gale, 1987). Feurer et al (1995) also use the label 
'business units' to describe a second layer of decision making under the corporate level. 
This suggests a preference for the concept of an umbrella strategy, with which the author 
concurs, where targets and vision are defined at the head of an organisation and detail is 
added by decision-making managers lower down the hierarchy. The question of whether 
companies have 'a strategy' or 'a network of partial strategies' is a key consideration in 
this research, and will be returned to below. 
For the purposes of clarity, it is necessary to identify the definitions the author proposes 
to utilise with respect to the levels at which strategy making can occur within an 
organisation. This clarification is necessary as there is a degree of confusion within the 
literature as to the precise definition of terms, particularly those of corporate, business and 
competitive strategy. Corporate strategy has been characterised as being concerned with 
the types of business that the company should be engaged in, and is therefore principally 
concerned with decisions relating to its scope (Johnson and Scholes, 1999). This process 
has been defined as domain selection (Bourgeois, 1996). Grant expressed the view that 
corporate strategy decisions included decisions in respect of the following high level 
issues: "investments in diversification, vertical integration, acquisitions, and new ventures, 
the allocation of resources between the different businesses of the firm, and divestments" 
(Grant, 1998, p.19). Other authors have described strategies of this kind as 'grand 
strategies' (Pearce and Robinson, 1994, p.220), which are defined and addressed in 
Section 2.5.4. 
Business and/or competitive strategies are characteristically concerned with how the 
company intends to compete within the markets chosen at a corporate level. Once again, 
to quote Bourgeois (1996) competitive or business strategy is 'domain navigation'. At the 
operational level, strategies are concerned with how to operationalise partial strategies 
developed at the business level, themselves an attempt to operationalise partial strategies 
developed at the corporate level. 
The confusion tends to emanate from authors describing domain selection as either 
'corporate' or 'business' strategy making (such as Buzzell and Gale, 1989, or Abell, 
1980), while other authors refer to either 'business' (Ohmae, 1983) or 'competitive' 
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(Porter, 1980, Bowman and Asch, 1996) strategy making with reference to domain 
navigation. For clarification, therefore, this research uses the term 'corporate strategy' 
to describe domain selection activities, 'business strategy' to describe domain navigation 
activities, and 'operational strategy' to describe activities undertaken to operationalise 
strategy. Support for this rationalisation comes from the literature (Dess et aI, 1995, 
Pearce and Robinson, 1994, Abell, 1980, Bower, 1986), and reflects the fact that 
companies are increasingly being called upon to develop different strategies at different 
levels, and in different locations (Bitt et aI, 1997). 
2.1.2.2 Strategy: Prescriptive or Emergent 
As was noted in Section 2.1.1, many writers on strategy have suggested that the strategy 
process itself provides a map which closely and clearly guides the future actions of the 
company: Chandler's association of 'long-run goals' and 'adoption of courses of action 
and resource allocation' (1962); Andrews' "Pattern of objectives, purposes, or goals and 
the major policies and plans for achieving these goals" (1971); Drucker's "purposeful 
action" (1974), and Ansoff's strategy as a 'means' to achieve a company's ends (1985). 
This view can be summarised as the prescriptive approach to strategy formulation. An 
alternate title may be the 'design' approach, featuring "a logical process in which strategy 
is formulated through rational analysis of the firm, its performance and the external 
environment" (Grant, 1998, p.21). 
The prescriptive or design approach is very much associated with the concept of strategy 
as plan, as discussed earlier in Section 2.1.1.1. It is a "consciously intended course of 
action" (Mintzberg, 1987b, p.11). By adopting this definition, a prescriptive approach 
discounts the concept of strategy as ploy, because there is an implied specific objective 
behind the operation. Prescriptive strategy formulation tends to follow a very traditional 
six stage process, here defined by Lynch (2000): 
~ define the organisation's objective; 
~ analyse the environment; 
~ reappraise objective in light of environmental analysis; 
~ develop options; 
~ select the most favourable option; and 
~ implement (Lynch, 2000, p.S3). 
Prescriptive approaches suggest activities aimed at minimising risk, by virtue of imposing 
as much order and certainty upon the strategy process as possible. Essentially, adhering 
to a prescriptive approach benefits the firm by providing: a complete overview of the 
organisation; the opportunity to compare strategic options with the organisation's 
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objectives; a further opportunity to assess the resource demands associated with any 
strategic option and an assessment of the contingencies available should events not follow 
a plan; and the ability to build a monitoring facility to observe the milestones within the 
plan as they are passed (Lynch, 2000, p.54). 
Against this supportive view of a prescriptive approach come a number of criticisms and 
warnings from Mintzberg (1990) of its inherent dangers. He identified six basic 
assumptions underpinning the prescriptive view, which he argued could not be validated 
in an increasingly turbulent environment. These assumptions, and their attendant 
criticisms, were that: 
~ the company's future was sufficiently predictable that the analysis and choice of 
options could be entertained Mintzberg argued that the whole planning process 
would therefore be rendered invalid if anyone major competitor or element in the 
environment changed; 
that a company is better advised to always take the long view than the short view. 
He argued that even if it were possible to identify the long term aims of an 
organisation, which he doubted, it may not always be possible to create the sort 
of political or economic environment that is prepared to make the necessary 
sacrifices to achieve these goals; 
that once formulated strategies would inevitably be followed as planned. He 
argued that the inevitability of such an assumption holding took no account of the 
political environment within most companies. 
that the CEO will establish goals, understand how best these goals are to be 
achieved, and carry the company with him in pursuit of these goals. Again, 
Mintzberg argues that such a view is optimistic and takes no account of actual 
reality; 
that strategies articulated as a result of this process will not require amendment 
or alteration regardless of the change evident in the environment. Mintzberg 
acknowledged that this was at least a possibility, although unlikely in the majority 
of cases; and 
that implementation is divorced from the strategy process, and will occur in a 
distinct phase following the conclusion of strategic analysis and choice. He 
argued that this was unconvincing and simplistic given the complexity and 
interrelatedness of modern business organisations and environments. 
Overall therefore this represents a highly critical analysis of the traditional approach 
adopted towards strategy formulation by most organisations. Indeed, it is hard to argue 
with any of Mintzberg's criticisms, and a conclusion must be drawn that a fixed and 
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unresponsive strategy process would contribute to more business failures than successes. 
However, it is also hard to conceive of many organisations who stick slavishly to a 
patently failing strategy if the evidence of failure is consistent and strong. There must be 
another reality, but is that provided by Mintzberg's alternative? 
2.1.2.2.1 Emergent Strategy 
Mintzberg's contrasting view predictably questions whether such an idealised and 
fonnalised process is viable in reality, and argues that the reality of strategy fonnulation, 
that it is less fonnal and less structured, be acknowledged. The view is therefore not of 
strategy as plan, but strategy as pattern. The result is a re-designation of the strategy 
process along the following lines. The strategy that is developed by senior managers is 
identified as 'Intended Strategy'. However, given the nature of decision making in large 
organisations, this intended strategy wil\ by necessity be the outcome of a wide-ranging 
process of negotiation, internal politics, and compromise, reflecting divergent opinions 
and interests. His analysis suggests that what is actually achieved, 'Realised Strategy', 
tends to be a much smaller proportion of this intended strategy, due to the nature of the 
organisation's implementation process, which perforce requires managers to adapt to 
changing external circumstances, and indeed allows for operational managers interpreting 
intended strategy differently from their senior management colleagues. Intended strategy 
becomes realised strategy, therefore, because of emergent strategy. 
This approach has been deemed as a 'process' approach, as distinct from the 'design' 
approach detailed above. However, it would seem to differ from that approach principal\y 
in tenns ofterminology, and the extent to which proponents of a design approach would 
argue and expect such an approach to be pursued to its fullest effect. The process 
approach does not distinguish between corporate and business strategy. All it would 
appear to do is acknowledge that there may be only limited similarity between corporate 
strategy and operational reality, due to external and internal moderating and mediating 
factors. 
The key issue is that the process school identifies the nonnative design school as being 
an unrealistic method for use in strategy formulation. Mintzberg argues that separating 
formulation and implementation, and hence all of the factors which will affect the final 
appearance of 'realised strategy', is unrealistic, and denies the organisation which 
practices it considerable opportunity, while at the same time encouraging existing threats. 
He argues for a more intuitive approach to strategy formulation. 
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The reality of this debate is that in most organisations, strategy is made by design based 
upon the sort of systematic analysis described in Section 2.1.1.2. However, increasingly 
a greater awareness of the need for intuitive learning and understanding of strategy and 
its relationship to the firm plays a part in formulating corporate strategy, but this is 
essentially only one element of good strategy formulation. It could not, in most cases, 
take the place of systematic analysis and appraisal. 
2.1.2.3 Alternatives 
Cho (1998), in an analysis of strategic behaviour in Korea, argued that while companies 
that adapt to the environment are the norm, the true location of business strength in 
today's markets rests with companies that create an environment which is wholly 
advantageous to them. This overcomes the danger to the firm which, in the course of 
adapting to a changing environment, experiences unfavourably changed circumstances, 
finds that it can not adapt and therefore begins to lose ground. Cho proposes a new 
concept, called an Environment-Creating Mechanism (ECM) to ride the waves of change. 
The ECM features "the vision of the top management, the firm's ability to recompose and 
create both internal resources and external environment" (Cho, 1998, p.84). The 
approach depends upon the ability of the company's dominant coalition4 to envision the 
future, particularly the demands of the customers of the future, and act accordingly. 
Consequently the approach is based upon establishing objectives, like the prescribed 
approach, but not based upon an assessment of the past and current market situation as 
in a prescribed process. Cho's work included an analysis of very large organisations such 
as Daewoo, as well as smalIer and more entrepreneurial Korean companies. The 
approach would appear to place itself very firmly in the strategic innovation phase of the 
evolution of strategic management as shown in Table 2.3. The ability of all managers to 
dream sufficiently creatively must be in doubt, but it is at least possible to argue that this 
approach may be the only way organisation's can hope to win in new virtual market-
places. 
A more conventional alternative is that provided by Burnes (1997), who believes that 
managers can and do exercise a considerable degree of choice over the direction of their 
organisations. He outlines a model; Burnes' Choice Management--Change Management 
model (Burnes, 1996), which explains how decision making can be utilised to control the 
circumstances in which an organisation operates, and so take control of its destiny. 
4 
The concept of the dominant coalition will be defined in Section 2.3. 
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2.1.3 A Chronology of Strategic Thought 
The management literature has been subject to a series of major shifts in emphasis over 
the preceding fifty years, as writers have attempted to understand and address changes 
within the increasingly complex global market place. Arguably, the management literature 
has evolved alongside the industries and markets it has sought to analyse and understand. 
The development of management thought over this period also indicates the dynamics of 
an evolutionary process wherein differing perspectives have developed in competition 
with each other. A reoccurring feature of the process has been that concepts have been 
postulated, tested for validation or falsification, adopted, then 'replaced' as new schools 
of thought have developed to suggest a 'better' solution to than those which were 
formerly dominant. Consequently, the history of management thought has been 
epitomised by the development of new ideas, which have subsequently been superceded. 
The process is, as with any intellectual activity, competitive and the currency of many 
seemingly discarded concepts retain advocates within the literature, as forthcoming 
sections will attest. Grant's analysis of the evolution of the milestones in strategic 
management thought are shown in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 is of interest, as it reflects the changing themes in the literature over the last five 
decades. It also reflects to a certain extent, the relationship between the management 
literature, and the real life business world it seeks to explain. The early themes reflect the 
reality of corporate life, and concepts like corporate planning and corporate strategy 
through portfolio management. It is clear that the'strategy as plan' concept was very 
much in vogue during the early years of this period, and that during the 1950's and 1960's, 
there was very little variation away from the planning model, reflecting an environment 
that was arguably much more stable than that which is currently witnessed. 
From the late 1970's onwards, reflecting the increased complexity of the markets the 
literature seeks to describe, it is possible to identify a shift in this relationship. Arguably, 
management writers started to become more ambitious in their outlook, and instead of 
inductively developing theories following observation, began to deductively test theories. 
Consequently, concepts like the analysis of industry structure, business process re-
engineering, and various concepts of strategic innovation have emerged from the 
literature, to be 'imposed' upon industry rather than the other way around. 
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Table 2.3: The Evolution of Strategic Management 
Period Dominant Theme Main Issues Principal Concepts Organisational 
and Techniques Implications 
1950s Budgetary planning Financial control Financial budgeting, Financial 
and control through operating investment planning, management the 
budgets project appraisal key 
1960s Corporate Planning Plruming growth Forecasting, Rise of corporate 
investment, plruming planning 
models departments and 
five-year fonnal 
plans 
1970s Corporate Strategy Portfolio plruming Synergy, SBUs, Diversification, 
portfolio plruming, multi divisional 
matrices, experience 
structures, quest 
curves, return to 
market share for global market 
share 
Late 1970s Analysis of Industry Choice of industries, Analysis of industry Greater industry 
to Early and Competition markets, segments, structure, competitor ruld market 
1980s and positioning analysis, PTh1S selectivity, 
within them analysis industry 
restructuring, 
acti ve asset 
mrulagement 
Late 1980s The Quest for Sources of Resource analysis, Corporate 
to Early Competitive competitive analysis of core restructuring ruld 
1990s Advantage advrultage within the competences business process 
finn reengineering, 
refocusing ruld 
outsourcing 
Mid to Strategic Innovation Strategic and Dynrunic sources of The virtual 
Late organisational competitive orgrulisation, the 
advrultage advrultage, control of knowledge based 
1990s struldards, knowledge finn, alliances and 
ruld leaming networks, the quest 
for critical mass 
Source: Grant, 1998, p.18 
Table 2.3 therefore reflects changing fashions in both industry thinking, and the academic 
literature. It demonstrates that complexity is a key issue, and that writers are attempting 
to devise ways in which this complexity can be tackled. The final section of the table 
identifies the development of such new approaches, seeking to accommodate the new 
competitive landscape developed by the on-going e-technical revolution. While an 
exploration of this aspect of the development of strategy, which seeks new sources of 
competitive advantage, is beyond the remit of this thesis, readers are referred to work by 
Ritt et al (1998) and a forthcoming work by Mische (2001), who discusses the "high-
performance demands" of a new economy which is "competing at the speed of life" 
(Mische, 2001, p.1). 
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One interesting aspect of the debate, and its impact upon trends in management research, 
is noted by Hoskisson et al (1999). Refening implicitly to the analysis presented in Table 
2.3, they argue that the increased complexity of the industrial environment has lead to a 
return to favour of qualitative means of organisational analysis. They identify the genesis 
of organisational research as being qualitative, and case based through the work of 
pioneers such as Penrose, Selznick, and Chandler. They note that with the development 
of industrial economic approaches to the structural analysis of industry, the favoured 
approaches became more quantitative, but that the complexity of more business 
interactions requires a more qualitative approach. This debate is explored at length in 
Section 3.1 of Chapter Three. 
2.2 Differing Concepts of Strategy in Relation to the Firm 
Table 2.3 shows the emergence of the concept of competitive advantage during the 1980's 
as a key factor which changed the direction of strategic analysis within the literature. 
Before moving on to explore how the concept affected the development of differing 
schools of thought with respect to the behaviour of the firm it is perhaps necessary to 
briefly define the tenn. Authors such as Ohmae (1983) have been particularly associated 
with the concept, which has become a common currency within the literature, although 
the development of the concept may be traced back to the work of Selznick (1957). The 
concept involves gaining a sustainable advantage over competitors, in a fashion which 
produces the most added value for the organisation. This advantage may be found within 
a number of locations inside the firm, but its crucial element is that in some way it adds 
value to the finn in comparison with competitors within the same market. 
Very often writers argue that competitive advantage lies within a firms' competencies 
(Bogner et aI, 1999, p.275). There is a tendency within the literature for the terms 
'capability' and 'competence' to be used interchangeably. Some writers have argued that 
this further confuses the debate but others suggest that the difference is "purely semantic" 
(Hamel and Prahalad, 1992, p.164). Within this thesis, the author seeks to avoid using 
the terms interchangeably, but instead recognises that the use of either term conveys an 
estimation of the degree to which a capability has been used effectively. To explain this 
distinction, it is necessary to note that organisations have a range of capabilities. When 
these capabilities are unique, or add value to a considerable extent they can be seen as 
competencies. 
Writers have sought to further imply a hierarchy of competencies, and therefore that some 
competencies are more important than others. Selznick is credited with coining the term 
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'distinctive competence' to suggest the actions a firm performs particularly well in relation 
to its competitors (Selznick, 1957). The term has also notably been used by Snow and 
Rrebiniak (1980). This concept, that there are particular attributes which may be 
products, systems, processes or people, that a company possesses and which can bring 
it competitive advantage, was extended by the work of Ramel and Prahalad who coined 
the phrase 'core competence' to distinguish those capabilities held by the firm which are 
fundamental to the firm's performance (prahalad and Hamel, 1990). The distinction of 
being a 'core competency' was later (Hamel and Prahalad, 1992) argued to be the 
providence of those capabilities/competencies which: 
~ make a disproportionate contribution to ultimate customer value, or to the 
efficiency with which that value is delivered; and 
provide a basis for entering new markets. 
The key to this debate, as Grant notes (1998, p.118), is the fact that competencies are 
held, whether distinctive or core, relative to other firms. In short, therefore, competencies 
are important in that they provide a firm with an advantage over another firm. The extent 
to which that advantage can be sustained (Collis and Montgomery, 1995) brings us to a 
consideration of the differing concepts of the firm. 
As Table 2.3 showed, during the 1980 ls the dominant theme in strategic management 
argued that strategy formulation be based upon a thorough-going analysis of one's 
industry and of one's competition within that industry. Characteristic of this time was the 
work of Porter, and the empirical studies conducted by the PIMS project (Grant, 1991). 
Porter took his general thesis to be that "the essence of formulating competitive strategy 
is relating a company to its environment" (Porter, 1980, p.3). In short, and using 
industrial economic theory, Porter argued that the opportunity for competitive advantage 
rested upon the structure of the industry, and the way that a company constructed 
strategy relative to the competitive environment that that structure produced (Teece et 
aI, 1997). This view was highly influential, and has been subject to repeated analysis and 
testing. As a product of this process, an increasing number of authors have critiqued the 
approach as being incomplete, and unable to offer explanations which explain verifiable 
circumstances within the real world (Rumelt, 1991; Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1992, 
Kay, 1994a). The result has in part been the development of a competing school of 
thought, based upon the effective utilisation of the resources of the firm, and the search 
for competitive advantage. Both schools of thought continue to enjoy prominence within 
the literature, as they attempt to adapt to and explain the new electronic economy and its 
impacts. Each ofthese competing schools, and there impact upon this research, are now 
explored in greater depth. 
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2.2.1 The Competitive Forces Approach 
Early developments within the strategy literature aimed at understanding the strategy 
process tended towards qualitative case based assessments of individual companies 
(Hoskisson et ai, 1999), while within organisations, corporate planning was the dominant 
activity (Grant, 1998). The advent of Industrial Organisation economics, or the 
competitive forces approach which was most notably championed by Porter (1980, 1985, 
1996), shifted the attention of the firm externally towards industry structure and an 
organisation's competitive position within the industry relative to its competitors. 
Porter's work is widely known within the literature, and so the author does not propose 
to dwell upon it at length. In addition, the key elements of the approach will be discussed 
again in relation to the key drivers of strategy, in Section 2.2.3. 
Porter's work argued that a firm's performance was primarily a function of the industry 
environment in which it competed. Furthermore he argued that the key consideration for 
the firm was the industry structure: the relationship between customers, suppliers and 
competitors, which determined the firm's performance. In seminal works published in 
1980 and 1985, Porter presented an analytical framework that could be used for 
understanding the structural makeup of industry, and the attractiveness of an industry to 
new market entrants. Competitive advantage, in Porter's model, is determined by 
effective positioning within the industry, as well as effective differentiation of an 
organisation and its product offering from those offerings made by competitors, following 
extensive focussed segment analysis to "help the management of the organisation make 
judgements about the relative attractiveness of particular parts of the market" (Bowman 
and Asch, 1996). The process is therefore one of 'outside-in', where the key influences 
are external producing reactions within the company. His concepts were represented by 
his Five Forces Model. 
Porter's Five Forces are usually discussed with reference to the model represented at 
Figure 2.1, which identifies the five forces as: 
~ Potential Entrants; 
~ Industry Competitors; 
~ The Threat of Substitute Products; 
~ The Bargaining Power of Suppliers; and 
~ The Bargaining Power of Buyers. 
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Figure 1.1: Porter'. Five Forces Model: Forces Driving Industry Competition 
POTENTIAL 
ENTRANTS 
Threat of 
new en trran ts 
V 
Bargaining power INDUSTRY Bargaining power 
of suppliers COMPETITORS of buyers 
SUPPLIERS ~ RW~U .. ~ BUYERS 
Existing Firm. 
~, 
Threat of substitute 
products or services 
I SUBSTITUTES I 
Source: Porter, ) no, p.4 
These five forces 'jointly detennine the intensity of industry competition and profitability, 
and the strongest force or forces are governing and become crucial from the point of view 
of strategy formulation" (Porter, 1980, p.6). Different forces will be of significance in 
different industries. When conducting analysis of this kind, it is vital for the strategist to 
bear in mind that long term factors need to be assessed, and should not be deflected by 
the numerous short term factors which may act to obstruct this process. The components 
of each of these are fully described by Porter in his 1980 work. The competitive forces 
approach championed by Porter is closely associated with the same author's work on 
generic competitiveibusiness strategies. Through the use of these strategies, Porter 
anticipates that companies can achieve competitive advantage within the context he 
describes. If the strategy devised by the firm enables it "to respond to, predict, or dictate 
these environmental forces" it is likely to be high performing, observers have concurred 
(Ketchen et aI, 1996). However, the five-forces industry analysis approach is just one of 
a number of environmental scanning approaches that can and should be used by an 
organisation wishing to identify opportunity and avoid shocks. Time constraints mean, 
however, that a fuller exploration of such environmental scanning techniques as PEST et 
cetera is not possible in their review. 
Most critiques of Porter's views relate to these generic strategies, and their relative 
applicability, and these will be discussed at length in Section 2.5.5.2 of this chapter. 
However, it is worth noting two principal critiques of Porter's views: firstly, that is it 
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highly unlikely that an organisation will have the appropriate resource flexibility to move 
between industries, if an analysis of its current industry's five-forces does not look 
favourable (Bowman and Asch, 1996, p.23). Secondly, there is a growing viewpoint that 
a simple focus upon the industry alone will not provide a guarantee of competitive 
advantage (Rumelt, 1991, Grant, 1991). This view leads the discussion towards a 
consideration of the resource based view of the firm. 
2.2.2 The Resource Based View of the Firm 
The development of management theory based upon a 'resource based view of the firm' 
can be interpreted as an attempt to rectify the 'neglect' (Grant, 1991, p.114) the issue of 
resources received throughout much of the 1980's, as demonstrated in Table 2.2. 
Additionally, the resource based view of the firm is of significance because inter-firm 
performance differs. This suggests that firm-level phenomena are important (Hoskisson 
et aI, 1999), and hence there is a need to understand how firms are different, and how 
firm's achieve and sustain competitive advantage. Furthermore, authors in favour of a 
resource based view of the firm have suggested that the traditional method by which 
companies define themselves; the market they are seeking to serve, is of increasingly less 
relevance. The new global economy is presenting a situation where markets and 
customers are so volatile that attempting to build a strategy around serving such a view 
is dangerous (Collis and Montgomery, 1995, p.118). Instability is therefore challenging 
accepted notions of the foundations upon which strategy is to be made, and emphasising 
the importance of resources, which translate into distinctive competencies. 
The view of advocates of the resource based or competence based view such as Bogner 
et al (1996), Collis and Montgomery (1995), Scarborough (1998), Gorman and Thomas 
(1997) and so on, is that the instability of the competitive environment can be overcome 
by building strategies upon the stability provided by the firm itself, and in particular the 
combination of resources and capability/competencies which define the firm. Resources, 
therefore, should become the basis upon which strategy is made (Rumelt, 1987; Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990; Grant, 1991; Barney, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Peterlaf, 
1993; Collis and Montgomery, 1995, among many others), revisiting the work of 
economists like Ricardo, Schumpeter and Penrose (Grant, 1991, p.114), the latter of 
whom expressed the view that the firm was in essence a collection of productive resources 
(Penrose, 1959). The result, according to writers, such as Wernerfelt (1984), Rumelt 
(1984), Barney, (1986a), and Dierickx and Cool (1989) is superior performance, based 
upon supenor resources. 
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A key aspect of the debate is improving the utility of resources. Grant argues that "the 
greater the rate of change in a firm's external environment, the more likely internal 
resources and capabilities are to provide a secure foundation for long-term strategy" 
(Grant, 1998, p.108). He argues for strategy to be related directly to a rational perception 
of the true capabilities of the firm. In support of this view, he critiques Levitt's (1960) 
view that companies should overcome uncertainty in their operating environment by 
narrowly defining the markets in which they will seek to compete, and suggests that this 
view very often leads to poor performance. Instead, he argues that a strategic approach 
based upon a clear understanding of internal capabilities can lead to a company being able 
to realise opportunities in areas that may have seemed unrelated without this sort of 
concentration upon resources. Such a focus would allow a company faced with declining 
demand in its traditional markets to focus upon other markets where its resources would 
be of equal value. 
Figure 2.2: Grant'll Framework for a Resource-Bued Approach to 
Strategy AnalYlLil 
4. Select a strateer whioh 
beat exploits the firm 'I 
resouroes and oapabilities 
relative 10 External 
opportunities 
3. Appraise the reut- generating 
potential of reaouroea and 
oapabilities in tennl of: 
(a> their potential for 
sustainable oompetitive 
advantage, and 
(b> the appropriability of 
their returns 
2. IdentifY the firm's oapabilities: 
what oan the firm do more 
effeotively than ilB rivala? IdentifY __ 
the resouroes inputs to eaoh t----~ 
oapability, and the oomplexity 
of eaoh oapability 
1. IdentifY and olaaaifY the firm'. 
resoure... Apprai.e .trengtha and 
weaknesses relative 10 oompetitors 
Identify opportunities for bener 
utilization oftesouroes 
COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE 
I 
CAPABILITIES 
t 
RESOURCES 
S. IdentifY reaouoe gaps 
whioh need to be filled 
Invest in replenishing, 
augmenting and upgrading 
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Grant attempted, in an article in 1991, to develop a framework to allow a resource-based 
approach to strategy analysis, and that framework is reproduced at Figure 2.2. As can be 
seen, the framework is similar to most strategy framework's in that it features a systematic 
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approach to the analysis and choice of strategy, augmented by a feedback loop to 
strengthen the eventual choice taken. Grant argues that the case for making resources the 
focus of a firm's long term strategy rests upon (a) the influence that resources and 
capabilities pose in shaping the basic direction of the firm's strategy, and (b) the role 
resources and capabilities play in providing the basic source of profits for the firm. These 
are briefly discussed below. 
(a) Resources as a guide to the direction of strategy: Grant notes that normally such 
direction is provided by an understanding of the location of your markets and customers 
(Grant, 1991, p.116). However, and as already mentioned, given the increased volatility 
of markets and customers, this practice of focussing upon the external environment is 
perhaps akin to building a castle upon sand. An internal focus provides a much greater 
degree of stability, and hence "a definition of a business in terms of what it is capable of 
doing may offer a more durable basis for strategy than a definition based upon the needs 
which the business seeks to satisfy" (Grant, 1991, p.116). 
(b) Resources as the basis for corporate profitability: Grant suggests that existing 
empirical research brings into doubt the commonly held view equating profitability with 
industry location, and argues that research has identified differences in profitability within 
industries as being more significant (Buzzell and Gale, 1987; Schmalensee, 1988), due to 
an increasing intensity in competition. Grant argues that, in effect, the whole strategic 
positioning approach was founded upon resources and so a focus upon resources 
overcomes any obfuscation a positioning strategy may cause. 
Grant further argues that many theories relating to the creation of competitive advantage 
are centred principally upon resource issues. He cites barriers to entry as an example 
(Grant, 1991, p.117). Without resources such as patents, experience, brands, or physical 
resources creating scale economies for example, it would be impossible to erect such 
barriers. To overcome such barriers, a competitor must develop these resources 
themselves, so it is the possession and deployment of the resources in the first instance 
which confers the advantage rather than the position the company adopts. 
Therefore, to summarise this brief review of the resource based view, the basis of a 
successful resource based approach is to accurately assess your resources and capabilities 
relative to your competitors, and the opportunities available to you in your existing 
industry as well as other concentric industries (Grant, 1991, p.121). This assessment 
must therefore be used to shape the direction, and the content of the strategy. However, 
a number of criticisms of the resource based view have been voiced. Principal among 
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these is the difficulty of assessing and directly measuring concepts which do not lend 
themselves readily to measurement (Robins and Wiersema, 1995). Despite some authors 
arguing that this flaw in the resource based approach has begun to be overcome 
(Hoskisson et ai, 1999), this remains a concern with the use of this approach. 
2.2.3 Drivers of Strategy: Differing Perspectives 
Implicit in the differing views of strategy in relation to the firm, are differing views as to 
what are the key factors driving strategy. The issue of strategy drivers is a crucial one in 
this research, and as such it is necessary to review these differing perspectives. Figure 2.3 
presents a pictorial summary of the nature of the differing perspectives, and forms the 
centre-piece of this discussion. 
The 'drivers' identified in Figure 2.3 have been divided into four distinct groups, to reflect 
differing perspectives. Group A reflects the key drivers identified by the competitive 
forces approach, and Group B reflects the key drivers identified by the resource based 
view. Group's C and D, leadership and legal-regulatory influences and social expectation, 
reflect key influences upon strategy whose importance is less contentious. This section 
aims to briefly explore the perspectives contained in Group's A and B. Leadership is 
considered a significant separate issue, and is therefore addressed as a separate area in 
Section 2.3 of this chapter. The influences oflegal-regulatory authorities and social 
Figure 2.3: Drivers of Strategy 
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of Strategy 
expectation are particularly important in any discussion in relation to former State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), and so are addressed in a separate chapter, Chapter Four, which aims 
to provide the context for the research as a whole. 
2.2.3.1 Strategy Drivers: A Competitive Forces Perspective 
In Section 2.2.1, the components of a competitive forces approach were discussed. 
Within this discussion the importance of Porter's work, and in particular the five-forces 
model indicated that under this perspective strategy was driven by a company's reaction 
to a set of external forces which determined the extent of the intensity of competition 
within an industry. These forces: of potential entrants, industry competitors, substitute 
products, suppliers and buyers, seek to constrain the opportunity of a firm to achieve 
competitive advantage, and require a reaction on the part ofthe firm to prevent this. 
According to this view, therefore, strategy is driven by competition and the demands that 
competition places upon a firm. Strategy is therefore a product of, and a reaction to, the 
operating environment. Within the literature, the relationship of strategy and environment 
is well established, and widely accepted (Burns and Stalker, 1961, Dess and Beard, 1984, 
Hambrick, 1983b, Miller and Friesen, 1984 among many others). Authors identify a 
variety of different strategy-environmental matches, within what has been described as the 
task environment: that is an environment defined by customers, suppliers, competitors and 
regulatory agencies (Roth and Morrison, 1992 quoting Dill, 1958). Authors exploring this 
area have identified and studied a variety of different industry-environment matches, 
among these high-growth, mature, declining, industrial, consumer, fragmented, or 
concentrated (Dess, 1987, Aaker and Day, 1986, Hambrick and Lei, 1985, Hambrick and 
Scheter, 1983, Harrigan, 1982, 1980, Hofer, 1975 among others). Within each, the 
environmental configuration creates a particular need for a response by a company 
(pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and furthermore authors argue that the same principals apply 
whether the company has a national or international focus (Roth and Morrison, 1992). 
2.2.3.2 Strategy Drivers: A Resource Based Perspective 
In contrast to the externally focussed perspective outlined previously, a resource based 
perspective looks inwards. Strategy, as has been argued by authors subscribing to this 
view, should be based upon a foundation of a firm's resources (Grant, 1991, p.114). 
Advocates of a resource based view suggest that strategy selection should be based upon 
identifying the best match between resources and corporate aims relative to external 
opportunities, rather than be driven by external demands and opportunities that may not 
be attainable given a particular resource profile (Grant, 1991, p.115-116). Advocates of 
a resource based view do not disregard the need to also have an external focus, indeed 
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Collis and Montgomery note the importance of a combined internal-external focus (Collis 
and Montgomery, 1995, p.119). The resource based view simply argues for an internal 
focus, to best judge the appropriate response to the sort of external pressures identified 
above. 
Consequently the availability and quality of company skills and resources drives, or 
constrains, strategy under a resource based view. As shown in Figure 2.3, therefore, the 
key elements influencing strategy are its technology, adaptability, processes, culture, 
capital resources, innovational capability, people et cetera, relative to its competitors and 
to the demands of the industry in which it seeks to operate. The resources of an 
organisation therefore are strategic enablers, the availability and quality of which will 
influence the content of strategy. In the view of the author, they do not represent the 
strategy of the company itself. As Grant notes, "the essence of strategy formulation .. .is 
to design a strategy that makes the most effective use of (the) core resources and 
capabilities" (Grant, 1991, p.129), which exploit to the maximum its unique 
characteristics (Grant, 1991, p.l33). Clearly, this association of competencies/resources 
has been linked here directly with competitive advantage, by presenting a company with 
"a gateway to a wide variety of potential product markets" (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994, 
p.219). Thus, arguably, a resource based view requires an organisation to develop an 
approach which looks beyond a single industry. 
2.2.3.3 Impact of Strategic Drivers on Research 
As part of this research's objectives, the competing competitive forces and resource based 
views are reviewed throughout the research. The impact of each, alongside the question 
ofleadership to be addressed shortly, and the impacts of the legal-regulatory requirements 
addressed in Chapter Four, are constantly reviewed throughout both the preliminary and 
field research, and used as reference points in relation in particular to Objective Two. 
2.3 The Impact of Leadership 
Within the literature, the importance of leadership to superior performance within 
organisations is extensively identified (Hart and Quinn, 1993, Keller, 1992, Kotter, 1990 
among many). However, the importance of leadership was not always as recognised as 
is the case in the current literature (Ireland and Hitt, 1999). Perhaps the key theorist 
involved in changing this perception was John Child (1972). Child argued that strategic 
leaders, armed with the necessary knowledge and responsibility for decision-making, 
could significantly influence the direction of a firm, and the way in which it was to be 
managed. Arguably, the connection had not previously been made, as the literature had 
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tended to focus upon managerial issues (Ireland and Hitt, 1999). The distinction will be 
drawn below. 
The literature surrounding the issue of leadership is extensive, reflecting its importance. 
A full review of that literature is beyond the scope of this survey, which seeks primarily 
to focus upon the key aspects ofleadership as developed from Child's perspective, and 
which relates directly to the objectives of this research. This involves a consideration of 
the ability of the leadership/dominant coalition to affect strategic decisions. However, 
before moving on to consider this objective, it is perhaps necessary to outline some key 
aspects of the debate about leadership. 
2.3.1 Leadership Defined 
The literature has suggested that managers and leaders are different people, and perform 
different tasks within an organisation (Kotter, 1990, Zaleznik, 1977). They are "two 
distinct and complementary systems of action" (Kotter, 1990). To Kotter, management 
is concerned with coping with complexity, a vital task as organizations have grown, and 
become more complex. In contrast, leadership is about coping with change. While the 
need to change has also grown as the business world has become more complex, the 
emphasis is different. Management involves ensuring processes work effectively, 
leadership with ensuring that strategy is effective and congruent. Both are vital for 
organisations wishing to prosper. 
Kotter notes that each involves deciding what must be done, creating networks of people 
and relationships to undertake what must be done, and then sets out to accomplish these 
objectives. However, management and leadership differ in the ways these tasks are 
addressed. Management emphasises control measures such as planning and budgeting to 
establish milestones, and then allocates resources to achieve these milestones. It 
emphasises staffing and organization to facilitate this process, and establishes control 
methods and problem solving techniques to ensure plans are adhered to. Leadership 
establishes a direction for the organization, through the development of a vision, and the 
appropriate strategies to achieve this vision. It aligns people to create the appropriate 
environment in which the vision may be achieved. Whereas managing implies control, 
leadership implies motivation and inspiration. This research's focus upon strategic 
development and content justifies the emphasis here upon leadership. 
Research has suggested that there are two principal leadership styles: transactional and 
transformational (Bums, 1978). The suggested distinction drawn between the two styles 
rests upon the nature of the contact between leader and led. A transformational leader 
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will seek to motivate by providing an example or elaborating a vision, while a 
transactional leader will seek to control, by instituting systems and dictating targets. The 
distinction is discussed by Tichy and Ulrich thus: "where transactional managers make 
only minor adjustments in the organisation's mission, structure and human resource 
management, transformational leaders not only make major changes in these three areas, 
but they evoke fundamental changes in the basic political and cultural systems of the 
organisation. The revamping of the political and cultural systems is what most 
distinguishes the transformational leader from the transactional one" (Tichy and Ulrich, 
1984, p.6). This view is not universally held, however, as Bass concludes that 
transformational leadership is a variation of transactional leadership, employed in specific 
cases (Bass, 1990). 
A number of studies of Transformational leadership have been undertaken, and have led 
to the conclusion that this approach can have the most marked impact upon organisational 
performance (Bass, 1990, Lim, 1997, Kouzes and Posner, 1987), while Wilderom and van 
den Berg's (1997) work suggests that some form of balance is necessary, between relying 
totally upon one at the expense of the other, a view supported by Davis et al (1997). 
Clearly, either approach, if taken too far, carries the considerable risk of unbalancing an 
organisation. Another interesting study, conducted by Hambrick and Mason, identifies 
the importance of the environment in driving the actions of a leader (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). This finding draws the debate on leadership back to the question of the 
impact of the environmental context of the firm, addressed in Section 2.2.3.1. 
The concept ofleadership is often bracketed with that of the dominant coalition (Cyert 
and March, 1992). This concept is defined by Pearce as "the social network of individuals 
having the greatest influence on the selection of an organisation's goals and strategies" 
(Pearce, 1995, p.1 075). The power of a dominant coalition is derived from the individual 
power and influence of its members, who obtain their power from their ability to 
command the resources of the organisation. Miles and Snow (1978) note, in their work 
on organisational typology, that the membership of the dominant coalition will vary in 
accordance to the type of organisation it manages. Hence the dominant coalition of a 
defender organisation with its emphasis upon control will contain managers from the 
finance and production functions (Miles and Snow, 1978, p.48), while a prospector, with 
its emphasis upon innovation would see representatives from the marketing and research 
and development functions within its dominant coalition (Miles and Snow, 1978, p.66), 
and so on. 
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Even allowing for the brevity of this review, it is clear that support for the concept of the 
importance of leadership in strategy making is significant, and is clearly identified as a 
driver of strategy. As identifying the impacts of different drivers of strategy is an 
established objective of this research, it is necessary to understand more about the features 
of strategic leadership. Therefore the next section concentrates upon the role of the CEO, 
as the central leadership figure either individually or as a key member in a dominant 
coalition, in this crucial area. 
2.3.2 The Role of the CEO 
The role of the CEO is of particular interest in this research project. In an industry that 
was relatively homogeneous as it moved into the new era, and in which senior managers 
were primarily drawn from the ESI (see Chapters Five to Eight) the impact ofleadership 
could be expected to be crucial. This section therefore reports an empirical study of the 
role of the CEOlleader conducted by Farkus and Wetlaufer (1996). Their study of 160 
US CEO's identified five different styles of management and also established that 
generally a CEO will "adopt the approach that will best meet the needs of the organization 
and the business situation at hand" (Farkus and Wetlaufer, 1996, p.111), thus agreeing 
to some extent with the view that leadership is likely to be situational, as discussed above. 
The five approaches they identified were: 
~ the Strategy Approach: where the CEO identifies their role as being primarily the 
person with responsibility for creating, testing and designing the implementation 
oflong-term strategy. They take responsibility for, and are prime communicators 
of, decisions, overlook all aspects of resources allocation, and spend much time 
analysing the environment. This approach demands much data collection and 
analysis. It also seeks to bring the company much closer to the real demands of 
the customer. Farkus and Wetlaufer's research identifies industrial complexity as 
being one of the chief reasons for the use of this approach - a CEO appreciates 
how hard it is to compete in the industry, and sets out to make sure that the 
company does well by leading the strategic effort themselves; 
the Human-Assets Approach: in contrast to the former approach, managers 
adopting this approach are concerned principally for the appropriate development 
of their key managers in order to enable them to take the appropriate decisions in 
their functional roles. Their aim is to create a network of satellite CEOs, so 
recruitment and training of managers is key, as is the retention of effective 
managers. This approach emphasises a degree of conformity to a 'corporate way 
of doing things', and this approach is most effectively inculcated from the top 
down; 
the Expertise Approach: CEOs favouring this approach believe their role to be 
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that of emphasising the skills and resource assets of the organisation, to be used 
to build competitive advantage. There is a heavy emphasis upon building and 
improving knowledge networks within the organisation, as a means of 
differentiating the company. CEOs are very close to recruitment, and to the 
deployment of key staff to effectively share skills around the company; 
the Box Approach: CEOs favouring this approach seek to establish a control 
culture upon the organisation, and spend their time developing and monitoring 
explicit control mechanisms to ensure uniformity. This is an approach which 
seeks to be risk averse, through being more overtly prescriptive, and tends to 
favour a promotion system based upon seniority. The evidence found that 'box 
approach' CEOs were more likely to be found in highly regulated industries, or 
industries where public safety is the primary concern; industries with little or no 
'margin for error'; and 
the Change Approach: Farkus and Wetlaufer argue that CEO's adopting this 
approach believe that their "most critical role is to create an environment of 
continual re-invention, even if such an environment produces anxiety and 
confusion, leads to some strategic mistakes and temporarily hurts financial 
performance" (1996, p.112). Change agents of this kind are the exact opposite 
of 'box approach' CEO's. Their approach is based upon passion, energy and 
openness as they strive to push the company forward, and aim for their most 
important contribution, identified by Farkus and Wetlaufer as consensus building. 
Farkus and Wetlaufer note that overlap can and does occur, but that CEO's tend to adopt 
and abide by one dominant approach, and they infer that consistency is a feature of an 
"effectively run organisation". There is scope for a change in approach, however, if the 
situation demands it. A different perspective is presented by Lynch, who also identifies 
a series of differing leadership styles, but characterizes only two forms: that of a shared 
vision approach, and of a dominance approach (Lynch, 2000, pAS 1). Lynch, in defining 
the shared vision approach, returns to the work of Senge (1990) who identified that while 
leaders provide vision, defining purpose and strategy was the function of the whole 
organisation. The leader's role, therefore, is that of a facilitator who works towards 
developing an understanding of a shared purpose. Largely, this approach shares elements 
of the human-assets approach and the expertise approach identified by Farkus and 
Wetlaufer. 
The other approach Lynch describes as the Dominance Approach. This approach, like 
the Box Approach ofFarkus and Wetlaufer requires "strong and firm central leadership 
to enable it to survive" (Lynch, 2000, pAS 1 ). However, Lynch also allows for different 
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styles of dominance approaches, noting that entrepreneurial leadership could also be as 
dominant as a strict disciplinary style of leadership. Lynch argues that the choice of 
leadership style will depend upon a number of factors, and draws upon the work of 
Bourgeois and Brodwin (1983) to identify them. These factors include: 
~ the personality and skills of the leader; 
~ the size of the company; 
~ the degree of geographical dispersion of the company/its clients; 
~ the stability of the organization's environment; 
~ the current management style of the organization's culture; and 
~ the organization's current profitability and its desire and need for change. 
2.3.3 Strategic Leadership 
Recently (Mische, 2001) writers have developed the phrase 'strategic leadership' to 
reflect the importance of leadership in the ever more complex operating environment. 
Principally, the aim is to identify the new roles that strategic leaders must play to keep 
their organisations competitive. Ireland and Hitt (1999) suggest that these areas include: 
~ developing and sustaining an effective organisational culture; 
~ emphasizing ethical practices; 
~ establishing balanced organisational controls; 
~ being growth oriented; 
~ developing knowledge management capabilities; 
~ mobilizing their available human capital; and 
~ remaining focussed upon the future. 
A recent alternative perspective on the relationship between effective strategic leadership 
and superior organisational performance is provided by Eisenhardt (1999), who identifies 
the following four key lessons that strategic leadership should heed, to encourage the 
development of successful strategy. Leaders should, she argues: 
~ build collective intuition; 
~ stimulate quick conflict within a dominant coalition to arrive at consensus early; 
~ maintain the pace of decision making, and not allow the process to slow down; 
and 
defuse political issues within the organisation (Eisenhardt, 1999). 
Mische contends that the concept of individual strategic leadership is "archaic" in a 
modem business environment (Mische, 2001, p.194). Instead, he associates leadership 
with the concept of the dominant coalition, and also provides a series of 'traits' that 
strategic leaders should possess, a number of which inevitably overlap with the 
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characteristics identified by Ireland and Hitt, and Eisenhardt. He does identify what he 
terms as 'the five essential qualities of high-performance leadership' (Mische, 2001, 
p.198): character and integrity; sense of self; a passion to lead; perspective and insight; 
and confidence, courage and conviction, which given his view on dominant coalition must 
therefore be shared among a leadership elite. 
2.3.4 Impact on Research 
As stated previously, strategic leadership has been identified as a driver of corporate 
strategy. As such it needs to be considered throughout the preliminary and field stages 
of this research. Certain key aspects discussed above therefore will be used as variables 
in identifying and classifying the strategic characteristics of the companies under study. 
Principally the leadership styles, as suggested by Burns, and Farkus and WetIaufer will be 
examined for, as will the membership of dominant coalitions, as per Miles and Snow. The 
aim of this exercise will be to identify whether the appropriate leadership configuration 
has been applied to emergent strategic combinations (as discussed in Section 2.6 of this 
chapter), and whether there is any identifiable relationship between types of leadership 
style, and strategic direction. This study will also attempt to relate discernable changes 
in strategic direction to changes in the identity of a company's leadership. 
2.4 The Importance of Structure 
One other crucial area which impacts upon strategic decisions and content is that of 
organisational structure. Once again, it is not possible to include more than a cursory 
review of this important area of the business literature, but insofar as structure playa role 
in the upcoming discussion such a review is necessary. The structural debate is principally 
focussed upon the question of whether structure follows strategy, as asserted by writers 
such as Chandler (1962), whether strategy follows structure, or whether as Mintzberg and 
Quinn argue "the two exist interdependently, each influencing the other" (Mintzberg and 
Quinn, 1996, p.320). Over and above this debate, what is not in question is the 
importance of arriving upon the appropriate structure for an organisation as, as Handy 
notes, "many of the ills of organizations stem from imposing an inappropriate structure 
on a particular culture" (Handy, 1985, p.185). In this section, therefore, the concept of 
structure is defined, and differing perspectives on the question of the relationship between 
strategy and structure are considered. Finally, some of the more common structural 
arrangements are presented, and the state of current thinking on the appropriate nature 
of these structures considered. 
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2.4.1 A Definition 
The initial definition of' Structure' is provided by Alfred Chandler, whose' Strategy and 
Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise' has been 
identified as being the most probable starting point for modem research into corporate 
structure (Galbraith, 1973). Structure, Chandler asserts, "can be defined as the design of 
organization through which the enterprise is administered. This design, whether formally 
or informally defined, has two aspects. It includes, first, the lines of authority and 
communication between the different administrative offices and officers and, second, the 
information and data that flow through these lines of communication and authority. Such 
lines and such data are essential to assure the effective coordination, appraisal, and 
planning so necessary in carrying out basic goals and policies and in knitting together the 
total resources of the enterprise" (Chandler, 1962, p.14). 
Therefore, Chandler suggests that structure is not solely about the physical framework of 
the organisation, but also about the intangible systems that operate across the company's 
physical structure, and provide the 'life blood' of the company. Structure therefore 
includes the channels along which information flows, through which direction is provided, 
and through which responsibility is exercised. 
2.4.2 Differing Perspectives 
Chandler noted that progress in the areas of technology, business practice and a widening 
of the patterns of demand experienced by the companies he had studied, largely drove 
their strategies. As a response to changes of this nature the new strategies developed by 
these organisations placed new demands upon each company's existing structures; 
demands that these structures were not equal to, leading to change. His research 
emphasized that" a company's strategy in time determined its structure and that the 
common denominator of structure and strategy has been the application of the enterprise's 
resources to market demand" (Chandler, 1962, p.383). His finding, that "product-market 
diversification required subsequent alterations in structure" (Miller, 1986) proved highly 
popular in the 1970's, and was widely tested and found to be proven in a number of 
national tests, such as the investigation conducted in Britain by Channon (1973). 
However later research suggested that, as Mintzberg argues, the 'one best way' approach 
to organisational structure was not consistent with superior company performance 
(Mintzberg, 1979, 1996b). The result has been the development of a view that argues 
that "structure should reflect the organisation's situation .... the extent to which its 
environment is complex and dynamic" (Mintzberg, 1996b, p.331). But even that 
development is not sufficient to address the requirements of an increasingly demanding 
-62-
environment. To meet such needs Mintzberg argues for the development of a further new 
approach, which he describes as a configuration approach. In this approach, a logical 
process is pursued to ensure that all elements of organisational design are internally 
consistent (Mintzberg, 1996b, p.331). Mintzberg's view is that once research is 
undertaken into the structuring of organisations, a series of generalizable organisational 
types emerge which are distinct and accurately describe organisational reality for most 
organisations. 
Mintzberg continues by arguing that each organisation has six basic parts: the strategic 
apex, the middle line, the operating core, the technostructure, support staff, and 
'ideology'. The strategic apex provides the leadership in the company, and it is the 
position from where the operations of the company are overseen. Miles and Snow refer 
to this part of the managerial structure as the dominant coalition, as defined in Section 
2.3.1. The middle line refers to the development of a middle management structure within 
the managerial hierarchy between the' strategic apex' and the' operating core', who are 
the part of the organisation which undertakes productive labour (in a traditional 
manufacturing organisation for example). As organisations become more complex, a 
'technostructure' develops which contains what Mintzberg called' analysts'. This group 
of 'analysts' may include technical staff performing IT functions, but also other staff 
managing other activities such as an organisation's environmental or quality programmes. 
'Support staff' includes other members of personnel providing services for the 
organisation, which can vary from cafeteria employees to the organisation's public 
relations activities. The 'ideology' of the organisation is its guiding values, or 
organisational culture. Table 2.4 shows a series of seven configurations devised by 
Mintzberg to show the possible interrelationships between internal and external factors 
influencing the organisation. Mintzberg determined the nature and descriptions of the 
seven configurations based upon his assessment of three key determining characteristics: 
the prime coordinating mechanism; the key part of the organisation; and the type of 
decentralisation predominating. 
Mintzberg's thesis is that there will be a fit between structure and strategy, in much the 
same way that there would be a fit between strategy and environment. Structure arguably 
then becomes a issue of organisational flexibility and responsiveness, reflecting the 
demands of the environment and the resources available to an organisation. 
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Table 2.4: Mintzberg's Structural Configurations 
Configuration Prime Coordinating Key Part of Type of 
Mechanism Organisation Decentralization 
Entrepreneurial Direct Supervision Strategic Apex Vertical and 
organisation horizontal 
centralisation 
Machine Standardisation of work Technostructure Limited horizontal 
organisation processes decentralisation 
Professional Standardisation of skills Operating core Horizontal 
organisation decentralisation 
Diversified Standardisation of Middle Line Limited vertical 
organisation Outputs decentralisation 
Innovative Mutual adjustment Support Staff Selected 
organisation decentralisation 
Missionary Standardisation of Nonus Ideology Decentralisation 
organisation 
Political None None Varies 
organisation 
Source: Mintzberg, 1996b, p.343, extending his work of 1979 
Another view of the question of structural forms has been provided by the US academics 
Raymond Miles and Charles Snow. Many of the assumptions adopted by Mintzberg: that 
there should be a fit between strategy, structure and environment, are reflected in the 
work of Miles and Snow, but they provide some interesting variations. In particular, in 
their articles of 1986 and 1992, Miles and Snow sought to introduce and explain a new 
structural fonn, the network, which seeks to resolve the dilemma of structural flexibility 
evident in Mintzberg's configuration. Miles and Snow identified three basic forms: 
functional, divisional and matrix, and differentiated the new network firm from these. 
Within the new network type of structure, they identified three different variants: the 
stable network, the internal network, and the dynamic network. Miles and Snow's work 
is central to Objective Three ofthis research, so some time is provided to a consideration 
of their conceptual forms. 
(aJ The Functional Form: Miles and Snow defined the functional form as "a special-
purpose machine designed to produce a limited line of goods or services in large volumes 
and at low cost" based upon "centrally coordinated specialization" (Miles and Snow, 
1992, p.S8). Often firms adopting this form would integrate forward and backward to 
secure customers and supplies respectively. Such action is potentially highly costly, not 
least in that the control systems needed to manage a functional company may be unable 
to judge the extent to which such investments ofthis kind make a contribution. Miles and 
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Snow note the recent tendency to disaggregate - to buy, rather than to make - in such 
situations. They also note the problems associated within this form when it tries to move 
away from its traditional products, and make a more diverse product offering. 
(b) The Divisional Form: Miles and Snow defined the divisional form as "a collection of 
similar special-purpose machines, each independently operated to service a particular 
market and all evaluated centrally on the basis of economic performance for possible 
expansion, contraction, or redirection" based upon a coupling of divisional autonomy with 
centrally controlled performance evaluation and resource allocations (Miles and Snow, 
1992, p.60). The form is both flexible, possesses the potential for economies of scope, 
and can focus assets in areas of new business opportunity. The divisional company 
"develops an unique competence for evaluating divisional performance in a given set of 
related markets and for investing pooled returns to promote growth in existing divisions 
and to create or acquire new divisions" (Miles and Snow, 1992, p.60). Miles and Snow 
note that the divisional form would provide a company with advantages in responding to 
new opportunities. They note the problems associated with this form are those of over 
extension, into areas outside of their distinctive competence. Divisionalized firms may 
also tend to move away from their fundamental reason for existence, which may 
undermine their ability to retain congruence. Miles and Snow raise the concern that 
companies that operate a notional divisional structure may introduce "extensive corporate 
staff coordination" leading to minimal actual divisional autonomy (Miles and Snow, 1992, 
p.61). 
(c) The Matrix Form: Miles and Snow define the matrix form as "a complex machine 
simultaneously generating two or more outputs for a set of both stable and changing 
markets" (Miles and Snow, 1992, p.61). The matrix form is a composite of both the 
divisional and functional forms. The key to the matrix form is the requirement for 
"balance among the components to produce mutually beneficial allocations of resources" 
(Miles and Snow, 1992, p.61). Similarly, the matrix form may be overloaded by 
extending its operations beyond its capabilities. It may also suffer if modifications occur 
which 'violate its operating logic'; that is, if the balance it sought to develop was allowed 
to deteriorate. 
Miles and Snow conclude that for all forms they identify, their internal operating logic 
only exists within certain limits, and that "when a particular form's operating logic is 
violated, even by apparently reasonable extensions or modifications of the form, failure 
may result" (Miles and Snow, 1992, p.62). The primary applications and principal causes 
of failure of the three longstanding structural forms are replicated from their 1992 paper, 
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at Table 2.5. 
(d) New Network Forms: as stated above Miles and Snow have identified a new 
organisational form, the network. Within the network form, they argue it is possible to 
identifY three distinct patterns. The need to distinguish different types of network forms 
perhaps reflects a recognition that there were problems inherent in the existing three 
forms proposed. Arguably, they were not able to adapt to the rapidly changing 
operational environment. 
Table 2.5: Causes of Failure in Traditional Organizational Forms 
Organizational 
Form 
Primary 
Application 
Extension 
Failure 
Modification 
Failure 
Functional 
Efficient production of 
standardized goods and 
services 
Vertical integration 
beyond capacity to keep 
specialized assets fully 
loaded and/or to 
evaluate contributions 
Product or service 
diversification that 
overloads central 
planning mechanisms 
Source: Miles and Snow, 1992, p.59 
Divisional 
Related diversification by 
product or region 
Diversification (or 
acquisitions) outside area 
of technical and evaluative 
expertise 
Matrix 
Shared assets between 
standardized products and 
prototype contracts (e.g., 
many aerospace finns) 
Shared assets between 
worldwide product 
divisions and country-
based marketing divisions 
(e.g., some global finns) 
Expanding number of 
temporary contracts beyond 
ability of allocation 
mechanisms 
Search for global synergy 
limits local adaptability 
Corporate interventions to Modifications that distort 
force coordination or obtain the dual (i.e., favour one 
efficiencies across type of market or product 
divisions over another) 
The first of these network forms is the Stable Network. Miles and Snow suggest that the 
stable network form has its roots in the functional structure. That is to say, it is designed 
to serve a fundamentally predictable market, by linking activities along a clearly defined 
value chain. The stable network substitutes for a vertically integrated firm. The principal 
problems associated with this form are those associated with an over concentration upon 
supporting the activities of a single core firm. It may lead towards a diminution of the 
impact ofthe market upon each of the firms in the network. This process is described as 
one of "asset overspecialisation and over dedication" (Miles and Snow, 1992, p.63). 
Such close ties restrict the freedom and flexibility of a network company, and lowers its 
ability to innovate or update its processes. Stable networks can also be damaged by an 
overzealous attempt by core firms to influence the actions of suppliers or distributors. In 
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so doing, the core firm may be converting the network into a vertically integrated 
functional organization. 
The second network form is the Internal Network. This form requires the creation of a 
market within a firm, with sub-units buying and selling amongst themselves at market 
approximating rates. The internal network, like the matrix structure aims "to gain 
competitive advantage through shared utilization of scarce assets and the continuing 
development and exchange of managerial and technological knowhow" (Miles and Snow, 
1992, p.65). This form, like the matrix, can fail by over extension. It may also fail by 
mis-guided modification, and the problem of forced transactions. Again, the overall 
objectives of the structure need to be held in mind when internal resourcing or political 
decisions are taken. The key success factors in such a form need to remain paramount 
for decision makers. This is an important concept, and one witnessed often within the 
companies examined in this research. 
The third network form is the Dynamic Network, whose operating logic is closely linked 
to the divisionalized form. In this form, independent firms are linked together to achieve 
the one-time, or short term, attainment of a particular good or service. The success of 
the form depends upon their being numerous substitute firms available at each point in the 
value chain ready to join and break as required. The viability of each firm at each point 
depends upon their ability to stay flexible and creative, and avoid becoming limited to, for 
example, providing a particular product at a particular specification for a particular 
network. Miles and Snow describe these sorts of companies as "hollow corporations" 
(Miles and Snow, 1992, p.67). 
They note that problems arise in all forms from an inability to self-renew, at least in a 
competent fashion. All the forms may attempt to move forward, but can lose sight of 
their primary purpose. Efforts at self-renewal lead therefore into attempts at wholesale, 
and possibly incongruous change. The concepts developed by Miles and Snow, and in 
particular their work on network structures, are becoming increasingly widely used within 
the literature (as recent work by Lepak, and Snell, 1999, Sheppard and Sherman, 1998, 
Stuart et ai, 1998, and Singh, 1997 among others indicates). 
Another author who has attempted to establish a series of common configurations of 
strategy and structure is Danny Miller. Miller critiqued the early work of writers 
examining the relationship between strategy and structure as being too narrow (Miller, 
1986, p.233-4): firstly, in terms of a failure to understand the breath of strategic options 
available to firms, and secondly for not exploring the link between the content of strategy 
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and organisational structure. Miller's approach was therefore to seek to compare the 
work of strategic theorists like Porter (1980), Hambrick (1983a) and Miles and Snow 
(1978), with the work of major structural theorists such as Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), 
Burns and Stalker (1961), Galbraith (1973) and Mintzberg (1979). His main thesis was 
that there exist ties that unite strategy and structure, and "that given a particular strategy 
there are only a limited number of suitable structures" that the strategy can be successfully 
pursued within, and vice versa (Miller, 1986, p.234). 
Miller undertook exploratory work attempting to match aspects of strategic content to 
known structural typologies, and found a large degree of correlation between certain 
structures and their suitability to support certain strategies. Miller argues that there is a 
wide degree of similarity between the various generic configuration schemes devised by 
authors, and that in turn each of these similar archetypes is tied to a particular set of 
corporate or business level strategies (Miller, 1986, p.236-237). The subject of generic 
classification is addressed in greater detail in Section 2.5 of this chapter, but it is 
instructive here to consider some of Mill er' s observations. He presented a large quantity 
of data relating structure, environment and strategy, which is replicated at Table 2.6. 
It is clear from the work presented in Table 2.6 of the interrelated nature of many of the 
concepts that have been addressed to date. For example, Mintzberg's 'entrepreneurial 
organisation' is clearly akin to Miller's simple structure, and Miller's work extends the 
concept by adding details of the kind of strategies that companies of this type would be 
seeking, and the sort of environments that they would inhabit. Similarly, Miles and 
Snow's Defender organisation (Section 2.5.6.2.1) and functional form is evident within 
the machine bureaucracy, and so on. Miller's work can therefore be seen to strengthen 
the links between structure and strategy, and establishes a basis for the following 
discussion of the various types of strategy, leading to an understanding of a 'whole 
systems' perspective (in Section 2.5.6). 
As with other aspects of the management literature covered in this survey, the literature 
on structure and its relationship with strategy is extensive, and impossible to cover in any 
great depth. This section has, however, noted the initial assumption popularised by 
authors such as Chandler who argued for the tendency of structure to follow strategy, and 
cited the development of divisionalized structures resulting from the development of 
diversification among US forms in the early to mid Twentieth Century as an example of 
this trend. In addition, this section also sets out the views of authors such as Mintzberg 
who believes that more recently it is increasingly unwise to see either structure or strategy 
as preceding or following the other. Rather, it is more likely that as strategy making has 
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become more complex these decisions have emerged simultaneously out of the strategy 
formulation process, a view that the author broadly concurs with. The section also 
presents a variety of models by noted authors describing various organisational structures 
which have been shown to be related to each other in relation to aspects of their design. 
These models seek to show the relationship between structure and strategic content, that 
will be discussed in greater detail in Section 2.5. 
Table 2.6: Miller's Relationship Between Structure, Environment and Strategy 
Structural Simple Machine Organic Divisionalized 
dimensions strncture bureaucracy 
Power All at the top CEO and designers Scientists, Divisional 
centralisations of workflow technocrats and executives 
middle managers 
Bureaucratization Low-infonnal Many fonnal rules, Organic Bureaucratic 
policies and 
procedures 
Specialization Low Extensive Extensive Extensive 
Differentiation Minimal Moderate Very high High 
Integration and By CEO via direct By technocrats via By integrating By fonnal 
coordination of supervision fonnal procedures persOlmel, task conunittees via 
effort forces via mutual plan and 
adjustment budgets 
Infonnation Crude, infonnal Cost controls and Infonnal scatming, Management 
Systems budgets open infonnation 
conununications systems and 
profit centres 
Environmental 
dimensions 
Technology Simple, custom Mass production, Sophisticated Varies 
large batch/line product, automated 
or custom 
Competition Extreme High Moderate Varies 
Dynamism! Moderate Very low Very high Varies 
uncertainty 
Growth Varies Slow Rapid Varies 
Concentration Very low High Varies Varies 
ratio 
Barriers to Entry None Scales barriers Knowledge barriers Varies 
Business-level strategies Corporate-
level Strategy 
Favoured Strategy Niche Cost leadership lImovative Conglomeration 
differentiation differentiation 
Marketing Quality, service, Low price New products, high lInage 
emphasis convenience quality 
Production Economy Efficiency Flexibility Vertical 
emphasis integration 
Asset management Parsimony Intensity Parsimony Varies 
llmovation and Little Almost none Very high Low to 
R&D moderate 
Product-market Very narrow Average Average Very broad 
scope 
Source: Miller, 1986, p.242 
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2.5 Classification Schemes and Systems: Typologies and Taxonomies 
Preceding sections of this chapter have been concerned with establishing an understanding 
of the concept of strategy, through definition and an appreciation of its importance, as 
well as examining the various 'drivers' which shape and determine strategic direction and 
content. In this section, the attention shifts to the question of content, by exploring the 
options available to strategic decision makers. This is undertaken by exploring the 
literature surrounding configurations such as typologies, taxonomies, and other systems 
of classification. The section therefore reviews the most significant and useful, in terms 
of the direction of the research, systems of classification. In doing so, it fulfils two crucial 
roles within this thesis. Firstly, it continues the work of this chapter, by exploring a key 
area in the strategic management literature, and secondly, it provides a series of analytical 
frameworks, which will be used to shape the design of the forthcoming research. 
Before beginning this part of the review it is necessary to clarify two key issues that 
require consideration. The first concerns the different levels of the organisation at which 
authors have targeted systems of classification, and by implication at which levels strategy 
making can occur. The second concerns the purpose authors have intended objectives for 
the various systems of classification. 
2.5.1 Different Levels of Classification 
Earlier in the chapter, the distinction between corporate and business level strategy was 
presented (Section 2.1.1.6). This definition, drawn from that developed by Bourgeois 
(1996) and supported by Grant (1998), identified corporate level strategy as being 
concerned with' domain selection', and business or competitive level strategy as being 
concerned with 'domain navigation'. Therefore, strategy making at the corporate level 
is concerned with decisions of which industry a firm will compete in, while strategy 
making at the business level is concerned with decisions of how to compete within the 
chosen industry. Authors have followed this prescription, and have developed systems 
of classification which have been targeted at specific levels of strategic decision making, 
and consequently the discussion follows these developments. In Section 2.5.4, therefore, 
corporate level configurations are presented, while in Section 2.5.5 business level 
configurations are explored. In addition Section 2.5.6 reviews the work of authors such 
as Miles and Snow (1978) and Mintzberg (1988), who have attempted to develop systems 
of classification which address' Organisational Systems'. 
2.5.2 The Aims and Significance of Classification Systems/Schemes 
This section attempts to clarify both the aims, and the significance, of classification 
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systems and schemes, and to define the concept of generic strategy, which is widely used 
in this research. Systems of classification, and generic strategies, have become an 
ubiquitous presence within the management literature, despite some concern for their 
validity. As Mintzberg notes "almost every serious author concerned with 
'content' .... has his, her or its own list of strategies commonly pursued by different 
organisations" (Mintzberg, 1996, p.83). He acknowledges that there may be an anxiety 
about the general validity of any such system, based upon authors' tendency to "almost 
always focus narrowly on special types of strategies or else aggregate arbitrarily across 
all varieties of them with no real order" (Mintzberg, 1996, p.83). These anxieties will be 
returned to. 
As with the issue of competencies and capabilities discussed earlier (Section 2.2), the 
terminology of classification is complicated, and often contradictory. The author believes 
that it is necessary to establish clear definitions that will be used in the forthcoming 
analysis and so refers to the work of Chrisman et al (1988), which addresses this subject 
in great detail. The definitions furnished by Chrisman et al are of interest in two respects: 
the distinction between classification systems and classification schemes, and their full 
explanation of the attributes of 'taxa' in a taxonomy. The subject of taxa, taxonomies, 
and typologies is addressed below in Section 2.5.3, so it is to the distinction between 
classification schemes and systems that the discussion now turns. 
According to Chrisman et ai, to be effective a classification system "must be based on the 
key characteristics of the entities that are classified" (Chrisman et ai, 1988, p.416), a 
definition that they argue is based on the original writings on classification by Darwin. 
In a business context, these key characteristics measure "the theoretically and practically 
important within-group similarities and between-group differences of organizational 
strategies" (Chrisman et ai, 1988, p.416-417). To be considered a system "all 
characteristics describing scope, segment differentiation, and types of competitive 
weapons" should be included (Chrisman et ai, 1988, p.417). Failure to be inclusive 
downgrades a classification system to the designation of classification scheme. By 
definition, therefore, a classification scheme is a typology which seeks to classify aspects 
of intergroup relationships, but which does not describe all aspects of those relationships. 
Hence, Chrisman et al argue Porter's (1980) generic strategy is not a system, as it is not 
internally homogeneous. Furthermore is not collectively exhaustive, as it does not 
possess all of the key characteristics to fulfil its stated task5 (Chrisman et ai, 1988, p.419). 
This is due to the typology's failure to include segment differentiation, as will be discussed below. 
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Additionally, Abell's (1980) typology similarly is considered a scheme as it is not 
internally homogeneous, is not labelled consistently in respect of the existing literature, 
and also does not possess all of the key characteristics required for its task6 (Chrisman et 
ai, 1988, p.421). By this definition, therefore, there are no classification systems 
presented in this analysis, with the exception of Chrisman et aI's own, which is argued to 
overcome the deficiencies of Porter and Abell, by meeting all of the attributes of a 
classification system7, although in respect of its parsimoniousness this is open to question. 
Chrisman et aI's taxonomy is discussed more fully in Section 2.5.5.4. Henceforth all 
references to classification constructs will be referred to as schemes, rather than systems, 
with the exception of Chrisman et aI's own. The generic term 'systems of classification' 
will be used to discuss both classification systems and schemes. 
What then are the objectives of classification schemes? Broadly, there are two. The first 
of these is an attempt by an author to provide a definitive8 series of options available to 
decision makers, in particular organisational situations. As stated in Section 2.5.1, these 
situations may relate to corporate, business or whole strategic systems decision making, 
and have been adapted by other authors for use in specific industry conditions. For 
example, Chrisman et al (1988, p.413) note the work of authors such as Hofer (1980) in 
developing systems of classification for application in turnaround situations, Harrigan 
(1980, 1984) in declining industries and in cases of vertical integration, Woo and Cooper 
(1982) in low-share businesses, and Galbraith and Schendal (1983) and Robinson and 
Pearce (1985) in manufacturing businesses. The second objective, in most cases at least, 
is to provide an analytical tool. This aspect, as will be demonstrated, is truer of the 
business level systems of classification reviewed here than those at a corporate level, and 
seeks to enable the observer to understand organisational success or failure by reference 
to a framework. Hence Porter titles his seminal 1980 work "Competitive Strategy: 
Techniques for analysing industries and competitors" (Porter, 1980). Systems of 
6 
A product of the typology's lack of all available competitive weapons. 
7 
The ten attributes of an effective classification system are that it is mutually exclusive, internally 
homogeneous, collectively exhaustive, stable, relevantly titled, possesses all of the key characteristics, is 
aimed generally rather than specifically, is parsimonious, allows for a hierarchy, and is timeless 
(Chrisman et aI, 1988, p.416-417). 
8 
Some authors, such as Porter, argue for the definitive nature of their work (Porter, 1980, p.35), while 
otllers such as Miles and Snow recognise the likelihood tlmt their work will be developed by other authors 
(Miles and Snow, 1978, p.166). The use of the tenn 'definitive' is therefore a generalisation, albeit 
calculated to reflect the general position of authors in their field. 
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classification can therefore be used as a checklist against which options can be adduced, 
and an analytical tool against which performance can be assessed. 
As stated previously, systems of classification have been, and remain extremely popular. 
Partially, this popularity can be explained by the desire of the social scientist or business 
researcher to develop and expand upon the subject using methods which approximate to 
those found in the natural sciences (Cooper and Emory, 19959). The vocabulary of this 
part of the strategy literature is liberally distributed with terms such as 'classification', 
'configuration', 'typology' and 'taxonomy', all of which originated in the natural sciences. 
The desire to place observable behaviour in organisations into 'typologies', for example, 
is also seeking to a certain extent to introduce an approximation of the 'governing laws' 
that are present in the natural sciences, to this field. 
The origins of many of the pre-eminent systems of classification, it has been suggested, 
can be traced to the late 1960' s/early 1970' s (Hoskisson et ai, 1999). This development 
within the literature, towards more quantifiable approaches allowing more rigorous 
statistical analysis, has been portrayed as a reaction against the perception of management 
research as an unscientific endeavour, lacking in real worth or validity. Systems of 
classification, while adopting scientific terminology, were therefore also striving for 
scientific validity. 
Systems of classification therefore imply the ability of the researcher to impose order upon 
the diffuse concepts and relationships of strategy, resource, environment, and human 
interactions. The intention is that these concepts can therefore be (i) understood, (ii) 
measured/classified, and (iii) predicted. Systems of classification therefore strive to 
provide the management sciences with a set of' governing laws', the prior possession of 
which is felt to provide the natural sciences with their inherent validity, and implied 
superiority of procedure and outcome, over the social sciences. However, it may be 
noted that the problems most generally associated with system building in social sciences 
concern the absences of governing laws, or at least a general agreement over what form 
these governing laws take, which arguably undermines the attempt to establish scientific 
validity. Researchers are, it is argued "committed to a particular school of thought or 
methodology .... (and as a result ofwhich) ... very often the lack of understanding of the 
precise nature of each archetype generates a great deal of criticism and cynicism" (Eilon, 
9 
Cooper and Emory note that "good research uses the scientific method" (Cooper and Emory. 1995. p.12). 
The question of the ability of social science to achieve scientific approaches to research is addressed at 
length in Section 3.1. of Chapter Three. 
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1974, p.9) and this damages the overall perception of social science research as a valid 
discipline. 
This absence reflects a situation where writers in the field have failed to arrived at a 
methodological approach to research which applies a single method to the consensual 
satisfaction ofall exponents of research in the field. In the following chapter, the question 
of competing schools of research philosophy will be covered, to throw more light upon 
this subject (Section 3.1). For the purposes of this review, however, it is sufficient to 
understand that writers are attempting to create a fully validated series of governing laws, 
to understand the interactions and behaviour of organisations in the market place. 
On a more purely practical level, systems of classification provide an antidote to the 
problem identified by Chandler (1962). Chandler argued that the process of strategy 
formulation was unique to each organisation, due to the infinite number of permutations 
of environment, personality, resource, products, processes and so on that must be 
considered in the strategic formulation process. He argued that the only way of making 
sense of that number of permutations was to develop certain generic archetypes which 
allowed the most commonly reoccurring permutations to be identified, classified, and 
understood. Other authors, especially those whose work is reviewed below, have argued 
that this form of classification is fully justified, and indeed approximates the process 
generally used throughout the scientific community (Smith et ai, 1986). Systems of 
classification, and specifically generic strategies, have been further identified as 
representing a reaction to a failure in the literature of economics. McGee and Thomas 
point to a 'gaping hole' "left by economists' traditional focus on the two polar cases of 
pure competition and pure monopoly" (McGee and Thomas, 1986, p.141), and argue that 
there is a need to understand what occurs in between. Hence the development of the 
field. 
As noted earlier, one basic reservation associated with systems of classification, and 
generic approaches in particular, is their tendency to adopt either too narrow, or in some 
cases too broad, a scope. Ketchen et al (1993) provide an explanation for how this 
difference can emerge, when they note that there are two major approaches to the 
definition and comparison of organisational configuration: an inductive approach which 
"concentrates upon maximising internal validity while sacrificing generalisability"; and a 
deductive approach which "focuses on producing configurations generated deductively 
from prior theory", and consequently which produces configurations which "apply broadly 
and are not dependent on particular industry contexts" (Ketchen et ai, 1993, p.1280). 
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Clearly, criticisms flow from the scope of either approach. Narrow, industry focussed 
studies can not be said to apply to other industries without empirical testing. Broader 
models, based upon greater generalisation can not hope "to be simultaneously general, 
accurate and simple" (Weick, 1979, p.35), and therefore have lead to criticism for 
producing "trivial, inconclusive research" (Weick, 1979, p.36), expressing a view also 
shared by White (1986, p.220). Any use, therefore, of systems of classification or generic 
strategies must acknowledge and explicitly recognise "the necessary trade-offs" that using 
such approaches entail (Miller and Dess, 1993, p.554). One interesting aspect of this 
debate on applicability is the view developed by Douglas and Rhee (1989), who argue 
that there is an inherent bias towards 'Americanism' in work of this kind. Most writers 
draw from experience, or empirical evidence, generated in the USA and therefore the use 
of such systems should arguably be confined to situations similar to that of the USA, or 
at least with an awareness that there may be a need to account for bias. This inevitably 
impacts upon the ongoing applications of approaches of this kind. Indeed the same could 
be said of many of the dominant theories across all management disciplines. 
A further problem with generic strategies is essentially a by-product of the competition 
between differing research philosophies, but is also part of the nature of research in the 
business arena itself This problem relates to the fact that many of the generic models 
developed by authors are in direct competition with each other. This suggests that one 
implied aspect of the scientific method - that researchers work together to create a better 
understanding - is not always evident in the business environment. As will become clear 
in the following discussion, there is some evidence of writers adopting the Newtonian 
approach lO, but too often this is not the case. 
2.5.3 The Features of Classification Schemes 
The preceding section sought to identify the rationale which has developed in the 
literature to justify the development of systems of classification. This section seeks to 
identify the features of these schemes and systems, to explore the differing types, and their 
accompanying vocabulary. It was noted above that systems of classification tended to be 
aimed at fulfilling two disparate roles: that of checklist, and of analytical tool. This 
section is more concerned with their use as an analytical tool. Under this guise, what is 
sought from systems of classification are approaches which can identify and explain 
commonly occurring clusters of aspects of organisational strategies, structures and 
10 
Newton attributed his achievements to "standing on the shoulders of giants", a reference to building upon 
the work of predecessors, and is the widely quoted symbol of scientific progress. The full quote reads "If 
I have seen further it is by standing on y" shoulders of giants", Newton to Hooke, 5 Feb. 1676. 
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processes (Miller and Mintzberg, 1983; Miller, 1987; Mintzberg, 1990a). 
The rationale underpinning approaches of this kind is summarised by Ketchen et al 
(1993): "at the heart of the configurational perspective is the assumption that increased 
understanding of organisational phenomena can be better achieved by identifYing distinct, 
internally consistent sets offirms than by seeking to uncover relationships that hold across 
all organisations. Although the configurational prospective emphasises codification - the 
classification of organisations into typologies and taxonomies - prediction is also possible 
when appropriate theory guides the process of defining configurations" (Ketchen et ai, 
1993, p.1278). Generic strategies therefore identifY distinct types of firms, explain why 
they are distinct and the elements of their shared distinction, and how they interact with 
other firms that exist within their industry but not within their distinct group. In this 
sense, generic implies membership of a group, rather than specific individuality. They 
may also be used to predict behaviour. Chrisman et al identify four objectives for a 
classification system: 
~ differentiation, 
~ generalisation, 
~ identification, and 
~ information retrieval (Chrisman et ai, 1988, p.416-5). 
Ketchen et al drew attention to two distinct forms of classification: typologies and 
taxonomies, which are often erroneously used interchangeably (Ketchen et ai, 1993, 
p.1278-9). The difference between a typology and a taxonomy is explored with reference 
to the work of Miller (1996, 1999), who suggests that the literature's tendency to develop 
either approach in isolation contributes to its shortcomings. 
Typologies, according to Miller, at their best are memorable, neat and evocative (Miller, 
1999, p.27). They differentiate between types of strategy, organisations and decision-
making styles, and if successful, they show "how and why the attributes in each of their 
types interrelate" (Miller, 1996). Prominent examples of typology are those presented by 
Bums and Stalker (1961), Miles and Snow (1978), and Mintzberg (1979). Typology 
therefore is the study oftypes and of their succession or sequence. When typologies are 
effective they are: 
~ well informed by theory, and hence draw distinctions and relationships of 
conceptual importance; 
invoke contrasts that facilitate empirical progress, and which resolve persistent 
debates and conflicts; and are 
clearly assembled in order that the elements and variables used to describe each 
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type are "shown to cohere in thematic and interesting ways" that have important 
conceptual, evolutionary or normative implications (Miller, 1996, p.S07). 
In other words, typologies should build upon existing concepts and themes in order to 
make an active contribution to the development of knowledge. Typologies which are not 
grounded in theory will lack the essential attributes that ensure external and internal 
validity. Empirical testing should be undertaken to assure validity. 
Taxonomies, according to Miller, differ from typologies in being more empirical and more 
numerical. They use statistical techniques to test for evidence of relationships between 
firms in an industry to identify 'natural clusters'. Taxonomy therefore provides a 
classification of categories and their principles, including an explanation of their 
formation. They are therefore more quantitative than typologies. According to Miller: 
"the merit of the taxonomy approach is that when it is well executed it discovers reliable 
and conceptually significant clusterings of attributes" (Miller, 1996, p.S07). Miller notes 
that taxonomies have come under considerable criticism principally for promising more 
than they are able to deliver. He notes the work of Barney and Hoskisson (1990), and 
McGee and Thomas (1986) who criticise taxonomies for a lack of theoretical significance, 
several authors including Ketchen et at (1993) who criticise taxonomies for being 
arbitrary and narrow, and Hatten and Hatten's (1987) concern for their output of 
unreliable or unstable results. 
In Miller's analysis, most typologies and taxonomies fail to achieve their objectives. As 
configurations seek to describe organisational wholes "more should be done to discover 
their thematic and systemic aspects - to probe into just why and how their elements 
interrelate and complement each other to produce the driving characteristics of an 
enterprise" (Miller, 1996, p.S07). These elements Miller describes as 'organizing themes', 
key influences which drive a particular strategy "placing a marked emphasis upon some 
tactics and a supportive co-alignment among many others" (Miller, 1996, p.S07). Miller 
notes that qualitative studies using 'rich historical data from individual companies' 
provide assistance in discovering such themes, and hence an understanding of the inter-
relationships of configurations. Having determined the members of a configuration, 
Miller argues, multivariate analysis "can disclose important quantitative relationships 
among their elements that confirm the themes". In such a way, the elements of typology 
and taxonomy are required to be joined to ensure the validity of the examination. The 
importance of the determination of organising themes is recognised by the author, and will 
become a focus of the research in relation to Objective Three and Supporting Objective 
One throughout this thesis. 
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Having reviewed the features of systems of classification it is now opportune to consider 
the work of some of the key authors in the field. The next three sections present systems 
attempting to offer strategic options and analytical tools at three different levels: the 
corporate, the business, and the whole systems level, incorporating both corporate and 
business level decisions. Within each section the utility and objectives of each approach 
will be discussed, and a determination of the appropriate designation reached. 
2.5.4 Corporate Level Classification Schemes 
As stated previously, the author adopts a definition of corporate strategy as involving 
decisions which "define the scope of the firm in terms of the industries and markets in 
which it competes" (Grant, 1998, p.19), or domain selection (Bourgeois, 1996). This 
definition is extended by reference to the authors Pearce and Robinson, whose system of 
classification of 'grand or master' strategies (Pearce and Robinson, 1994, p.223), forms 
the basis of this section of the review. Corporate strategy decisions involve, they argue, 
setting the "basic direction for strategic actions", and provide "the basis of coordinated 
and sustained efforts directed toward achieving long term business objectives" (Pearce 
and Robinson, 1994, p.223). 
The significance of considering the views of Pearce and Robinson at this time result from 
their work on the question of which options are available to companies in the selection 
of corporate strategies. They undertook an analysis of the literature with respect to viable 
options in domain selection, and have identified what they believe to be a definitive list 
of fourteen grand strategies. This work is essentially a synthesis of the observations and 
conclusions drawn from earlier authors, initially starting with Ansoif's work with growth 
vector components (1965), and a range of other authors such as Pearce and Harvey 
(1990), Cooper (1979, 1983), Carroll (1984) in relation to concentrated growth 
approaches, Kotler (1987) in relation to market and product development, Perry and 
Porter (1985) in relation to horizontal integration, Harrigan (1984) in relation to vertical 
integration, Devlin and Bleackley (1988) in relation to concentric diversification, Pearce 
and Robbins (1993) and Robbins and Pearce (1994) in relation to turnaround approaches, 
Gomes-Casseres (1989) in relation to joint ventures, Clarke and Gall (1987) and Chastain 
(1987) in relation to divestment, Glueck (1980), Schendal et al (1976) and Schmidt 
(1987) in relation to joint ventures, and Lei and Slocum (1991) in relation to strategic 
alliances. 
Pearce and Robinson's work is essentially therefore a list of options, which in synthesising 
the work of many authors attempts to identifY an extended portfolio, or menu, of strategic 
options available to corporate strategy decision makers seeking to establish their strategic 
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domain. This section now explores their work in depth. The reason for this depth of 
interest is fourfold. Firstly, because the strategic options comprising the configuration are 
all well known approaches which are routinely mentioned in the strategy literature, and 
which are extensively referred to throughout this research. Therefore, a clear definition 
at this stage is beneficial. Secondly, the framework presented by Pearce and Robinson 
is used extensively to map the strategic decisions taken by the companies under 
investigation within the thesis, in pursuit of the research's first objective. The rationale 
underpinning the decision to utilise this framework is explored in full in Section 3.4.3.2. 
Thirdly, a full definition of these corporate strategic options enables a clear distinction to 
be drawn with the business level options to be presented in Section 2.5.5. Finally, that the 
framework developed by Pearce and Robinson, from original work by Pearce (1982) 
which was later extended (Pearce et aI, 1987), continues to be a frequently cited 
reference and an important influence on current management research (Richard, 2000; 
Kumar and Subramanian, 2000; Hatfield et aI, 1998; Kumar et aI, 1998; Judge and 
Krishnan, 1994; Pearce and Robbins, 1993; Narver and Slater, 1990, among others). 
Before presenting the classification scheme, it is necessary to comment upon its objective. 
The scheme suggested by Pearce and Robinson is concerned with domain selection, and 
undertakes this objective by presenting a series of options from which an organisation can 
select. It is therefore less of an analytical tool, and more of a checklist. However, the 
author believes that this additional utility can potentially be added to the model by a 
process of extending the work started by Pearce and Robinson. This process, of 
identifying certain generic combinations of grand strategies, was alluded to in the original 
work but not made explicit (pearce and Robinson, 1994, p.246), although the authors did 
develop a series of grand strategy matrices (pearce and Robinson, 1994, p.264-265). This 
aspect of the analysis of Pearce and Robinson's work will be returned to in Section 
2.5.4.15. In addition, a possible difficulty the author identifies with respect to Pearce and 
Robinson's view that anyone of the fourteen grand strategies "could serve as the basis 
for achieving the major long-term objectives of a single firm" (Pearce and Robinson, 
1994, p.224) is discussed and critiqued. 
The fourteen grand corporate strategies suggested by Pearce and Robinson were: 
Concentrated Growth Vlll Conglomerate Diversification 
11 Market Development IX Turnaround 
111 Product Development x Divestment 
IV Innovation XI Liquidation 
v Horizontal Integration Xli Joint Ventures 
VI Vertical Integration Xlll Strategic Alliances 
Vll Concentric Diversification XIV Consortia 
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Each of these strategic options will be defined with respect to four key variables: the basic 
premise underlying the option; the characteristics necessary for that strategic option to 
succeed; the most favourable market conditions for the use of the option; and the risks 
and rewards for following such an approach. These definitions appear in Table 2.7. A 
summary for each option is also provided. The grand strategies identified by Pearce and 
Robinson are of considerable importance to this research, and it would have been 
preferable to include a fuller exploration. However, such an extension of this review was 
not practical in the present work. 
2.5.4.1 Concentrated Growth 
Pearce and Robinson hold the view that for many organisations, a concentrated growth 
approach is very often the most viable option. It favours organisations which have a clear 
understanding of their market, and are able to exploit that understanding by making a 
better product offering, based upon the effectiveness of its operations and promotional 
ability. Concentrated growth can be a niche strategy, where more generalist 
organisation's have overlooked need, but it is unlikely to be a successful approach in a 
dynamic environment, unless it is extended. A concentrated growth approach involves 
efficiency of operations, as well as organisational effectivenessll . It also involves 
inhabiting a narrower domain, either in terms of product offering, or market definition. 
Overall, a concentrated growth approach aims to minimise risk. It is clearly associated 
with a competitive forces, rather than a resource based, view of a firm's strategy. 
2.5.4.2 Market Development 
The market development approach presents a company with the most risk averse method 
of extending a concentrated growth approach outside of its natural market area. 
Providing the company has good market intelligence, has access to effective distribution 
channels and promotional efforts, has the resources to support a new campaign, and that 
barriers to entry are not too strong, this approach represents the most effective way of 
working an organisation's core competencies and resources more effectively. In effect, 
a market development approach involves widening the domain of a concentrated growth 
approach. It can therefore be seen as embracing a resource based view of the firm. 
2.5.4.3 Product Development 
A product development approach involves a company seeking to strengthen its hold over 
II 
An aspect to which Pearce and Robinson paid less attention, preferring to focus upon the potential of 
marketing to enhance the strategy. The author argues that improved efficient and effective operations are 
naturally to be located within a concentrated growth grand strategy. 
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its existing domain, by improving its product offering possibly to head off a potential 
threat from a rival. The approach does not imply a widening of its product domain, unless 
the product development approach runs parallel to a market development approach. The 
approach is more risk apparent than a concentrated growth approach: there are of course 
famous examples of instances where a product development approach has resulted in a 
disastrous outcome for the company seeking to employ it12, but suggests changing 
circumstances in its operating environment, or the approaching end of a product's natural 
life cycle. The approach clearly fits with a competitive forces concept of strategy making 
within the firm. 
2.5.4.4 Innovation 
An innovative approach can have high risks but also high rewards. It requires a company 
to be fully aware of its competencies and resources, but may require the sort of swift 
action which mediates against a full audit of capabilities and resources. By innovating 
effectively, a company may be able to establish barriers to entry to prevent other 
companies benefiting from its efforts. However, empirical evidence suggests that most 
innovations do not bring benefits, and so an innovative approach should only be 
considered with caution, unless the company is supremely confident in its capabilities. 
Innovation could fit with either a competitive forces or a resource based view of strategy 
within the firm. 
2.5.4.5 Horizontal Integration 
Horizontal integration is a strategic option open to companies wishing to grow their 
market domains, but which are unwilling or unable to do so organically. The purchase 
of an organisation occupying the same level of its market, and performing compatible 
activities, brings with it the potential for exploiting greater market share and reduced 
costs of operation, but must be weighted against the potential for such a move to result 
in incompatible cultures and systems, providing a drain on the resources brought to bear 
on the project. Success is clearly therefore dependent upon understanding both the 
capability of existing resources, and the market that a firm is seeking to serve. 
2.5.4.6 Vertical Integration 
Vertical integration is a strategy available to companies wishing to extend their business 
activities into areas where they have no existing expertise, but which have a direct impact 
12 
TIle case of tIle Coca Cola Corporation and the introduction of New Coke provides a salutary lesson for 
companies attempting a product development approach (pendergrast, 1994). 
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upon their ability to function with reduced risk in their key business activities. Vertical 
integration is a potentially risky strategic option, due to all of the well documented 
problems of integrating two companies systems and cultures, but may be overcome by 
introducing a holding company structure, and making the new acquisition a subsidiary 
rather than seeking to integrate it into the organisation. Vertical integration aims to 
reduce the risks associated with a company's business by ensuring that its lines of supply, 
or the demands for its products are guaranteed. This approach holds more potential in 
competitive markets where there is a reduced threat of opposition to takeovers, which 
may appear to lead to the exercise of monopoly powers. Vertical integration is perhaps 
more commonly associated with a competitive forces concept offirm strategy. A model 
favouring vertical integration has been presented by the petroleum industry (Edwards et 
ai, 2000, Obaidan and Scully, 1993, Levin, 1981), where companies have identified the 
importance of establishing a presence at each stage of the process, as the' location' of 
profitability has been found to 'shift'13. Industrial economists, like Helm, have argued that 
companies operating within industries prone to risk will inevitably seek solutions based 
upon vertical integration as a means of systematically addressing their exposure to that 
risk (Helm and Jenkinson, 1997). 
2.5.4. 7 Concentric Diversification 
Concentric diversification is aimed at taking over a company that complements the 
functions of the purchaser, and provides an opportunity to add value. This would be 
principally achieved through opening up possibilities for synergy. Diversification differs 
from integration in that the company being purchased will have no formal linkages to the 
core business of the purchaser, and therefore even concentric diversification may be 
subject to the inherent risks of making such an investment. Diversification to benefit 
performance in an existing market would appear to be aligned to a competitive forces 
approach. Diversification to enable existing resources to be redeployed would be aligned 
to a resource based view of strategy. 
2.5.4.8 Conglomerate Diversification 
A high risk option, only open to organisations with considerable financial resources able 
to locate suitable investment opportunities with the aim of generating high returns which 
are not available to them from investing in their core businesses. Diversification of this 
13 
Due to vagaries in the market, such as ease of extraction, seasonable demand, competitor activity or act 
of government the location of profits can be found in extraction, refinement, or wholesale or retail sale 
to consumers. Therefore, in order to ensure that profit taking opportunities are not missed, a petroleum 
company needs to be present at each stage. 
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kind is a specialised talent, and very large scale investments tend to be undertaken by 
companies that occupy a specialist position in the economy. This option fits a resource 
based view of strategy, ifa firm's principal resources involve the due diligence capability 
and large financial holdings mentioned above. 
2.5.4.9 Turnaround 
Turnaround as a strategy is a signal that the company is not performing to expectations, 
but is also a signal that the management have realised the shortcomings of its current set 
of strategies. Turnaround involves managed cost and asset reduction to stabilize the 
company, and establish a new operating climate in which it may begin to seek its key 
organisational objectives once again. Pearce and Robinson describe this process as being 
"planned retrenchment" which results initially at least in "near-term financial stabilization" 
(pearce and Robinson, 1994, p.237). Charles Hofer reaffirms this point when he states 
that "what is needed most in a turnaround situation is some clear-cut strategy for guiding 
all organisational actions so that scarce resources are not dissipated in unproductive 
ways" (Hofer, 1980, p.20). 
2.5.4.10 Divestiture 
Divestiture can be selected as a strategic option for either positive or negative reasons. 
Business units may be divested to take advantage of a favourable valuation of the 
elements to be divested, or as part of a 'make-or-buy' decision. Alternatively, they may 
be divested as a consequence of an ill-judged integration or differentiation strategy, or as 
a sign that a turnaround strategy has not achieved its hoped for objective. Divestiture is 
not generally a strategic option that a company will set out to pursuel4 . 
2.5.4.11 Liquidation 
Liquidation as a grand strategy is perhaps a reflection of the failure of other strategic 
approaches. Liquidation involves the sale of a company, but not as a going concern. 
Liquidation is, according to Pearce and Robinson "an admission of failure" which would 
be taken only as a last resort to avoid damaging the asset value of the company to existing 
stakeholders, through a planned divestiture of all of the company's assets. Further 
discussion of this grand strategy is not deemed necessary. 
14 
The only instances where this would not be the case would be the actions of so-called 'corporate raiders' 
who buy failing companies with the sole intention of improving their profitability before selling them on 
to the highest bidder. Most famously, this sort of behaviour has been identified with Hanson. 
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Table 2.7: Features of Grand Strategies 
Section 
Reference 
2.5.4.1 
2.5.4.2 
2.5A.3 
2.5.4.4 
Grand 
Strategy 
Concentrated 
Gro\\th 
Market 
Development 
Product 
Development 
Innovation 
Basic Premise 
Making its existing share of 
the market work harder. Also 
knO\m as 'market 
penetration' or Concentration 
Strategy'. Utilising effective 
management approaches. 
An extension of the 
concentrated growth 
approach, aimed at reaching 
new markets with existing 
products. 
The substantial modification 
of an existing product! 
development of a new 
product, to be marketed to 
existing customers. 
A means of overcoming 
instability in operating 
domain. Seeking first-mover 
advantage. Evident in new 
product or service 
development. 
Characteristics Necessary for 
Success 
Ability to assess market need, 
improve knowledge of buyer 
behaviour, enhance price 
sensitivity, market itself 
effectively. Limitation of scope 
of strategy. Focussed upon 
building core competencies. 
Transportability or easy 
adaptability. High level of 
environmental monitoring 
capability. Promotion capability. 
An existing customer base; a 
product which "ill have appeal 
to this customer base. Requires 
environmental scanning 
capability. Innovation. 
Availability of appropriate 
internal resources. Market 
uncertainty. Unrealised market 
demand. Creati,ity. Innovation 
seeks to create a new market, or 
make offerings of a competitor 
obsolete. Often seen as a last 
resort option. 
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Favourable Market Conditions 
Market resistant to 
technological advances; mature 
markets; industry not product 
saturated; growth potential; 
distinctive; stability; unsatisfied 
niche markets 
Same as in 2.5.4.1, but low 
barriers to entry, and gaps in 
existing provision. 
Same as success characteristics: 
Company will pursue if its 
concentrated grO\\th approach is 
failing. Othemise, same as 
concentrated grO\\th. 
High risk, so assessing 
favourable conditions is 
difficult. But opportunity must 
be e\ident Clear understanding 
of the market, and of resource 
implications. Managerial 
competence. 
Risks and Rewards 
Use in stable industry would see 
great potential reward; use in 
changing environment would see 
problems; over commitment may 
lead to overlooking more 
promising environment. 
Relatively few risks, great 
potential to exploit existing 
resources and capabilities. 
Relatively low, if company 
understands its customers. 
Rewards include deepening hold 
over market, building barriers to 
entry, exploiting its resources. 
Considerable risk, if what is 
intended is not fully understood, 
or possesses inappropriate 
resources. Rewards can, however 
by considerable if product finds 
its market. 
Table 2.7: Features of Grand Strategies continued 
2.5.4.5 
2.5.4.6 
2.5.4.7 
Horizontal 
Integration 
Vertical 
Integration 
Concentric 
Diversification 
Growth through acquisition of 
organisations at the same 
stage of production-marketing 
chain. Aim to increase market 
share. 
Gro\\th through acquisition of 
supplier of raw materials or 
customer for outputs. Aimed 
at reducing risk. 
A departure from existmg 
business, although related in 
some respect. Variety of 
reasons can lead to decision 
but synergy crucial here. 
Some degree of commonality. 
Expected benefits must outweigh 
cost of acquisition. Increased 
market share, or opportunity for 
synergy. Capability to manage 
new demand, and the merger. 
Shared attributes. 
Availability of either suppliers or 
customers at the right price, in 
order to offset uncertainty. 
Particularly important if number 
of suppliers or customers is 
small. 
Compatibility is key, in either 
products, markets, distribution 
channels, technology, resources. 
Aim synergy, but not 
interdependence. 
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Markets where benefits 
following removal of 
competition, either from 
increased sales or reduced costs. 
These benefits must be cheaper 
to buy than develop organically. 
Costs or profits indicate that 
power of buyers or power of 
customers too great. Overly 
turbulent environment. Hope 
that control will reduce 
turbulence. Possibly anti-
competitive. 
Compatible companies, offering 
compatibility, at an agreeable 
price. Transferable capabilities. 
Overestimating value to be 
achieved. Underestimating 
associated problems of fit. 
Increased dependence upon 
industry in decline. Benefits 
include wider scope for 
concentrated growth strategy, 
including increased market 
share, increased effectiveness or 
reduced costs. 
Possession of appropriate 
expertise, or competencies. May 
undermine companies existing 
successful relationship with 
market. Can improve 
management of risk. Can take 
profits wherever they are offered. 
Risk exists if cost of investment 
outweighs benefit achieved. Can 
be overcome in negotiation 
process. High value added can 
result from effective synergy. 
Table 2.7: Features of Grand Strategies 
2.5.4.8 
2.5.4.9 
2.5.4.10 
2.5.4.11 
Conglomerate 
Diversification 
Turnaround 
Divestiture 
Liquidation 
Undertaken to take advantage 
of investment opportunity. 
Enhanced profitability. No 
obvious synergy. 
Utilised if performance weak, 
or if in terminal decline. 
Aimed at fortifying distinctive 
competencies. Attempted 
through either cost or asset 
reduction. 
Sale of a firm, or a 
component part of a firm. 
May follow failure of 
turnaround, or may involve 
sale of non-core business, or 
business whose value is 
greater to someone else. 
Reflection of failure 
elsewhere. 
Considerable financial resources. 
Skills in portfolio management, 
including balanced portfolio. 
Capability in due diligence. 
Strong lines of credit. 
Motivated by failure, approach 
seeks effective management. 
Remedial actions. Need to be 
aware of need for such action, 
and focussed upon demands of 
performance improvement. 
Planned retrenchment. 
Not generally an option company 
will set out to pursue. Tend to 
arise as an option, for 
advantageous or disadvantageous 
reasons. May see a failed 
takeover being divested, a partial 
sale of a non-core businesses 
following a takeover, or an offer 
too good to refuse. 
Sale of the company. 
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Organisation generating high 
profits, seeking advantageous 
investment opportunity, or faced 
with cash crisis needing income 
generator. 
Company would hope to avoid 
necessity, but if necessary would 
hope to anticipate need before 
too much damage done. 
Decision based upon sound 
judgement. Severity will 
depend upon severity of problem 
to be remedied. 
Needs to be a buyer which 
matches the company's 
valuation of its asset. 
Indicates failure. 
High risk, calling for specialised 
skills. Requires considerable 
resource application, and high 
evaluative capability. Benefits 
include enhanced cash flow or 
improved return on investments. 
Risks can be greater in not 
following turnaround approach 
when perceived necessary. Ill-
judged retrenchment can make 
situation worse. Rewards may be 
survival or improved, leaner, 
performance. 
If asset sold when true value not 
assessed, may be costly to 
reverse. This in particular with 
'make or buy' decisions. 
Judicious divestment may bring 
considerable benefit. 
Attempt to realise as much 
value for stakeholders. 
Table 2.7: Features of Grand Strategies continued 
2.5.4.12 
2.5.4.13 
2.5.4.14 
loint Ventures 
Strategic 
Alliances 
Consortia 
Attempt to overcome 
weakness/achieve opportunity 
by two or more companies 
working together. Separate 
entities/joint ownership. Risk 
averse means of market 
development. 
Differ from joint ventures in 
that equity positions not 
taken. Licensing agreements. 
Means of getting products to 
new market with limited risk. 
Relationship between several 
organisations, developed to 
bid for large projects. 
Complementary skills. 
Opening new opportunities to 
existing skills. 
Source: Adapted from Pearce and Robinson, 1994, p. 223-245 
Complementary skills, resources. 
Willingness to cede some control. 
Do require continued support 
despite being separate from core 
business. 
Relatively risk free. Locating 
suitable partner key concern. If 
successful, method of market 
development. 
Must have all skills necessary to 
deliver contract. Must be able to 
complete on time and cost. 
Company must demonstrate what 
able to contribute to project. 
Project management the key 
factor. 
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Viable solution to desire to do 
business across borders, when 
other solutions too expensive. 
May enable technology transfer. 
Opportunity to overcome 
obstacles, such as import quotas. 
May be option where joint 
ventures would not work. 
Demand for such alliances, so 
economic gro\',th. Must possess 
right capabilities to play active 
role. Failure can drag project 
back. 
Risk of lost capital, operational 
control, or goodwill. Rewards 
may be highly compensatory, and 
relatively risk free. Market 
development. 
Harm to reputation. May enable 
further exploitation of existing 
productsibrands, at low risk. 
Group protection, but also 
significant demands. Provides an 
arena in which to exploit core 
competencies. 
2.5.4.12 Joint Ventures 
Joint ventures are partnerships between two or more companies resulting in the creation 
of a third entity for the purpose of pursuing common objectives. They are risk averse, and 
can facilitate an organisation's ability to pursue, for example, a market development 
strategy that would otherwise have been beyond it. Essentially, joint ventures can fit both 
a competitive forces or a resource based view of strategy. 
2.5.4.13 Strategic Alliances 
A risk averse solution to market development objectives that may prove intractable due 
to difficulties encountered attempting to enter the new market. The most common form 
of alliance would take the form of a formal licencing arrangement, allowing a strategic 
partner to act as the agent of the first company in their home territory, paying a premium 
to their strategic partner. 
2.5.4.14 Consortia 
Consortia are large scale alliances between companies possessing compatible skills and 
resources aimed at winning and then fulfilling major contracts. Principally of benefit to 
organisations seeking market development opportunities at a greater scale than available 
to them through organic means. Consortia present a viable route through which a more 
resource based approach could be operated. 
2.5. 4.15 Feature of the Typology 
This detailed review of the Pearce and Robinson list of grand strategies provides this 
research with a framework against which the strategic content of the RECs can be 
measured. The need for such a framework and the choice of the Pearce and Robinson list 
is addressed in Section 3.2. Before moving on to consider similar systems of classification 
for business level strategies, it is necessary to briefly summarise the features of this 
typology. Firstly, it is necessary to say that it is a typology rather than a taxonomy. It is 
clearly neat, memorable and evocative (Miller, 1986), but it does not seek to empirically 
produce explanations of relationships between the types, and hence is not a taxonomy 
(Miller, 1986). 
The work of Pearce and Robinson is also not a tool by which performance can be 
assessed. The business level systems of classification which follow all seek a dual utility: 
acting as a list of available options, and a self contained technique for assessing 
performance. The Pearce and Robinson approach is simply a list of options. It does not 
aspire to judge the workings of a company's domain selection. However, Pearce and 
Robinson do consider the formation of strategy combinations (Pearce and Robinson, 
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1994, p.246), as discussed earlier. The author believes that to some extent a 
comprehensive list of strategic combinations could add to the utility of the typology, by 
indicating a selection of internally valid and viable combinations. This enables the 
typology to be used as an analytical tool, in conjunction with either a competitive forces 
or a resource based view of the firm. Such a development would also help towards the 
achievement of Objective One of this thesis. As such, the author begins the process in 
Section 2.6 of this chapter, as part of the concluding remarks of this review of the 
literature. 
2.5.5 Business Level Classification Systems and Schemes 
As noted previously, the discussion of business strategies in this section concerns those 
decisions aimed at determining "how the firm competes within a particular industry or 
market", and hence with how a firm establishes competitive advantage (Grant, 1998, 
p.52). Alternatively, Ansoff's definition of what he terms 'competitive strategy'IS is the 
determination of a strategy "which specifies the distinctive approach which the firm 
intends to use in order to succeed in each of (its) strategic business areas", described as 
corporate strategies in this thesis (Ansoff, 1965, p.lll). Specifically, therefore, this 
section explores strategy approaches that companies may chose to pursue once the 
decisions regarding corporate strategy discussed in the preceding section have been taken: 
domain navigation (Bourgeois, 1996). 
The development of an understanding of business strategies has evolved over the last four 
decades. This understanding has developed from the work of Ansoff, through the major 
contribution of Porter, to a current situation where a wide range of hybrid systems of 
classification and generic strategy are available within the literature. Arguably, each new 
development has sought to refine the work of the preceding authors. Within this section, 
therefore, attention is paid to the work of Ansoff, Porter and to other authors who have 
either emphasised different aspects of the debate, or who have sought to refine the 
preceding work. However, it is not possible to present in detail all of the work that has 
been developed in what is an overcrowded field. Consequently, the work of Abell (1980), 
Chrisman et al (1988), and the synthesis offered by Johnson and Scholes (1999) are also 
reviewed, with mention being made to the work of other authors as appropriate. 
2.5.5.1 The Contribution of Ansoff 
The work of Ansoff strongly influenced the direction of the literature on strategy at both 
IS 
but which the author has chosen to term business strategy, as discussed in Section 2.1.1.6. 
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the corporate and business levels. His influence on the work of Pearce and Robinson, and 
other writers on corporate strategy classification, in particular through the concept of 
growth vector components, was mentioned in Section 2.5.4. Ansoff suggested that it was 
possible to specifY the kinds of strategic areas that a company intended to do business in 
(Ansoff, 1965, p.108). This approach Ansoff described as a 'portfolio strategy'. Within 
the portfolio strategy, Ansoff identified four components. These were the' geographical 
growth vector', 'competitive advantage', 'synergies' and' strategic flexibility'. It is the 
first item in the portfolio that is of interest in this section. Ansoff's geographical growth 
vector identified possible directions for a company's future strategic growth, as can be 
seen illustrated at Figure 2.4. 
F' Il!Ure 24A ff'G : nso s rowt bV ector c omponen s 
Present New 
Product 
Mission 
Present Market Product 
Penetration Development 
New Market Diversification 
Development 
Source: AnsoiI, 1965, p.109 
The rapid progress of industrial development in the second half of the Twentieth Century 
prompted his deliberations. In the first half of the Century, he argued, the relative 
simplicity of products in markets meant that a company's business strategy was largely 
prescribed. The optimal success strategy was simple. A company had to seek to 
"minimise the costs of (its) products and sell at a price equal to or less than (its) 
competitors", an approach he described as a market share or market position strategy 
(Ansoff, 1965, p.112). This approach relied upon the existence of standardised products, 
which were not readily differentiable. However, as the Century progressed, the extent to 
which consumers demanded differentiated products increased, alongside a proliferation 
of market types and locations, requiring the development of more sophisticated business 
strategies, as demonstrated in Figure 2.4. 
The matrix presented in Figure 2.4 shows a series of options available to an organisation 
wishing to: 
~ increase the returns it receives from its existing products in its existing markets ( 
a market penetration approach); 
~ locate new markets for its present products (a market development approach); 
~ create new products for its existing market (a product development approach); or 
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create new products for new markets (diversification). 
In essence, the approaches suggested by Ansoff's growth vector components were 
precursors of the systems of classification presented in the preceding section. Clearly, the 
market penetration approach approximates closely to Pearce and Robinson's concentrated 
growth approach, while market and product development are the same in each scheme, 
and Ansoff's diversification forms the basis of Pearce and Robinson's concentric and 
conglomerate diversification options. 
However, following on from this' corporate level' classification scheme, Ansoff suggests 
a business level classification scheme which was also to be highly influential. As a 
consequence of the changes in demand patterns and consumer behaviour he detected, 
Ansoff proposed four possible business strategies, which were: 
~ a market share maximisation strategy: the traditional approach which aimed to 
minimise costs, and to sell a product at a lower price than a competitor's; 
growth strategies: which were focussed strategies aimed specifically at raising an 
organisation's market share through such means as geographic market expansion, 
market segmentation et cetera; 
market differentiation strategies: which aimed at "creating a distinctive image on 
the minds of potential customers for the firm's products/services" (Ansoff, 1965, 
p.l13); and 
product/service differentiation: aimed at differentiating "the performance of the 
product/service from the competitors products/services" (Ansoff, 1965, p.113). 
Ansoff's principal contribution was therefore to suggest that price alone was no longer 
necessarily the only issue that a company should consider when deciding how its 
businesses should try to compete. Differentiating products from those of competitors 
through the use of such tactics as creating brand awareness, and by differentiating its 
approach to different segments in the market all became issues that a company needed to 
consider. 
2.5.5.2 The Contribution of Porter 
The work begun by Ansoffwas built upon most notably by Porter, who developed a more 
detailed theory from Ansoff's typology which became know as his generic competitive 
strategy typology. Porter began by taking the stand-point that business strategies (which 
Porter referred to as competitive strategies) involved "taking offensive or defensive 
actions to create a defendable position in an industry, to cope successfully with the five 
competitive forces and thereby yield a superior return on investment for the firm" (Porter, 
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1980, p.34). These five competitive forces were those of: the threat of new entrants; the 
bargaining power of buyers; the threat of substitute products or services; the bargaining 
power of suppliers; and the rivalry among existing firms. These were discussed above in 
this chapter's section on drivers of strategy, in Section 2.2.1. 
Porter acknowledges Chandler's statement about the singularity of the strategy process, 
when saying that the best strategy for a firm will ultimately be "an unique construction 
reflecting its particular circumstances" (porter, 1980, p.34). However, he also identifies 
three "internally consistent generic strategies, which can be used singly or in combination, 
for creating .... a defendable position in the long run" and allowing the firm to outperform 
its competitors (porter, 1980, p.34). These generic strategies were: overall cost 
leadership; differentiation; and focus. These concepts are well known, and so it is not 
proposed to explain them in great detail, although some explanation is necessary. The key 
requirements for a company seeking to utilise each approach are presented in Table 2.8, 
while some of the key conditions and implications of the pursuit of each strategy are 
presented in Table 2.9. Both tables are then briefly discussed. Readers wishing for a 
more detailed explanation are referred back to the original text. 
Table 2.8: Requirements of Pursuing Porter's Competitive Strategies 
Generic Strategy 
Overall Cost 
Leadership 
Differentiation 
Focus 
Commonly Required 
Skills and Resources 
Sustained capital investment and access to 
capital 
Process engineering skills 
intense supervision of labour 
Products designed for ease of manufacture 
Low-cost distribution system 
Strong marketing abilities 
Product engineering 
Creati ve flair 
Strong capability in basic research 
Corporate reputation for quality or 
technological leadership 
Long tradition in the industry or unique 
combination of skills drawn from other 
businesses 
Strong cooperation from chrumels 
Combination of the policies for overall cost 
leadership rulCl/or differentiation directed at 
the particular strategic target 
Source: Porter, 1980, p.40-41 
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Common Organisational 
Requirements 
Tight cost control 
Frequent, detailed control reports 
Structured organisation and 
responsibilities 
Incentives based on meeting strict 
quantitative targets 
Strong coordination runong functions 
in R&D, product development, and 
marketing 
Subjective measurements and 
incentives instead of quantitative 
measures 
Amenities to attract highly skilled 
labour, scientists, or creative people 
Combination of the policies for overall 
cost leadership rulCJ/or differentiation 
directed at the particular strategic 
target 
Table 2.9: Condit' 
---"- - --- - - ------ --- - -- - -_.- - - - - - - ---d Imnlicaf ,cPu Porter's Strat . - - --- - -- ------ --
Overall Cost Leadership Differentiation Focus I 
Advantage Over Competitor Cost Based Unique product/service Segmentation I 
Barriers to Entry Cost Based Qualitylreputation et cetera Cost or Quality, as appropriate I 
Preferable Share of Market High Niche Niche I 
Processes Inter-changeable Flexible Tactical 
! 
Skills Base Generalist Specialist Specialist I 
Preferred Environment Stable Changeable Varies I 
Capital Profile High Investment Varies Varies I 
Risks Associated • Skills required are expensive • Potential to misjudge price • Potential to misjudge demands 
• Resource intensive elasticity of customers 
• Vulnerable to environmental • Potential cash flow difficulties • May fail to reach the sub- I 
instability/technical change • Unsuitable in mature industries markets they are targeting 
• Vulnerable to imitation • Dependent upon matching 
• Potential to overlook new customer valuations 
market opportunity 
• Vulnerable to changing 
I conditions among external factors 
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As can be seen from Tables 2.8 and 2.9, the generic strategies impose quite different 
implications upon the organisation and resources of a company, as well as identifYing quite 
distinct markets that the company is seeking to reach. Low cost companies seek high 
market share to enable them to benefit from economies of scale, and will establish 
sophisticated systems in order to build upon and exploit their cost advantages. 
Differentiation companies will seek to gain from providing distinct products, aimed at 
customers who want 'something extra' and who may be willing to pay a premium for the 
differentiated product. As Table 2.9 notes, differentiation products may only be viable for 
a short time as competitors attempt to imitate, and achieve low cost production of new 
products to erode the advantage conferred by an initial differentiation strategy. The table 
also notes, however, that a low cost strategy may be undone by an ignorance of changing 
tastes or demands. The focus approach, which may be either cost or differentiation based 
is a specialist extension of one of the main strategies to reach a specific target audience, 
and will tend to be used sparingly in the case of a particular opportunity or threat that it 
would be inopportune for a company to ignore. 
Porter also identified a fourth generic strategy, but one that is associated with failure. 
That strategy, which he identified as being' stuck in the middle', indicates a failure upon 
the part of a company to fully develop one of the preceding strategies. Porter argues that 
a firm stuck in the middle is also guaranteed low profitability. It is not prepared or able 
to compete with companies that are successfully pursuing the other strategies. Porter 
suggests that such a position probably can be implied to show a directionless organisation, 
with a weak culture, or poor leadership. He believes that a 'stuck in the middle' strategy 
is untenable in the long run and that a company finding itself in this position must take 
actions to reorient itself along one of the cost/differentiation/focus strategic lines before 
its survival is placed in doubt. The company must take this decision based upon the 
closest match between its capabilities and the demands of one of these strategies. Porter 
cautions that once a decision is taken to pursue one of the three profitable generic 
strategies, a 'stuck in the middle' company would be advised not to continually change 
their decision, as this will only lead to a perpetuation of the state of being' stuck in the 
middle'. 
Porter's contribution to the development of research in the field was considerable. Miller 
and Dess note that for a five year period (1986-1990) one in every two articles published 
in the prestigious Strategic Management Journal referenced his work (Miller and Dess, 
1993, p.SS3). Partially this was due to the fact that his typology of generic business 
strategies met the criteria established by Miller: of being memorable, neat and evocative 
(Miller, 1996). The prominence of Porter's work does not imply that it has not been 
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challenged. His approach has been widely tested and critiqued, and it is to 'post-Porter' 
developments that attention now switches. 
2.5.5.3 Developments in Business Strategy 
One of the key critiques of Porter's work was his view that adopting combined strategies 
was an unwise business decision, leading to the state of being 'stuck in the middle'. Many 
authors have questioned this aspect of his analysis, and these critiques are addresses here. 
Before this, however, it is necessary to show the extent of developments in the models 
underpinning the concept and progress of typologies of business strategy. 
The development of the field has tended to be shown as a progression, through from the 
early work of authors such as Ansoff (1965) and Andrews (1971), to Porter (1980) and 
Abell (1980), through to the authors who have followed and attempted to refine their 
work such as Chrisman et at (1988). In most cases, authors have tended to extend the 
work by building upon existing theory, seeking to improve its effectiveness, and the 
universality of the frameworks developed. In order to better understand the development 
of concepts of business strategy, and to provide a framework for the coming discussion, 
Table 2.8 shows a subjective interpretation of the progression of business strategy systems 
of classification from Ansoff(1965) to Johnson and Scholes's synthesis of the work in the 
field (1999). 
What is clear from Table 2.10 is how much each succeeding author has borrowed from 
their predecessor. Ansoffs work on a portfolio of strategy established a variety of 
different options in which an organisation could compete, other then by price alone. 
Porter develops this theme, but establishes a neater, albeit arguably narrower, 
configuration which was less deterministic and more prescriptive (Miller and Dess, 1993, 
p.578). His work addressed the question of which competitive strategies are available 
to an organisation trying to establish competitive advantage within a specific industry16, 
as well as the breadth of the product/market scope within which that advantage is sought. 
As previously noted, Porter argued that the strategies he set out were not to be used in 
combination, as they would result in a lost focus, resulting in a company becoming' stuck 
in the middle', and hence producing inferior performance. It is this aspect of his analysis 
which has been most heavily critiqued. A number of authors, among them Hall (1983), 
Dess and Davis (1984), White (1986), Wright (1987), and Miller and Dess (1993) sought 
16 
Porter's work on the industrial organisation or competitive forces approach was described in Section 
2.2.1, and his work on generic strategies is very closely linked to this governing theory of the firm. 
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to test his approach and provide evidence which refute his assertion with respect to being 
'stuck in the middle'. Porter's work was at its most influential in the early to mid 1980's 
but is still widely cited, and utilised in the current literature, as Campbell-Runt's (2000) 
recent article makes clear. 
T bl 210 P a e . : . B r02reSSIon an usaness St t ra e 2Y 
Ansoff Porter Abell (1980) Chrisman et al Johnson and 
(1965) (1980) (1988) Scholes (l999), 
after BO\\1nan 
(1998) 
Name of Competitive lbree Generic Segment New Competitive The Strategy Clock 
Framework Strategy Competitive Differentiation Business Strategy 
Strategies Classification Scheme 
Elements of i) Market Share i) Cost i) Differentiated i) Segmented Cost i) A 'No Frills' 
Framework Maximisation Leadership ii) ii) Segmented Cost strategy 
ii)Growth ii) Differentia- Undifferentiated Focus ii) A Low Price 
Strategies tion iii) Focus iii) Segmented Utility Strategy 
iii) Market iii) Focus iv) Segmented Utility iii) An Added Value 
Differentiation Focus or Differentiation 
Strategy v) Segmented Benefit Strategy 
iv) Productl vi) Segmented Benefit iv) An Hybrid 
Service Focus Strategy 
Differentiation vii) Mass-Market Costs v) A Focussed 
viii) Focus Cost Differentiation 
ix) Mass-Market Utility Strategy 
x) Focus Utility vi-vii) Failure 
xi) Mass-Market Benefit Strategies 
xii) Focus Benefit 
xiii) Mass-Market 
Shortage 
xiv) Focus Shortage 
Source: Table derived from works of original authors 
Authors have identified other problems with Porter's analysis, in addition to those related 
to disagreements with the diagnosis of being 'stuck-in-the-middle'. Miller and Dess 
criticised his assertion that his typology was truly generalizable, arguing that none of his 
strategies were truly generic (Miller and Dess, 1993, p.577-578). A potentially more 
serious charge was that Porter's approach did not allow for segment differentiation 
(Sandberg, 1986). This critique suggests that Porter's model does not allow for 
organisations which utilise differing strategic approaches in the different product/market 
segments in which they operate. Clearly, this is a serious failing in an increasingly global 
economy, which minimises the effectiveness of the approach, and its utilityl7. 
This failing of Porter's approach is partially compensated for in the literature by the work 
of another author cited in Table 2.10, Abell (1980), whose taxonomy concentrates upon 
an organisation's ability to differentiate its products across different product/market 
17 
This failing led to Chrisman et aI's claim that it was therefore a classification scheme, rather than a 
classification system (Chrisman et ai, 1988, p.417). 
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segments. Abell suggests that companies can be classified by the scope of their 
differentiation and the markets they serve. Hence, his differentiation strategy category18 
is used to describe companies adopting a broad focus of serving various markets with 
various different competitive weapons. In contrast, the undifferentiated strategy category 
indicates a company that employs only one common approach in each of the segments it 
seeks to serve. His focus category describes a company seeking a narrow scope within 
which to employ their strategic weapons. Chrisman et ai, whose work followed Abell, 
argue that his approach benefits from this wider scope, making it more useful than 
Porter's as his "business definition strategies also are collectively exhaustive because they 
cover all possible combinations of scope and segment differentiation" (Chrisman et ai, 
1988, p.419). However, Abell's approach, unlike Porter's, does not allow for a 
consideration of competitive weapons. His taxonomy additionally does not distinguish 
between companies that operate one competitive weapon and those that utilise a range of 
weapons, and this has been identified as a weakness (Chrisman et ai, 1988, pA18). This 
feature also presents his work from being considered a system, and therefore it is like 
Porter's typology, a scheme. 
Chrisman et al set out to remedy the weaknesses identified in both Porter's and Abell's 
approaches, by combining their key attributes. They attempted to combine all of the 
possible choices of scope, segment differentiation, and types of competitive weapons, and 
identified sixteen theoretically possible generic business strategies (Chrisman et ai, 1988, 
pA23), although two ofthese were later removed as they were felt unlikely to ever occur. 
This approach, it was argued, was collectively exhaustive. The result was a taxonomy that 
was larger than either Porter's or Abell's, but this extra size was, argued the authors, 
required to overcome the perceived difficulties of each of the models it sought to rep lace. 
The authors of the approach argued that the benefits of the extra aspects increased its 
scientific reliability. The next section explores Chrisman et aI's typology in more depth, 
and explains its amendment and possible improvement upon the work of Porter and Abell. 
2.5.5.4 Chrisman et aI's Generic Business Strategies 
As indicated in the preceding section, the work by Chrisman et al (1988), which included 
Charles Hofer, sought to develop a typology of business strategies which was inclusive, 
and overcame in turn the weaknesses of both Porter's and Abell's typologies. The result 
18 
A taxonomy is comprised of taxa "which are sets of entities sufficiently similar to each other and 
sufficiently different from the entities of other sets tllat tlley are separately defined and named" (Chrisman 
et ai, 1988, p.415). A category is "a rank or level in a hierarchical classification which is comprised of 
taxa" (Chrisman et ai, 1988, p.415). 
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was a typology of sixteen strategies. This represented a major increase over both Porter's 
and Abell's approaches, but was defended as being 'reasonably parsimonious' by the 
authors as a smaller set of strategies would have involved either reducing some 
possibilities as unfeasible, or combining some cells. The latter they viewed as undesirable 
as it would damage the typology for the very reasons the authors identified a need in the 
first place. They did feel able to reduce the typology slightly through the removal of two 
possible strategies (Chrisman et aI, 1988, p.424). Part of this process involved developing 
new designations to augment or redefine the cost, differentiation and focus labels used by 
both Porter and Abell. Thus a benefit strategy involved seeking a competitive advantage 
through the use of noncost or price attributes to differentiate their products or services 
(Chrisman et aI, 1988, p.423) while a utility strategy involved the simultaneous use of 
both cost and non-cost weapons, a development not allowed by Porter (Chrisman et aI, 
1988, p.423). 
Overall, the authors claim that the typology is more scientific than either the Porter or the 
Abell approach making it both a taxonomy and a system. The sixteen strategies were: 
~ Segmented Cost: which is a strategy available to companies with a broad business 
scope, operating in a segmented industry, where the use of costs/prices are among 
its competitive weapons; 
Segmented Cost Focus: which is a strategy available to companies with a narrow 
business scope, operating in a segmented industry where the use of costs/prices 
as competitive weapons are particularly important in specific segments; 
Segmented Utility: which is a strategy available to companies with a broad 
business scope, and operating in a segmented industry, where the use of cost and 
benefit weapons simultaneously is a necessity or adds competitive advantage in 
their principal product/market segments; 
Segmented Utility Focus: which is a strategy available to companies with a narrow 
business scope, but operating in a segmented industry, where the use of cost and 
benefit weapons simultaneously is a valid approach to obtaining competitive 
advantage in their specific target product/market segments; 
Segmented Benefit: which is a strategy available to companies with a broad 
business scope, operating in a segmented industry where the use of non-cost 
attributes are among its competitive weapons; 
Segmented Benefit Focus: which is a strategy available to companies with a 
narrow business scope, operating in a segmented industry where the use of non-
cost attributes are among its competitive weapons in its specific target markets; 
Mass-Market Costs: where a company does not differentiate among the segments 
in which it operates, and uses costs/prices attributes across all of these segments; 
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~ Focus Cost: Porter's cost focus strategy; 
~ Mass-Market Utility: where a company does not differentiate among the segments 
in which it operates, and uses an utility approach across all of these segments; 
Focus Utility: where a company does not differentiate among the segments in 
which it operates, and uses an utility approach with a particular focus upon one 
specific segment; 
Mass-Market Benefit: where a company does not differentiate among the 
segments in which it operates, and uses a benefit approach across all of these 
segments; 
Focus Benefit: where a company does not differentiate among the segments in 
which it operates, and uses a benefit approach with a particular focus upon one 
specific segment; 
Mass-Market Shortage: where a company does not differentiate among the 
segments in which it operates, but has few competitive weapons available to it; 
and 
Focus Shortage: where a company does not differentiate among the segments in 
which it operates, but has few competitive weapons available to it in specific 
markets that it sought to target. 
The model is helpful in that it overcomes some of the difficulties authors have identified 
with Porter's and Abell's approaches. In particular it acknowledges some of the problems 
of generalisation encountered in Porter's work: how can there only be four possible 
variations; why does the typology assume only one strategy in operation across a 
company, even those operating in multiple segments; what about companies that are 
demonstrably operating combined strategies and prospering?, without taking the view that 
strategy making is uncategorizable. The more inclusive nature of the approach has 
appealed to a number of researchers, and it has been utilised in a variety of recent studies 
(Aulakh et aI, 2000; Chua et aI, 1999; Chrisman et aI, 1998; Sriram and Anikeeff, 1995; 
Carpano et aI, 1994 among others). However its extra complexity, and the greater 
prominence of competing approaches have arguably resulted in a lower level utilisation 
than may have been expected for an approach which seeks to resolve practical difficulties. 
Despite this, the author believes that the approach does provide a greater degree of utility 
in the analysis of business strategy and its categorization, and therefore will be used in the 
forthcoming analysis. 
2.5.5.5 Johnson and Scholes: A Synthesis of the Literature 
The British management writers Johnson and Scholes have attempted to synthesise the 
work of various writers on the subject of business or competitive strategies, and have 
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developed a typology they have described as a 'strategy clock', within which the bases of 
separate business unit competitive advantage will be located. The outcome of this process 
of synthesis is, they argue, an extended version of Porter's work taking into account the 
views of those authors who have critiqued Porter's generic strategy approach and in 
particular Hill (1988), Miller and Friesen (1986a and 1986b), and White (1986). Johnson 
and Scholes extending the work of Bowman (1998), identify eight possible 
business/competitive strategies that a company may employ in the search for competitive 
advantage. After Porter, two of these are price-based strategies (Johnson and Scholes, 
1999, p.271); one is a added value, or differentiation strategy (1999, p.276); one is a 
hybrid strategy (1999, p.281); one is a focussed differentiation strategy (1999, p.282); and 
three are described by Johnson and Scholes as failure strategies (1999, p.284). The details 
of this approach are presented in Table 2.11. 
2.5.5. 6 Features of the Typologies 
Of the models presented in this section, there is a clear difference of intent from Pearce 
and Robinson's scheme presented in the preceding section. While Pearce and Robinson's 
scheme offered a series of options on the choice of strategic domain from which managers 
could choose, all of the authors quoted here have presented systems of classification 
which encourage a more complex, and arguably philosophical debate, about how the 
company will compete. All of the options presented require a company to engage in a 
political process, and indeed are closely related to the competing conceptions of the firm 
presented in Section 2.2. The systems of classification present concepts, rather than mere 
options, which involve an analytical process and their operationalisation is consequently 
more complex. They operate within a framework developed out of the deliberation at the 
corporate strategy level. 
Equally clearly all of the systems presented in Section 2.5.5 could be used as analytical 
tools, to explore and explain the performance of companies. Relative success or failure 
could be attributed by authors on the basis of a comparative failure to: 
~ develop a clearly appropriate business strategy; and 
~ follow that strategy assiduously. 
It is perhaps this added element which makes this area of the literature more contentious 
that the area addressed in Section 2.5.4. 
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Title Description 
A 'no' frills strategy A price-based approach "combines a low price, low perceived added value and a focus on a price-sensitive market segment"(p.271). 
Apparently 'unattractive', but recognises that there are some markets where customers are not looking for high cost, high value, high quality 
goods or services, and so this basic strategy is appealing, and based upon very low prices. They note that some companies use this approach 
as a means of gaining entry into a market place, and that once past the barriers to entry, can attempt to develop a different approach. 
A Low Price Strategy A price-based approach "seeks to achieve a lower price than competitors whilst trying to maintain similar value of product or services to 
that offered by competitors" (p.271). This approach is essentially the overall cost leadership approach championed by Porter, and is 
essentially a potential strategy in its classical sense for companies holding core advantages over competitors, who as the authors note may 
otherwise be able to imitate the low price approach leading to reduced margins throughout the industry. Such advantages may be a lower 
overall cost base, access to economies of scale, market and buying power and so on. Only viable for one organisation per industry and 
indeed may arguably not be a "iable strategy at all unless it is tempered by combination with another strategic option. Companies generally 
aim somewhere between a 'no frills' strategy and 'overall price leadership', rather than pursue this approach. 
An Added Value or The added value or differentiation approach "seeks to provide products or services unique or different from those of competitors in terms 
Differentiation Strategy of dimensions widely valued by buyers" ( p.276), with the aim of achieving improved market share. Suggest that the true value of a 
differentiation approach is through developing close links with customers and suppliers and exploiting the unique values that these provide. 
Finally, they suggest that companies that assume stability will persist and base their strategy upon this assumption are weakening that 
strategy's chances of success in the long term. Strategies of this type need to be continually innovating to remain relevant to their target 
consumers 
An Hybrid Strategy This hybrid approach "seeks simultaneously to achieve differentiation and a price lower than that of competitors" ( p.281), that is the 
delivery of enhanced value at a market competitive price. This approach relies upon having a low cost base, rather than being able to lower 
prices. This difference implies that the low cost element is a consistent feature of the approach, rather than the alternative differentiation 
approach, which seeks differentiation as the central part ofthe strategy, but which chooses to do so at the same time as trying to keep costs 
lower. The former aims to achieve both differentiation and low cost, while the latter is primarily concerned with differentiation, but reserves 
the use of low costs as an additional strategic tool. 
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Table 2.9: Johnson and Scholes (1999) Typology of Business Strategies Continued 
A Focussed Differentiation 
Strategy 
Failure Strategies 
This approach "seeks to provide high perceived value justifying a substantial price premium usually to a selected market segment" (p.282). 
This approach is seeking to provide a high quality/high differentiation product or service at a premium, to maximise the value added by 
the differentiation approach. However this approach is less likely to be a generalist approach to the market, and more one based upon 
targeting a market niche. Wider differentiation brings with it a number of key considerations, as creating a globally differentiated strategy 
is going to require the utilisation of a great degree of organisational resources. Clearly, a precise understanding of who your customers are 
and what exactly their needs are is vital. Meeting those needs is the essence of the approach. 
Three possible strategic configurations which seem destined to fail (1999, p.284), to which could be added Porter's concept of being 
'stuck in the middle' are when: 
• a company increases its price of goods and services without at the same time raising the value of the goods and services to the 
consumer. This will result in an erosion of market share, providing competitors exist. They therefore note that the charge of 
following this approach has often been levelled at public utilities which operated in monopoly conditions and did not face the 
threat of substitution; 
• a company increases its prices while at the same time reduces the value of its product offering, an even more extreme version 
of the situation shown previously; and 
• a company retains its prices while at the same time seeks to reduce value; which is also a potentially dangerous approach but 
one that is more commonly witnessed. 
Source: Adapted from Johnson and Scholes, 1999 
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The relationship between the systems of classification presented in Section's 2.5.4 and 
2.5.5 is clear. One provides the context within which decisions in the other are taken. It 
is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that some authors have attempted to devise systems of 
classification which address all of these questions consecutively. These models are 
addressed in the following section. 
2.5.6 Organizational Models 
This third section on systems of classification has been titled 'Organisational Models' in 
order to distinguish the models discussed here from the work reviewed above, which 
sought to provide options or classification systems for corporate and business level 
strategies. The distinction centres upon the attempt by some authors to identify the 
characteristics of an organisation as a complete system, in relation to both corporate and 
business level strategy, and their interrelationships. In particular the generic strategy work 
of Mintzberg (1988) falls into this category. The section also identifies the Miles and 
Snow (1978) typology of organisational strategy, structure and process, as a model which 
links strategic options to a "broader holistic approach to the organization-environment 
adaption cycle" (Segev, 1987, p.258). That is to say, it "proposes explicit links between 
strategy, environment and process" (Miller and Dess, 1993, p.578). This latter typology 
has encountered a degree of controversy, but is still a widely cited and used typology 
which plays a significant role in this research. 
There is a difference of approach between the two models presented here. Mintzberg's 
model is concerned with the process an organisation has to go through to maximise its 
performance in its core business area, and follows this process from the corporate level 
decision making down to the business level. It is not, strictly speaking, a system of 
classification but rather a set of generic strategies. However, its inclusion at this point is 
valid, as Mintzberg has criticised the sort of model building already discussed in this 
Chapter, and his generic strategy is an antidote. Including it here helps to extend the 
debate on the validity of systems of classification. As has been noted, Miles and Snow 
have perhaps more than any other writers attempted to marry the strategic decision 
process required at all levels of an organisation, and attempted to show their 
interrelationships and impacts. Their approach included identifying a number of strategic 
archetypes which describe whole structures and systems, from the direction of corporate 
strategy, through the way a company will compete, to aspects of its functional decision 
making. Firstly, Mintzberg's contribution to the debate. 
2.5.6.1 Mintzherg's Generic Corporate and Business Strategies 
In 1973, Mintzberg developed a system of classification comprising three modes of 
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strategy-making: the entrepreneurial, the adaptive and the planning modes (Mintzberg, 
1973b). This work focussed upon the process of strategic decision making, including 
motivations, actors, environment and so on. The outcome of this process was an 
organisational typology very similar in aim and objective to the Miles and Snow typology 
reviewed below. However, in later work (Mintzberg, 1988), he turned against concept 
building of this kind, regarding the approach as being too narrowly focussed, and tending 
to "aggregate arbitrarily across all varieties ofthem with no real order" (Mintzberg, 1988, 
p.1) and suggested a set of generic strategies which were more generally applicable, and 
therefore or real utility for organisations. 
Mintzberg believes that generic strategies fall into five broad groupings, all of which take 
their starting point as an organisation which is (a) seeking to establish its core business, 
and (b) seeking to develop that core business, in some way. The five broad groups of 
strategy are these: 
~ locating the core business; 
~ distinguishing the core business; 
~ elaborating the core business; 
~ extending the core business; and 
~ re-conceiving the core business. 
As the following discussion will make clear, Mintzberg is here proposing a system which 
returns the debate to the first section of this chapter. In his system, strategy is a pattern 
not a plan. Hence, where other authors like Porter identify a generic strategy as a plan or 
a ploy, and therefore make it a prescriptive act, Mintzberg suggests a general process, 
making following that strategy a pattern. However, within these 'patterns', Mintzberg 
himself suggests a variety of more recognisable prescriptive generic strategies that 
companies can elect to pursue to obtain their objectives. This difference in form will 
become clear during the following discussion. 
2.5. 6.5.1 Locating the Core Business 
Mintzberg suggests that an organisation exists at the junction of a network of industries 
which are processing, buying and selling goods and services. This first stage involves 
determining exactly where on that network a business' core is located. This may involve 
being located in the primary, secondary or tertiary sectors of the industry, or as Mintzberg 
now suggests these positions are called, the upstream, midstream or downstream of the 
industry (Mintzberg, 1996, p.85). Numerous generic approaches exist to enable a firm 
to decide where their core is located, but for most companies this decision will be 
determined by their organisational origin. 
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2.5.6.1. 2 Distinguishing the Core Business 
To Mintzberg, the next stage in a company's development is to open up the business and 
understand what capabilities it possesses that provide it with competitive advantage. This 
involves understanding how the value chain, as identified by Porter (1985), operates and 
the various strategies available at each stage of that value chain. These include: sourcing 
strategies (of procurement, people and finance); supporting strategies (legal, control, 
training and so on); designing strategies (R&D); processing strategies (process 
development, operations), and delivering strategies (marketing, sales, distribution and 
service). Strategies of this type would seem to fall within the boundaries of operational 
strategy, as discussed in Section 2.5.1. 
Within this process of distinguishing the core business, however, Mintzberg also includes 
all of the concepts developed by Porter in his generic approach, reviewed in Section 
2.5.5.2. Mintzberg acknowledges the main generic approaches devised by Porter: cost 
leadership, differentiation, cost focus and differentiation focus, dwelling upon 
differentiation by suggesting the following possible variations upon the differentiation 
approach: 
~ the price differentiation strategy: where products are differentiated by price; 
~ the image differentiation strategy: where products are differentiated by marketing; 
~ the support differentiation strategy: where products are differentiated by a noncost 
attribute, similar to Chrisman et aI's concept of a benefit strategy (Chrisman et aI, 
1988, p.423); 
the quality differentiation strategy: where products are differentiated by an 
improvement in quality; 
the design differentiation strategy: where products are differentiated by enhanced 
design features; and 
the undifferentiation strategy: where no differentiation is attempted. 
However, Mintzberg also notes the critique offered by authors like Abell (1980) and 
Chrisman et al (1988), in relation to the question of scope, and hence includes an 
additional range of competitive strategies which address this shortcoming: 
~ the unsegmentation strategy: equivalent to Chrisman et al's mass market strategy; 
~ segmentation strategies; 
~ the niche strategy; and 
~ customizing strategies: wherein unique aspects are added to an approach to 
account for the particular needs of individual customers. 
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2.5.6.1.3 Elaborating the Core Business 
Mintzberg, having adopted the views of Porter and Abell in the preceding stage, adopts 
those of Ansoff(1965, and Section 2.5.5.1) at this stage, in elaborating the core. He 
notes the availability of the four stages identified by An s off: penetration, market 
development, product development and diversification. 
2.5.6.1.4 Extending the Core Business 
These strategies aim to take a company beyond its core business, and this can be done 
either vertically or horizontally, or through a combination of vertical and horizontal. 
Mintzberg describes vertical strategies for extending the core business as 'Chain 
Integration' strategies, and horizontal strategies for extending the core business as 
'Diversification' strategies. 'Chain Integration' strategies involve decisions on the part 
of managers to extend their actions either upstream or downstream to encompass the 
activities of either suppliers, customers or both. Referring back to Pearce and Robinson's 
grand strategies of Section 2.5.4, the decision to undertake vertical integration would be 
evidence of a 'Chain Integration' generic strategy. 
'Diversification strategies', operating horizontally to become 'Chain Integration' 
strategies, refer to a company's entry into businesses not in the same chain of operation. 
Mintzberg notes that this action may be related, or unrelated, to the existing core business. 
Hence, a 'Diversification' generic strategy would encompass grand strategies such as 
horizontal integration or concentric diversification if the business area moved into was in 
some way related to the core, or conglomerate diversification if it was unrelated. 
In both 'Chain Integration' and 'Diversification' strategies, other of Pearce and 
Robinson's grand strategies may be evident, specifically in relation to how 'new' areas of 
activity are entered and controlled. Both may of course operate organic internal 
development programmes or may choose to grow by acquisition: each consistent with an 
extended concentrated growth strategy, or implicit in a vertically or horizontally 
integrative, or concentric or conglomerate diversification strategy. However, companies 
may also choose to grow by accessing a variety of other grand strategies, such as joint 
ventures, strategic alliances or consortia. 
Mintzberg also notes a variety of other combined integration-diversification generic 
strategies available to a company to extend its core. These include 'By-Product 
Diversification', 'Linked Diversification', or 'Crystalline Diversification'. These involve 
a series of market or product development grand strategies, or extended vertically or 
horizontally integrative grand strategies, aimed at releasing opportunity for the company 
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as it seeks to extend its core business. A final generic strategy available in this section is 
the 'Withdrawal Strategy'. Variously labelled as an exit strategy, shrinking the core 
business, or utilising the grand strategies identified by Pearce and Robinson, of divestment 
or liquidation. 
2.5.6.1.5 Reconceiving the Core Business(es) 
Mintzberg justifies examining strategies aimed at reconcelvmg (or redefining or 
reconfiguring) because of the real possibility that as firms develop, as they identify, 
distinguish, elaborate and extend their strategies, they may lose touch with what they were 
aiming to do. Reconceiving the business is therefore a form of rationalisation. Mintzberg 
identifies three basic reconception strategies: 'Business Redefinition', 'Business 
Recombination', and 'Core Relocation'. 
(a) A 'Business Redefintion' strategy involves undertaking a process of're-imagining' the 
company, possibly in respect of its function, its market, the product it produces and so on. 
A business may redefine by becoming narrower, or broader. This strategy would occur 
in the minds of the stakeholders in the company and lead to formal action on the part of 
senior management. 
(b) A 'Business Recombination' strategy involves a process akin to realising synergistic 
opportunities, by recombining business horizontally. Mintzberg draws attention to the 
difficulties that may result from such a strategy, but notes that should the correct 
conditions be in evidence the results of such a strategy can be significant. He notes that 
business recombination's can be both tangible and intangible, creating the potential for 
conceptually recombined businesses. This is an important aspect for the companies under 
investigation, as electricity companies with gas businesses recombine to become' energy 
companies'. He also notes that business recombination may involve the bundling, or 
unbundling of products to meet a perceived demand of consumers. Mintzberg suggests 
that the nature of this strategy leads to a 'systems view' of a business "where all products 
and services are conceived to be tightly interrelated" (1996, p.720). 
(c) A 'Core Relocation' strategy notes that an organisation can move away from its 
original core location, as the company distinguishes, elaborates and extends its strategy. 
Mintzberg suggests that the company may more profitably locate its core away from its 
original location to reflect the distance it has travelled. He suggests that a company may 
move along its operating chain, either up or down stream from its original location. There 
may be movement between dominant functions within the company, there may be a shift 
to a totally new business, or to a totally new core theme. 
-107-
Mintzberg warns that a company focussing upon the list he provides as a guide to strategy 
development "may put that organisation at a disadvantage against competitors that 
develop their strategies in more creative ways" (1996, p.720). This generic typology 
therefore aims primarily to identify strategic options available to a company, rather than 
differentiating and generalising behaviour. 
2.5.6.1.6 Features of the Typology 
Mintzberg's typology is an interesting construct being at the same time a synthesis of 
earlier work, and in particular the work of author's discussed in Section 2.5.5 of this 
chapter, and an attempt to present work of this nature in a more 'user friendly' and 
practical configuration. As stated previously, this approach conforms to his underlying 
concept of strategy as pattern, preferring to illustrate a potential series of options for an 
organisation, rather then to prescribe. It is striking, however, to note the extent of 
similarities between the work of writers in this field and the tendency for writers to 
develop differing labels for constructs which appear similar to those of other writers. This 
tendency seems to confirm the view expressed earlier that part of the inherent weakness 
of social science research is its capacity for competition rather than collaboration between 
its exponents. 
2.5.6.2 Miles and Snow's Generic Typology 
Miles and Snow's (1978) typology of strategic types differs markedly from Mintzberg's. 
Where Mintzberg's model provides a process, Miles and Snow's approach seeks to 
differentiate, generalise, identify and retrieve information. The typology is principally a 
corporate level description of organisational types, but in covering an organisation's 
"orientation toward product-market development" (Segev, 1989) infers aspects of 
business level decision making. It aimed to describe the organisation as a "whole system" 
(Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980, p.318) and was therefore different from many of its 
contemporaries. Some authors, in particular Hambrick (1983), have suggested that Miles 
and Snow's model is not a 'whole systems' model, but focusses primarily upon business-
level strategies, "and its applicability for corporate-level strategy is not clear, but it 
probably is very limited" (Hambrick, 1983a, p.6), a view shared by White (1986), 
Chaganti and Sambharya, (1987), and Douglas and Rhee, (1989) among others. Miller 
(1986) notes that while the scope of the Miles and Snow typology is extensive and while 
it does discuss strategic content, "there are relatively few details given about marketing, 
production, R&D, vertical integration and asset management strategies" (Miller, 1986, 
p.234). The author believes that the relationship to corporate level strategy is at least 
implied by the model, and cites the work of Hambrick (1981 a, 1981 b, 1982, 1983 a) and 
Burgelman (1983) as relatively contemporary attempts to make this link more explicit. 
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While this point continues to be debated, for example Thomas and Ramaswamy note the 
typology's organisation wide prospective including "the articulation of new domains for 
the organisation" (Thomas and Ramaswamy, 1996, p.251), what is not in question is that 
the model developed by Miles and Snow is a typology, as it differentiates between types 
of strategy, organisations and decision-making styles, and is also evocative and 
memorable. 
Miles and Snow viewed their approach as a continuation of the Strategic Choice 
Approach (Child, 1988) which emphasised the overwhelming influence of organisational 
decision makers on the strategy that a company would seek to deploy. This issue was 
identified as being especially important in an industry with no competitive heritage to draw 
upon. As such, the Miles and Snow approach pays close attention to the functioning of 
a dominant coalition, the most influential grouping of the company's top managers defined 
in Section 2.3.1. In essence, the approach holds that the responses of the dominant 
coalition to a number of key questions will both shape corporate strategy, and address the 
issues relating to strategic deployment. 
Miles and Snow argue that the solutions a company's dominant coalition devised to a set 
of three fundamental problems effectively shaped that company's corporate strategy. 
These questions were described as: the entrepreneurial problem, or how to manage their 
share of their market sector; the engineering problem, or how to operationalize their 
solutions to their entrepreneurial problem; and the administrative problem, or how to 
structure their organisation to manage these processes. 
The model further suggested that while all companies would develop unique responses to 
these questions, many companies would develop similar responses, and that it would be 
possible to observe common patterns of behaviour. As a result of their application of the 
approach, they identified four such organisation types: the defender; the reactor; the 
analyser; and the prospector. The key features of each, including their respective 
entrepreneurial, engineering and administrative problems are summarised in Table 2.10, 
and explored below. 
2.5.6.2.1 The Characteristics of the Defender 
The entrepreneurial problem facing the Defender is how it is able to secure a stable niche 
market, and then 'seal off' that niche to enable it to command a stable set of products and 
customers. It is perhaps important to highlight here Miles and Snow's use of the term 
'niche'. In the context of Miles and Snow's model, 'niche' appears not to be used in the 
currently defined form of an organisation so specialised as to be able to only meet the 
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needs of a very small part of the market, through the production of a specific product or 
use of a specific technology, that it is secure from the challenge of other organisations 
(Modiano and Ni-Chionna, 1986), but rather to indicate a certain segment of the market 
captured by a more generic strategy; in this case cost leadership. Reference to a niche 
market as used by Miles and Snow's in the remainder of this report should take this 
possible ambiguity into account. 
The defender is likely to adopt a strategy similar to that identified by Porter as 'overall cost 
leadership' (Porter, 1980, p.35) based upon efficiency and excellence of service. The 
essence ofthe behaviour ofthe company is limitation and incrementalism: do not be over 
ambitious in your objectives and adopt an incremental approach to growth strategies. The 
overwhelming demands of efficiency constitute the operational problem of the defender, 
a problem it will seek to resolve by the application of cost-efficient technology, and by a 
quest for continuous improvement. This may involve a high level of capital investment. 
Such a strategy will see concentration upon single core technologies and core business 
activities, although such companies will also seek the assurances offered by vertical 
integration. 
The administrative problem facing the defender is concerned with the achievement of 
control, as a means of assuring efficiency. Miles and Snow argue that as a consequence 
of this situation, positions within the dominant coalition of the defender will be filled by 
financial and production experts, managers more used to operating systems and 
developing structures, and thus strategy or box approach managers from Farkus and 
Wetlaufer's checklist (Section 2.3.2). The members of the dominant coalition will see 
lengthy tenure, and promotions will occur from within. Centralised control will be 
enforced by an intensive planning regime, which follows the traditional Plan, Act, Evaluate 
pattern (Miles and Snow, 1978, p.43). Consequently, the defender will tend to be rigid, 
bureaucratic, and rarely able to make rapid internal readjustments. In this respect the 
defender is very similar to Mintzberg's 'Machine Organisation' (Mintzberg, 1979). Miles 
and Snow describe a defender organisation as offering "a limited, stable product line and 
(which will) compete primarily on the basis of value and/or cost" (Miles and Snow, 1986, 
p.54). The role played by a defender within an industry is to "uphold quality levels while 
driving down the costs of standardized goods and services "(Miles and Snow, 1986, p.60). 
2.5.6.2.2 The Characteristics of the Prospector 
The entrepreneurial problem facing the prospector is how to locate and exploit new 
product and market opportunities. The prospector is a 'first to market' company, and as 
such requires a highly developed industry surveillance system to detect opportunities as 
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they arise. Through such a monitoring system, a prospector oversees a very wide domain. 
The company embraces change, and may experience non-linear growth patterns as it seeks 
to achieve product and market development. The prospector is therefore not unused to 
risk. 
Table 2.12: Chief Characteristics of the Miles and Snow Model 
Personality Dominant Preferred Strategies Planning and 
Objectives control systems 
Defender Desire for a secure Specialisation: cost-efficient Centralised, 
and stable niche production: marketing emphasises price detailed control 
market and service to defend current business: Emphasis on cost 
tendency to vertical integration. Greater efficiency Extensive 
efficiency from existing operations. use offormal 
planning 
Prospector Location and Growth through product and market Emphasis on 
exploitation of new development (often in spurts). Constant flexibility, 
product and market monitoring of environmental change. decentralised 
opportunities Multiple technologies. Exploration of control, use of ad 
change in an effort to open up new areas hoc measurements 
of opportunity. 
Analyser Desire to match new Steady growth through market Very complicated. 
ventures to present penetration. Exploitation of applied Co-ordinating roles 
shape of business research. Followers in the market between functions 
(egproduct 
managers). 
Intensive planning. 
Reactor Survival Pattem of adJustment inconsistent and Fire fighting 
unstable. Lacking cOllsistellt response 
mechanisms which can be put into effect 
when faced with changing envirollmellt 
Miles and Snow identify the avoidance oflong-term commitment to a single technology 
as the operational problem facing the prospector. This problem is overcome by flexibility: 
of technology and of personnel. The solution is closely linked to the quality of the 
prospectors· most valuable asset, the people in the operation. The down-side of flexibility 
is a lack of opportunity to achieve efficient operations. 
The problem of how to facilitate and coordinate the diverse activities of the prospector 
constitutes the companis administrative problem. The flexibility evident elsewhere 
characterises the solution in this area: prospectors form problem solving ad hoc groupings 
to deal with specific situations, and are results oriented. Tenure within the dominant 
coalition will not always be lengthy, as fresh ideas and solutions are sought often from 
outside the organisation. Marketing, and research and development experts would tend 
to exercise the most influence. The planning function within a prospector is broad, and 
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based upon seeking opportunities and problems, rather than upon organisation. This 
process is characterised as following the Evaluate, Act, Plan pattern (Miles and Snow, 
1978, p.62). Miles and Snow describe a prospector organisation as being "first to market 
with a new product or service and (who) differentiate themselves from their competitors 
by using their ability to develop innovative technologies and products" (Miles and Snow, 
1986, p.54). The role played by a prospector within an industry is seen as being to 
"sustain technological innovation" as they are the principal contributors to the design of 
new products and services (Miles and Snow, 1986, p.60). 
2.5.6.2.3 The Characteristics of the Analyser 
The entrepreneurial problem facing the analyser is how to locate and exploit new 
opportunities, while at the same time defending their existing base of products and 
customers. An experienced analyser is perceived to combine the strengths of both 
prospector and defender in a single entity. The analyser is therefore a hybrid, with a dual 
domain and surveillance mechanisms concentrating upon the marketing function. Growth 
would be achieved through market penetration and both product and market development. 
Operationally, problems arise from the dual need of being efficient in core business areas 
and yet flexible in new business activities. The company would achieve this by operating 
dual technologies where appropriate, while understanding that some degree of efficiency 
is sacrificed in such a situation. The analyser emphasises the role of applied research in 
achieving a solution to its operational problem. 
The administrative problem facing the analyser is highly complex and concerns the 
question of how to differentiate the organisation's structure and processes to 
accommodate both the core and the new business areas. The company will develop a 
matrix structure combining both functional divisions and product groups. This will require 
extremely complex coordination mechanisms, and feed back facilities. The objective of 
the process is to maintain balance, stability, and flexibility. The dominant coalition will 
reflect the differing priorities of the company, and will centre upon the marketing and 
applied research functions, but which will also include the production function. 
As a consequence ofthe complexity of the operations, planning will be both intensive and 
comprehensive. Due to the nature of the company's activity Miles and Snow hold that 
planning similar to that carried out by defenders will occur: established core businesses 
will Plan, Act, Evaluate. With new business activity, the process will be characterised as 
Evaluate, Plan, Act; a recognition of the need to establish whether the endeavour is likely 
to yield reward before any action is undertaken (Miles and Snow, 1978, p.75). The 
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analyser performs a key role for the industry in which it operates, of transferring 
information about what is possible and profitable to other less well attuned companies. 
Miles and Snow believe that the analyser "sets broad efficiency targets that defenders try 
to surpass" (Miles and Snow, 1978, p.61), and describe an analyzer organisation as 
pursuing a "second-in strategy whereby they imitate and improve upon the product 
offerings of their competitors", thus taking the opportunity to rationalise other firms' 
product designs and methods of production (Miles and Snow, 1986, p.S4). Miles and 
Snow believe that the analyzer plays the most important role in the industry, that of 
transferring information, leading to standardization of technology and product design. 
Analyzers therefore actively rationalise the product offering of prospectors, and ensure 
only the best ideas prosper. 
2.5. 6.2.4 The Characteristics of the Reactor 
The reactor is a company that is fundamentally unprepared for the challenges that face it 
in its operating environment. The company is reactive and inflexible in the face of rapidly 
changing situations, and will probably have no defined dominant objectives, above what 
may be described as survival. If a strategy is articulated, there may be inadequate 
capability to see it through, either in terms of an inappropriate structure, unsophisticated 
processes or unsuitable technology. 
Another problem which constrains the reactor is a tendency for management to remain 
loyal to a particular strategy-structure relationship even though it is no longer relevant to 
environmental conditions. This may be the product of a flawed strategy process, or of 
loyalty towards a policy which has proved successful in the past. It may also be due to 
uncertain command structures. A flawed strategic decision making process may well 
develop inconsistent and unstable responses to changing circumstances. The overall effect 
is that the reactor will pursue ill articulated or inappropriate strategies, and will respond 
to change only when forced to. The lack of a specific strategy makes a company a 
reactor, and more than likely dooms it to "experience poor business performance" (parker 
and Helms, 1992, p.2S) 
2.5.6.2.5 Developments from the Original Typology 
Within their original work, Miles and Snow noted that they expected the dimensions of 
their typology to be extended, a reflection of the exploratory nature of their work. They 
noted that their theoretical framework was "in no sense complete" and that "modifications 
and extensions will undoubtably occur" (Miles and Snow, 1978, p.166). Two such 
developments require discussion here. The first was suggested by Miles and Snow 
themselves. The concept of a 'Dynamic Network' organisation was introduced in 1986 
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and later developed upon (Miles and Snow, 1986, 1992). The new form recognises the 
increasingly dynamic environment that business must operate within, resulting in new ways 
of interacting. The new form is flexible, and able to assemble and reassemble as demand 
warrants, and the use of strategies based upon joint ventures, subcontracting and licencing 
across international borders indicates its existence. 
The characteristics of the new form are: 
~ vertical disaggregation, where "business functions such as product design and 
development, manufacturing, marketing and distribution" which are typically 
conducted within a single organization "are performed by independent 
organizations within a network", which may be more or less complex depending 
upon competitive circumstances (Miles and Snow, 1986, p.56); 
brokers, who act as linking mechanisms to assemble the various business functions 
necessary to perform the necessary services; 
market mechanisms, which take the place of formal planning and control regimes. 
In such a situation, contracts between functions and payment by results determine 
business interrelationship; and 
full-disclosure information systems, a transparent method of agreeing upon what 
constitutes value added activity and verifYing that value added activity has 
occurred. 
Miles and Snow argue that such a firm will, by forming a network, be freed from any 
constraints applied to it that may prevent it maximising the performance of its distinctive 
competencies (Miles and Snow, 1986, p.57). They argue that, properly constructed, such 
a network will see components complementing rather than competing with other 
components. Such a configuration will handle manage situations, or projects that can not 
be resolved by a single company. Network organisations, therefore, provide a formal 
structure for major consortia. 
The network form predicts a situation where organisational forms join together to 
undertake projects that they individually could not perform. For example, Miles and 
Snow speculate that within a network form prospectors may play the designer role, 
analyzers may play the marketing/distribution role, and defenders perform the producer 
role. A theoretical network form therefore synthesises the other types of firm to allow 
each to exploit their individual distinctive competencies. The network form, therefore, 
synthesises vertical integration. It also allows organizations to move across industry and 
international borders, as brokers locate links in the network far away from each other. 
Conceptually, the new Network Form exists within the Network structures identified in 
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Section 2.4.2 of this chapter. 
A second new form within the Miles and Snow typology was devised by Wright et al 
(1990). The Balancer was an organisation which sought to strike a balance between the 
needs of a stable technology and those of fluid technologies, across a range of separate 
product-market spheres. 
2.5.6.2. 6 Features of the Typology 
In contrast to Mintzberg's model, the Miles and Snow approach seeks to generalise 
observable behaviour in a system of classification that attempts a more holistic 
understanding of the various component parts of an organization's strategic process. It 
attempts, broadly, to classify the different capabilities displayed by organizations within 
the same industry. These capabilities would have been developed, as distinctive 
competencies, to match the desired strategy of the organisation. The typology therefore 
seeks to associate a variety of aspects of an organisation's characteristics: its strategy, 
structure, leadership, organisational control measures and so on, in a "complete system" 
(Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980, p.318). The typology was devised with the intention of being 
universally applicable, and is therefore subject to the criticism of Weick (1979) and White 
(1986) of being too generalized to be of any value. However, the typology has proved 
extremely popular over the past two decades, and has been used as the basis of a large 
number of empirical studies (Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980; Hambrick, 1983, Smith et aI, 
1986, McDaniel and Kolari, 1987, Segev, 1987, 1989, Conant et aI, 1990, Parker and 
Helms, 1992, Thomas and Ramaswamy, 1996, Lukas, 1999, among many others). 
An interesting aspect of the Miles and Snow approach is their intuitive conception of the 
need for different industries - defined as being at a different stage of development - to 
have different configurations of company types. They identify three possible patterns: 
~ embryonic industries, where there is inevitably a high population of prospector 
companies, will move to their next stage (maturity) when a company decides to 
develop a defender approach leading to other defender and analyzer companies 
following behind it. They quote the example of Henry Ford and automobiles as 
an example; 
mature industries, where there is an expectation of fewer participants and a 
tendency towards defender oriented approaches, but which must have some 
prospector organisations to prevent the industry from declining, by pushing it 
forward through innovation; and 
transition industries, where the mix will be more varied reflecting the stage of 
development that the industry finds itself in. The failure of a defender to emerge 
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in an embryonic industry may see that industry failure to develop to maturity 
stage. 
This concept will be applied to the industry under investigation to see if it holds for the 
ESI. 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
The intention of this chapter was to explore the areas of the management literature that 
directly impacted upon the proposed research. To that end, the following areas were 
identified as being appropriate for consideration and review: 
~ an understanding of the concept of strategy; 
~ an appreciation of theories relating to the factors influencing strategy; 
~ an awareness of means of classifYing strategy and identifYing strategic content; and 
~ an assessment of predictive management models, and theories. 
These issues have therefore been reviewed in this chapter, and while the process has 
necessitated some degree of pragmatism in relation to the depth into which the review has 
gone, the key area: classification and strategic content, have been explored in detail. In 
addition to grounding the work of this thesis in the existing literature, the chapter had 
three other key objectives, as identified in Section 2.0.1: 
~ to identifY any deficiencies in the existing literature, in relation to the chosen area 
of study and in particular to the general applicability of systems of classification 
in regulated environments; 
to identify analytical frameworks that were to be carried forward for use in the 
proposed research; and 
to critique aspects of the literature and propose appropriate amendments to 
existing models and concepts. This concluding section of Chapter Six addresses 
each of these three key objectives. 
2.6.1 Deficiencies in the Literature 
The belief that there exist deficiencies within the literature has two aspects, which are 
directly related to the context of this proposed research. Firstly, there is the ongoing 
debate as to the presumed general applicability of management theory across all sectors 
of the economy, and secondly the author's concern, shared by a variety of authors, that 
regulated environments experience different conditions to traditional market 
environment's, undermining any confidence in the concept of general applicability. 
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The unique context of the ESI, and its difference from traditional market models, will be 
addressed in Chapter Four. At this point it is necessary to reprise the concerns voiced by 
authors such as Weick (1979), White (1986), Douglas and Rhee (1989), Barney and 
Hoskisson (1990), McGee and Thomas (1986), Hatten and Hatten (1987) and so on, who 
all question the validity of the use of, outcomes of, or general applicability of systems of 
classification. Of more particular concern are comments from authors such as Snow and 
Hrebiniak (1980) with respect to the lack of attention theorists have paid to non-
traditionally competitive markets, or even to the transition industries identified by Miles 
and Snow (1992). The author contends that the lack of attention paid to privati sed, 
liberalised, regulated or partially regulated industries is a serious omission, especially given 
the proliferation of industries of this type as identified in Chapter One. Serious doubts 
exist as to the validity of many of the core managerial concepts discussed in this chapter 
in non-traditional environments and this research seeks to comment upon these. 
2.6.2 Frameworks for Analysis 
Another role of this chapter has been to identify a series of analytical frameworks for use 
throughout this thesis. The focus upon strategy content, drivers of strategy and 
classification systems has determined the nature of the frameworks adopted for this 
research. In relation to strategy content, the author has decided to employ the Pearce and 
Robinson (1994) system of grand strategies for the identification and analysis of corporate 
level strategy, and a combination of Porter's (1980) generic business strategies, and the 
taxonomy presented by Chrisman et a/ (1988). The rationale behind these decisions are 
as follows: 
~ each of the systems of classification conform to Miler's (1996) measures for 
effectiveness of a system of classification: they are all memorable, neat and 
evocative; 
each provides a comprehensive selection of the options that are possible to identify 
in relation to each area of strategy making, although the author notes Chrisman 
et a/'s critique of Porter's work in particular and their (Chrisman et aI's) 
suggested amendments/improvements to his work. The decision to include 
Porter's framework in the analysis has been taken to align the work with other 
work previously undertaken to review the applicability of Porter's concepts; 
each system has been widely used within the literature, and continues to be utilised 
by academic researchers contributing to the literature; and 
each is appropriate to the task at hand. 
In relation to strategic drivers, a framework was presented at Figure 2.3 which attempts 
to capture all of the relevant aspects of the debate on strategic drivers, as influenced by 
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a competitive forces and a resources based view of the firm. The figure acts as a synthesis 
of these aspects, showing the authors perception of the interrelationship between the 
various factors that have been identified throughout this research. The Figure, it is hoped, 
will enable a deductive analysis of these influences across the various case studies to be 
presented in both the preliminary and field stages of this research. However, the author 
does acknowledge the possibility of new factors being identified, and proposes to review 
this deductive framework at the conclusion of the preliminary stage of the research, in 
Chapter Eight, to determine the continued validity of this construct. In Chapter Twelve, 
a review of the impact of the various influences will be undertaken. This review will 
utilise the model illustrated in Figure 2.5 to propose a solution to Objective Two. The 
hope is that this discussion will enable this thesis to make a contribution to the literature 
by suggesting an 'organising theme' (Miller, 1996) in the area of strategy in regulated 
environments. 
Figure 1.5: A Map or Possible Strategy Drivers 
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Finally, systems of classification. The literature also discussed organisational systems, 
which attempt a whole systems approach, will allocate descriptive labels to collections of 
interrelated strategies, structures, systems, procedures and so on. In this analysis, the 
system developed by Miles and Snow (1978, 1986, 1992) has been adopted by the author, 
as it conforms to all of the considerations identified above in relation to corporate and 
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business level systems of classification: its neatness, its comprehensiveness, its wide and 
continued use, and its appropriateness to the given task. Inevitably, one of the major 
issues for this research is judging the continued comprehensiveness of the approach given 
the context of this research, but it was the author's view that the typology was the most 
appropriate for consideration in the circumstances, especially given Miles and Snow's 
extension of their work in 1992, which acknowledged the potential for different 
configurations to be evident at different stages in an industry's development. 
Having identified these three key areas, it should also be noted that a number of other key 
concepts identified within this review will be utilised in the following analysis. These 
include: 
~ the question of whether the strategies of the sample companies are identifiably 
prescriptive or emergent, as discussed in Section 2.1.2; 
the question of whether REC leadership style is demonstrably transactional or 
transformational, as discussed in Section 2.3.1; 
the question of the importance of dominant coalition, as Miles and Snow note that 
the approach of the dominant coalition will be particularly important in industries 
with a limited competitive heritage, and whether there is a link between 
membership of a dominant coalition and the strategy pursued, as also discussed 
in Section 2.3.1; 
the question of which if any ofFarkus and Wetlaufer's leadership archetypes are 
evident in any of the case study companies, as discussed in Section 2.3.2; 
the question of the importance of structure, and its relationship to strategy, as 
discussed in Section 2.4.2; and 
a formal assessment of Miles and Snow's concept that different configurations will 
be seen to predominate at different stages of the development of an industry. 
2.6.3 Critiques and Amendments 
The final section of this chapter marks the beginning of the inductive research proposed 
within this work. It was noted earlier that, firstly, an objective of this research was to 
propose a series of viable strategy combinations that were evident within the industry. 
But that, secondly, this was work that had yet to be undertaken by Pearce and Robinson, 
upon whose work this analysis was based. The author therefore proposes to establish a 
series of possible strategic combinations which are suggested by the work of Pearce and 
Robinson, but which are not made clear. The aim here is to establish a reference point for 
work on strategy combinations that will occur, in particular, in Chapter's Five to Eight of 
this research. 
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To reiterate the key sentiments expressed by Pearce and Robinson in relation to 
combinations of grand strategies: a grand strategy is "a comprehensive general approach 
that guides a firm's major actions" (pearce and Robinson, 1994, p.224). Anyone of the 
grand strategies "could serve as the basis for achieving the major long-term objectives of 
a single firm .... but.. .. many firm's usually combine several grand strategies" (pearce and 
Robinson, 1994, p.224). While Pearce and Robinson offer the reader suggested clusters 
of grand strategies, they do not specify the nature and relationship of strategic 
combinations. Some of the grand strategies provide, therefore, options to decision 
makers to progress their decision making if an existing strategy has fallen short of its 
objectives, or ifnew opportunity has presented itself. The objective of this section is to 
explore this subject, and suggest possible combinations demonstrating this concept. 
However, the author believes it is firstly necessary to critique the view expressed by 
Pearce and Robinson in regard to their claim that anyone grand strategy could act as the 
basis for achieving a firm's major long term objectives. It is therefore argued that of the 
14 grand strategies presented, only two: concentrated growth and innovation, could be 
pursued in isolation. It would not be possible to follow, for example, a product 
development strategy ifthere was not a concentrated growth strategy in place to provide 
a 'product' for the strategy to 'develop'. Of these two 'core' strategies the concentrated 
growth strategy is by far the most common, and perhaps is the 'default', 'foundation', or 
'building block' strategy underlying all of this analysis, by which it is meant that most 
organisations will seek, or arguably will have to seek, a concentrated growth strategy if 
they are to survive and prosper. Most strategies, therefore, will originate from a 
concentrated growth base. The providence of basing a strategy on innovation has already 
been questioned, in particular in the review of the prospector organisation in Section 
2.5.6.2.2, as well as Section 2.5.4.4. However it is possible, and therefore needs to be 
identified as such here. However innovation is much more likely to be used as an strategic 
option, rather than as a strategic foundation. 
Figure 2.6 displays, therefore, a series of strategic combinations developed by the author 
which utilise the logic of Pearce and Robinson's conceptualising as well as a knowledge 
of the behaviour of organisations in market situations. It is not intended to provide 
exhaustive explanations of the nature of these combinations at this point, as their validity, 
in terms of existence and viability will be legitimised by the research that follows in 
Chapter's Five to Eight. 
-120-
Figure 2.6: Possible Strategy Combinations 
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Narrative 
Variant 1: The core concentrated 
growth approach 
Variant lA: An extended concentrated 
growth approach, featuring concentric 
diversification 
Variant IB: An extended concentrated 
gro\\1h approach, featuring vertical 
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Variant IC: An extended concentrated 
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Variant 2A: Extended organic market 
development, featuring concentric 
diversification 
Variant 2B: 
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Variant 3A: External market 
development, featuring concentric 
diversification 
Variant 3B: An extended external 
market development approach 
Variant 3C: Alternate view of Variant 
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Variant 4: Organic product 
development 
Variant 4A: External product 
development 
Variant 5: A multiple approach, 
featuring elements of Variant's 1,2,3, 
and 4 
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Variant 5B: An extended multiple 
approach 
Variant 5C: Another extended multiple 
approach 
Variant 6: Innovation 
The above figure provides a variety of possible strategic combinations that may be 
evident. It is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely to indicate a variety of the most 
commonly occurring combinations. Throughout the research, these combinations will be 
referred back to, new variant's identified, and discussion of their relative merits and 
legitimacy, and suitability for application, will be presented. 
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Chapter Three Methodology and Research Design 
3.0 Introduction 
There exists within the business management field an at times acrimonious (Gill and 
Johnson, 1991, p.vii) debate as to the relative merits of different schools of research 
methodology. What authors do not debate, however, is the vital importance of 
methodology in producing valid and reliable outcomes from research. This chapter has 
two objectives: to present the decisions taken by the author in respect of the methodology 
employed in this research; to make a case for the validity and reliability of that chosen 
methodology, and hence underline the validity of the outcomes of the research itself 
Before beginning this exercise, however, it is perhaps appropriate to provide a brief 
summary of the contents of this chapter to guide the reader. The chapter is divided into 
seven discrete sections. In Section 3.1, the reader is introduced to a series of standard 
research concepts regularly used by social science researchers. As previously mentioned 
research philosophy is a contentious issue, and so a clear understanding of the location of 
this research is of considerable importance. In order to justify the author's approach, 
therefore this section seeks to explore the key features of the two main schools of thought 
in social science research: positivism and phenomenology, along with the key methods of 
exploration, data collection and analysis, associated with each school. In so doing, the 
issue of the context of the research and the selection of the most appropriate approach are 
addressed. 
In Section 3.2, readers are presented with a map of the research design as a guide to the 
research process, which is described in Section's 3.3 to 3.6. In addition, the key concept 
of triangulation is discussed and its relevance to the research process explained. In 
Section 3.3 the early, preparatory stages of the research are explained, with reference to 
the process followed by the author in terms of domain selection and research questions, 
the role, process and outcome of the literature survey, and the role and process of 
exploratory interviews. 
In Section's 3.4 and 3.5, the preliminary and field stage research processes are explained. 
In each section the aims and objectives, key methodological issues (in particular relating 
to the use of content analysis in Section 3.4 and case studies in Section 3.5), process of 
triangulation, and outcomes are clarified, and explained. Section 3.6 discusses the process 
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of inductive proposition building, from the tentative propositions put forward in Chapter 
One to the development of hypotheses for testing in future research, as presented in 
Chapter Thirteen. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter by relating the chosen approach to 
the scientific method, and exploring the question of validity. 
3.0.1 Characteristics of Research 
Before moving on to consider these issues, it is perhaps appropriate to briefly consider 
some wider issues with respect to the process of research itself, and its underlying aims. 
The literature suggests that there are a variety of different forms of research in the 
business environment. Jankowicz notes three types; pure research; consultancy; and 
applied research (Jankowicz, 1995, p.92). The variation between these differing types 
stems ultimately from the differing ends that the research is intended to address, within the 
context of the environment. In the business environment, this impact on the environment 
can be identified as the provision of solutions to real business problems. Pure research is 
intended to have no immediate practical application. It is undertaken to increase the fund 
of academic knowledge, and is theory based. Consultancy, on the other hand is only 
concerned with practical application, in this case providing a solution to a managerial 
problem. Applied research represents a combined approach, wherein academic 
investigation provides solutions to specific management problems. 
Cooper and Emory reinforce this distinction, by arguing that research is either problem 
based, or it is pure research. Pure research also seeks to resolve problems, but "of a 
theoretical nature that has little direct impact on action, performance or policy decisions" 
(Cooper and Emory, 1995, p.10). They note four different categories of study that a 
project may adopt; reporting, descriptive, explanatory, and predictive (Cooper and Emory, 
1995, p.ll). Churchill (1991) argues that of these four, the most important are 
exploratory and descriptive research. Exploratory research seeks to better understand an 
area of interest, and begin to develop new approaches. It marks the beginning of a 
research process, in terms of idea generation and the location of initial insights to be used 
in future explorations of the issues and problems identified (Robson, 1993, Yin, 1994). 
Primarily, it is undertaken by reference to existing data, or new data gained to support the 
process of concept development. As indicated in Chapter One, this research can be 
identified on the whole as being exploratory in nature, using a single industry study to 
develop more detailed hypothesis to be used in future descriptive analysis. Descriptive 
research tends to follow exploratory research, and involves extending the field of study 
across a much wider sample. It tends to focus upon a narrower range of variables than 
exploratory research, but through an interrogation of a wider sample and will seek 
understanding of causal relationships. This research does not involve descriptive research, 
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as it is intended to generate the concepts and working hypotheses that will be pursued in 
future descriptive research, as discussed in Chapter Thirteen. 
Returning to the issue of the nature of research, the consensus is that it must be about the 
solution of problems, whatever their origin, and for whatever their ultimate purpose. Pure 
research will aim to build, test or disprove theory. Consultancy will seek to find a solution 
to a particular managerial problem. Applied Research will take an academic, theory based 
approach to resolving a practical problem. This project is intended to be located in the 
area of applied research, as it is hoped that the eventual outcomes will provide valuable 
insights into the operation or organisations in situations of industrial transformation. It 
has not been undertaken for purely theoretical purposes, nor as a consultancy project. 
3.1 Standard Research Concepts 
As mentioned in Section 3.0, research in the social sciences is often overshadowed by a 
debate with respect to the inherent validity of competing methodological approaches. 
This debate centres upon the extent to which social science research can achieve the 
validity conferred by the application of the 'scientific method'. There is a general 
consensus within the literature that "good research uses the scientific method" (Cooper 
and Emory, 1995, p.12), or hypothetico-deductive methods (Jankowicz, 1995) as the 
concept is sometimes described. According to Gill and Johnson consideration of the 
scientific method or hypothetico-deductive reasoning implies an acceptance, shared with 
the natural sciences, that what is important in research is not the source of theories and 
hypothesis, but the process by which these ideas are tested and verified (Gill and Johnson, 
1991, p. 32). The debate within the social research arena is how best, or indeed whether 
it is possible, to successfully achieve a scientific approach to research. 
In short, the discussion is concerned with locating the most appropriate route to a final 
destination, perhaps identified as the 'objective truth'. The competing schools, primarily 
positivism and phenomenology (Gill and Johnson, 1991, Easterby-Smith et ai, 1991)\ 
argue for the validity of one approach and often for the invalidity of the other, based upon 
either's ability to achieve scientific methods of investigation and analysis. Some authors 
have argued each approach is quite different from the other, generating different concepts 
and using different tools (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and so are not in competition. Other 
Other schools of thought have developed within the literature: realism, SUbjectivity, idealism and 
postmodemism. A decision was taken not to review these competing schools of thought as their 
relevance to the research in question was not thought to be significant. 
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authors, such as May (1997), have argued for the validity of either approach in the 
appropriate circumstances and providing that rigour in methodological terms is achieved. 
Either of these latter views could be interpreted as suggesting that the approaches may be 
complementary . 
This section seeks to explore this debate, in order to facilitate an appropriate choice of 
research methodology for this thesis. Both positivism and phenomenology will be 
explored, in terms of their guiding philosophy, principal methods of exploration and 
analysis, and their appropriate research contexts. In addition, the relationship between 
both positivism and phenomenology and deductive and inductive approaches to research 
will be discussed. 
3.1.1 Positivism 
The underlying philosophy of the positivist is that social scientists must seek to divorce 
themselves as much as possible from the views of the people in society2, and hence study 
social phenomena "in the same state of mind as the physicist, chemist or physiologist when 
he probes into a still unexplored region of the scientific domain" (Durkheim, 1964, quoted 
in May, 1997). In short, therefore, a positivist or behaviourist approach seeks to adopt 
a scientific detachment, free from the distorting potential of opinion and bias, in order to 
achieve "the prediction and explanation of the behaviour of phenomena and the pursuit 
of objectivity" (May, 1997, p.1 0). Such an approach would therefore share the same aims 
as the natural scientist. 
Gill and Johnson, synthesising the work of writers such as Keat and Urry (1975) and 
Giddens (1979), argue that the two most significant characteristics of a positivist approach 
are that: 
~ research should concern itself with "only directly observable phenomena, with any 
reference to the intangible or subjective being excluded as being meaningless" (Gill 
and Johnson, 1991, p.132); and 
should seek "the testing of theories, in a hypothetico-deductive fashion, by their 
confrontation with the facts of a readily observable external world" (Gill and 
Johnson, 1991, p. 132). 
Johnson (1983) provides a succinct explanation of the rationale for the positivist approach 
when he argues that "human behaviour is subject to the operation of laws of cause and 
2 
In business research this would equate to industry. 
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effect, and the nature of these laws can be identified by the process of hypothesis-testing 
against empirical evidence" (Johnson, 1983). 
The outcomes of a positivist approach therefore seeks to produce sets of' covering laws' 
in the same fashion as do the natural sciences. These covering laws describe, on the basis 
of observed phenomena, expected behavioural characteristics which may be applied to the 
whole of society/industry. It is an approach which seeks to understand causality within 
society/industry, on the basis of generalizable behaviour, but without direct reference to 
the opinions of actors within society/industry. As such, as will be discussed, it has been 
associated with more quantitative research driven by surveys, experimentation, and 
content analysis, rather then more qualitative, opinion based research (Sapsford and Jupp, 
1996). Saunders et al identifY the steps necessary in an hypothetico-deductive approach 
as including: 
~ deducing the hypothesis from the theory; 
~ expressing the hypothesis in operational terms; 
~ testing the operational hypothesis; 
~ examining the outcome; and 
~ modifying the theory in the light of the outcome, if necessary (Saunders et ai, 
1997, p.7l). 
The approach will inevitably be highly structured. 
Closely related to the concept of positivism is the concept of empiricism. It is generally 
accepted that empiricism is separated from positivism by each school's perspective on the 
issue of theory. As can be seen from the preceding discussion, in a positivist approach 
data is collected with the intention of either defending or falsifYing a theory. Empiricism, 
on the other hand "refers to a conception of social research involving the production of 
accurate data - meticulous, precise, generalizable - in which the data themselves constitute 
an end for the research" (Bulmer, 1982, quoted in May, 1997, p.ll). In short, the view 
ofthe empiricist school is that data generated by research is an end in itself "and requires 
no explanation via theoretical propositions" (May, 1997, p.ll). Despite this, the school 
shares many similarities with a positive approach, not least the view that "there is a world 
out there that we can record and we can analyse independently of people's interpretations 
of it" (May, 1997, p.ll). 
3.1.1.1 Chosen Methods of Exploration 
Section 3.l.l referred to the tendency for positivist (or empiricist) approaches to rely 
upon quantitative methods for the exploration of research problems. Table 3.1 presents 
the various means of collecting data available to the social science researcher, as compiled 
-131-
Table 3.1: Selected Methods of Data Collection 
N arne of Method Definition Disposition 
Surveys the collection of data from large samples to detennine the Quantitative 
characteristics and beliefs of the population at large 
In-depth interviews a conversation between researcher and infonnant which may Qualitative 
be open-ended, semi-structured or structured 
Elite interviewing differentiated from vi) above as seeking specifically the views Qualitative 
of influential or well-infonned people in an organization 
(Cooper and Emory, 1995, p.119) 
Ideal or laboratory defined by Cooper and Emory as "studies involving Quantitative 
experiment intervention by the researcher beyond that required for 
measurement" (1995, p.351), where dependent variables are 
manipulated by a researcher to observe the reaction of a 
independent variable; 
Quasi-experimental Action research, according to Rapoport "aims to contribute Qualitative 
& action research: both to the practical concerns of people in an immediate 
problematic situation and to the goals of social science by 
joint collaboration within a mutually acceptable ethical 
framework" (Rapoport, 1970, p.499); 
Ethnography, or defined by Cooper and Emory as the process of discovering Qualitative 
street ethnography: how a cultural subgroup describes and structures its world at 
a street level (1995, p.119); 
Official statistics data collected by a government agency Quantitative 
Participant the study, by observation, of naturally occurring social Qualitative 
observation phenomena. An approach based upon the researcher not 
having a preconception of what is important, but allowing 
the importance of phenomena to become apparent through 
observation (Bawnan, 1992; Samuel, 1994; Whyte, 19S4, as 
quoted in May, 1997, pp.132-33) 
Documentary the investigation of public records, reports, government Quantitative/ 
research documents, historical or contemporary analysis or data, Qualitative 
recorded opinion, or confidential materials; 
Projective identified by Cooper and Emory as including themic Quantitative/ 
techniques and apperception tests, projective measures, games, and role-play Qualitative 
psychological (1995, p.lIS) 
testing 
Films, photographs for the purpose of "capturing the life of the group under Qualitative 
and videotape study" (Cooper and Emory, 1995, p.llS); 
from the work of authors such as Gill and Johnson (1991), May (1997), and Cooper and 
Emory (1995), among others. The extent to which each is related to the positivist 
tradition is determined by (i) the extent to which the approach can be divorced from 
subjectivity on the part of the respondent/observer and (ii) the extent to which the data 
collected can be analysed by quantitative methods. 
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Of the above methods of data collection, the approach most frequently associated with a 
positivist view, in management research at least, is that of the survey. In other branches 
of social science research other positivist methods are successfully employed, such as in 
psychology for instance where laboratory experiments are frequently used. Surveys are 
often seen as a way by which statistical evidence can be collected to confirm or falsify a 
theory. Subject to the appropriate measures to ensure standardisation, replicability, 
validity and representativeness, surveys can provide data about which generalisation's can 
be made in respect of the behavioural characteristics of a specific sample of people, 
companies and so on. Surveys, which are replicated and found to provide similar findings, 
increase the confidence that can be placed upon the validity of results, and hence the 
confidence that can be placed upon the confirmation of the theory. Surveys are often 
associated with a positivist philosophy as they provide the means of gathering data which 
allows the researcher to remain detached from their subjects, but which allows for the 
creation of generalizable rules. They are seen to utilise a methodology with "logical 
similarities to that used by physical scientists" (May, 1997, p.83). A key attribute ofa 
survey is identified by Ferber et al (1980): a method of gathering information, from a 
sample of some description, to gain insight into the larger population from which the 
sample was drawn. Surveys are forms of data collection, as well as methods of analysis 
(De Vaus, 1996). 
Surveys provide a researcher with an approach where data collection is relatively 
straightfOlward, theoretically grounded, providing the appropriate procedures have been 
followed in the construction of the research instrument, and easily replicable, aiding the 
process of verification and strengthening the reliability of the outcomes. The approach 
does, however, have a number of inherent weaknesses, which may actively restrict the 
option of utilising the approach in certain contexts. 
The principal objection to a survey approach is that it attempts to show a causal 
relationship between sets of variables, when the reality of social interaction is not based 
upon causality (May, 1997, p.104). It is argued in certain sections of the literature that 
the co-relation of variables does not imply that one has caused the other, just that there 
may be an association. The tendency of the survey approach is to suggest a relationship 
between variables that does not in reality exist, and by seeking to understand relationships 
statistically, a researcher may overlook the true significance of their findings (May, 1997, 
p.104). 
May notes that an associated criticism of the survey approach is that it "rules out the 
possibility of understanding the process by which people come to adopt particular values 
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or behaviours" (May, 1997, p.1 04). It is possible for researchers to ground their survey 
in theory, and so overcome this criticism, but the literature continues to perceive that this 
is still a common feature of the use of questionnaires. Another related concern is that the 
bias of the surveyor will become apparent within the survey construction. Bias in question 
formulation will lead inevitably to the outcomes that the researcher is seeking, and 
therefore undermines the validity of the process undertaken. Surveys also tend to be 
'snap-shots' of opinion at a particular time, unless they are undertaken longitudinally 
(May, 1997, p.105). 
The underlying concern with the use of survey method is therefore that of validity. 
Without interaction with the participant, a number of questions are posed. How is the 
researcher to be sure that the respondent has understood the question? How is the 
researcher to know the respondent has answered the questions truthfully? How is the 
researcher to know that the respondent has access to the data required, and is in a position 
to speak for their organisation authoritatively? How is the researcher to know that what 
the respondent says that they do, they do in actuality? (Jankowicz, 1995, p.184; Cooper 
and Emory, 1995, p.269). Surveys, driven as they are by the needs of quantitative 
analysis, will tend towards reducing potentially complex problems to a series of limited 
responses, which arguably actively reduces the quality and breadth of the potential 
responses. Therefore, reliability is a key issue, although as Gill and Johnson note, 
reliability is no guarantee of validity (Gill and Johnson, 1991, p.88). 
A second major quantitative approach used in data collection is content analysis. This 
approach does not seek to survey organisations or people operating in the field, but 
predominantly seeks to quantitatively analyse large quantities of secondary textual data, 
like for example newspapers (Beardsworth, 1980). As the reader will see, the analysis of 
the content of newspapers and the use of content analysis is a significant feature of this 
research and so the subject will be addressed in Section 3.4. 
3.1.1.2 Chosen Methods of Analysis 
Clearly, as indicated by the preceding sections, positivist approaches are most closely 
associated with quantitative methods of analysis. Quantitative methods are usually 
associated with the use of descriptive statistics, which maintain the underlying aim of a 
positivist approach of enabling cause and effect to be assessed. A first stage therefore is 
description, as De Vaus notes, "unless we have described something accurately and 
throughly, attempts to explain it will be misplaced" (De Vaus, 1996, p.24). A wide range 
of techniques can be applied in descriptive analysis, from simple reporting of mean scores, 
to significance testing using tests such as chi-square. The aim of this stage of a 
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quantitative analysis is to prepare the data prior to its testing in relation to the underlying 
hypotheses. 
The literature on hypothesis testing is considerable, and it is not possible to address here 
in great detail. In essence, the objective of hypothesis testing through quantitative 
approaches is to prove causal relationships through the application of rigorous and 
verifiable statistical techniques. Quantitative approaches are of particular virtue in areas 
of study requiring an understanding of the behaviour of large sample populations, and the 
testing of the relationship between variables through the use of statistical analysis. 
Proponents of quantitative methods argue that they are more inherently scientific than 
other possible methods, providing the necessary preparatory conditions have been fulfilled. 
3.1.2 Phenomenology 
The opposite position to the positivist philosophy has been variously described as a 
interpretive or phenomenologist approach. This approach seeks to interpret social 
phenomena in terms of the relationship between actor and act. In a phenomenological 
approach there is no attempt to separate out the effect that the human actor has upon 
observable actions, to account for the possibly illogical underpinnings of decisions, and 
the possible "structural inequalities in society/industry" (Sapsford and Jupp, 1996, p.304), 
which can affect the decisions taken. Generally, this school holds that a positivist 
approach: clinical, scientific, and seeking to downplay the effects of the human, seeks 
explanation rather than understanding, and hence produces a situation which limits 
research, and reduces the outcomes of research. Research that is interpretive will, it is 
argued, more accurately reflect what is happening, and hence contribute to the creation 
of responses which more accurately reflect reality, than a positivist approach. 
Phenomenological approaches have tended to be associated with more qualitative methods 
of exploration, and hence with more exploratory research (Cooper and Emory, 1995, 
p.118). In essence, certain elements of the literature suggests that phenomenological 
approaches are useful for the generation of research questions, especially the case when 
inductive research is being undertaken, or for establishing rough propositions for 
development into more definite hypotheses, which would then be tested more 
scientifically. Other authors increasingly argue that phenomenological approaches have 
intrinsic value of their own (Yin, 1994, Hamel, 1992), and this is especially the case with 
the development in popularity of perspectives like the resource based view of the firm 
which emphasises the need to study phenomena internal to the organisation. As was 
shown in the preceding chapter, the development of the resource based view has been seen 
as a move back towards the case-based qualitative approaches favoured by early writers 
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on management (Hoskisson et aI, 1999), and away from the more quantitative approaches 
championed by authors such as Porter (1980) during the 1970's and 1980's. 
3.1.2.1 Chosen Methods of Exploration 
In much the same way that certain methods of data collection are associated with 
positivist/quantitative approaches, so certain methods of data collection are associated 
with phenomenological/qualitative approaches. These approaches are again referred to 
in Table 3.1, and as can be seen by reference to this comparison, the variety of approaches 
available within the social sciences is varied, and contentious. This, arguably, has been 
a major cause of the difficulties associated with research in this school - the fact that no 
one dominant approach has emerged. However, the use of case studies most frequently 
characterises a qualitative approach, either in conjunction with in-depth interviewing or 
techniques like participant observation. Cases play an important part in this research, and 
it is therefore on case-based approaches that this section focusses. 
The value of utilising a case based approach in social research is increasingly being argued 
by a number of social science researchers (Yin, 1994, Hamel, 1992, Perry and Kraemer, 
1986). Indeed some authors argue that the use of cases in management research has a 
long history, stretching back to the work of scholars such as Learned and Andrews 
(Hoskisson et aI, 1999), and realisation of the value of case based approaches is once 
again common within the literature (Hoskisson et aI, 1999, p.417). Increasingly, case 
studies are perceived as providing a degree of detail, and an opportunity to understand 
complex social phenomena that other research methods fail to achieve (Yin, 1994). The 
purpose of this section is therefore to explore this approach more fully, as well as to 
understand the limitations of a case based approach, and their implications for the 
reliability of the outcomes of this research. A number of these issues have already been 
addressed in Section 1.6.l, but the author believes it is necessary to review them again in 
some length. 
Firstly, it is necessary to assess the occasions in social research when a case based 
approach may be considered appropriate, and to explain the characteristics of these 
occasions. Yin argues against the generally accepted viewpoint that "various research 
strategies should be arrayed hierarchically" (Yin, 1994, p.3). In such an arrangement, the 
only role that a case approach would perform would be that of the initial exploratory 
phase of a research project, to be followed subsequently by more scientifically rigorous 
approaches, such as surveys or experiments. Yin argues that all approaches have 
applications in all phases of research, whether that stage is exploratory, descriptive or 
explanatory, and cites his own research as evidence (Yin, 1981a, Yin, 1981b). The key 
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issue, in Yin's view, is that the appropriate strategy be applied to a research project, and 
that "gross misfits" of strategy and project be avoided (Yin, 1994, pA). 
According to Yin selecting an appropriate, or rather a not-inappropriate, research 
approach involves three key factors for the business researcher to consider. These are: 
~ the type of research question posed; 
~ the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events; and 
~ the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events. 
Yin presents a graphical representation of the relationship between these key factors, and 
the five principal research strategies available to the business researcher, as replicated in 
Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies 
Strategy Fonn of research Requires control over Focusses on 
question behavioural events? contemporary issues? 
Experiment how, why yes yes 
survey who, what, where, how no yes 
many, how much 
archival analysis who, what, where, how no yes/no 
many, how much 
history how, why no no 
case study how, why no yes 
Source: Yin, 1994, p.6 
This thesis, as established in Chapter One, has four key research objectives. These 
principally seek to ascertain the nature of the content of the strategies the sample group 
of companies has developed, and why. The project has not sought to determine questions 
related to performance such as how many, or how much. For the purposes of this 
research, therefore, a case approach supported by textual and archival analysis provides 
the necessary means to pursue the research objectives. It would have been possible to 
undertake the intended research through a survey-based approach, but the author doubts 
that the such an approach would have been able to access the necessary detail sought, and 
explore the complex interrelationships involved in the strategy processes of the sample 
companies. In this essentially exploratory research, therefore, the propensity of 
phenomenological approaches to address complex and detailed interrelationships was 
thought the most beneficial, and appropriate way forward. 
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In explaining why this decision was taken, it may be beneficial to explore the supposed 
limitations of a case based approach by explaining how potential weaknesses were 
overcome or felt to be oflimited danger in the conduct of this research. The traditional 
concern in the use of case studies in research has been over the potential lack of rigour, 
and three common elements regarding the application of case studies have been identified 
(YIn, 1994, p. 9-1 0). The first concern is centred upon the capacity of case based research 
to present findings which have "allowed equivocal evidence or biassed views to influence 
the direction of the findings and conclusions" (Yin, 1994). However, it is clear from the 
literature on social science research, that bias and equivocation can be equally evident in 
more supposedly rigorous approaches such as experiments and surveys (May, 1997, 
p.104). Consequently this concern can not be localised in relation to case based research, 
but to badly formulated research in general. Research which has been developed 
objectively should be safe from this concern. 
Secondly is the concern mentioned above about the replicability and generalizability of 
case based research, and the question of external and internal verification. It is generally 
held that these are valid concerns in relation to case based approaches, but again concerns 
which could be applied to other research approaches. Once again, poorly conceived 
research may suffer from each of these blights. It is perhaps appropriate to consider each 
of these concerns in reference to this research project. 
(i) Replicability: there is clearly a problem in seeking to replicate this research project, if 
an exact replication is to be sought. It is unlikely that another researcher would be given 
access to each of the managers interviewed in this research, especially when the industry 
itself is fluid and a company's internal management structure is often in a state of flux. 
However, it is possible to approximately replicate this project - to follow each step - as 
the wider sample population is known and aspects of the material used in triangulation (for 
example published documents from sample organisations, the wider business literature and 
business press) are freely available. 
(ii) Generalizability: the author has been concerned to suggest throughout that research 
of this nature is not intended to be seen as generalising widely about the nature of 
company behaviour. Until the conclusions of the research have been tested in a wider 
context, they can only be said to infer behaviour among the companies that (a) agreed to 
participate and (b) operate in the industry sample. The project's single industry focus has 
been established, and the characteristics of a single industry project were reviewed in 
Section 1.6.2. Wide scale generalizability is not an aim of this project. 
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(iii) External and Internal Verification: the author has aimed to clearly reference all 
works used within this discussion, even those accessed through an intermediate author. 
The primary data collected in confidential interviews has been presented in as open a 
method as possible: Section 1.5.2.1 shows the companies and positions of those 
interviewed (but not the names, as per confidentiality agreements); each quote used from 
the primary data has been referenced against this schedule; and a sample of the interviews 
conducted with senior industry managers has been replicated in Appendix Two. This 
openness, it is hoped, will satisfy concerns about the validity and originality of the 
research. As mentioned above, exact verification may be difficult to achieve, but 
approximate replication is a distinct possibility. 
Thirdly, Yin notes a general concern that a case based approach results in an over long 
research process, and produces documents that are consequently themselves generally 
over long, and therefore arguably ineffective. As Yin notes, such a criticism may be 
appropriate, or it may not (Yin, 1994, p.10). This depends upon the method of data 
collection applied in the case. If the case is based upon lengthy data collection 
procedures, such as ethnography or participant-observation, then the preparation of the 
case may take a long time, and run to many pages. Conversely, if another method is 
chosen, such as the use of a telephone, or indeed the method applied here of a series of 
in-depth interviews, the data collection can both be undertaken more concisely, and can 
also be focussed upon achieving specific objectives. 
Other writers have identified further potential problems with the use of a case approach, 
and these are addressed here. Moser and Kalton (1983) identify a further three issues. 
The first of these is accessibility, and the question of whether the interviewees had access 
to "the information that the interviewer seeks". The interview framework utilised took 
into account the potential for interviewee's to refuse to answer questions due to a concern 
for commercial confidence. As such, the framework was intended to dwell upon former 
activities - a description of how strategy developed, and for what reason, and what current 
or future strategy directions were intended. That is, it was intended that the question of 
confidentiality would not be an issue. While in some cases interviewee's thought 
processes led them towards confidential issues, these were in the main illustrative points 
and did not affect the substance of the interviews themselves. 
Additionally, Moser and Kalton identified the question of interviewee cognition. Did the 
person to be questioned, possess an understanding "of what was required of him or her 
in the role of the interviewee"? While a response to this question will inevitably be 
subjective, all possible actions were taken to ensure that interviewee's understood their 
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role in the process. Early notification of the areas for discussion were circulated to 
interviewee's, and, as the cases consisted of semi-structured interviews, it was possible 
for the researcher to guide the interviewee back to the main areas of discussion if they 
began to digress3. Furthermore, as far as the selection of potential interviewee's was 
concerned, this process was undertaken by the researcher and the key organisational 
contact in tandem. Usually the key contact was the group strategy director who once fully 
briefed understood the needs of the research, and was able to identify suitable supporting 
interviewee's. 
Finally, Moser and Kalton identified the question of motivation, wherein the interviewer 
must make the interviewee "feel that their participation and answers are valued". Again, 
assurances in respect of motivation are inevitably subjective, but the author argues that 
all possible actions were taken to ensure that interviewee's understood the value of their 
input. For example, all interviewee's were presented with copies of their transcribed 
interviews as soon as possible after the interview date, and asked to make comments or 
corrections as they felt necessary. All interviewee's have been kept up to date with the 
progress of the research project, and provided with copies of all subsequent publications 
resulting from the research. 
Clearly, the author shares the view of a number of authors, and Yin (1994) in particular 
that different approaches to conducting research are valid providing two conditions are 
meet. Firstly, that the approach is appropriate for the stated objectives, and secondly that 
the research process is rigorous. Simply assigning a methodology based upon a 
preference is not a feature of good research, and so the author argues for the compatibility 
of the differing perspectives, rather than declaring himself for one side or the other. 
Before verifying the decisions taken in this research project, it is necessary to briefly 
consider the relationship between the differing traditions discussed to date, with inductive 
and deductive approaches. 
3.1.3 Deductive and Inductive Approaches 
In making a decision as to whether to adopt a deductive or an inductive approach in a 
research project, the researcher must know the precise starting point of the investigation, 
as the 'logical ordering' of each approach is the opposite of the other (Gill and Johnson, 
1991). A deductive approach "entails the development of a conceptual and theoretical 
structure prior to its testing through empirical observation" (Gill and Johnson, 1991, p.28) 
3 
Examples of the framework's for semi-structured interviews are presented at Appendix One. 
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while an inductive approach "involves moving from the 'plane' of observation of the 
empirical world to the construction of explanations and theories about what has been 
observed II (Gill and Johnson, 1991, p.33). 
Deduction is identified as a process whereby a relationship is established between reasons 
and conclusions, where through the research process reasons will be found to imply the 
conclusion, and can therefore be seen to represent a proof (Cooper and Emory, 1995, 
p.26). The approach requires empirical testing, as for the approach to succeed it must be 
shown to be "both true and valid" (Cooper and Emory, 1995, p.26), in order to show that 
the conclusions reached necessarily follow from the premises, or reasons, established at 
the outset. In deduction, theory forming comes before research. 
Induction is identified as a process where the relationship between reason and conclusion 
is not as strong. As Cooper and Emory note, lito induce is to draw a conclusion from one 
or more particular facts or pieces of evidence" (1995, p.27), where your conclusion will 
explain the facts available, while the facts available will support the conclusion. However, 
it is in the nature of an inductive approach that there may be a variety of possible 
conclusions. Therefore any conclusion arrived at is by necessity viewed as an hypothesis, 
which needs to be tested empirically. In an inductive approach, conclusions are inferred, 
until they are substantiated, and lithe task of research is largely to determine the nature of 
the evidence needed and to design methods by which to discover and measure this other 
evidence" (Cooper and Emory, 1995, p.28). 
As the preceding section shows, there would appear to be a close relationship between 
deduction and positivist, quantitative research, and between induction and 
phenomenological, qualitative research. The importance of theory, and empirical analysis 
links deduction and quantitative approaches, while the search for theory appears to link 
induction and qualitative approaches. While this can be said to generally hold true, it is 
not possible to argue that it is beyond debate. Clearly, theory can be tested deductively, 
but using qualitative methods. While such a decision would not be universally supported 
by authors from the positivist tradition, it is clear that other authors whose views have 
been presented above would argue for the validity of such an approach. The question 
would inevitably come down to a choice of the appropriate method of exploration being 
selected to address the research question to be resolved. 
3.1.4 Approach Chosen for this Research 
The preceding debate largely reveals the chosen approach adopted for this research. 
However, the author considers that it is necessary to clarify the decisions taken in order 
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to locate the research within the dominant traditions. There are five key observations to 
make about this research: 
~ It is applied research: the research is intended to have value for organisations 
experiencing conditions similar to those investigated, and to provide to the 
companies from the sample an insight into their experiences of industrial 
transformation~ 
It is exploratory: the research undertaken in this thesis represents an initial review 
of events and interactions intended to generate a group of formal hypotheses to 
be tested empirically in the next stage of the research, or to be verified by other 
researchers; 
It is inductive: the exploratory nature of the research, aimed at hypothesis 
generation rather than hypothesis testing, indicates that an inductive approach is 
the more appropriate direction for the research to take~ 
It is located within the field of phenomenology: the research is aimed at identifying 
issues of strategic content and causal relationships in strategic decision making. 
No prior theory exists, which requires the direct input of the actors in these 
decisions for the development and understanding of concepts to be tested at a later 
date. An approach based within the field of phenomenology was therefore 
considered the most appropriate~ and 
It employs a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods of data 
collection, followed by analysis using purely qualitative methods: as will become 
clear in section 3.4, a range of methods including content and other forms of 
textual analysis was used in data collection in the preliminary stage of the research. 
This data was analysed and presented in the form of a series of case studies of the 
sample companies. In the field research, as shown in Section 3.5, a purely 
qualitative approach based upon the use of in-depth interviews and case studies 
was employed. 
3.2 Research Process and Verification Measures 
Having outlined the key methodological details of the research, it is necessary to discuss 
the research process in more detail. Prior to this discussion, however, it is necessary to 
provide a map to orient and guide the reader through the design of the research. This 
section also addresses the question of triangulation, and how the process of triangulation 
was used to assure the validity of the findings of the research. 
3.2.1 A Map of the Proposed Research 
Figure 3.1 provides both a map and a description of the research process, and guides the 
reader through the following Sections 3.3,3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. 
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Figure 3.1: A Map of the Proposed Research 
I (i) I I 
1 
I (ii) I l (iii) J 
l 
I 
I (iv) I 
I 
I (v) J 
l 
I (vi) J 
3.2.2 Triangulation 
(i) Domain Selection (Section 3.3.1): this section 
explores the process wherein the domain in which 
the research was to occur (the industry sector) was 
identified and research questions developed. 
(ii) Literature Survey (Section 3.3.2): this section 
explains the aims, objectives and outcomes of the 
literature survey relative to the wider objectives of 
the research. In addition, it helps to establish the 
research framework used in (iv). 
(iii) Exploratory Interviews (Section 3.3.3): this 
section explains the aims and objectives of the 
exploratory interviews undertaken, and their 
contribution to the research process. In addition, it 
helps to establish and verify the research 
framework used in (iv). 
(iv) Preliminary Research (Section 3.4): this section 
outlines the process of the first stage of data 
collection and analysis, using content and other 
fonus of textual analysis, and the development of 
case studies, leading to the development of 
propositions. 
(v) Field Research (Section 3.5): this section 
outlines the process of the second stage of data 
collection and analysis, using in-depth interviews 
to test the validity of the propositions developed in 
(iv). 
(vi) Hypothesis Development (Section 3.6): this 
section explores the development of propositions at 
each stage of the research, and the presentation of 
hypotheses in Chapter Thirteen. 
A method of overcoming the inherent limitations of a qualitative approach may be 
available through the application of a verification process based upon the concept of 
triangulation (Gill and Johnson, 1991, p.1S0-1S2; Yin, 1994, p.91-92). Triangulation is 
based upon the notion that data collected by qualitative methods gains credence if it is 
demonstrably verified, or cross checked, with other reputable sources. Preferably this 
verification would take the form of other researchers interrogating the same sources of 
data (Denzin, 1970, quoted in Gill and Johnson, 1991, p.lS0). Other authors, such as 
Miller and Friesen, argue that triangulation enables concerns resulting from the use of 
either quantitative or qualitative methods to be dispelled by utilising both approaches in 
a triangulation process (Miller and Friesen, 1982). The process therefore validates the 
authenticity of the data source, by agreeing that the content of the data is both reputable, 
and valid. 
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Within this project, triangulation of data sources and observations has been extremely 
important, and the author has sought to utilise the approach to cross-refer (a) differing 
sources of information, and (b) in the preliminary stage research at least, data collected 
by differing methodological approaches. The process of triangulation undertaken in this 
research is presented in Figure 3.2, and discussed below. 
Figur~ 3.2: Process of Triangulation 
(i) Preliminary Stage 
(a) External Data 
(content analysis) 
(ii) Field Stage 
(b) In-Depth Interview(s) 
(textual analysis) 
3.2.2.1 Triangulation at the Preliminary Stage 
(a) Outcome of 
Preliminary Stage 
(c) Internal Document.s 
(content analysis) 
As diagram (i) of Figure 3.2 shows, a process of triangulation was put in place during the 
preliminary stage of the research. The data was collected from a variety of sources and 
subjected to analysis using approaches derived from both major philosophical traditions. 
The majority of the data analysed in the preliminary stage of the research was externally 
sourced data obtained using content analysis: (a) in Stage (i) of Figure 3.1. A variety of 
data sources were accessed in this process, but the principal source was the Financial 
Times database, 1990-2000. The author examined every story relating to each of the 
twelve companies in the sample, and extracted data relating to a framework of corporate 
and business strategy variables, derived from the literature survey. The key element to 
stress at this point is that the analysis looked at factual data, and counted that data using 
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content analysis techniques. This process will be discussed in greater depth in Section 3.4. 
The second point ofthis triangulation process: (b) in Stage (i), involved a similar process 
utilising internally sourced data, derived from the annual reports issued by the twelve 
sample companies since their privatisation. In so doing, the veracity of exercise (a) and 
(b) could be assured by reference with each other. The third point of the process: (c) in 
Stage (i), involved a process oftextual analysis wherein the same external sources of data 
as in exercise (a) were examined for evidence of opinion, rather than fact. Textual 
analysis, as defined by Silverman (1995), is identified as the qualitative equivalent of 
content analysis and allows for the aggregation of participants views rather than factual 
occurrences. As such, the factual data derived from exercises (a) and (b) could be cross 
verified with the analysis of industry observers, academics, and industry participants 
themselves. The outcome of this stage of the research, reported in Chapter Eight, is a 
series of propositions aimed at securing a solution to Key Objectives One and Two. 
This set of outcomes, as Diagram (ii) of Figure 3.1 demonstrates, provide point (a) in 
Stage (ii) of the triangulation process undertaken in this research. Point (b) in Stage (ii) 
of the process is represented by the in-depth interviews undertaken in the field stage of the 
research. In each ofthe three case study companies, the views of a 'principal interviewee' 
on the outcomes of the preliminary stage of the research were sought. In two of the three 
cases, the principal interviewee was the Head of Group Strategy for the organisation, 
while in the other it was the Director of Human Resources. Multiple interviews were 
conducted within each organisation, where permissible and where they offered the 
opportunity to add value to the research. The objective of this activity was to cross-refer 
the views of actors within the same organisation and so strengthen the process of 
triangulation by adding an extra element of verification for the potential subjective views 
expressed by the interviewees, so overcoming a potential for bias within the process. This 
was a factor in point (c) in Stage (ii), the content analysis of any internal documentation 
each of the case study companies were able to provide to the author. 
Therefore, in summary, the triangulation process allows the researcher to verify the 
accuracy of a variety of sources of data, and so aid the validation of the outcomes of the 
research. The process allows for any subjectivity on the part of the researcher to be 
eradicated, by testing his potentially subjective interpretations against the opinions and 
knowledge of actors actively involved in the strategic decision taking process. There have 
been some methodological concerns raised about the application of a triangulation 
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approach\ but the greater concern has been practical, as in relation to the pressure placed 
upon available time and resources. However, it is clear that the triangulation undertaken 
in this project consisted of activities which were entirely consistent with the underlying 
objectives of the project, and which did not place extra pressure upon the available time 
or resources. Indeed Yin argues that a case approach readily lends itself to a triangulation 
process (Yin, 1994, p.91), arguing that it will enable a greater degree of construct validity 
(Yin, 1994, p.92). Patton identifies four different types of triangulation: (a) of data 
sources, described as data triangulation; (b) among different evaluators, described as 
investigator triangulation; ( c) of perspectives on the same data set, called theory 
triangulation; and (d) of methods, called methodological triangulation (patton, 1987). 
This project would appear to sit most comfortably within the realm of data triangulation, 
although the use of both content and textual analysis means that methodological 
triangulation has also occurred. 
3.3 Domain Selection, Literature Survey and Exploratory Interviews 
This section provides the methodological background to the two preceding chapter's. 
This involves briefly reviewing the process of domain selection, and the generation of 
research questions, the process involved in the survey of literature, and the nature and 
aims of exploratory interviews within this research project. Firstly, domain selection. 
3.3.1 Domain Selection 
Section 1.2 addressed a number of factors which influenced the choice of the UK 
electricity industry as a suitable domain for study. These included: the global reach of 
privatisation; the issue of providing insights into the effective management of former 
SOEs; the potential deficiencies in existing prescriptive approaches (as discussed in 
Section 3.3.2); and the inherent value of understanding more about how organisations 
manage paradigm shifts, in situations of industrial transformation. While these factors 
provided justification for the need to study an industry, they did not explain why the UK 
electricity industry was an appropriate choice for a study of this importance. 
The UK electricity industry was identified as an appropriate domain for research for a 
number of reasons, which were set out in an early paper developed from this research 
(Ghobadian et aI, 1997). The UK industry, it was argued, provided an estimable research 
opportunity. This was due to the fact that: 
4 
For example, a researcher will need to be certain that the findings of the process of triangulation are 
indeed valid, by ensuring that each aspect of the process is involved in an analysis of the same variables. 
This may prove difficult in certain circumstances. 
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all of the companies in the sample were created on the same day, and all were 
originally part of the same organisation prior to privatisation; 
each possessed very similar, although not identical, characteristicsS in terms of 
organisational and managerial structure, corporate culture and ethics, core 
business activities, business practices and procedures; 
all of the companies shared the same relationship with the industry's regulatory 
authorities; 
there were only twelve companies in the industry, and while primary access was 
still to be an issue, the small size of the sample allowed the researcher to build a 
comprehensive and intimate picture of each company from the existing and 
plentiful data sources; and 
they enjoyed a common interaction with a changed competitive environment. 
Allied to these features of the companies of the industry sample are other key aspects of 
the industry, which were identified during the literature survey: 
~ it was the first industry of its kind to be de-integrated (Burton, 1997); 
~ it was the first industry of its kind to experience ordered competition (Burton, 
1997) - that is competition was a legislative requirement, rather than developed 
due to market pressures; 
it was the first industry of its kind to include a commitment to full competition in 
domestic supply; and 
there was a suggestion, later confirmed (OFFER, 1999c, UK001) that the 
companies had been allowed autonomy in determining the content of strategy as 
well as other issues such as organisational structure, and so on. 
In short, the decision to explore the chosen industry was a product of a variety of 
complementary factors: there was an identified need for the research; the sample industry 
was small and thought to be accessible; the sample provided a controlled environment, 
wherein all companies started from a similar position, but there was enough circumstantial 
evidence by the time the research began6 to suggest that differences were emerging; and 
the author believed that the outcomes of the survey would make a contribution to existing 
Details of the twelve companies, and their particular characteristics are presented in Section 4.2 of 
Chapter Four. 
6 
The project began officially in October 1994. 
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knowledge, through publication in the management literature7 . 
3.3.2 Literature Survey 
The importance of the literature survey as a first stage in any research project is well 
understood (Bell, 1987, Howard and Sharpe, 1983, Veal, 1992, among many). Gill and 
Johnson identifY the key aims of a literature review as demonstrating some awareness of 
the current state of knowledge in the chosen field and the limitations of the existing 
literature (Gill and Johnson, 1991, p.21), and implicitly the researcher armed with this 
knowledge is therefore in a position to gauge what sort of contribution to the existing 
literature the proposed research is intended to make. The literature review provides the 
relevance of the research. 
Within this thesis, a wide ranging literature review has been conducted. This has had two 
primary focusses: the wider management literature exploring issues relating to strategy 
(Chapter Two), and the narrower literature exploring issues relating to privatisation 
(Chapter Four). The objectives of each were as follows: 
(i) Management literature: the objectives of this first part ofthe literature survey were 
four fold: 
~ to establish an understanding of the key concepts and definitions used 
throughout the thesis; 
to identify and review key factors influencing the content of organisational 
strategy; 
to identify and review existing frameworks, or systems of classification, 
which could be utilised by the author in the undertaking of the proposed 
research; and 
noting any deficiencies that may exist within existing concepts, definitions 
and frameworks when applied to industries sharing the same 
characteristics as the industry under study. 
(ii) Privatisation literature: the objectives of this second part of the literature were 
three fold: 
7 
~ to establish an understanding of the key concepts underlying the policy and 
practice of privatisation; 
to identify the events of the UK privatisation programme as a whole, and 
the privatisation of the electricity industry in particular; and in so doing 
Fonnally five academic journal articles have been published as a result of the research to date along with 
a number of conference papers, another is in press, while a number of others are planned (please see 
Ghobadian et ai, 1997, 1998, 1999, Ghobadian and Viney 2000, James et ai, 1997,2001) . 
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understand the context within which industrial transformation has 
occurred. 
The literature review therefore provides the context within which the research occurs, an 
understanding of the location of the research with respect to existing work in the field and 
of the key concepts which shape the existing literature, an idea of deficiencies within the 
literature that the research will seek to address, and a series of concepts, frameworks and 
tools that can be employed by the author to advance the proposed research. Discussion 
of the identity and nature of the frameworks to be utilised will follow below. 
3.3.3 Exploratory Interviews 
In support of the formal literature survey, a number of exploratory interviews were held 
with figures from the industry under investigation. The principal objective of these early 
interviews was to act as a sounding boards for ideas and observations flowing from the 
textual and documentary research undertaken in the preliminary stage (Section 3.4). As 
stated previously, a schedule of all of the formal interviews undertaken for this research 
is presented in Section 1.5.2.1. Of these the key interviews were UK002 (Eastern Group, 
1995b), with the then of Eastern Group, and UK001 (OFFER, 1999c), with the then 
for OFFER. Other interviews, principally with managers 
from US companies and non-case study UK companies occurred as per the schedule. In 
addition, other interviews occurred informally with interested academics, members of 
trade unions, other employees of RECs and so on. To an extent, these 'exploratory' 
interviews were on-going throughout the research and so the use of the term 'exploratory' 
is perhaps inappropriate. It is perhaps more appropriate to term them as 'networking' or 
as 'confirmatory' interviews conducted in a non-case study environment. The literature 
describes such interviews as 'elite interviews'. 
3.3.4 Outcomes of Exploratory Stage 
Before moving on to identify the process of the preliminary research stage, it is necessary 
to briefly establish the outcomes of the exploratory stage. These were four fold: 
~ the establishment of the research domain, and a number of key and supporting 
objectives of the research (see Section 1.3); 
as part of these objectives, the establishment of two 'core' propositions which 
would be developed over the course of the research to become formal hypotheses 
to be tested in subsequent confirmatory research in other research projects; 
the development of an understanding of the key concepts within the literature, and 
of the inherent deficiencies of these key concepts; and 
the identification of a number of systems of classification from the literature which 
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would be used to aid the analytical process. 
3.4 Preliminary Stage Research 
This section aims to establish: the aims of the preliminary stage of the research; the 
features of the process; an assessment of the issues raised by the techniques employed at 
this stage; and its outcomes. 
3.4.1 The Aims Of the Preliminary Stage 
Essentially, the aims of the preliminary stage of the research involve progressing the first 
two key objectives of the research: with respect to establishing an understanding of the 
content, and of the influences on the development of strategy, among the sample 
companies. As part of this process, this stage of the research also seeks to elaborate upon 
the 'core' propositions, with the aim of developing more specific propositions to be 
further developed towards working hypotheses later in the research. This stage of the 
research also helps to test the validity of the frameworks chosen by the author to shape 
the research process, and through triangulation of data sources and data gathering 
techniques, to verify the work undertaken to date. 
3.4.2 Features of the Preliminary Stage 
This stage of the research features twelve individual case studies of the industry sample 
companies, which are presented in Chapter's Five to Seven. Each of these case studies 
is developed with reference to existing sources of data, analysed by means of content and 
textual analysis. Within each case study, data is reported and observations made and 
assessed by reference to concepts derived from the literature, with respect to the content 
of strategy and the likely influences upon the strategy producing that content. Each 
chapter features an analysis of the findings, which are drawn together in Chapter Eight 
where preliminary conclusions are drawn with relation to Key Objectives One and Two. 
In addition, the tentative core propositions presented in Chapter One are expanded as a 
result of this preliminary stage. 
The grouping of RECs in each of these three chapters was determined by analysis 
conducted by Holmes (1992), which divided the RECs into four discrete groups, based 
upon (i) their geographic location, and (ii) their prospects in the new environment. This 
grouping is shown at Table 3.4. Holmes' expectation was that location would playa 
significant part in the content of the strategies of the RECs. By using his model as the 
basis of the initial analysis, it may be possible to determine to what extent Holmes' view; 
that market will influence tactics/strategies, can be supported, as part of the wider review 
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of the key drivers of strategy within the industry. This analysis will be considered in full 
in Chapter Eight. Therefore, and despite the "inevitably large generalisations" (Holmes, 
1992, p.54) required to split the sample, the following division has been pursued. 
Table 3.4: Composition of Sub-Samples Presented in Chapters 5-7 
Title Companies Definition Chapter 
Location 
The Manweb "these four serve the fonner heavily industrialised Chapter Five 
Northen Norweb areas of the country which have suffered long tenn 
Industrials Northern decline, but where industrial demand is still 
Yorkshire dominant. Population drift is beginning to stabilize 
but, long tenn, the areas they serve are shrinking in 
both demographic and industrial tenns, despite 
numerous bright spots of industrial development" 
The East "a region where industrial activity is stabilising and Chapter Six 
Midlands Midlands probably reviving, following the decline of the motor 
Midlands industry. Demand is fairly evenly spread between 
domestic, industrial and commercial sectors" 
The SWALEC "mainly rural areas, now that heavy industry in Chapter Six 
Agricultural SWEB South Wales has all but disappeared, with a widely-
RECs spread population and heavy reliance on domestic 
and light industrial users" 
The Eastern "four of the biggest RECs, covering the most affluent Chapter 
Southern London part of the country, with comparatively little heavy Seven 
Suburban Seeboard industry, but with growing commercial demand and 
RECs Southern population increasing". 
3.4.3 Methodological Issues 
The methodological issues raised at this stage of the research concern: the choice of 
research framework, the choice of data collection and analysis techniques, and the concept 
of triangulation. Each are addressed separately. 
3.4.3.1 Choice of Research Framework 
The choice of data collection and interpretation framework's utilised in this research was 
made in Chapter Two, after a study of the relevant literature. It was decided that the 
content of each company's strategy would be explored using: 
~ Pearce and Robinson's typology of grand strategies (Pearce and Robinson, 1994); 
~ Porter's (1980) typology of generic business strategies and Chrisman et aI's 
(1988) taxonomy of generic business strategies; and 
Miles and Snow's (1978) typology of organisational strategy, structure and 
process. 
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Justification for the selection of each was presented in Section 2.5. However, to 
reiterate, these frameworks were chosen because: 
~ they are widely cited, tested and established conceptual frameworks; 
~ they provide an estimable utility by separately exploring the key issues the research 
seeks to address, and jointly complementing each other to provide a full coverage 
of all of the main aspects under investigation, and in particular Objectives One and 
Two; and 
the testing and verification of each of these frameworks in a regulated setting is 
the third key objective of the research project, as identified in Chapter One. 
3.4.3.2 Choice of Data Collection and Analysis Techniques 
As stated above, each of the case studies presented at this stage of the research features 
data is derived from the literature. Chapters Five to Eight make use of existing textual 
and archival source data drawn from a series of principal locations. Chiefly, these data 
locations are: 
~ The Financial Times 1988-2000; 
~ The Economist 1988-2000; 
~ The RECs Pathfinder Prospectus, issued by Klienwort Benson in 1990, and all 
subsequent prospectuses issued by the RECs when shares have been sold; 
~ Company Annual Reports 1989-2000; 
~ Annual reports and other reports from regulatory bodies; 
~ Press releases, from companies, and regulatory and governmental bodies; 
~ Analysts reports; 
~ The academic literature; and 
~ Other sources of information which will be duly attributed. 
Of these sources of data, the three most commonly used were: the Financial Times, for 
details of day-to-day business decision making and activity; the pathfinder prospectus, for 
details of the starting point for each of the companies; and company annual reports, for 
details of more in-depth strategic thinking. The use of annual reports is common in 
academic research, but it is perhaps necessary to justify the reliance upon the Financial 
Times for much of the detail in relation to each company's 'Key Events' section. The 
Financial Times is widely recognised as an impartial, accurate and reliable source of 
business news and one of the principal sources of business information available. Its focus 
on business provides a researcher with the certitude that the full spectrum of events have 
been reported upon within its pages. The importance of the Financial Times is further 
deepened by the current paucity of coverage of issues relating to privatisation within the 
management literature, as discussed in Chapter's One and Four. The interrogation of the 
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various sources of secondary data was undertaken using (a) content analysis and (b) other 
forms of textual analysis. It is perhaps appropriate to briefly identify the key aspects 
relating to the use of concepts such as content analysis at this point in time. 
3.4.3.2.1 Content Analysis 
The concept of content analysis is based upon the need, identified in the literature, for an 
approach which permits large quantities of textual data resources: "a very convenient and 
easily handled source of raw material for the analyst" (Beardsworth, 1980, p.372) to be 
analysed and verified scientifically and so produce "hard, objective data" (Beardsworth, 
1980, p.372). This need reflects the desire on the part of researchers to access rich 
sources of data, such as provided by newspapers and other printed media, which may 
otherwise be unavailable in such a way that subjectivity is removed from the process, and 
outcomes are validated. Content analysis, in its many forms, has been identified as an 
appropriate technique in situations of this kind. 
One definition available in the literature is that proposed by Budd et al (1967), which 
states that "content analysis is a systematic technique for analysing message content and 
message handling - it is a tool for observing and analysing the overt communication 
behaviour of selected communicators" (Budd et aI, 1967, p.2). Holsti adopts a wider 
perspective, identifying the concept as follows: "content analysis is any technique for 
making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics 
of messages" (Holsti, 1969, p.14). As Beardsworth notes, the key to this latter definition 
are its core characteristics: its objectivity, systematic approach and generality 
(Beardsworth, 1980, p.374). Using content analysis, he argues, involves explicitly 
formulated rules and procedures. He further notes that there is an assumption that the 
outcomes of content analysis will be analysed using statistical methods. Silverman 
identifies this aspect of content analysis as placing the technique in the 
quantitative/positivist school (Silverman, 1993, p.9-10), and sees it as an attempt to 
provide a scientific means of analysing data that could otherwise only be analysed 
subjectively. 
Content analysis, therefore, could be criticised as an opportune method of making sense 
of otherwise uncategorisable data. There are two strains to the process of content 
analysis: firstly, of counting the number of mentions a particular variable, "the lexical 
contents and/or syntactic structures of documents" which normally takes actual words as 
the basic content elements, and secondly, of counting the instances in which particular 
themes arose in the texts being examined (Beardsworth, 1980, p.375). In both cases, an 
inference would be placed upon the outcomes, following statistical analysis. The 
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technique may be subject to criticism. Beardsworth himself notes that despite the 
seemingly 'hard, objective' nature of the process, it would be unwise to infer any scientific 
virtue to the outcomes (Beardsworth, 1980, p.392). Decisions to present stories in 
newspapers, for example, are based upon subjective decisions and can not be guaranteed 
to represent an objective view. The author accepts this critique, and suggests that the 
process of triangulation proposed in this research provides an opportunity to judge the 
value that may be attributed to the outcomes of this process. It is now necessary to 
discuss the process of content analysis undertaken in this research, and perhaps suggest 
a variation upon the core concept. 
As noted above, Beardsworth identified two strains of content analysis, one based upon 
textual analysis and one based upon theme analysis8. The author has selected the theme 
analysis approach, for the following two reasons: 
~ the authors' interest is in noting behaviour in a limited range of easily 
categorizable circumstances which, as they are clearly defined areas of strategic 
decision making, are closer to themes than to lexical or syntactical structures; and 
the information the author is seeking will not appear in the texts in the same form 
as the themes mentioned previously. Hence, there is a requirement upon the part 
of the author to interpret the data, and assign themes. Thus a textual approach 
would be inappropriate. 
As Beardsworth suggests, the use of content analysis' involves explicitly formulated rules 
and procedures', and the rules and procedures followed here were as shown in Figure 3.2. 
The first stage of the process, (a) in Figure 3.3, involved identifying the data source, which 
in this case was a database of the Financial Times from 1990 to 2000. Similar data 
sources were provided by The Economist, company annual reports and so on. Having 
identified the data source, a research framework, (b) in Figure 3.3, was assigned, which 
in this case involved Pearce and Robinson's framework of Grand Strategies (1994), but 
also included Chrisman et ai's (1988) taxonomy of business strategies. Stage three 
involved counting the instances when the grand strategy themes appeared in stories 
contained in the FT database, and transcribing these events into a table, (c) in Figure 3.3. 
This occurred for all twelve companies of the sample. The outcomes of this exercise were 
then qualitatively interpreted, (d) in Figure 3.3. The author argues that a qualitative 
8 
Beardsworth's use of the word 'textual' in this context is unhelpful, as other authors, such as Silvennan 
(1993, p.9-10), use the phrase to describe approaches for analysing text which are not quantitative. 
However, as Beardsworth's notion of 'textual analysis' is not used in this research, this possible confusion 
will be noted, but not acted upon. 
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Figure 3.3: Process of Content Analysis: A Themic Analysis 
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analysis was necessary in this case because: 
.. the data was not a sample drawn from the complete database, but rather 
represented the position for industry sample as a whole. Statistical inference was 
therefore unnecessary and the author argues that this approach makes the analysis 
more reliable than had a more common fonn of content analysis been pursued; and 
despite the use of a quantitative technique for data collection the thrust of the 
research, as suggested by Section 3.1.7, is qualitative. The author argued earlier 
that a qualitative approach was necessary to understand the complex relationship 
between all of the factors involved, and hence the qualitative analysis of even this 
quantitatively gathered data was wholly appropriate. 
The outcomes of this analysis is reported extensively in Chapter's Five to Eight. 
Before moving on to discuss the issue of triangulation, it is necessary to make two further 
points in relation to content analysis. The first of these is that while 'formal' content 
analysis occurred within the research, other forms of textual analysis (as defined by 
Silverman rather than Beardsworth) also occurred. Silverman notes that qualitative 
textual analysis aimed to "understand participants' categories" (Silverman, 1993, p.9) 
which the author takes to imply that opinions, rather than facts, can be culled from large 
expanses of textual data. The implications of this actions are shown in relation to 
triangulation. The second of these concerns Willer and Willer's (1973) concept of 
'systemic empiricism'. Systemic empiricism is a form of content analysis, which appears 
close to that adopted by the author. Its features are that it is inductive, exploratory, and 
intended to identify generalisations based upon a series of categories, such as corporate 
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strategy options, which occur across a sample and across time. Its authors claim that the 
key difference is that systemic empiricism does not make the claims of scientific validity 
as does content analysis. The attraction of the concept of systemic empiricism is that it 
explains the approach adopted by the author, although the author would argue that his 
approach is more valid, as all data is explored and sampling is not undertaken. 
3.4.4 The Process of Triangulation 
The concept and process of triangulation in relation to this research were discussed at 
some length in Section 3.2.2. Therefore, it is intended to only briefly review the actions 
taken at this stage of the research. As Figure 3.2 demonstrated, triangulation took the 
form of a comparison of outcomes resulting from the analysis of: (a) externally sourced 
factual data (derived from the Financial Times, Economist et cetera) analysed by content 
analysis; (b) internally sourced factual data (derived from annual reports, offer 
prospectuses et cetera) analysed by content analysis; and (c) externally sourced opinion 
data (also derived from the Financial Times, Economist et cetera) analysed by textual 
analysis. The aim of this process was to: 
~ identify and verify the nature of the content of the strategies developed by the 
companies of the sample industry; 
develop a rational explanation as to why that particular content had developed in 
each case, and 
develop an understanding of the strategic combination operated by the company, 
and how that led to the content identified. 
The process of triangulation allows for the outcomes of this stage of the research to be 
agreed and verified, and thus provide a solid basis for the next stage of the research. The 
outcome of this stage of the research involved the development often formal propositions 
to be tested in the field stage of the research. 
3.5 Field Stage Research 
This stage of the research discusses: the aims of the field stage of the research, the 
features of the process, an assessment of the issues raised by the techniques employed at 
this stage, and its outcomes. 
3.5.1 The Aims Of the Field Stage 
Essentially, the aims of the field stage of the research involve continuing the progression 
of the first two key objectives of the research from the preliminary stage. This involves 
attempting to verify or falsify the ten propositions developed at the end of the preliminary 
stage of research, as part of the process of developing formal hypotheses for future 
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testing. The principal aims of the field stage, and its relationship to the preliminary stage 
are discussed at length in the concluding remarks to the preliminary stage, made in Section 
8.5. To a large extent, this stage of the research is aimed at validating the analysis 
conducted to date, by the application of a further process of triangulation using both 
different sources of data, and different methods of data collection. 
3.5.2 Features of the Field Stage 
This stage of the research features three individual case studies of Eastern Group, 
Seeboard and SWEB which are presented in Chapter's Nine to Eleven. Each of these case 
studies is developed with reference to primary sources of data, in the form of a series of 
in-depth semi-structured interviews undertaken with a number of managers from each 
company. These are analysed by means of textual analysis. Within each case study, data 
is reported and observations made and assessed by reference to concepts developed in the 
preliminary stage of the research, once again with respect to the content of strategy and 
the likely influences upon the strategy producing that content. Each chapter features an 
analysis of the findings, which are drawn together in Chapter Twelve where final 
conclusions are collected together with relation to Key Objectives One and Two, as well 
as to Key Objective Three. In addition, the formal propositions presented in Chapter 
Eight are expanded as a result of the work of this field stage, in support of Key Objective 
Four. 
3.5.3 Methodological Issues 
The principal methodological issue raised by this section of the research concerns the use 
of case studies, and their internal and external validity. As discussed extensively in 
Section 3.1.2. 1 of this chapter, the author argues that cases are valid for the collection, 
analysis and reporting of data, and the most appropriate media for the investigation at 
hand. The process by which case studies aided the analytical process will be discussed 
with reference to the process of triangulation in the following section. 
3.5.4 The Process of Triangulation 
The concept and process of triangulation in relation to this research was discussed as 
some length in Section 3.2.2. Therefore, it is intended to only briefly review the actions 
taken at this stage of the research. As Figure 3.1 demonstrated, triangulation took the 
form of the comparison and cross-verification of: (a) the outcomes of the preceding 
preliminary research stage, derived from published sources of data; (b) internally sourced 
interview data (derived from a bank of interviews with senior managers in each of the case 
study companies) reviewed by textual analysis; and (c) internally sourced factual data 
(such as internal reports, and organisational diagrams derived from the interviewees), 
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analysed by textual analysis. The aim of this process was to: 
~ critically review the observations and conclusions drawn from the preliminary 
stage research, which by implication would include the formal propositions 
developed at the end of the preliminary stage, against the views of managers and 
internal documents from each of the case study companies; 
verify the potentially subjective interpretations of individual managers by cross 
referring them with the views of other managers interviewed during the process, 
to ensure that the potential for bias, ignorance or misinterpretations of events is 
minimised; and so 
allow for a bank of propositions to be put forward, based upon an extensive and 
rigorous testing and verification procedure. 
In so doing, the ten initial propositions developed at the end of Chapter Eight can be 
modified, if necessary, and put forward in Chapter's Twelve and Thirteen as hypotheses 
to be tested in future research. 
3.6 Hypothesis Building 
The stages of the development of propositions in this research has been discussed 
throughout this chapter, but it is perhaps necessary to briefly explore this question in 
greater depth. As stated earlier in this chapter, this research has been identified as being 
primarily exploratory in nature, and the exploratory nature of the research is reflected in 
its inductive approach. As was also noted earlier, the stage of development of theory was 
crucial in determining the inductive nature of this research. This research was intended 
to develop a set of hypotheses which would be tested in later research, rather than in the 
research reported here. This project was not, therefore engaged directly in testing theory, 
but in developing concepts which may later become theory. 
Cooper and Emory differentiate an 'hypothesis' from a 'proposition' as follows. Where 
a 'proposition' is "a statement about concepts that may be judged as true and false if it 
refers to observable phenomena" (Cooper and Emory, 1995, p.39), an "hypothesis" is a 
proposition formulated for empirical testing. They also note that hypotheses can assign 
variables to cases. They represent a way in which the veracity of a theory may be tested, 
by attributing characteristics to that theory. Propositions are hence a lower form of 
statement, one's for which supporting observable phenomena must be identified prior to 
their development into hypotheses. This research seeks, therefore, to undertake this 
process. Tentative propositions are established in Chapter One. Observable phenomena 
are assembled and analysed in Chapter's Five to Eight. The tentative propositions are 
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then refined, in Chapter Eight, and further tested by exposure once again to the same 
observable phenomena, albeit derived from an alternative range of sources. These 
propositions, duly judged to be true or false, are then presented as hypotheses in the final 
chapter of the thesis, and in so doing mark the beginning of the next stage of the intended 
research. 
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
Earlier in this chapter, the importance of the application of the 'scientific method' to social 
science research was referred to. In closing this assessment of the methodological 
approach adopted in this thesis, the relationship of the scientific method to this research 
is discussed. Cooper and Emory (1995, p.12-13) present seven characteristics defining 
the 'scientific method', and their underlying rationale, which are briefly summarised here. 
Effectively, they represent a checklist against which the validity of any research project 
should be judged. Cooper and EmOlys characteristics are presented in bold, are explained 
in bracketed arabic type, and the comments of the author with respect to the research's 
ability to achieve these characteristics in presented in italics. 
1) The purpose of the research should be as clearly defined as possible, and 
should avoid any degree of ambiguity. In short, the aims and objectives of 
the research should be transparent, and effectively communicated to the 
reader (Without such clarity, a reader may feel that the researcher lacks the 
necessary qualities to undertake the research, and may call into question the 
findings of the research, whatever their apparent value). The objectives of the 
research andjustificationfor their selection was provided in Section 1.3. The 
author contends that these objectives are clear and unambiguous; 
2) The details of the research approach should be clearly defined, and sufficient 
detail provided so that they are replicable by another researcher if felt 
necessary. This includes a requirement of full and frank disclosure of 
locations of data, and means by which they were obtained (Without this 
procedural detail, a reader may find it impossible to "estimate the validity and 
reliability of the data" (Cooper & Emory, 1995, p.12), and may cause them to 
view the outcomes with reduced confidence). As has been noted, two potential 
problems exist in this respect: firstly, case-based approaches do not lend 
themselves readily to such replication, and secondly, that the identity of 
interviewees within the case companies is to be kept in confidence in any 
published outcomes of the research. However, it has also been stated that in the 
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main the key information reported in the project is available from externally 
verifiable sources, and hence future verification of the majority of the research 
should be possible. It is also hoped that the process of triangulation provided 
within the report increases the confidence of the reader that the data presented 
is accurate, and derivedfrom reputable sources. Furthermore, the case studies 
followed a set strncture. This is addressed fully within the discussion conducted 
in this chapter, and future researchers could replicate this approach; 
3) The design of the research project should be fundamentally concerned with 
producing results which are as objective as possible given the context of the 
research (All efforts necessary to eliminate the possibility of personal bias in 
collecting and recording data must be taken, to ensure the reader's confidence in 
the analysis of the data collected, and the reported outcomes). The process of 
triangulation, using differing sources of data, and different data collection 
methods should reassure the reader that the requirement has been fulfilled. 
Furthermore, the cross verification of the potentially subjective material derived 
from conducting in-depth interviews with more than one manager, should provide 
added reassurance; 
4) The validity of the research process requires a frank admission by the 
researcher, of any perceived or potential flaws in the design and execution 
of the research, and their impact upon the reported outcomes (It is important 
that the researcher communicates his or her awareness of any potential flaws in 
their research, in order to anticipate any concerns a reader may have as to the 
validity of the research and to reassure the reader that the researcher has taken any 
procedural frailty into account in the research design). This has been a principal 
objective of this chapter, and key methodological issues related to the approach 
are discussed in Section 3.4.3; 
5) The preparation and presentation of data will utilise the appropriate 
research techniques, and the true nature of the findings will be reported, 
whatever their impact upon the project's underlying hypothetical objectives 
(It is crucial for the researcher to explain the process by which data has been 
collected and analysed to ensure that its intrinsic validity and reliability is beyond 
question. This is necessary to show that the findings of the research can also be 
accepted as being valid and reliable). Given the qualitative nature of the research, 
this is a less serious concern than if the research had been quantitative. Also, 
given the descriptive nature of much of the research, there is no apparent gain 
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to be achievedfrom misrepresenting the outcomes. In addition, all of the cases 
have been checked by participant interviewee's to ensure accuracy; 
6) Conclusions should be confined to those justified by the data of the research 
and limited to those for which data provide an adequate basis (The objectivity 
of the research process is dependent upon the findings of the research being based 
solely upon the intended and detailed research process. It is advisable not to 
extrapolate widely from the data collected; for example to assume that the patterns 
observed from a small sample would in any way be representative of a larger 
population. Making unjustified claims for the findings of the research will 
undermine overall confidence in the reported outcomes, regardless of the method 
pursued and the strength of the findings). The process of triangulation, referred 
to throughout this chapter and addressed in relation to data in Chapter's Eight 
and Twelve, satisfies this concern; and 
7) The confidence of readers will be greater if the researcher has a proven 
record of integrity, application of the scientific method, and experience of 
successfully managing complex research questions. The nature of the doctoral 
process does mitigate against such reassurance, but the author has already 
published extensively from the research which is hoped to be a surrogate for this 
requirement which can only be developed over time. 
Given the explanatory/descriptive nature of this study, however, all of these criteria can 
be said to apply, and the success of the outcomes of the project are to be judged against 
these characteristics. 
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Chapter Four Conceptual Background and Industry Context 
4.0 Introduction 
The privatisation ofthe electricity supply industry (ESI) in the United Kingdom (UK) has 
been described as "the biggest and most radical project in the extensive UK privatisation 
programme" (Surrey, 1996a), within "by far the largest of the UK's nationalised industries 
in terms of turnover and capital employed" (Chesshire, 1996). It was, in short "the most 
ambitious exercise in the whole UK privatization programme" (Yarrow, 1995, p.62), and 
recognised as the "most technically and politically difficult" privatisation (Thatcher, 1993, 
p.682) even among the very highest levels of government. However, a number of 
observers have criticised the process suggesting that the system produced by the 
privatisation is at best an hybrid "which has caused many new difficulties without 
establishing a fully commercial market", and has seen reforms which have succeeded only 
in creating an impractical solution to the problems it was intended to resolve (Holmes, 
1992, p.1). The system, it is argued is a product of radicalism that was wholly 
unintended: "The system evolved in response to criticisms of earlier utility privatisation's 
and the structure chosen was heavily shaped by other government objectives, such as 
reducing the power of the coal-mining unions" (Thomas, 1996, p.63). Any suggestion, 
therefore, that the process was in any way systematic has been called into doubt. 
However, and despite these concerns, there is no doubting the importance of the 
industry's privatisation to the ongoing development of awareness of the concept of 
privatisation. For while Britain was not the first country to engage in reform of its 
electricity industry, it was the first major industrialised country to do so (Surrey, 1996, 
p.11). Additionally, Britain has witnessed the implementation of a wider range of 
conceptual components than experienced in other countries. For instance, the UK has 
witnessed all of the following: 
~ both vertical and horizontal de-integration; 
~ forced competition in generation and in supply; 
~ full competition for supply to domestic customers; 
~ regulatory action to prevent reintegration; and 
~ substantial forward direct investment through changed ownership. 
The particular feature of the ESI, and the focus of this research project, has been the 
impact of the introduction of competition for all consumers within the industry, an action 
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for which "there is no real precedent elsewhere in the world" (MacKerron and Boira-
Segarra, 1996, p.1l0). 
This Chapter is intended to outline the motivations for both the whole programme of 
privatisation in the UK in general, and the privatisation of the ESI in particular. In doing 
so it is intended to place the strategic development process described and assessed in the 
remainder of the research project in context. In particular, it is the objective of this 
chapter to explain the nature of the factors driving, and constraining, the strategy 
processes of the companies under assessment. The chapter is therefore structured as 
follows: In Section 4.1, the history of privati sat ion in the UK is explored, with a particular 
emphasis upon the underlying socio-political motivations behind the process. This analysis 
will include an exploration of the rationale underlying the privatisation of the ESI. 
In Section 4.2, the structure of the ESI after privatisation is explained. This involves 
establishing how the industry was de-integrated: both vertically and horizontally, 
introducing all of the companies and institutions created by the process, and explaining 
their interrelationships. Section 4.3 explains the importance of competition to the 
privatisation process within the ESI, and the impact that the introduction of competition 
has had upon the companies of the ESI, while Section 4.4 outlines the regulatory 
environment that the companies of the ESI have been working within. Section 4.5 
reprises the key events over the twelve years since privatisation, and Section 4.6 provides 
a brief summary of the chapter. 
4.1 Brief History of Privatisation in the UK 
While a clear understanding of the origins of the privatisation process in the UK has been 
formed, there is still a degree of contention as to the importance of each of the factors 
underpinning and driving this significant political and economic programme. Many 
explanations have been provided, but no clear consensus has emerged as to the 
appropriate weighting that should be applied to these factors influencing change. This 
section seeks briefly to outline both the origin of the process, and also to establish a clear 
understanding of the underlying rationale for the programme, in order to explain why the 
ESI was privatised in the way that it was. 
As Bishop and Kay note, for the majority of the Twentieth Century there was a strong 
tendency towards increasing the scale and scope of government intervention in the 
economy (Bishop and Kay, 1992, p.193). However, during the 1980's this tendency was 
reversed, for a variety of reasons. The UK has been at the forefront of the change - "the 
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most extensive privatisation programme in Western economies" (Bishop and Kay, 1992, 
p.193). The process in the UK has principally witnessed three key characteristics in what 
has been described as a series of "path-braking experiments by Government in industrial 
economics" (Thomas, 1996, p.63). These are: 
i) a shift in ownership from state to private hands; 
ii) a corporate restructuring leading to the creation of new or radically re-shaped 
companies; and 
iii) a change in procedures by which the sector operates, usually involving an injection 
of competitive procedures, and market liberalisation. 
Before exploring the question of the privatisation of the ESI itself, it is necessary to briefly 
explore the motivations underpinning the UK's privatisation programme. These were 
either political or economic in nature. 
4.1.1 Political Origins 
Privatisation became a key feature of each of the Conservative administrations between 
1979 and 1997. However, when the first administration of Margaret Thatcher came to 
power in 1979, there was little or no direct mention of privatisation in the Party's 
manifesto, and no indication of the importance that this philosophy was going to assume. 
Indeed, the eminent economist Beesley argues that it was not until the privatisation of 
British Telecom in 1984, during the second of these four Conservative administrations that 
the true significance of privatisation was revealed (Beesley, 1997a, p.43). Rees has 
argued that the forerunner of privati sat ion was perhaps the general policy of 'rolling back 
the state' that was a feature of Conservative policy from the 1960's onwards, but which 
had been damaged by the failures of the Heath administration in this regard between 1970 
and 1974 (Rees, 1994, p.44). 
The policy of privatisation, especially in relation to public utilities, was a direct reversal 
of a long standing and until then relatively consensual opinion that such industries should 
be managed by the State for the people. The reasons for this consensus have been 
identified as resulting from a wish to avoid previous market failures, justifying state 
ownership, vertical integration and monopoly, as identified here by Helm and Jenkinson: 
"State ownership 'resolved' the conflict of interest between the private and public good; 
vertical integration ensured that customers bore the risk of upstream sunk investments; 
and monopoly prevented the destructive competition which was widely thought to have 
pervaded the industries in the 1920s and 1930s" (Helm and Jenkinson, 1997, p.1) 
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However, the consensual politics of post war Britain were on the wane by the end of the 
1970's, and there was a feeling abroad in the country that government was participating 
in areas of industry that it had no real place to be; defined as almost everywhere except 
defence (Holmes, 1992, p. 13). In addition, the new Conservative administration was 
looking for more radical economic solutions to achieve their economic and political 
objectives. Hence the use of privatisation which as the next section explores provided a 
ready answer to all of these objectives. 
4.1.2 Economic Origins 
In the main, the principal characteristics of the UK privatisation process were shaped by 
the views ofa small group of notable industrial economists, who were strongly influenced 
by neo-classicist economists, and in particular Hayek (1948, 1978) whose work on the 
meaning, importance and application of competition underpinned much of the structural 
design. Principal among the UK economists involved in the structural design were the late 
Professor Michael Beesley of London Business School, and Professor Stephen Littlechild 
of Birmingham University; members of the 'Austrian' school of economic thought. 
Professor Littlechild is perhaps the economist most closely associated with the process, 
as it was his report which was used as the basis for the regulation of British 
Telecommunication in 1983 (Littlechild, 1982), as well as being the first Director General 
of Electricity Supply (DGES) from 1989 until 1998. 
In a seminal work on the principles of privatisation, first presented in 1983 (Beesley and 
Littlechild, 1983) and revised and reprinted in 1997 (Beesley and Littlechild, 1997), 
Beesley and Littlechild outline the case for privatisation, and discuss the issue of 
privatisation in relation to three key areas: firstly, the criteria to be used to decide whether 
a particular industry is a suitable case for privatisation; secondly, how an industry should 
be structured and regulated after privatisation; and thirdly, what should be the priorities 
for industries that have been privatised. They are at pains to stress that in their assessment 
they aimed only to consider the economic benefit associated with privatisation, and were 
not aiming to make judgements based upon political expedients. 
They proposed that the best way in which to assess an industry's suitability for 
privatisation is to employ the criterion of aggregate net benefit to consumers. They argue 
that unless this benefit promises to be considerable, then the political costs involved would 
not be worthwhile (Beesley and Littlechild, 1997, p. 27). Having judged that the 
consumer will benefit from a privatisation, the same criterion must be used to shape the 
following six crucial decisions to be taken in advance of the privatisation:-
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i) the number of companies, the assets and liabilities of each, and their intended aims 
and scope of business; 
ii) the structure of the industry in which the company (or companies) will operate, 
especially the conditions of new entry; 
iii) the regulatory environment, including competition policy, efficiency audits, 
controls (if any) on prices or profits; 
iv) the non-commercial obligations: in respect of employment, prices or provision of 
services, and sources of funding for these obligations; 
v) the timing of the privatisation scheme, including the floatation date and the times 
at which new competition is allowed and/or regulation instituted; and 
vi) the future levels of government shareholding, and ways in which the associated 
voting power will be used. 
They strongly argued that a change in ownership is important, both in symbolic and actual 
terms. A number of observers (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997\ MacKerron and Watson, 
19962 among others) have suggested that many of the changes: improvements in service 
quality, investment and efficiency, produced by privatisation could have equally been 
achieved if the industries in question had remained in public hands, but had been subject 
to a more marked focussed approach. Beesley and Littlechild disagree with this 
viewpoint, and cite the discipline of the market as being the only possible means to achieve 
these ends, and a disbelief that a surrogate market focussed approach would achieve the 
desired results. In their view, nationalisation "delays inevitable adjustments to market 
forces" (Beesley and Littlechild, 1997, p.29). 
The key concept, in their view, is competition. Competition will maximise consumer 
benefits, and at the same time limit monopoly power. Vital to the success of competition 
is the threat of market entry, to increase rivalry. Hence, the starting form and structure 
of any new industry is vital to achieve consumer benefits. This may involve a separation 
of the incumbent nationalised industry'S assets, and vertical de-integration. They 
Newbery and Pollitt's view was based upon a social cost-benefit analysis of the restructuring and 
privatisation of the CEGB, which attributed much of the advances of the privatisation to efficiency 
improvements in generation, which did not require the full privatisation process. They were, however, 
cautious with respect to the validity of their findings, and the methods they employed to conduct the 
analysis (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997, p.296). 
2 
MacKerron and Watson note the difficulty of undertaking such an intangible analysis, but also note that 
any such cost-benefit analysis may have to wait until a sufficient time has elapsed to al10w for proper 
reflection (MacKerron and Watson, 1996, p.185). 
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acknowledge some concern that the dis-benefits resulting from de-integration: such as the 
loss of scale economies, would be greater than the benefits to consumers resulting from 
the change, but doubt that that would be the case in reality. They do, however, argue that 
obeying market forces is crucial to the success of any privatisation and that the "future 
growth of the industry should not be fixed by the pattern established at floatation. 
Companies should be allowed to expand or contract, diversify or specialise, as market 
forces dictate" (Beesley and Littlechild, 1997, p. 30), a situation that has not come to pass 
in the various UK privatisations. They also note that where there is a low expectation of 
competition developing outside of an industry, then the "starting structure should be 
designed to create effective competition", and that "smaller rather than larger successor 
companies should be created, and allowed to merge thereafter", (Beesley and Littlechild, 
1997, p.30) a policy followed as will be seen, in electricity, water and rail privatisations, 
but not in telecommunications and gas. The question of structure, however, was to be 
influenced by the introduction of regulation to guard against the abuse of monopoly 
powers. The views of Beesley and Littlechild on regulation are considered in Section 4.6 
of this chapter. 
As for which industries deserved to be privatised, Beesley and Littlechild believed that 
priority should be given to those that would result in the greatest public benefit. They 
assumed that size of turnover correlated to potential for consumer benefit, and therefore 
believed that electricity, telecoms, gas, coal and steel were the five biggest nationalised 
industries and hence the industries that should be privati sed first. In their view, relatively 
small industries would accrue relatively little benefit to consumers by privatisation and 
hence were not priorities. They also believed that those industries most in need of 
remedial action would also be most likely to benefit consumers following reform. Hence, 
at the time of writing (1983) industries like British Airways, British Steel, British Leyland, 
Rolls-Royce, British Shipbuilders and the bus companies offered little further scope for 
savings (Beesley and Littlechild, 1997, p. 33). However, these companies were also 
privati sed and so we can assume that in these cases the political rationale was the key 
factor. As they themselves pointed out, many of the industries identified by them as 
candidates for privatisation had not previously been considered as such. An explanation 
for the changed attitude may be evident if we explore in greater depth the stated motives 
underlying the process. 
4.1.3 Motivations for the Privatisation of ESI 
As noted above, the extent to which the UK's privatisation programme was planned, or 
evolved, is a matter of contention. Some have argued that the policy was an expedient 
solution to politically based ideological objectives (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995, p.3; 
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Beesley, 1997, p. 43), with Thomas arguing that "the privatisation of the ESI should not 
be seen as an isolated act of government policy. It was the culmination of a concerted 
policy by the Thatcher Governments over a period of about a decade to reduce the overall 
level of public ownership and to move decision-making for the productive sector of the 
public to private hands" (Thomas, 1996, p.40), and the overturning of what had been a 
fairly broad consensus about how public industries of this type should be managed 
(Chesshire, 1996, p.37). 
However, others have noted the economic case for change. Among the latter group have 
been politicians such as John Moore (1983, 1985) who were closely associated with the 
policy at this time, and whose arguments are here summarised by Beesley and Littlechild 
(1997, p.28): "Privatisation will generate benefits for customers because privately owned 
companies have a greater incentive to produce goods and services in the quantity and the 
variety which consumers prefer. Companies which succeed in discovering and meeting 
consumer needs make profits and grow: the less successful wither and die .... selling a 
nationalised industry substitutes market discipline for public influences". 
Even if economic motivations did underlie the rationale for the privatisation, other 
observers have identified political factors at play in the structure chosen. Thomas, for 
example, suggests that the speed with which the privatisation was undertaken and the fact 
that it was politically imperative that the companies created by the legislation would be 
stable detennined to a large extent the structure of the reformed industry (Thomas, 1996, 
p. 71). The question of vertically separating distribution from supply, which when left 
vertically integrated was as apparently anti-competitive as leaving generation and 
transmission integrated, was overlooked, and was not addressed again until the Utilities 
Act 2000 (House of Commons, 2000). In 1989, however, to have undertaken business 
separation of this nature would have been to create a number of supply companies from 
the former Area Board staffwho had little or no commercial experience. Safer, therefore, 
to initially launch twelve combined distribution and supply companies and minimise the 
chance of commercial failure (Thomas, 1996, p.72). The possibility of cross subsidy, 
therefore, was a policy issue at this early stage. 
4.1.3.1 The Views of Politicians 
The extent of the Conservative Party's avowed intention to introduce a process of 
privatisation when it came to power in 1979 is contained in this brief paragraph from their 
1979 election manifesto: the Conservative Party promised "to sell back to private 
ownership the recently nationalised aerospace and shipbuilding concerns, giving their 
employees the opportunity to purchase shares" and selling "shares in the National Freight 
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Corporation to the general public" (Craig, 1990, p.273). Clearly, not an extensive 
programme and baring very little relation to the programme as it appeared in its final form, 
although the scope for privatisation in 1979 was limited by the prevailing economic 
climate, according to senior Conservative's (Thatcher, 1993, p.678). By the time of the 
1983 election manifesto the Government's commitment to privatisation had been 
demonstrated by a number ofless complex privatisations, and they felt able to identifY the 
following promise: to "seek other means of increasing competition in, and attracting 
private capital into, the gas and electricity industries" (Craig, 1990, p.327). This policy, 
of identifYing and pursuing the easier targets first runs directly counter to the economic 
analysis presented above. Beesley and Littlechild identified targets such as Associated 
British Ports, Amersham International et cetera as having little potential for public benefit 
and hence not prime targets for privatisation. This suggests that in 1979-1983, the 
motivations were primarily political, and that latterly, therefore, the economic motivations 
became more openly identified as the political targets were accomplished. Arguably, the 
extent of the political victory can be adduced by the acceptance of the economic policies. 
The two most telling contributions to this debate probably come from Margaret Thatcher 
and John Redwood, and the views of these politicians are reported here, along with the 
views of other senior Conservatives associated with the privatisation programme, John 
Moore and Cecil Parkinson. 
4.1.3.1.1 Margaret Thatcher 
Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister of the UK from 1979 to 1991, and is inevitably 
closely associated with the privatisation process for which she was a chief advocate. It 
has already been noted that privatisation was not explicitly mentioned in the Conservative 
Party manifesto of 1979, so it is perhaps instructive to consider her own thoughts on the 
process, as revealed by her recently published memoirs. In her first term in office, 
Thatcher refers to privatisation as a possible solution to problems with the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement (PSBR)3, but one which would require lengthy legislation, with 
the exception of selling the Governments remaining shares in British Petroleum (Thatcher, 
1993, p.49). Clearly, and initially at least, privatisation was viewed as a fiscal tool to be 
used for political expediency. The first term saw the introduction of the bill to privatise 
British Telecommunications, but this was side-lined in the run up to the 1983 election. 
3 
Specifically, how to remove public services with their huge demands for subsidy from the PSBR. This 
has been identified by Bishop and Kay as a principal concern especially during the privatisation of British 
Telecommunications (Bishop and Kay, 1992, p.197). 
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The manifesto for 1983 contained a much clearer commitment to privatisation. 
Increasingly, the economic justification for privatisation was emphasised. Privatisation 
was identified as strengthening the 'supply side' of the economy: part ofa wider process 
therefore, which included reductions in trade union power, improved training, wider home 
ownership, reductions in business regulation, and tax cuts. "Privatisation shifted the 
balance from the less efficient state to more efficient private business", Thatcher notes, 
identifying the process as a pillar upon which the Government's economic policy rested 
(Thatcher, 1993, p.672). She acknowledges that privatisation rose in significance as a 
policy during the period of Conservative government4 . Therefore, there are elements of 
both political and economic motivations behind the programme. 
The multi-purpose nature of the concept, as both economic and political tool, is later 
clarified, although its importance as a political tool is clear as this passage shows: 
"Privatisation, no less than the tax structure, was fundamental to improving Britain's 
economic performance. But for me it was also far more than that: it was one of the 
central means of reversing the corrosive and corrupting effects of socialism. Ownership 
by the state is just that - ownership by an impersonal legal entity: it amounts to control by 
politicians and civil servants; and it is a misnomer to describe nationalisation ...... as 'public 
ownership'. But through privatisation - particularly the kind of privati sat ion which leads 
to the widest possible share ownership by members of the public - the state's power is 
reduced and the power of the people enhanced ...... privatisation is at the centre of any 
programme of reclaiming territory for freedom" (Thatcher, 1993, p.676). 
This was, she believed, a "fundamental purpose of privatisation". In a telling passage, 
Thatcher suggests that this political concern overrode the economic, and managerial, 
imperative. Implicitly, the necessity of 'reclaiming freedom' overrode the debate about 
the appropriate form of the means of sale, competitive structures and regulatory 
frameworks chosen (Thatcher, 1993, p.676). Consequently, political expedience resulted 
in a situation where "in some cases if it was a choice between having the ideal 
circumstances for privatisation, which might take years to achieve, and going for a sale 
within a particular politically determined timescale, the second was the preferable option" 
(Thatcher, 1993, p.677). 
4 
It is interesting to read in her memoirs that, in her analysis, the success of the privatisation is as much 
measurable by the number of people who partook in the share sale, as by the more intangible measure of 
performance improvement. 
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In particular, her recounting of the privatisation of British Gas shows the imperative given 
to achieving the privatisation at the expense of having to reform the structure at a later 
date (Thatcher, 1993, p.681-2). Having established this political motivation, Thatcher 
also notes that the economic arguments for privatisation are equally "overwhelming". In 
her view, as with those of the economists noted earlier, the state can never replicate the 
rigour of the market, and provide the "spur" for business success. 
In relation to the challenge posed by electricity, Thatcher is quite illuminating. She states 
that the challenge facing the third Conservative administration of this period was to 
privatise as much as possible ofthe industry while introducing the maximum amount of 
competition (Thatcher, 1993, p.682), and a promise to do so was included in the election 
manifesto of 1987. She notes that policy on the ESI changed after the removal of Peter 
Walker from the Department of Energy (DoE), who had favoured a British Gas style 
transfer to public hands, and his replacement by Cecil Parkinson, who developed the 
structure eventually applied, with some modification by John Wakeham. She also 
implicitly notes that the interpretation placed upon the nuclear issue later in this chapter 
was indeed correct. Therefore, the decision was taken to exclude the Country's nuclear 
assets from the privatisation with the aim of avoiding adding a potentially huge liability, 
of decommissioning existing nuclear plant, to the privatisation, which would have wreaked 
its chance of success. 
4.1.3.1.2 John Redwood 
A further telling contribution to the question of motivation was made by John Redwood 
in 1980. In his book 'Public Enterprise in Crisis: The Future of the Nationalised 
Industries' (Redwood, 1980) he outlines a pro-market critique of nationalisation which 
would strongly influence the design of the privatisation process. Indeed when, in 1983, 
Redwood became head of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit, he himself was in a position 
to shape the process delivered by the Government. His argument in favour of a market 
solution in the public utilities is based upon a belief that faith in nationalisation is 
misjudged, in two crucial senses. 
Firstly, he argues, that the notion that withdrawing a profit motive from the provision of 
such services will improve efficiency is erroneous. Where the nationalisers assumption is 
that by removing a profit motive additional revenue will be retained and not wasted, the 
reality, he argues is that "inefficiencies could develop (and by implication have developed) 
in a non-profit oriented organisation which could more than outweigh the benefits of not 
charging a profit margin on the goods or services supplied" (Redwood, 1980, p. 2). 
Secondly, he argues that the assumption that a lack of competition would lead to a 
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reduction, or the elimination, of the sort of "extravagance and waste" associated by 
advocates of nationalisation with the commercial sectors need for advertisements, 
marketing and so on, was also incorrect. For evidence, Redwood cites the prices for the 
services provided which he argues were "on a rising trend of noticeable proportions 
relative to prices generally", between the years 1960 and 1976 (Redwood, 1980, p.2). 
The economic justification for this view point is put forward by Yarrow, who argues that 
as generation and supply are not naturally monopolistic, they are therefore open to 
competition and hence subject to the general economic case for competitive markets 
(Yarrow, 1995, p.63). Competition, he argues in support of Redwood, can be expected 
to deliver higher outputs and lower profit margins than would be evident in a monopoly, 
and since neither activity was by its nature monopolistic, it is to be assumed that no large 
scale compensatory economies of scale exist to support monopolistic provision. He 
argues that the expectation would be that competition would lead inevitably to a lower 
cost base (Yarrow, 1995, p.64). 
In a telling passage, Redwood notes that "exciting growth industries like air transport, 
telecommunications, power generation and supply, gas, coal and most other forms of 
surface transportation" were all at the time under performing, and by direct implication 
suitable for privatisation. Of course during the period 1979 - 1997 all of these industries 
were privati sed, or liberalised. It is interesting to note that in the conclusion to the book, 
Redwood doubts the potential for competition in these industries, at least initially. He 
argues that "the solution to the monopoly question must ultimately lie in fostering 
competition", the "perfect solution". However, he notes, "in the short and medium term, 
it is unrealistic to suppose that the monopolies can be effectively challenged by 
competitive forces even if the regulatory and statutory framework were altered to allow 
competition to develop. Nor is it realistic to suppose that the nation's economy would 
necessarily benefit or withstand a major change in state monopoly undertaken too hastily 
and without sufficient political agreement across the spectrum of debate" (Redwood, 
1980, p. 199). Other solutions need therefore to be adopted, he argued. 
4.1.3.1.3 Moore and Parkinson 
John Moore echoed the views of both Thatcher and Redwood, and he constructed, 
through a series of keynote speeches (1983, 1985) a defence of privati sat ion which was 
at the same time an attack upon the 'evils' of national is at ion. He argued that privatisation 
was "justified on economic criteria as well as making sense in political terms" (Moore, 
1983, p.78), in defence of criticisms aimed at the Conservatives accusing them of short-
termism. He outlines a critique of publicly provided services pointing to poor 
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performance - with high prices having an effect upon national competitiveness (1983, 
p.81), and low customer satisfaction (1983, p.82). These failings he attributes to the lack 
of market rig our, and a lack of competition which is an efficient mechanism which 
"ensures that goods and services preferred by the consumer are delivered at the lowest 
economic cost" (1983, p.93). It is a responsive mechanism, that does not require political 
interference. 
He enumerates three principal benefits of privatisation (1985, p.95). These are that 
privatisation: 
.. increases productive efficiency, through shareholder pressure and the operation 
of competitive processes; 
increases a wider distribution of share ownership, which further encourages 
efficiency and price restraint; and 
increases each industries' potential to raise finance on international capital markets 
leading to improved services. 
In short, the disciplines of the market produces efficacious benefits, and few if any 
disbenefits. 
These were views also echoed by Cecil Parkinson, who was the Secretary of State at the 
Department of Trade and Industry when the Electricity Act was first brought before 
Parliament. His motivations were equally ranged between a market ideology, a desire to 
reduce the role played by government, and a desire to destroy socialism. "We set out 
quite consciously when we were elected", he stated in 1988, "to cut back the role of the 
public sector, to take ownership away from the state and spread it as widely as possible 
among the public" (Travers, 1988, p.53). Central planning, he argued was a "recipe for 
mediocrity and low living standards" (Travers, 1988, p.54). Introducing competition to 
electricity, he further argued, was a 'once-in-a-lifetime' opportunity to overcome the 
failings of a misguided faith in central planning. 
4.1. 3. 2 Summary 
The solution to this question of what motivated the privatisation must inevitably be that 
both political and economic objectives played a part in the process, and that inevitably 
there will be differing opinions as to the impact the various factors had upon the process. 
Generally, eleven factors have been identified, each of which was either political, 
economic or managerial in nature, and the importance of which varied over the life of the 
privatisation programme (Thomas, 1996, p. 42). These were: 
a) that the operating systems of each industry under public ownership were piece 
meal and hence ineffective, leading to inefficiency; 
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b) that there had been a lack of clear objectives within each industry, aside from a 
general aim of meeting a public good, and a lack of managerial authority inhibiting 
innovation and constraining effectiveness; 
c) a general public antipathy towards publicly managed institutions; 
d) the view that state ownership could in no sense replicate or replace the rigours of 
the market place leading to industries which were wasteful, ineffective and weak, 
or within which there is no sound business case; 
e) that service quality may be lower than in a privately owned, but publically 
regulated environment; 
f) a desire to reduce the burden of subsidy from central government and the tax 
payer, thus enabling politically and ideologically motivated reductions in income 
taxes; 
g) a desire to reduce the monitoring activity of central government, thus reducing 
administrative costs; 
h) a political objective of reducing the power of public sector trade unions; 
i) another political objective, of spreading more widely share ownership and so 
creating a share owning society (Thomas, 1996, pA2); 
j) the political and economic objectives of defending the UK nuclear industry; and 
k) to minimise cross subsidy, which was perceived to encourage inefficiency 
Clearly, the range of the potential motivations for privatisation was wide, providing 
politicians with considerable strength in pushing each policy through, and enhancing the 
popularity of the policy among the voting public. It also makes the process an ambiguous 
one, as, as Thomas notes "it is difficult to estimate the precise extent to which 
privatisation was adopted to serve interests other then the explicit one of reducing public 
ownership, but a number of other policy objectives were clearly well served by 
privatisation" (Thomas, 1996, p.42). 
Thomas continues by noting that "some of the secondary objectives of the earlier 
privatisation programme were lost in this new phase (between 1991 and 1995): there was 
little revenue to the Treasury, no profits to the general public from share flotations and 
little opportunity to expand share-ownership; but the power of large trades unions was 
further eroded by the transfer of people from employment by the state to small, private-
sector organisations. The ideology remained intact" (Thomas, 1996, p.46). Clearly, 
therefore, privatisation was an approach that solved many of the obstacles that faced the 
Government between 1979 and 1997. The fact that the policy provided such an 
advantageous means by which they could be addressed perhaps would serve to indicate 
how each of the problems privatisation solved were irrevocably interlinked, indicating the 
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perceived existence of a fundamental 'blight' upon the UK at that time. 
4.1.4 The Events of the Privatisation 
The Conservative Party's intention to privatise electricity was a key aspect of their 1987 
election winning manifesto. This privatisation, however, was intended to be markedly 
different to those that had gone before. As has already been stated, the principal factor 
guiding the privatisation of electricity was that the 'mistakes' ofBT and BG should not 
be repeated (Holmes, 1992, p.1S). Hence, there would be no 'BE', and the industry was 
to be wholly restructured. However, this decision, it is argued, overlooked the complexity 
of the electricity system - the fact that electricity is not a commodity industry like others, 
and creates severe difficulties if it is treated as such. As Holmes notes, therefore, "the 
forces of competition and the free market were .... brought to bear on the market to which 
they were least relevant" (Holmes, 1992, p.16). He suggests that there was no underlying 
logic and no systematic planning underpinning the development of the ESI as a 
competitive industry. 
The process of developing a model for the privatisation was characterised by considerable 
hostility between the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) and the Government. 
In the end, it has been suggested (Holmes, 1992, p.21) the solution to the structure 
adopted by the Electricity Act of 1989 was the result of an agreement between the 
Government and the twelve Area Boards aimed at emasculating the CEGB, which as was 
observed earlier, had been the dominant player in the industry. This was achieved by 
proposing that the new structure took away control of the transmission system from the 
CEGB, so removing the principal means by which it achieved its centrality within the 
industry. 
Having decided upon an approach which removed the objections of the CEGB from the 
equation, the principal practical hurdle during the process was the issue of nuclear power. 
The original plan to privatise the whole of the UK's nuclear generating capacity was 
gradually altered. The initial plan had seen two national generating companies established, 
one managing 70% of the generating capacity in the UK (including all of the nuclear 
capacity) and one managing 30%. The rationale behind this approach was to create a 
company that "would be large enough to absorb the risks of nuclear power", in terms of 
both operating and decommissioning costs (Green and Newbery, 1997b). The objective 
was to make the industry an attractive and viable investment proposition. However, this 
plan began to unravel as first the aging Magnox power stations were removed from the 
privatisation, in the Autumn of 1989, then in the early Winter the remaining Advanced 
Gas-cooled Reactor's (AGR) and one Pressurised Water-cooled Reactor (PWR) were 
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separated from the privatisation plans altogether and placed under the control of two 
nuclear generating companies: Nuclear Power and Scottish Nuclear. The principal 
problem was the widely held view that despite the efforts to make a National Power with 
nuclear capability an attractive investment, all the evidence suggested that the investment 
community was not ready for such potentially risky offer. The need to appease investors, 
and ensure that the sale of the generators produced the appropriate public and fiscal 
success therefore prompted a compromise within the crucial generation privatisation. 
Many commentators have seen this compromise as severely undermining the introduction 
of effective competition into generation, leading to extensive and continuing remedial 
action upon the part of the Regulator. 
Supply competition policy also brought about a compromise. The gradual introduction 
of competition to the industry was a decision taken late in the process; in late 1989 
according to some observers (Green and Newbery, 1997b, p.78). The justification for the 
decision is to be found in many issues, but principally the industry did not have the 
technology necessary to introduce effective competitive at a domestic level until late in 
the 19901s. Initial hopes were therefore scaled down. The question of competition is 
explored in more depth in Section 4.5. 
Despite these last minute problems, the transfer of the ESI to private hands occurred on 
time, on vesting day, 31 st March 1990. According to senior politicians of the time, the 
privatisation proceeded "with great success, to the benefits of customers, shareholders and 
the Exchequer" (Thatcher, 1993, p.685). The events of the run up to privatisation are 
addressed in some detail in Margaret Thatcher's memoirs (Thatcher, 1993, 680-685), 
which correspond very closely to the critical analysis presented by Holmes (1992, p.19-
32), although Thatcher's views inevitably cast the privatisation in a more positive light. 
Other authors who present a description of events in this period include Armstrong et ai, 
1994; Thomas, 1996; and Green and Newbery, 1997b among many. 
4.2 Structure of the Electricity Industry 
The ESI was created after the Second World War as part of the wave of nationalisation1s 
undertaken by the Labour administration of Attlee (Holmes, 1992, p.7). The final 
nationalisation, accomplished in 1948, was the culmination of a process which had 
witnessed more and more of the UK electricity supply system falling under public control, 
with the result that the several hundred local electricity suppliers were brought together 
into a unified whole. The industry's structure at this time was functional, and decision 
making power was not evenly distributed throughout the system. The ESI was effectively 
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divided in halL with the higher voltage Generation and Transmission activities on one side, 
and the lower voltage Distribution and Supply activities on the other. Generation and 
Transmission were undertaken by the CEGB, and Distribution and Supply by twelve Area 
Boards covering the whole of England and Wales. The situations in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland were different. For a more detailed analysis of the ESI under 
nationalisation, readers are referred to works by Vickers and Yarrow (1988), and Green 
and Newbery (1993), while Middlemass (1993) presents an analysis of the development 
of the industry from nationalisation to privatisation from the perspective of one of the 
Area BoardIRECs. 
The relationship between the CEGB and the Area Boards was often problematic, due to 
a disparity of power in favour of the CEGB (Holmes, 1992, p.8). This disparity was due 
to the CEGB's control of generation assets, and its obligation to ensure a continuation of 
supply to all electricity customers in the UK. The CEGB' s statutory role was to "develop 
and maintain an efficient, co-ordinated and economical system of supply of electricity in 
bulk for all of England and Wales, and for that purpose: (a) to generate or acquire supplies 
of electricity; and (b) to provide bulk supplies of electricity for the Area Boards for 
distribution by those boards" , as laid down by the Electricity Acts of 1947 and 1957 
(Yarrow, 1986, p.192). The body also had certain budgetary and financial performance 
responsibilities imposed upon it under the later act of 1978 (Yarrow, 1986, p.192). 
The CEGB and the Area Boards were formally separate statutory bodies, but given that 
there was considerable 'informal' vertical integration within the industry, and given its 
financial and performance related responsibilities, the CEGB was able to strongly influence 
the Area Boards (Yarrow, 1986, p.191). The resulting structure was often portrayed as 
inefficient, unreconstructed, and poorly managed. Newbery and Pollitt describe the ESI 
during its nationalised period as follows. The ESI was, they suggest, "a classic example 
of a cost-of-service regulated public utility, with excessive capital costs, over-dependence 
on high-cost indigenous coal and nuclear power, a low rate of productivity growth, a low 
rate of return on assets, in tum reflecting the inefficient balancing of interests - the coal 
miners, the industry itself, domestic voting consumers, large industrial consumers, the 
Department of Energy, and the Treasury" (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997, p.275). 
Yarrow suggests that, pre-privatisation, the Government's approach to the ESI was 
primarily influenced by the PSBR, and this was the impetus behind the requirement placed 
upon the industry to meet increasingly stringent financial constraints. As part of this 
process, there is a suggestion that the Government used above margin cost pricing in 
electricity supply, to raise revenue (Yarrow, 1986, p.196). 
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The publication of the White Paper in 1988 confirmed the structure that the industry 
would take upon privatisation: one that was vertically and horizontally de-integrated. As 
the then Secretary of State, Parkinson, announced upon publication of the bill, the industry 
was to be structured as follows: "1 therefore propose to introduce legislation at the earliest 
opportunity to provide powers to restructure and privatise the industry. These powers 
will be used to reorganise the CEGB into three new companies. The first will be a new 
generating company, owning some 30% of the CEGB's existing capacity, all of it non-
nuclear. The second will comprise the remainder of the CEGB's existing capacity, both 
fossil-fuelled and nuclear. The third will be a national grid company, whose ownership 
will be transferred to the twelve existing Area Boards. The Area Boards will in turn be 
converted into twelve distribution companies, preserving their strong regional identity" 
(parkinson, quoted in Holmes, 1992, p.23). The structures of the old, and the new, ESl 
are shown at Figures 4.1 and 4.2, and are sourced from Armstrong et at (1994, p.294). 
As Green notes, whereas previous privatisations had seen companies sold which were 
"essentially continuations of the public corporations which performed the same functions 
under state ownership" (Green, 1991, p.24S), the sale of electricity saw a fundamental 
restructuring. 
Within the new structure, according to the planned legislation, the CEGB was to be split 
into three: two generating companies and a transmission company. The new companies 
created as a result of this process were:-
National Power pIc a conventional fossil fuel generator (called Big G during 
early negotiations for the establishment of the new 
industry) managing approximately 60% of the CEGB's 
non-nuclear capacity at privatisation. National Power was 
the intended home of the CEGB' s nuclear capability prior 
to the late change of policy. The Company is 
headquartered at Swindon, in Wiltshire; 
PowerGen pIc 
National Grid Company 
a conventional fossil fuel generator (known as Little G) 
managing approximately 40% of the CEGB's non-nuclear 
capacity at privatisation. The Company is headquartered 
at Coventry, West Midlands; and 
the transmission company, jointly owned at the time of 
privatisation by all of the RECs, it was intended to act as 
a common carrier and therefore to facilitate the 
introduction of competition. NGC manages the high 
voltage grid. 
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According to Yarrow, the new structure brought about by the act saw the abandonment 
of "the traditional model of horizontally and vertically integrated" public utilities, and 
ushered in an era of competition (Yarrow, 1995, p.62). Yarrow identifies both presumed 
positive and negative consequences from de-integrating the industry; the negatives 
resulting from the possibility of interdependences between generation and transmission 
facilities being overlooked or down played, while the positives are achieved by 
overcoming predictable anti-competitive circumstances within a vertically integrated 
Figure 4.1: Old Structure ofESI in England and Wales 
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PoworOon 
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Own 
Generation 
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Figure 4.2: New Structure of ESI in England and Wales 
(Source, Annstrong et ai, 1994, p.295) 
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system through the exercise of excessive market power. This debate continues with the 
Regulator's intended development of business separation, which Thomas would identify 
as a completion of the process of de-integration. Business separation is intended to 
prevent RECs from exploiting the opportunity of information abuse and collusion between 
a REC's distribution and supply businesses (Thomas, 1996, p.69). Yarrow argues that 
the problems associated with such a situation are alleviated if there exists sufficient 
competition to overcome excessive market power (Yarrow, 1995, p. 66). The key 
objective is to achieve a balance within the structure which encourages competition but 
which overcomes any possible externalities. The Regulator has clearly taken the view 
that even with competition fully entrenched, the risks of anti-competitive behaviour are 
too great to allow integration between supply and distribution businesses to continue 
(James et ai, 2001). As part of their incorporation, the RECs were required to keep 
separate accounts in both of their core businesses. Therefore, as Yarrow notes, while the 
functions of distribution and supply were vertically separate in terms of accounting, they 
were not separate in terms of ownership and operation (Yarrow, 1995, p.69). 
The companies responsible for distribution and supply, the twelve Regional Electricity 
Companies (RECs) of England and Wales, were also created by the Act of 1989. These 
companies were direct descendants of the twelve Area Boards, and were issued with 
licences to both distribute and supply electricity. They also owned, but did not manage, 
the transmission company NGC. The twelve RECs were: 
Eastern Electricity pic 
East Midlands Electricity 
pIc (EME) 
London Electricity pIc 
Manweb pIc 
Northern Electricity pIc 
Headquartered in Ipswich, Suffolk, and geographically the largest REC, 
Eastern served the largest number of customers; 2.94 million, at 
privatisation across East Anglia, Essex and North London. Its market 
was principally made up of domestic customers, and a growing 
commercial sector. It had limited in area industrial demand. 
Headquartered in Nottingham, EME served 2.14 million customers in 
the East Midlands at privatisation. Its market was fairly evenly spread 
amongst all areas of activity, but commercial and business activity was 
thought to be on the increase at the time of privatisation 
Geographically the smallest REC, it served 1. 9 million customers in the 
capital at privatisation. Its market was primarily made up of domestic 
and commercial customers. 
Headquartered in Liverpool, and fonnerly known as the Merseyside and 
North Wales Electricity Board, Manweb served 1.3 million customers 
in the North West of England at privatisation. Its market was suffering 
from industrial decline, and a substantial population shift. 
Headquartered in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Northern served l.39 million 
customers in the North East of England at privatisation. It also was 
suffering from industrial decline, and a substantial population shift. 
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Norweb pic 
Seeboard pic 
Southern Electricity pIc 
SWALECpIc 
SWEB pic 
Yorkshire Electricity pIc 
Headquartered In Manchester, and fonnerly known as the North West 
Electricity Board, Norweb served 2.1 million customers in the North 
West of England at privatisation. Like Manweb, and Northern it was 
thought to be suffering from industrial decline, and a substantial 
population shift. 
Headquartered in Crawley, Sussex, and fonnerly known as the South 
Eastern Electricity Board, it served 1.91 million customers in the South 
East of England at privatisation. Seeboard's market was principally 
based upon domestic and commercial customers and included Gatwick 
Airport. 
Headquartered in Maidenhead, Berkshire, it served 2.46 million 
customers in the South of England at privatisation, and was the largest 
REC by capitalisation at privatisation. Southern's market was 
principally based upon domestic and commercial customers and 
included the ports of Southampton and Portsmouth. 
Headquartered in Cardiff, and formerly the South Wales Electricity 
Board, it served 0.92 million customers in South Wales at privatisation. 
Swalec's market was principally agricultural, and domestic although its 
population was widely spread. Swalec had suffered from a considerable 
loss of heavy industrial demand. 
Headquartered in Bristol, and formerly the South Western Electricity 
Board, it served 1.24 million customers in the South West of England 
at privatisation. SWEB's demand was again principally agricultural, 
and domestic although its population was widely spread, with high 
infrastructure costs and considerable exposure to the weather. 
Headquartered in Leeds, it served 1. 95 million customers in Yorkshire 
at privatisation. Yorkshire was also subject to industrial decline and 
population movement. 
The White Paper had also included plans for the privatisation of the UK's nuclear power 
plants, which were intended to be passed on to National Power. However, these plans 
were adjusted late in 1989, and the act created two new companies: Nuclear Electric and 
Scottish Nuclear, which remained under public ownership. These companies were 
eventually amalgamated to form British Energy, and floated on the stock market in June 
1996. 
Nuclear Electric pic 
Scottish Nuclear pic 
British Energy pic 
a company managing almost all of the nuclear generating 
capacity in the UK, approximately 15% of the total 
generation capacity of the UK. 
a much smaller company, based upon two Advanced Gas 
cooled Reactors (AGR's), based in Scotland. 
On 1 April 1996, Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear 
merge to form British Energy pic, a single company 
managing all of the UK's 7 AGR and 1 PWR reactors. 
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Magnox Electric The merger excluded the country's Magnox range of 
reactors, which had been built principally for experimental 
or military purposes. These were taken over and managed 
by British Nuclear Fuels, which operated 2 Magnox 
reactors of its own, to form Magnox Electric, ownership 
of which was to remain in public hands. The company has 
an operational capacity of3000MW. 
Within the other companies created at privatisation: ScottishPower, Scottish Hydro and 
Northern Ireland Electricity, little of the experimentation undertaken in England and 
Wales was repeated and the companies entered the new era in forms very similar to those 
they existed in prior to the privatisation. In the case of the two Scottish companies, this 
means that they were fully integrated companies involved in all aspects of energy 
generation, distribution and supply. 
4.2.1 Differentiating Market Models 
The argument that the ESI and other regulated environments, are in some senses different 
from the more traditional market models devised by economists needs to be explored. In 
order to proceed with this discussion, it is necessary to understand alternate market 
models which may be commonly observable, and to understand where an industry like the 
ESI, or any other recently privatised and regulated industry, stands in relation to these 
models. Table 4.1 provides a comparison of four traditional market models, drawn from 
the work of Thompson (1993). These models describe the most common market 
formulations, and their principal characteristics. The configurations range from the largely 
theoretical model of pure competition: where price elasticity is very limited and product 
substitution is almost total, to pure monopoly, where only one supplier exists to provide 
a product, limiting consumer choice, barring industry entry, and increasing the potential 
for pure elasticity. It is necessary to ascertain whether the ESI market model is exhibited 
in Thompson's table above. 
Initial analysis suggests that the answer appears to be no, at least at the time of writing. 
It is clear that the ESI while a SOE was a pure monopoly, and was identified in many 
quarters as a reactor: an industry without a strategy, leading to the decision to pursue 
privatisation5. However, privatisation and the managed introduction of competition means 
5 
The view that the ESI was under perfonning and inefficient is not universal. Holmes (1992) argues that 
the Government did not set out to resolve perceived abuses or inefficiencies, because what abuses there 
were not identified as being serious enough to justify the action that was taken. Nor, Holmes argues, was 
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Table 4.1: Structural Characteristics of Four Market Models 
Market Number of finns Type of product 
Model 
Pure competition 
Monopolistic 
competition 
Oligopoly 
Large 
Large 
Few or a few 
dominant 
Standardized; identical 
Or almost identical 
Differentiated 
Standardized or 
differentiated 
Pure monopoly One Unique 
Source: Thompson, 1993, p.l28 
Control over price Entry conditions Non-price 
By supplier Competition 
None 
Some 
Limited by mutual 
interdependence; 
Considerable if 
Collusion takes place 
Considerable 
Free None 
Relatively easy Yes 
Difficult Yes 
Blocked Yes 
there particular public antipathy towards the ESI, as opposed to the considerable antipathy towards BT 
(1992, p.16). The decision was wholly influenced by ideology. 
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Table 4.2: Structural Characteristics of ESI Composite Industries 
Market Number of finns Type of product 
Model 
Generation 
1994 
1999 
Transmission 
1994/1999 
Distribution 
1994/1999 
Supply 
1994 
1999 
Few, subject to 
licence from 
Regulator 
Few, subject to 
licence from 
Regulator 
One 
Twelve 
Twelve, plus 
generators 
Many and 
increasing 
Standardised 
Standardised 
Standardised 
Standardised 
Standardised 
Increasingly 
differentiated 
Control over price Entry conditions Non-price 
By supplier. ____ __ Competition 
Some, but limited by 
Regulator managed 
Pool mechanism 
Some, but limited by 
Regulator managed 
Pool mechanism 
Regulated 
Some, depending largely 
on Regulator and 
management of cost 
Difficult, subject to 
licence from 
Regulator 
Difficult, subject to 
licence from 
Regulator 
Blocked 
Blocked No 
None 
None 
No 
Some, depending largely Blocked Potentially 
on Regulator and 
management of cost 
Some, depending largely Open, subject to Yes 
on Regulator and licence from 
management of cost Regulator 
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Table 4.3: Characteristics of a Regulated Oligopoly 
Market Number of firms Type of product 
Model 
Regulated 
Oligopoly 
Few (relatively) 
Source: Ghobadian et ai, 1998, p.S77 
Standard (relatively) 
Control over price Entry conditions Non-price 
By supplier Competition 
Limited, but greater and 
significant control over 
cost of sales 
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Difficult, due to Of growing 
presence of significance and 
Regulator potential 
it is no longer a classical monopoly industry. 
As this chapter shows, the ESI is as yet unable to fit with either of the other market 
models: of monopolistic competition or oligopoly. This is principally due to the action of 
the Regulator in the establishment of prices, and effective blocking of new entry to the 
market6• As with any discussion of the ESI it is necessary to apply conditions to this 
statement. Firstly, the ESI is now a variety of industries. Secondly, the extent of 
regulation and competition evident in each of the industries is varied, and subject to 
change over time. 
To approach this issue, it is necessary to divide the ESI up into its component industries, 
and appraise each using the same codifying variables as Thompson. In each industry, two 
situations are identified; before and after 1994. This is presented in Table 4.2. As the 
focus of the project is the strategy formulation of Distribution and Supply companies (the 
RECs), it is these upon which we will concentrate. It is clear that the market models of 
both Distribution and Supply companies are unlike any perceived by Thompson. 
Distribution is a monopoly business, and will remain so, but the actions of the Regulator 
in the control of pricing prevents Distribution companies from corresponding directly to 
the pure monopoly model. In the case of supply, there is certainly the potential for the 
development of competition, and hence alignment with models in Table 4.2, but again the 
presence of the Regulator mitigates against such an alignment. As such, this research 
project proposes a new market model, to join those already presented - the Regulated 
Oligopoly, as presented at Table 4.3. 
The products of the ESI, at least in terms of the core products, are largely standardised; 
they are the distribution of electrical current from the Grid, and its retailing to the 
consumer. As the industry develops, again in response to competition in the Supply field, 
we may observe changes in the conception of what constitutes the RECs core businesses. 
RECs may choose to focus primarily upon there distribution activities, or place a greater 
emphasis upon their generation projects while gradually de-emphasising Supply as profit 
margins are eroded by competition. 
At present entrance to the market, through the provision of second-tier supply contracts, 
is limited by the Regulator (OFFER, 1996). However, companies can enter the market 
if they can meet stringent entry stipulations. This is again an area where it may be possible 
6 
See Section 4.4 of this chapter for an assessment of the operation of the Regulator. 
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to observe developments in future years. Non-price competition is another. 
Developments in the United States suggest that non-price competition, or differentiation, 
may be possible with electricity branded like any other product (Economist, 1997, Nutley, 
1995), and advertised as such. There may also be considerable potential for differentiation 
through the bundling of different products, and through the exploitation of unique selling 
points, like environmental awareness. 
In summary, therefore, and given the factors described above, it is argued that the ESI is 
unlike any market types described by Thompson. The closest that the industry comes to 
a match is perhaps with the concept of oligopoly, although the actions of the Regulator, 
as a surrogate customer, takes away direct influence over price, and hence prevents a 
closer match. 
4.3 Importance of Competition 
It is a widely held view that what distinguished electricity from previous privatisations was 
the Government's decision to attempt to "engineer privatisation rather than simply waiting 
for it to emerge by some natural process" (Thomas, 1996, p. 67). This was deemed 
necessary as a consequence of consumer disquiet at previous privatisations, particularly 
in telecoms and gas, that had seen public monopolies transferred into the private sector. 
Thomas argues that "the benefit to consumers of being able to shop around for the 
cheapest deal and to withdraw their custom if they were dissatisfied with the service they 
received was therefore an important element in selling the electricity privatisation plans 
to the public" (Thomas, 1996, p.87). 
At the beginning of the privatisation process, however, the extent to which competition 
was to be encouraged in the ESI was relatively narrow. The White paper intended that 
competition would exist in only two areas of the industry: generation and in the supply of 
very large customers, and for no one else. However in 1989, at almost the last minute, 
it was decided to extend competition to all supply customers; including domestic 
customers, over a rolling ten year timetable (Green and Newbery, 1997a, p. 28). A 
detailed consideration of the impact and importance of competition in generation is 
beyond the remit of this research project, which focusses primarily upon the RECs. In 
addition, the subject of competition in generation has received extensive analysis by other 
authors, and the reader is directed to works by Yarrow (1995), Green (1996), Thomas 
(1996), and Green and Newbery (1997a, 1997b) among many others. The subject of the 
pool mechanism used to facilitate competition in generation has also received extensive 
analysis, and again the reader is directed to works by Green (1991), Helm and Powell 
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(1992), Holmes (1992, p. 65-72), Newbery (1995), von der Fehr and Harbord (1993). 
Recent developments which have seen the introduction of the New Electricity Trading 
Arrangements (NET A) are interesting in the light of comments raised early in the process 
by authors such as Yarrow (1995). Yarrow noted that competition in generation was 
possible, but that its complexity may encourage a tendency towards collusion, rather than 
to vigorous competition (Yarrow, 1995, p.64), an implicit criticism of the generating 
companies that the NET A confirms and seeks to overcome. 
As already noted, competition in supply was intended to be introduced over a ten year 
period. With effect from Vesting Day (the 1st of March 1990), the largest 5000 
consumers, those with maximum demands in excess of 1 MW, would be allowed to 
choose their suppliers. These 5000 large companies were estimated to consume around 
30% of the UK's electricity (Green and Newbery, 1997, p. 28). A second tranche of 
consumers, those with demands in excess of 100kW, would be allowed to choose their 
suppler from April 1994. This second group, of 45,000 medium sized business and 
commercial customers, represented a further 20% of the UK's electricity demand. The 
final group, of all domestic and small commercial customers consuming less than 100kW, 
were due to be given the choice of supplier from April 1998. 
This competition in supply produced a change in licensing arrangements with the 
Regulator. Customers still buying from their host REC were called first-tier customers. 
Initially, companies wishing to supply customers out of area, needed to apply for a second 
tier licence. Second tier customers then needed to instal a special meter to record their 
half-hourly consumption to facilitate the billing and payment process, as second tier supply 
involved alterations to the traditional payment routes for use of the networks for high 
voltage transmission (operated by NGC) and low voltage distribution (operated by the 
local REC). 
The effect of the introduction of competition has been a steady decline in the sales-
volumes of the RECs, as first the generators, then independent second-tier suppliers, 
usually large industrial companies (who purchase directly from the pool), and then 
companies like British Gas which have entered the industry as the gas and electricity 
markets have converged, have taken market share. Initially, the generators were limited 
to a maximum of 15% of the sales volume in each area, but this limit has been gradually 
lifted and eventually removed. 
4.3.1 Impact of Cross-Subsidy and Business Separation 
Helm and Jenkinson attribute the existence of cross subsidy in many of the privati sed 
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utilities to the maintenance of horizontal and vertical integration (Helm and Jenkinson, 
1997, p.6), especially in the case of BT and BG, but also implicitly in the vertically 
integrated distribution and supply activities of the RECs. In the main, they imply, the 
existence of such cross subsidy is a product of the haste with which many of the 
privatisations occurred. Such cross subsidy, it is argued, would inhibit the potential for 
new entrants into the industry, by providing the incumbent with the opportunity to cross 
subsidize the potentially loss making unregulated part of their business with profits 
generated by the monopoly part of its business. In an associated concern, vertically 
integrated companies may be suspected of colluding, or providing preferential treatment 
to their sister organisations, at the expense of competition and the opportunity of a level 
playing field for new entrants. 
This concern; and in many cases it is the impression that is important as no evidence exists 
that this sort of behaviour is occurring, is thought to act as a deterrent to new entrants 
(Helm and Jenkinson, 1997, p.6). This led, in the gas industry, to the creation of TransCo 
as a separate company from the rest of British Gas, and essentially, it is this concern that 
is motivating the Regulator and the Government in the provisions for business separation 
in electricity in the new Utilities Bill (HOC, 2000). 
Within the new Bill a new authority, the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (GEMA), 
will be established to regulate both the electricity and the gas industries, and to replace the 
existing regulatory provisions, currently OfGEM but formerly OFFER and OFGAS. This 
new authority will then take on the responsibility for the issuing of licences. In the original 
legislation, the Regulator had the authority to issue three different licences, while under 
the new legislation the number oflicence types is increased to four, as shown in Table 4.4. 
As can be seen there is now a separate licence for distribution and supply, as opposed to 
the formerly combined licence. This change is necessary to facilitate business separation. 
In order to differentiate the two formerly joined business activities, the following 
definitions were provided by the Utilities Bill (2000): 
Distribution ""distribute", in relation to electricity, means distribute by means of a 
distribution system, this it to say, a system which consists (wholly or 
mainly) oflow voltage lines and electrical plant and is used for conveying 
electricity to any premises or to any other distribution system"; and 
Supply ""supply", in relation to electricity, means supply of electricity conveyed 
by a distribution system to premises other than premises occupied by a 
licence holder for the purpose of carrying on the activities which he is 
authorised by his licence to carry on". 
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Table 4.4: Electricity Industry Licences 
The Electricity Act 1989 
Generation Licence: 
(a licence authorising a person to generate 
electricity for the purpose of giving a supply to 
any premises or enabling a supply to be so 
given) 
Transmission Licence: 
(a licence authorising a person to transmit 
electricity for the purpose of providing a 
supply) 
Supply Licence (combining Distribution and 
Supply activities): 
(a licence to supply electricity to any premises, 
with a distinction being made between 1't ad 
2nd tier supply licences) 
The Utilities Bill 2000 
Generation Licence: 
(a licence authorising a person to generate 
electricity for the purpose of giving a supply to any 
premises or enabling a supply to be so given) 
Transmission Licence: 
(a licence authorising a person to transmit 
electricity for the purpose of providing a supply in 
that person's authorised area) 
Distribution Licence: 
(a licence authorising a person to distribute 
electricity for the purpose of providing a supply) 
Supply Licence 
(a licence authorising a person to supply electricity 
to premises) 
Business separation is introduced into the framework in Clause 2 of Section 6 of the Bill 
which states that "the same person may not be the holder of both a distribution and a 
supply license" (HOC, 2000). The effect of this clause is to prevent the RECs, which 
when privati sed in 1989 were allowed to hold both distribution and supply licences, from 
being able to do so in the future. 
Business Separation was first explored in a consultation paper published by the OFFER, 
a precursor to the recently formed OfGEM, in May of 1999 (OFFER, 1999a). In 
launching its business separation proposals, OFFER justified its actions on the basis that 
a continuation of the initial and ongoing situation provides advantages to existing 
distribution companies, which may disadvantage both customers and the successful 
development of competition in supply. They also believed that the full convergence of gas 
and electricity markets may have been endangered without business separation. In 
building their case, OFFER outlined five principal concerns:-
i) that PESs7 may operate their supply and distribution businesses to maximise 
benefits to the company in a way that disadvantages competing suppliers; 
ii) that the PES supply business may achieve access to information about competitors 
as a result of their use of the distribution service, which may not be available to 
other suppliers; 
iii) that the ownership of supply and distribution businesses gives PESs the 
7 
PES: Public Electricity Supplier, usually a REC but any holder of first tier supply licences. 
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opportunity to cross-subsidise by allocating costs to the distribution business 
which more properly should be addressed by the supply business; 
iv) that the present integration of distribution and supply may act to deter customers 
from switching to a new supplier (OfGEM is worried that customers may be 
misled to believe that switching to a new supplier might lead to a poorer response 
from the distribution business); and 
v) that the present metering and meter reading monopoly held by the distribution 
companies was likely to reduce incentives for innovation and efficiency gains 
(OFFER, 1999b). 
Therefore, business separation was intended to overcome a long standing problem with 
the original legislation: how to be certain that distributors are being fair to all potential 
competitive suppliers, for which contingencies had apparently not been prepared. While 
the Director General of Electricity Supply (the Regulator) had been insistent that different 
business entities within a group report separately, have separate management structures, 
and indeed be physically located away from other companies within a group, it was still 
felt that further separation was necessary to ensure against anti-competitive actions. The 
five points identified above suggest that even the suspicion of collusion between, for 
example, the supply and distribution arms of the same company is to be considered anti-
competitive, and only through legal separation can this suspicion be removed. 
Helm and Jenkinson note, in relation to cross subsidy, that by introducing separation the 
Regulator would be able to ring-fence the financial data relating to the regulated activities 
of a company, separate from the various unregulated activities of the companies, and 
hence ensure no cross subsidy. They point out that the vast majority ofRECs (and now 
all) have been taken over, and have diversified away from their core regulated business 
activities, hence increasing the potential for cross subsidy (Helm and Jenkinson, 1997, 
p.7). While separate accounting of each business is already required by the Regulator, 
separation would help resolve the "inevitable questions about abuses of transfer pricing 
and cross-subsidy" as well as providing the Regulator with valuable market information 
about the performance of all of the regulated companies (Helm and Jenkinson, 1997, p.5). 
They do, however, note that the companies themselves may have a concern about this 
process, and the impact that it might have upon their ability to operate in a demanding 
business environment. Furthermore, they note that in situations of market risk companies 
will inevitably seek to vertically integrate, and until solutions can be found to problems 
associated with market risk, this will continue to be the case. It is interesting that they 
speculate that the development of spot, forward and derivative markets in electricity may 
change this impulse (Helm and Jenkinson, 1997, p. 8), especially in the light of movements 
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in this direction by Eastern Group (which is featured in a case study in Chapter Nine of 
this thesis), and others. 
4.4 Regulatory Environment 
The regulation of both the electricity and gas industries has attracted considerable 
attention since privatisation. The purpose of this section is to provide a necessarily brief 
overview of the office of the Regulator, his roles and responsibilities, and the impact that 
regulation has had upon the companies of the ESI. Many authors have addressed the issue 
of regulation, and the reader is referred to the following selection of articles for a more 
exhaustive analysis of regulation in public utilities: Beesley (1997b); Beesley and 
Littlechild (1997); Bradley and Price (1988); Green and Newbery (1993); Helm (1994a, 
1994b); Hood et al (1998); Jackson and Price (1994); Kay (1994b); Littlechild (1996); 
Mackerron and Boira-Segarra (1996); Mayer and Vickers (1996); McKinnon, (1995); 
Price (1994, 1997); Surrey (1996); Vickers (1997); Weyman-Jones (1995); and Yarrow 
(1986, 1994, 1995). 
Regulation of the ESI was placed in the hands of the Director General of Electricity 
Supply (The Regulator), who was also head of the OFFER, the regulatory office created 
by the Electricity Act of 1989. This responsibility passed to the Director General of 
Energy Markets, head of the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets in June of 1999 when 
OFFER and its gas industry equivalent (OfGAS) merged, to take into account the 
increasing convergence of the two industries. Throughout the privatisation process, the 
philosophy underlying the concept of regulatory regimes in the UK has been based upon 
two key principles: the avoidance of private monopolies exploiting their position at the 
expense of the customer, and the promotion of competition in the non-monopoly parts of 
the industry. In general, the Regulator has the ability to impose price caps upon the 
companies under his jurisdiction in their monopoly businesses, and also in those activities 
which are in transition to full competition. 
4.4.1 Role and Responsibility of the Regulator 
The Regulator is responsible for overseeing "a competitive industry operating in an 
efficient manner with full protection to customers against unreasonable behaviour by those 
companies within the structure which retain monopoly powers" (Electricity Association, 
1992, p.2). The Regulator also has "powers to protect customers from unreasonable 
behaviour through anti-competitive practices"(Electricity Association, 1992, p.2). 
Formally, the Regulator and the Secretary of State have three functions under Section One 
ofthe Electricity Act, 1989: 
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~ to ensure that all reasonable demands for electricity are satisfied; 
~ to ensure that all licence holders are financially and operationally capable of 
fulfilling the activities and obligations authorised by their licences; and 
to promote competition in the generation and supply of electricity. 
In the light of these responsibilities, both Regulator and Secretary of State must address 
these functions in a manner which is seen to be best calculated to: 
~ protect the interests of electricity consumers supplied by licence holders in respect 
of charges and terms of conditions, continuity of supply and quality of supply 
services; 
promote efficiency and economy on the part of transmission or supply licence 
holders, and the efficient use of electricity supplied to consumers; 
promote research into, and the development and use of, new technologies by or 
on behalf of each type of licence holder; 
protect the public from dangers arising from the generation, transmission or supply 
of electricity; and 
secure the establishment and maintenance of machinery for promoting the health 
and safety of those employed in such activities. 
Additionally, both are required to take into account the effect upon the physical 
environment of any operational activity conducted in these industries (Electricity 
Association, 1992). The functions that OFFER itself is required to perform include the 
following: 
~ the granting of licences to persons who wish to supply, distribute, transmit or 
generate electricity; 
~ the fixing and publishing of maximum charges for reselling electricity; 
~ the publishing of information and advice for the benefit of tariff customers; 
~ the establishment of standards of performance in customer services and energy 
efficiency which the RECs must achieve; 
~ the determination of customers' unresolved complaints about RECs; and 
~ a review function of developments within the ESI. 
The review function has proved the most potent, and arguably most controversial tool that 
OFFER has as its disposal. In particular, this device was utilised by the Regulator 
following the Trafalgar House bid for Northern Electric (Burton, 1997, p.182). 
4.4.2 Choice of Regulatory Regime 
Generally, the choice of regulatory system falls between one of the following three 
-193-
possibilities: "the first.. .. is rate-of-return regulation, whereby the firm is permitted to earn 
at most a fair return on its capital investment. The other methods include a constraint 
based on a fair return over costs and one based on a fixed profit per unit of output" 
(Bailey, 1972, p.663). The system at use within the ESI is the final of these three 
alternatives, based upon regulation by control of the price of a unit of production. In such 
a regime, the Regulator "is responsible for enforcing the price controls which govern the 
price that each REC can charge its tariff customers" (OFFER, 1989): a price cap system, 
under which the regulator effectively only has control over the distribution element of the 
price charged in a liberalised market. This price cap system contrasts markedly with the 
system as operated in the United States, where regulation is by the imposition of a cap 
upon profits: a rate of return system. Branton has commented that, when determining 
how the UK system was to be regulated, the framers of the legislation were determined 
that the choice should involve any system, so long as it was not that used in the USA 
(Branton, 1994, p.28), which Beesley and Littlechild had identified as being fundamentally 
incompatible, indeed fundamentally at odds, with the objectives of the privatisation 
(Beesley and Littlechild, 1997, p.30). 
The defects of a rate of return approach were identified by Beesley and Littlechild as 
being:-
~ its inefficiency; 
~ that it encouraged a 'cost plus' mentality; 
~ it involved expensive enforcement procedures; 
~ the vulnerability of regulatory body to capture by the utilities8; 
~ the limitations it introduced upon competition; and 
~ the consequent restriction of new entrants. 
In their minds, a rate of return approach was akin to nationalisation, and wholly 
inappropriate to a privatisation programme (Beesley and Littlechild, 1997, p. 30). The 
basis of the rate of return approach stems from the work of American economists Averch 
and Johnson (1962), whose work on "the behaviour of the firm under regulatory 
constraint" predicted that regulated firms will tend to overcapitalize in an environment that 
allows a certain degree of profitability which relates to its asset base, such as a regulated 
environment. The rate of return approach, therefore, limits the profitability of a company 
in such a situation. If a company can only earn up to a specified ceiling, it is argued, they 
8 
The notion of 'capture' relates to the inability of a regulator to pursue objectives that are not agreed 
with utilities. It implies that the utility has more power than the Regulator within their relationship. 
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will not see the economic value of overcapitalisation. This limitation upon the decision 
making of the firm prompted the view of UK economists that a rate-of-return approach 
was akin to nationalisation. 
The preference for a price cap approach is based upon the view that such an approach 
encourages efficiency, that is to say it provides incentives for greater operational efficiency 
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p.237), and so supports a market driven approach. As 
explained above, a profit cap system restricts an utility's profits to a level that the regulator 
considers a 'fair' amount: effectively an upper ceiling. On the other hand a price cap 
system like that used in the UK places no ceiling upon earnings, and it is argued this 
"allows the utility to earn reasonable profits provided it performs efficiently (Anon, 
1995c). The process operated within the electricity industry is reviewed by the Regulator 
on a five-yearly basis, and he will take a number of conditions into account before 
adjusting the price cap, one of which will be the economic performance of each of the 
companies covered by the cap. It is known by the description "RPI-X" formula, where 
'RPI' is the Retail Price Index; the general measure of inflationary forces in the economy, 
and 'X' if the discretionary figure that the Regulator judges appropriate to vary and 
control the prices charged by the utility. The Regulator has used this formula to reduce 
the amount that RECs can levy from the regulated parts of their business. Beesley and 
Littlechild stated that this approach was intended only as a stop-gap measure to protect 
consumers until full competition was entrenched, whereupon regulation would wither 
away and be replaced by the ineluctable influence of the market. To date, however, this 
has not occurred and regulation of the RPI-X variety remains a feature of all of the UK's 
privati sed utilities. This situation is possibly due to a second main benefit of the approach, 
identified by Baldwin and Cave as its administrative convenience (Baldwin and Cave, 
1999, p.237). Although the preparation for a review is extensive, the adjudication of the 
outcome of a review is relatively straightforward, based as it is upon a simple formula. 
The RPI-X formula inevitably has its critics. A significant criticism is that identified by 
Mayer and Vickers, who note the tendency of price-cap regulation to confer "unwarranted 
profits on the utilities", while providing an un-equitable return to consumers (Mayer and 
Vickers, 1996, p.1). It was the operation of a price-cap system that led to imposition the 
Windfall Tax on the utilities in 1997. The price cap approach also presents the Regulator 
with an arguably more demanding task, and hence can result in more invasive regulation, 
especially if price capping is carried out badly (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). Some of the US 
investors in the UK industry have certainly argued this point, citing unnecessary and 
overzealous participation on the part of the Regulator as an issue preventing them 
effectively operating their investments (Southern Company, US003, 1999). 
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4.4.3 Regulation in Practice 
The frequency and supposed predictability of the Regulator's adjudications: ie the five-
yearly review timetable, conditions the behaviour of the RECs. The system, it is argued, 
encourages costs to be taken out of the system early in this cycle, to maximise the 
opportunity for savings to be made, and hence profits to be achieved (Eastern Group, 
UK002, 1995). This has led observers such as Westlake and Beckett to comment that 
"electricity distribution has become a cost-cutting business, with consequent effects on 
staffing levels in particular" (Westlake and Beckett, 1995, p. 52). Companies can, at least 
at the start of the process, cut their costs severely and can therefore "make a fortune" 
(Anon, 1995d). 
One interesting aspect of the question of regulation is that of its future. It was initially 
envisioned, with the privatisation of British Telecom in 1983 that the need for regulation 
would wither away (Littlechild, 1983), as the effects of competition took hold. However, 
it is increasingly the view that there will always be a need for regulation as, as Helm and 
Jenkinson among others have noted, "regulation has in fact increased as competition has 
developed" (Helm and Jenkinson, 1997, p. 10). Regulation for competition, they argue, 
has proved much more difficult than regulation of monopoly. 
4.5 Key Events Since 1989 
The following section presents a chronological list of the events that have shaped the ESI 
from before its privatisation to its current market situation (December 2000): 
1983 Energy Act: First act to liberalise the provision of energy within 
the UK, with the removal of the legal monopoly in generation 
previously enjoyed by the CEGB. However, in practice this 
measure had no real effect upon the extent of competition within 
the ESI; 
25 February 1988 White Paper: Privati sing Electricity (Cm322) published: The White 
paper included within it all aspects of the later Act, except that it 
also contained proposals to privatise nuclear generation at the 
same time as conventional generation. This, in the end, did not 
2 March 1988 
30 November 1988 
27 July 1989 
9 November 1989 
3 1 March 1990 
occur; 
White Paper: Privatisation of the Scottish Electricity Industry 
(Cm327) published; 
The Electricity Bill, later The Electricity Act 1989, presented to 
Parliament: The provisions of the Bill, minus the attempt to 
privatise the nuclear generation capability of the CEGB, was fully 
implemented by 1991; 
Electricity Act 1989 receives Royal Assent; 
Nuclear power stations removed from privatisation; 
Vesting Day; 
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11 December 1990 
12 March 1991 
18 June 1991 
21 June 1993 
1 April 1995 
11 August 1994 
14 December 1994 
6 March 1995 
31 March 1995 
6 July 1995 
17 July 1995 
24 July 1995 
31 July 1995 
8 September 1995 
18 September 1995 
2 October 1995 
6 November 1995 
4 December 1995 
11 December 1995 
21 March 1996 
March 1996 
3 1 March 1996 
1 April 1996 
1 April 1996 
29 April 1996 
2 May 1996 
7 May 1996 
1 July 1996 
Privatisation of RECs completed, and the RECs traded in the 
market; 
Privatisation of generating companies partially completed (60% of 
both National Power and PowerGen); 
Scottish Hydro-Electric and ScottishPower floated; 
Northern Ireland Electricity privatised; 
100kW market opens to competition 
First regulatory review 
Trafalgar House announces a hostile takeover bid for Northern 
Electric, despite existence of Golden Share preventing anyone 
organization owning more than 15% of a REC. Bid lapses 10 
March 1995; 
Second tranche of generator shares sold; 
Government's golden share in RECs expires; 
Extraordinary second regulatory review; 
Southern Company bids for SWEB, takeover complete 18 
September 1995; 
ScottishPower bids for Manweb, takeover complete 12 October; 
Eastern Group announces agreed takeover by Hanson, 
subsequently completed successfully 18 September 1995; 
North West Water bids for Norweb, takeover complete 8 
November 1995; 
PowerGen bids for Midlands Electricity, bid referred and blocked 
by government on 24 April 1996; 
National Power bids for Southern Electric, bid referred and 
blocked by government on 24 April 1996; 
CSW bids for Seeboard, takeover complete 11 January 1996; 
Welsh Water bids for SW ALEC, takeover completed 29 January 
1996; 
Regulator requires RECs to sell shares in National Grid Company; 
The combined Welsh WateriSW ALEC renamed Hyder; 
The date by which National Power and PowerGen were required 
to divest 6000MW of coal fired generating plant; 
Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear merge to form British 
Energy. Also formed on that day was Magnox Electric; 
The combined North West WaterlNorweb renamed United 
Utilities; 
Phased liberalisation of gas markets begins; 
South West Gas trials commence 
The Government blocks the takeover of 2 RECs (Southern and 
Midlands) by 2 generators (National Power and PowerGen) (DT!, 
1996b) and stated that it would continue to block such bids until 
"there is adequate competition in the generation and supply 
markets"; 
Avon Energy bids for Midlands Electricity, takeover completed 7 
June; 
Southern Co. Sells 25% of SWEB to PP&L; 
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15 July 1996 
28 October 1996 
l3 November 1996 
18 December 1996 
24 February 1997 
27 February 1997 
13 June 1997 
30 January 1998 
3 February 1998 
2 March 1998 
18 June 1998 
29 June 1998 
1 September 1998 
25 November 1998 
31 December 1998 
1 January 1999 
11 June 1999 
23 June 1999 
6 July 1999 
1 October 1999 
9 November 1999 
15 December 1999 
20 January 2000 
20 March 2000 
28 July 2000 
3 August 2000 
7 August 2000 
8 September 2000 
15 September 2000 
4.6 Conclusions 
British Energy floated; 
CalEnergy bids for Northern Electric, takeover complete 24 
December 1996; 
Dominion Resources bids for East Midlands Electricity, takeover 
complete by l3 January 1997; 
Entergy bids for London Electricity, takeover complete by 7 
February 1997; 
Yorkshire Holdings bids for Yorkshire Electricity, takeover 
complete by 1 April 1997; 
The Energy Group demerged from Hanson; 
Pacificorp bids for Eastern Group. Bid referred to MMC and 
lapses 1 August 1997; 
Magnox Electric becomes wholly owned subsidiary ofBNFL; 
Pacificorp launches new bid for Eastern Group; 
Texas Utilities also launches bid for Eastern Group; 
Southern Company sells further 16% share in SWEB to PP&L; 
Dominion Resources sell East Midlands Electricity to PowerGen, 
takeover complete 27 July 1998; 
Scottish Hydro and Southern Electric announce merger, to form 
Scottish and Southern Energy, merger complete 14 December 
1998; 
Midlands announces sale of supply business to National Power, 
sale complete 30 June 1999; 
Entergy sells London Electricity to EdF, sale completed 30 
September 1999; 
OfGEM formed; 
SouthernIPPL to sell SWEB's supply business to EdF; 
Hyder to sell SW ALEC's supply business to British Energy, 
takeover complete 17 February 2000; 
GPU buys ClNergy's share in Avon Energy; 
SWEB changes name to Western Power Distribution; 
Eastern Group changes its name to TXU Europe Power; 
London and Eastern Announce intention to set up a joint venture 
to operate distribution networks. The new operator, 24seven, 
launches 3 April 2000; 
Utilities Bill introduced into HOC; 
Midlands Electricity changes name to GPU Power UK 
Utilities Act 2000 receives Royal assent 
TXU Europe takes over Norweb Energi 
British Energy sells SW ALEC Supply to Scottish and Southern 
Energy 
Independent Energy collapses, to be bought by npower 
WPD successfully wins control of SW ALEC Distribution 
In concluding this chapter, two issues are addressed. The first of these, Section 4.6.1, is 
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a brief examination of the views of notable authors with respect to the question of 'was 
the privatisation worth it?'. It is not the intention of this report to question the validity 
of the exercise, nor its relative success. However, a brief exploration of the views of the 
most significant writers may be illuminating with respect to the central aims of objectives 
of this research. The second section, Section 4.6.2, summaries the remainder of the 
chapter and identifies the unique characteristics of the industry prior to the more in-depth 
analysis of the strategy processes of the companies formed by the privatisation. 
4.6.1 Was it worth it? 
Many commentators have assessed the progress and nature of change in the industry, and 
attempted to answer the question of whether the effort was worthwhile. Inevitably, the 
views of different analysts are mixed. Green and Newbery considered whether the 
structure arrived at was appropriate for its principal aims of improving efficiency and 
achieving competition. They conclude that it was, especially in relation to generation. 
They content that by resisting 'vertical integration' within the industry, regulators and 
legislators have aided the growth of competition in generation, the most significant 
influence upon maintaining a downward pressure on prices (Green and Newbery, 1997, 
p. 45). They are not persuaded by the argument that larger companies with merged 
activities, or national champions along the French model, would have benefited the 
country or met the aims of the legislation. The ongoing role for policy makers, they 
argue, is to avoid any concentration of generation through any future mergers (Green and 
Newbery, 1997, p. 45). 
Yarrow describes the effects of privatisation in relation to the encouragement of 
competition, even at an early stage, as a resounding success (Yarrow, 1995, p.85), based 
upon the measure provided by new entry into the industry. The reason for this success, 
when compared for example to the attempted liberalisation of the energy industry in 1983, 
Yarrow firmly attributes to the presence and actions of the industry regulator (Yarrow, 
1995, p. 86). He also notes that the UK experiment in electricity had gone much further, 
in 1992, than the EU had envisaged itself requiring by 1996, or even the current situation, 
as is still the case. 
Holmes, writing relatively early in the project, takes the view that the privatisation was ilJ-
managed, if not ill-conceived. The failure to undertake a preliminary study, he argues 
resulted in a flawed industry structure (Holmes, 1992, p.1 09). He argues that it was only 
a last minute political fix: when Parkinson was replaced by Wakeham as the senior 
minister in charge, that stopped the whole process from collapsing upon itself. Central 
to his criticisms is a view that the electricity industry is not a market-place, and would 
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never be so. The tenor of his argument holds that electricity systems of this kind are much 
better suited to public provision. The system that developed, with its enforced 
competition, does not serve the aims of the privatisation, in that it does not replace a 
flawed system with a working system. Rather, it replaces one flawed system with another 
flawed system. In his view, "the whole business of a competitive market is, in short, a 
facade" (Holmes, 1992, p.144), and the results of the privatisation are a long way from 
achieving their goals. 
A variety of empirical assessments of the success of the privatisation have been 
undertaken, using a variety of analytical methods. One interesting assessment was 
conducted by the renowned economists Newbery and Pollitt, using a social cost-benefit 
analysis of the privatisation. Their findings suggest that while there has been a marked 
cost reduction of around 5% per annum, this saving has not been passed on to consumers. 
That is to say that it is the producers who have benefited from the process, and as such 
the privatisation has failed to meet one of its key criteria. They do note situations where 
reforms of the old system could have produced more socially advantageous results, but 
remain sceptical that all of the conditions necessary for this scenario to corne about would 
have necessarily occurred (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997, p.296). They also note that as 
much as one quarter of the gains in efficiency resulting from the privatisation have not 
been appropriated by the consumers of energy or even shareholders in the companies, but 
have been repatriated by the French electricity company, EdF, which has been able to sell 
its electricity into the UK industry most effectively since privatisation. 
Bishop and Kay also assessed the effects of privati sat ion upon efficiency (Bishop and Kay, 
1992, p.200-202), although their study was focussed upon all of the population of 
privati sed companies, and as it was reported in 1992, was unlikely to include the RECs. 
However, they concluded that in general, and after an uncertain start, the efficiency of the 
recently privati sed companies has markedly improved (Bishop and Kay, 1992, p.202), 
supporting the findings ofNewbery and Pollitt. They do note that privatisation was not 
necessarily the cause of organisational improvement, and further conclude that many of 
the changes achieved could conceivably have occurred under the organisation's previous 
ownership. They suggest that competition is more important than privatisation, and where 
there is any conflict between privatising an industry or introducing competition, then 
competition should take precedence. A review of the gas industry by Waddams Price and 
Weyman-Jones found evidence of higher productivity in the operations of British Gas 
since privatisation (1996). In contrast, the work of Martin and Parker (1997) found no 
consistent relationship between ownership and performance. 
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4.6.2 Unique Characteristics of the ESI 
The principal characteristic of the ESI is the unique method of its privatisation. The ESI 
was the first public utility in the UK to experience' ordered competition' (Burton, 1997): 
that is, it was the first UK public utility privatisation to proceed with a significant degree 
of attendant market liberalisation. Whereas BT and BG had been privatised as effective 
monopolies, the ESI was vertically and horizontally de-integrated and competitive 
markets, in generation and supply, set up. This chapter has also indicated that in most 
cases UK privatisations have occurred under time pressure, which has resulted in a greater 
virtue being placed upon the completion of each privatisation process than ensuring that 
the minutiae of the details were correct (Thatcher, 1993). Undoubtably electricity, given 
the last minute compromises9 and incomplete regulatory framework10 falls into this 
category. Interviews conducted as a part of this research project, with the then industry 
regulator OFFER, confirmed that issues relating to the development of company strategy 
were not taken into consideration when the industry was in the process of being 
privatisedll . 
Therefore, the companies of the ESI were faced with a set of issues that no previous 
company had faced during the UK privatisation process. The process of adaptation 
required not only that they assume responsibility for various functions usually performed 
by commercial enterprises: treasury, taxation, reporting and making profits for its new 
owners, but also adapting to competition within an environment that was and remains 
subject to regulation. As Chapter Two demonstrated (Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980) 
existing management models and techniques of management were not created to provide 
guidance for managers faced with these challenges. The impact upon each company's 
strategic processes of these new demands within an uncertain environment are addressed 
in Chapters Five to Eight. 
9 
Such as the removal of nuclear power from the initial proposal, and the late introduction of graduated 
competition in supply. 
10 
Necessitating the current introduction of business separation. 
11 
A quote to this end from Interview UKOO 1 was presented in Section 1.0 of Chapter One. 
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Chapter Five The Northern Industrial RECs 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter, and the three that follow it, begin the reporting of the preliminary stage of 
the research. The aim of this preliminary stage is to begin the process of addressing the 
first two objectives of the research, and to also begin the development and refinement of 
the tentative 'core' propositions, as discussed in Section 1.3, and Section 3.4.1. In order 
to ensure consistency the analysis presented in this chapter, and the two following it, 
adopt the same reporting and analytical frameworks. 
Chapter's Five, Six and Seven present a series of discrete case studies which report data 
on the RECs over the period 1990-2000. Each case study features the following sections: 
~ key events in the company history between 1990-2000; 
~ an analysis of the company's managerial and organisational structures; and 
~ an assessment of the corporate and business strategies that each company has 
pursued, across the various industries in which it operates. 
Evidence for this analysis is drawn from a variety of published sources, including the 
financial and academic literature, and from company publications, as discussed in Section 
3.4.3.2. Each chapter then presents an analysis of the data presented, which also utilises 
a common framework. This framework divides the analysis into the first and second 
objectives of this research, where in relation to: 
~ Objective One, as discussed in Section 3.4.3.2.1, a form of content analysis has 
been utilised to collect and analyse data. In each case, therefore, a matrix showing 
the prevalence of each form of' grand strategy' (Pearce and Robinson, 1994, and 
Section 2.5.4) for each of the different businesses of each REC is presented, and 
discussed. Alongside this, a second matrix showing the possible business 
strategies (Chrisman et aI, 1988, and Section 2.5.5.4) is presented and discussed. 
This review of evidence collected in support of Objective One of the research is 
continued by the author's assessment and identification of possible viable strategy 
combinations, in terms of (i) corporate, (ii) business, and (iii) organisational level 
strategies; and 
Objective Two, as noted in Section 3.4.3.1, a framework of possible drivers of 
strategy has been developed based upon the prospective dominant views of 
strategy making in the firm, as described in Section 2.2.3. This framework is used 
to assess the evidence obtained in this preliminary stage to make general 
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comments as to the nature and influence of these various drivers of strategyl. 
The analysis of each of the cases in the sub-sample, is drawn together in a separate 
concluding section of this chapter, Section 5.5, and a similar analysis will be performed 
for each of the two subsequent chapters. Reference will also be made to a variety of other 
key managerial concepts, as identified in Section 2.6. The process will culminate in a 
review chapter, Chapter Eight, which draws all of the preceding analysis together, and 
suggests general conclusions in respect of Objectives One and Two, to be further tested 
in the following case study Chapters Nine to Eleven. Chapter Eight also seeks to develop 
the refined tentative propositions to be further tested in the case study chapters. 
As described in Section 3.4.2, this sub-sample includes four of the RECs: Manweb 
(Section 5.1); Norweb (5.2); Northern Electric (5.3) and Yorkshire Electric (5.4). In 
characterising the companies of this sub-group, Holmes noted the following as being key 
similarities within the markets that each of these companies served: 
~ each area formerly contained the majority of heavy industrial demand within the 
UK: principally Mining (Northern and Yorkshire); Shipbuilding and Docks 
(Manweb'and Northern); Steel (Yorkshire); Textiles (Norweb and Yorkshire); 
auto-manufacture (Manweb) and so on; 
~ that each of these industries was in terminal or relative decline; 
~ that each area was witnessing to some extent a population migration to more 
affluent parts of the country; but that 
in accommodating these changes there were bright spots of commercial activity 
seeing an increase in demand, and the stabilisation of population movements 
(Holmes, 1992, p.56). 
Holmes therefore implies that the companies from this sub-sample would have faced a 
greater challenge than those in other sub-groups, as demand falls across their customer 
profile, and anticipated that this would affect the strategies chosen. However, at the time 
of writing, Holmes did not feel able to estimate how the companies of this sub-sample 
would respond, and whether that response would be uniform across each of the 
compames. 
It should be noted that this analysis is tentative, and will be subject to furtller exploration during the field 
stage of the research. This is due to the difficulty of consistently identifying the impact of the various 
drivers of strategy across all of tlle businesses of all of the case study companies, using textual analysis. 
The auilior argues that understanding the impact of drivers of tlus kind is more appropriate in case studies 
following in-depth interviewing. 
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5.1 Manweb (the former Merseyside and North Wales Electricity 
Board) 
Manweb is the REC for North Wales and Merseyside. The Company's operating 
franchise covered an area of 12,200 square kilometres and included Merseyside, North 
Wales and parts of Cheshire, Greater Manchester, Lancashire, Shropshire and 
Staffordshire. The customer composition of the area is varied, with large industrial and 
petro-chemical customers, and the Port of Liverpool accounting for much demand, while 
there was significant demand from North Welsh agricultural users. There was also 
significant domestic demand from the urban conurbation surrounding the city of 
Liverpool. However in recent times the area has been in relative decline, with its 
population decreasing due in part to economic instability. Manweb was from an early 
stage thought to be relatively vulnerable in two senses: firstly, to economic downturn; 
secondly to the aggressive attentions of other RECs hoping to win new custom in the 
recently liberalised 1 MW sector of the market. 
5.1.1 Key Events: 1990-2000 
Manweb is perhaps the direct opposite ofREC's such as Eastern Group (Section 7.2) and 
East Midlands Electricity (EME) (Section 6.1), in that it adopted the most consistent and 
narrowly focussed interpretation of what constituted its core business. This narrow focus 
was reflected in the briefest of all of the statements of future business intentions made by 
a REC at the time of its flotation (Anon, 1990). The Company acknowledged that 
distribution was the principal source of profitability and therefore intended to grow that 
business, while effectively managing its costs (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.326). What is 
very interesting about the Manweb approach is the way that the City was initially strongly 
in favour of a narrow focus, but that latterly, as other RECs proved the profit generation 
potential of 'non-core' activities, the City reduced its support for an approach of this 
nature. 
Manweb announced very early on that it intended to take a long term perspective, and 
wait until the industry had settled down before making any major strategic decisions. This 
involved not moving into Closed Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) generation2, and not taking 
part in any unrelated diversification with the exception of gas marketing, where the 
company shared the view of the other RECs that the separate gas and electricity industries 
were converging. Analysts were initially very complementary towards Manweb's stance. 
F or example, in 1990 the Financial Times noted that "strategy is Manweb' s strength: talk 
2 
The only REC not to do so. 
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around the board table is more typical of a US management consultancy than a REC. The 
decision not to invest in generation and its view on the possible restructuring of the 
electricity industry are evidence of its distinctive strategy" (Sychrava, 1990c). 
Manweb adopted a concentrated growth strategy, focussed upon its distribution network. 
The Company had adopted a new organisational structure eighteen months prior to 
privatisation, which involved the creation of three distinct business divisions - distribution, 
supply, and appliance retailing and electrical contracting. Additionally, a corporate 
services business was also established to sell its expertise to the three business divisions: 
a form of internal network as described by Miles and Snow (1992). While this structure 
was to become common after privatisation few RECs instituted a similar change prior to 
the industry paradigm shift. In addition, Manweb had invested heavily in a new and highly 
effective communications network for the Company. The management of Man web were 
highly regarded, and had shown a very early acknowledgement of the difficulty of making 
supply a profitable activity, especially in their market sector. As noted above, the area 
was heavily industrial, and therefore open to much competition for high energy users. 
Manweb's reaction was not to undercut the prices offered by competitors but to offer an 
improved range of added value services in the hope that, for example, assistance to 
improve efficiency would prove more attractive than a simple price reduction. Should that 
not prove the case, the Company was not particularly concerned, as the margins in supply 
were so small. As Manweb's Chairman noted "it's probably more profitable taking a 
management fee than it ever was just selling electricity" (Sychrava, 1990c). 
The Company therefore offered a low cost, differentiated service in supply aimed at 
providing high quality to customers, and a low cost service in the monopoly distribution 
network aimed at maximising operating profits. Such an approach would be identified as 
a segmented benefit focus approach, by Chrisman et al (1988, and Section 2.5.5.4). 
During the early post privatisation years Manweb endeared itself to the City by: 
.. sticking to the knitting: the City felt that RECs should concentrate on distribution 
and 'marked up' Manweb as a result; 
focussing upon cost reduction: Manweb had a reputation as a company that had 
slimmed down earlier than other RECs hence reducing its cost base, and 
maximising the profitability of its distribution business; 
announcing a willingness to seek synergistic savings opportunities with other local 
utility providers, in particular Welsh Water; 
focussing upon customer service: large customers were offered demand 
management and energy efficiency advice while domestic customers enjoyed lower 
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costs and higher service quality; 
being environmentally friendlier than other RECs: Manweb was the 'greenest' of 
the RECs (Sharpe, 1990), and its only involvement in generation came in 
renewable energy sources such as wind (Sychrava, 1992a), and clean coal (Smith, 
19941); 
acknowledging the potential of gas, and formed joint venture with Alliance 
(Buckley, 1992a); 
~ pulling out of retail (Smith, 1995b); and 
~ investing in upgrading existing infrastructure (Smith, 1993d). 
Manweb also enjoyed considerable success in market development and by 1993 had won 
back 38 large local customers that it had formerly lost, while at the same time winning 18 
new 'out of area' customers (Smith, 1993d). At this stage the Company was felt to be 
lean, effective and focussed upon a small number of core capabilities. Investor's trusted 
the Company's management team and as a result the City favoured Manweb. Its core 
business focus was unique within the industry, but over time increasingly less so, as 
companies that had diversified much more widely returned to a core focus. 
The problems for Manweb in relation to relative performance in the eyes of City analysts 
was that when companies such as EME adopted a core business focus, that core business 
was seen to involve generation, as well as the traditional businesses of distribution and 
supply and the other new core business, gas. Manweb by comparison, having not 
ventured into generation was seen to be less adventurous, and hence holding Manweb 
stock became less attractive. This occurred for two reasons. Firstly, companies were seen 
to be making a success of related diversification into generation. Secondly, because the 
first price review undertaken by the Regulator showed that distribution was increasingly 
likely to come under greater pressure for price reductions, and hence be less profitable. 
Manweb, having based its entire strategy on distribution and risk aversion, suddenly 
appeared to have made the wrong decision after all. 
It is interesting to note that the dilemma faced by Manweb highlights a consistent problem 
associated with corporate strategy making. A strategy which appears appropriate at a 
given time, in given conditions, can look less appropriate if those conditions change, and 
more so if the Company can not change with changing circumstance. Inactivity of this 
kind leads to the performance associated with the Reactor archetype, identified by Miles 
and Snow (1978). The first regulatory review in 1994 was without precedent, and hence 
strategies which had looked appropriate before the review, looked less appropriate 
afterwards. The reaction of the City reinforces this analysis, and exacerbates the apparent 
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deficiencies of what had been up until then a viable strategic position. 
Manweb became one of the first company's to be targeted for a hostile takeover, and the 
first company to be targeted by another electricity sector company, when ScottishPower 
bid for it in July 1995. The hostile bid valued Manweb at only £1.1 billion (Wighton, 
1995d) reflecting ScottishPower's view that Manweb was not a particularly viable option 
in terms of potential earnings growth, due to its decision to focus upon distribution. 
ScottishPower also claimed that Manweb had not achieved as much as could be expected 
from cost reduction, based upon comparisons with other RECs who had been shedding 
staff at a much higher rate. Manweb countered by claiming that they had a lower starting 
staff level due to the restructuring undertaken prior to privatisation, but in a defensive 
measure in August 1995 immediately announced job cuts which amounted to 17% of its 
staff total at March of that year. 
Manweb's loss of the takeover battle cost its managers dear. All of the senior managers 
of the Company were replaced by managers from ScottishPower. The wide ranging job 
reduction started prior to the takeover, when up to 1000 employees lost their jobs, 
continued as ScottishPower sought to realise as many synergistic savings as possible from 
the acquisition. The operations of Man web were moved to a smaller building in Chester 
with a further 350 job losses, principally in areas where there existed a duplication of 
ScottishPower functions (Wighton, 1995h). 
Since the takeover, Manweb has become a route by which ScottishPower has sought entry 
into the English and Welsh market, and the Manweb brand has been subsumed into the 
ScottishPower brand everywhere except in the Manweb area. The Company still operates 
in the region pursuing the core activities of distributing electricity, and retailing 
ScottishPower electricity and gas under the Manweb brand. It's focus remains upon 
providing a high quality service. Evidence from OfGEM suggests that Manweb is one of 
the best performing companies across a range of measures. The Regulator's 1999 report 
on Distribution and Transmission Performance (OfGEM, 1999) reported that Manweb 
was: 
~ the second best performing REC in relation to the number of interruptions per 100 
customers; 
in the upper quartile of companies in relation to low numbers of minutes lost per 
customer; and 
that in 1999 the Company reported their best performance over the 10 year period 
in relation to the number of faults per 100KM of network. 
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However, the comments were not all complementary, as Manweb received the fourth 
highest number of complaints per 10,000 customers, although this figure was actually 
below its 10 year average. 
5.1.2 Structure of Manweb 
In this section, the management and organisational structures of Manweb are presented, 
and significant changes to either during the period are highlighted. Firstly, the senior 
management structure up until the takeover by ScottishPower. At privatisation, the 
executive directors on the Main Board of Man web were as follows: 
Name Position Joined Manweb in From 
Bryan Weston Chainnan 1985 Yorkshire 
Electricity 
Richard Gales Managing Director 1978 Norweb 
Denis Farquhar Executive Director 1955 ESI 
(Network Services) 
Peter Hopkins Executive Director 1980 Eastern Electricity 
(Trading) 
Colin Leonard Executive Director 1967 ESI 
(power Marketing) 
John Roberts Executive Director 1967 ESI 
(Finance) 
All of the initial executive director's, with the exception of Leonard (Executive Director 
of Power Marketing), were chartered engineers, and none of them had worked outside of 
the electricity industry, with the exception of non-executive directorship's held elsewhere 
(Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p. 341). In 1992, the posts of Chairman and Chief Executive 
were separated, with Roberts becoming CEO in April 1992, and Weston becoming Non-
Executive Chairman. Roberts' replacement as Finance Director was John Astall, joining 
Manweb from Du Pont-Howson. Finance was usually the first executive position within 
a REC filled by an external appointee. Manweb were somewhat late in following this 
trend, as most RECs had appointed an external finance director prior to privatisation. 
Howard Kirkham replaced the retiring Farquhar as Director of Network Services. He also 
came to Manweb from a non-industry background (Manweb, 1993, p.11). 
A number of other significant changes occurred within Manweb prior to the takeover 
battle with ScottishPower. Weston retired, to be replaced by William Goodall as Non-
Executive Chairman with Roberts remaining as CEO. Astall resigned, to be replaced by 
Stuart Siddall, another finance director from outside of the industry, this time from 
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Balfour Beatty. Hopkins took early retirement as Manweb moved out of retail. A new 
position, Director of Corporate Affairs was created in 1994 and David Vernon-Smith 
appointed from his post as Head of Human Resources (Manweb, 1995, p.16). At 
takeover, therefore, half of the Board were original senior managers, and the influence of 
managers with non-industry experience was limited in comparison to the experience of 
other RECs. The preponderance of managers from engineering backgrounds may explain, 
to some extent, the focus upon distribution. 
In relation to organisational structure, Manweb had made early moves to adopt a product-
focussed divisional structure. A new organisational structure was adopted 18 months 
prior to privatisation, and involved the creation of three distinct business divisions -
distribution, supply, and appliance retailing and electrical contracting, under the corporate 
head office. Additionally, a corporate services business was also established to sell its 
expertise, in human resource management and training, information services and so on, 
to the three business divisions. The Head Office was responsible for major policy 
formulation as well as a range of activities such as purchasing, computing, industrial sales 
contract negotiation, and research and development. Operationally, the Company still 
maintained five areas which were largely responsible for customer related activities across 
the business divisions. Autonomy for business decision making was provided within a 
"framework of central planning, target setting and control" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, 
p.342) that flowed from Head Office. 
The structure was fine-tuned throughout the period. In 1995, the core distribution 
business was restructured into "three focussed units, supported by depots located 
throughout the region" (Manweb, 1995, p.3). These three operating units were: 
i) PowerNet: responsible for the strategic management of the network including control 
and capital investment planning; 
ii) Manweb Power Engineering: responsible for managing the construction, maintenance 
and day to day operation of the electricity distribution network; and 
iii) Business Support Service: responsible for essential services such as transport, 
technical training and telecommunications. It was also responsible for seeking new 
commercial development opportunities to exploit Manweb's expertise. This led to the 
creation of a fourth business: 
iv) Manweb Metering Services. (Manweb, 1995, p.8). 
The restructuring was aimed at making the Company's main business more efficient and 
effective, as the shadow of the ScottishPower takeover bid loomed. Other businesses, 
such as contracting, also underwent internal restructuring, while others, such as retail, 
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were divested. The takeover by ScottishPower, effectively left Manweb as a distribution 
company, and as a brand name with which it competed in the Manweb area. 
5.1.3 Strategy Decisions at Manweb 
In examining Manweb's strategic processes, and in acknowledgement of the differences 
between The Company and the other RECs, a slightly different structure has been adopted 
for this section, which considers both its corporate and business strategies. Manweb's 
strategy was the most 'pure' and undifferentiated of the strategies developed by the RECs 
following privatisation. The company adopted a very conservative concentrated growth 
strategy focussed upon cost reduction and efficiency within the core business of the 
company. This manifested itself in improving the quality, reliability and effectiveness of 
the distribution business; making it work harder, and providing a differentiated low cost, 
high quality service for customers in the supply business. In supply, this formula brought 
considerable market development success, and the move into gas, when it was accepted 
as a logical move for a REC, was taken to further its organic market development 
approach. Manweb divested its retail interests as soon as it became clear they did not fit 
its profile, and reduced its contracting business to that which was necessary to support its 
distribution network. The Company made use of joint ventures, and consortia where 
appropriate and was also rumoured to be exploring the potential of a strategic alliance 
with Welsh Water, when it was subject to the ScottishPower bid. It did not attempt to 
enter into gas cycle generation, nor seek to diversify in any other areas popular among the 
RECs, such as international consultancy. 
Therefore, Manweb undertook all of the actions that would have been expected of a 
company that had made an early decision to stick very closely to its core business 
functions, and not to seek to exploit the perceived new opportunities available to 
managers in the privatised ESI. The initial response from the City was very much in 
favour of this conservative approach, at a time when the City favoured utilities which were 
less adventurous. However, after the initial price review suggested that a reliability upon 
monopoly profits was not going to guarantee consistent future profitability the City 
changed its views. It began to favour companies which whilst more adventurous in 
developing new income streams had cautiously developed these streams to ensure there 
was a close relationship to their core businesses. That is, the City now favoured 
companies that had developed congruency in diversification. 
Manweb now is more akin to a brand provided by ScottishPower than a separate 
company. Its current structure is functional, and key decision making flows down from 
its owner's head office. Manweb's chief value to ScottishPower is as a relatively secure 
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source of monopoly profits, and a means by which ScottishPower can find a ready market 
for a portion ofits generation output, hence providing a hedge against fluctuations in the 
prices of electricity during the cycle. In addition, alongside Southern Water'l, Manweb 
provides a means by which ScottishPower can drive out synergistic cost savings from 
concurrent technologies, marketing opportunities and individual expertise. 
Manweb would appear to present an archetypical case of an organisation which 
determined its core intended market, and tailored its strategic behaviour accordingly. The 
City's view was arguably that it did not make sufficient use of its resources and seek 
available and appropriate revenue streams. As with London Electricity (Section 8.3), its 
strategic management appears to have been prescriptive, and consistent, and aimed at 
establishing and defending its niche roles within its home region. Its success may have 
contributed to its eventual takeover, as its decision to stay small made it a ready target for 
predator organisations like ScottishPower. 
5.2 Norweb (Formerly the North West Electricity Board) 
Norweb is the REC for the North West of England. The Company's operating franchise 
covered an area of 12,500 square kilometres centred upon the densely populated 
conurbation of Greater Manchester. Norweb's area was a mixture of domestic, 
commercial and industrial customers in an area of the UK that had seen significant 
recession during the 1980's. At the beginning of the period, the view held by analysts was 
that the Company relied too heavily upon heavy industry for its supply demand, although 
the Company felt that this was a misapprehension, which had caused market analysts to 
downgrade the rating of the Company unjustly. Norweb felt that it was not reliant upon 
anyone sector of the economy. At the time of privati sat ion, however, there were hopes 
of a commercial recovery in its region. Norweb is of interest because of the image it 
created for itself at the time of privatisation, which emphasised its prudence and its 
aggression simultaneously. Norweb had a reputation as being among the best at 
marketing itself within the industry, and believed itself to be among the most efficient: at 
the beginning of the period, its operating costs were falling much faster than the industry 
average (Sychrava, 1990b). There was also strong support for the management team at 
Norweb at the beginning of the period, based upon their prudence, their ability to meet 
government targets and their self belief. There were however a number of initial 'black 
marks' against the Company: there was some concern that its capital investment 
replacement programmes were greater than average; it had the highest gearing at 
3 
ScottishPower's other English utility subsidiary. 
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privatisation; it was seen as one of the slowest growing companies at the beginning of the 
period, in relation to the number of units it sold; and it was thought to have the highest 
potential efficiency improvements to realise (Thomas, 1990g). It is also interesting as it 
was the REC that was the most committed to appliance retailing. 
5.2.1 Key Events: 1990-2000 
Norweb was seen as being one of the RECs most able to adjust to a competitive 
environment. The importance given by Norweb to its retail operations had instilled a 
competitive element to its organisational culture from the beginning (Fazey, 1988). 
Norweb had a reputation, for instance, of being an effective marketing organisation. It 
also had one of the most modem customer service operations of all the RECs at 
privatisation. The Company was also a leading REC in relation to its power purchasing 
activity, and had in April 1988 bought the output of the Chapelcross Magnox nuclear 
power station in Scotland, run privately by British Nuclear Fuels, accounting for around 
5% ofNorweb's energy demand. Norweb also had an early interest in locating energy 
from renewable sources (Samuelson, 1989b), anticipating that up to 12% of its 
requirements could come from such sources. This interest has persisted throughout this 
period, and has included investments in wind turbines (Samuelson, 1990d), and gas from 
refuse projects (Maddox, 1992). Norweb was also the first of the RECs to become 
involved in a self-generation programme, taking a 20% stake in a joint venture with ABB 
called Lakeland Power (Samuelson, 198ge), as part ofNorweb's attempt to obtain energy 
"at the best price consistent with reliable supplies". It was also active in the Combined 
Heat and Power (CHP) market, in a joint venture with Combined Power Services 
(Thomas, 1990j). Norweb was also the keenest of the RECs in the area of appliance 
retail, and the most active in attempting to grow this part of its business. 
The Company, having made these initial moves, was clearly setting an agenda of 
"exploring opportunities to develop profitable new income streams from the Company's 
assets and resources" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.509). Noticeably there was a similarity 
of attitude here to that of EME (Section 6.1), but equally noticeably the actions which 
accompanied this statement were all clearly within the realm of related diversification, 
rather than EME's actions which were at least partially unrelated. Its search for new 
opportunities saw considerable expansion between 1992 and 1994, and these are some of 
the highlights: 
~ In Generation: In addition to its participation in Lakeland Power, its generation 
subsidiary Norweb Power bought 50% of the Keadby Power generation project, 
in a joint venture with Scottish Hydro (Anon, 1992b) to help it spread risk in its 
energy purchasing operations. In 1994, its ambitions in relation to the 
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opportunities offered by generation were shown when it approached PowerGen 
and National Power about buying the capacity it had been required to divest4 
(Hollinger, 1994); 
In Gas: it established Northern Gas, a joint-venture with UtiliCorp in April 1992, 
to market gas to large industrial users in competition with BG. Norweb held 75 
per cent of the venture (Sychrava, 1992b). In October 1994, Norweb announced 
it would set up a national gas marketing company to market to domestic 
customers as well; 
In Appliance Retail: In June of 1992, it significantly expanded its retailing 
activities through the acquisition of 20 Atlantis electrical superstores from Thorn 
EM! for £5 million (Thornhill, 1992a) as part of a strongly expansionary course 
in retailing. This was followed in February 1994 by a collaboration with ICL to 
establish a chain of at least 20 computer superstores under the 'Icon' brand (Cane, 
1994), and in 1995 by a decision to buy 18 out-of-town superstores and licences 
to operate 16 high street shops from SWEB, paying £4.3 million plus a 
consideration for stock (Lascelles, 1995a). All of these actions were part of a 
strategy to expand its retail activities from 63 superstores in 1995 to 200 by the 
end of the decade; 
In Telecommunications: As Norweb Telecommunications, it was issued with a 
telecommunications licence in 1994, and announced its aim to work with Energis 
in direct competition with BT (Adonis, 1994); and 
Overseas Investment: In June 1994 it paid $36 million (£23.6 million) for a 50% 
stake in two gas-fired co-generation facilities in Virginia (Smith, 1994d). Later 
that year, as a sign interpreted as indicating that further such investments were to 
be expected, it became the first REC to be listed on a US stock exchange 
(Lascelles, 1994e). 
In addition to these expansionist policies, it was also concentrating on being efficient and 
effective in its home market. Norweb was identified as the second best performer in the 
Regulator's 1992 disconnections league and claimed that its unit price reductions for the 
first five years following privatisation had been greater than concurrent increases in 
inflation. In 1993, following the reporting season it became the first among the RECs to 
talk about price freezes rather than rebates, taking the view that this was better for 
customers in the longer term. Finally, in 1995, it introduced a 6% price reduction, the 
highest percentage price cut in the industry to date. By this time, Norweb was the most 
4 
Which was eventually sold to Eastern Group (Wighton, 1996; Holberton, 1996f). 
-213-
diversified of the RECs, but also among the most highly rated by the City. Its managers 
were felt to have balanced cost reduction, profitability, improved service quality and 
diversification in a fashion which was satisfying all stakeholders, and overcoming the 
City's usual reticence towards, in particular, its continued involvement in retail. 
Early in the takeover 'frenzy' which followed the expiration of the Government's golden 
shares in the RECs, Norweb began negotiations with North West Water (peston, 1995), 
as well as Texas Energy Partners, a strategic alliance between Houston Industries and 
Central and South West Corp. Norweb initially turned down North West's bid preferring 
to work with the US companies, and became the centre of a contested takeover. The 
rationale behind the US companies' interest was familiarity: the companies had worked 
together in the past, had faith in the existing management team and believed that Norweb 
was 'uniquely well positioned' for the further deregulation of the electricity supply market. 
Norweb had the lowest tariffs and second lowest 'added costs' of all the RECs, and had 
performed well in the sectors of the market already opened up to competition (Wighton, 
1995b). Arguably, if the US bid had been successful, Norweb would have continued more 
or less as before, except with the financial strength of the US companies enabling it to 
pursue its business objectives even more strenuouslys. However, North West Water won 
the auction in November of 1995, and set about seeking synergies through integrating the 
two companies. It did so without the two most senior Norweb managers: Harvey, the 
chief executive, and Wilson, the finance director, who left the Company immediately. The 
combined company was renamed United Utilities on 1 January 1996. 
A first stage of the rationalisation following the merger saw United Utilities reducing its 
group workforce by 2500 in March 1996. The potential for savings resulting from the 
merger were then estimated to be in the region of £494 million by the close of the decade 
(Harverson and Taylor, 1996). The extent of this potential saving was justified by the 
scale of overstaffing and inefficiency North West Water claimed to have located within 
Norweb. United Utilities was also intent upon divesting businesses developed by Norweb, 
such as its appliance retail business, that it did not now consider to be core. 
In October 1996 it announced the sale of its process equipment division, formerly part of 
North West Water, for £125 million to the US Filter company (Martinson, 1996c). This 
sale was followed in November of the same year by the sale of the loan portfolio of its 
Norweb Retail business to Lombard Tricity Finance for £113 million (Blackwell and 
CSW eventually took over Seeboard, and adopted just such a 'hands off' approach. 
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Martinson, 1996), with the sale of the shops themselves, to Comet for £29 million 
(Martinson, 1996£), following shortly after. Its initial disposal programme was concluded 
when it sold its 50% share in the Keadby power station to Scottish Hydro for £253 million 
(Martinson, 1997a), and its US generation interests to Indeck North American Power 
Fund for $40 million (£25 million) (Anon, 1997a). 
However, this final sale was not an indication that aU overseas activities were to cease as 
in early 1997 United Utilities signed a contract to operate an electricity network in 
Argentina in a contract worth £249.3 million (Martinson, 1997b), while it also began to 
look to participate in major international consortia. At home, the Company's new focus 
upon related core activities was demonstrated further by the formation of a joint venture 
between its Vertex business and Northern Ireland Electricity, to provide billing, 
meter-reading and related services (Brown, 1997), although the venture was later 
cancelled. The focus of the Company on competing effectively in the new energy market 
was reiterated by the launch of its new brand name, Norweb Energi (Martinson, 1997c). 
The Company was also the first of the UK utilities to forge an affinity alliance with a 
major food retailer, Tesco (Hollinger, 1998). 
However, a divisive board room battle in 1997 saw changes in senior management within 
the Company creating the anticipation offurther changes in its direction. These changes 
were expected to involve the possibility of scaling back plans for international expansion 
and a re-focus upon achieving greater efficiencies from its core, regulated businesses. 
This 'back to basics' approach was announced in November of 1997, and effectively 
acknowledged that the lack of a core focus had led to the Company's central businesses 
failing to perform adequately. Subtextually, the new direction suggested that United's 
involvement in electricity supply was also being reevaluated (Holberton, 1997£). This 
reevaluation was a product of the increasing competition within supply, allied to the 
increasing demands in particular of regulation in the water industry. Almost inevitably, 
United announced its sale of Norweb Energi to TXU Europe (Section 7.1) in August 
2000. The sale valued Norweb at £310 million (United Utilities, 2000c). The move took 
United closer to a core skills focus. Interestingly, as part of this new focus, the Vertex 
operation is managing a large service contract for TXU Europe. 
5.2.2 Structure of Norweb 
In this section, the management and organisational structures ofNorweb are presented, 
and significant changes to either during the period are highlighted. Firstly, the senior 
management structure up until the takeover by North West Water. At privatisation, the 
Executive Directors on the Main Board ofNorweb were as follows: 
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Name Position Joined Norweb in From 
Ken Harvey Chairman 1989 London Electricity 
AlfCrowder Managing Director 1983 Midlands Electricity 
Bernard Benson Director of 1965 National Coal Board 
Administration 
Malcolm Faulkner Marketing Director 1967 ESI 
Alec Simmons Operations Director 1951 ESI 
Brian Wilson Financial Director 1982 North of Scotland 
Hydro Electric 
Board 
As with Manweb, all of the senior managers from Norweb were energy industry men, of 
whom half were engineers and half accountants (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.499). It is 
interesting to note that while this configuration within Manweb led to a narrow 
operational outlook, the same could not be said for Norweb. By 1993, there had been a 
small number of changes to the Board's structure. Harvey was still Chairman and CEO, 
although there was no longer a Managing Director. Harvey was very much, therefore, the 
principal senior manager. Norweb's increasingly outward looking strategy was reflected 
in the appointment of Peter McTague as Retail Director from Comet Group to head the 
Company's expanded retail operations (Norweb, 1993, p.22). Otherwise, the board's 
membership remained as before. This board structure took Norweb into the takeover 
battle with North West Water. Harvey's role within the Company was pivotal. In most 
analysis, he was estimated to be the key influence upon Norweb's strategic outlook, 
supported by a team of colleagues who for the most part had worked within Norweb for 
a long period of time. Most senior Norweb managers left the Company after the 
takeover, and were replaced by managers from North West Water. The current board of 
United Utilities consists of John Roberts, Chief Executive; Sir Peter Middleton, Non-
Executive Acting Chairman; Simon Batey, Group Financial Director; John Beckitt, 
Managing Director, Energy and Telecommunications; and Gordon Waters, Managing 
Director, International Operations. 
In relation to organisational structure, Norweb was a company which was functionally 
structured with a dominant Head Office providing the main strategic thrust, supported by 
a geographically oriented divisional structure in the field. At the beginning of the 
privatisation process Norweb along with most RECs operated a two-tier structure, 
wherein five areas and a number of centralised functions reported to the headquarters in 
Manchester. The headquarters itself was responsible for the formulation of policies and 
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the management of the vanous centralised functions, which included marketing, 
purchasing and sales, management of the distribution system, the Company's generation 
interests, finance and general administration. The areas therefore were responsible for the 
construction and maintenance of the distribution network, and customer related activities 
such as meter reading, collection, and local emergency services. The appliance retail, and 
contracting subsidiaries were managed separately from the main company headquarters. 
The managerial structure of the Company was as follows: "The management ofNorweb 
is controlled by six Executive Directors, comprising the Chairman, Managing Director and 
four Directors who are responsible for operations, marketing, finance and administration. 
The Operations Director is responsible for the electricity distribution and generation 
businesses, with day to day management delegated to an Operations Manager and five 
Area Managers. The Marketing Director has overall responsibility for the supply business, 
appliance retailing, electrical contracting and electricity marketing, with day to day 
management for each of these delegated to a separate manager" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, 
p.500). 
The original structure was amended after the 1994 price review, but the changes following 
the review were not substantial, with the existing five area offices cut to three. However, 
there were more substantial changes in relation to the composition of the workforce of 
Norweb, as a plan to reduce its number by 1200 over 5 years was announced. This was 
increased by a further 450 after the extraordinary second regulatory price review in 1995. 
Therefore throughout the period of its independence, Norweb retained approximately the 
same organisational structure, based upon a functional departmental configuration, rather 
than a divisional framework. 
After the takeover, United Utilities began the task of developing a new organisational 
structure. One of their first acts was to establish a facilities management subsidiary called 
Vertex. This subsidiary would be charged with merging and rationalising the customer 
service and billing operations, as well as information technology services, for United 
Utilities. The creation of Vertex was the principal action in the restructuring, which 
produced the following group structure: 
As Figure 5.1 demonstrates, Vertex is now one of five main businesses within the Group: 
The core regulated business of North West Water and Norweb Distribution; the emergent 
unregulated businesses of Vertex (business process outsourcing) and Norweb Telecom; 
and the international operating arm United Utilities International (operating in both water 
and electricity). However, as Figure 5.1 shows, United Utilities has recently divested its 
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Figure 5.1: Current Structure of United Utilities 
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Norweb Energi business (United Utilities, 2000b). The Group is now very much 
operating a divisional structure, based upon products. The emergence of Vertex was an 
highly innovative, and market leading development. In the same way as Eastern's 
development of its energy trading function into a core business, the development of 
Vertex is evidence of an organisation which is basing part of its strategy upon the 
exploitation of its key resources. 
The structure and strategy ofNorweb appear to have jointly emerged at around the time 
of the privatisation, and to have evolved together. During the Company's period of 
independence there were no major changes in strategy, more of a managed evolution, and 
only one change in organisational structure, and that was only for a readjustment 
following the 1994 regulatory price review. Since United Utilities was established, 
structure and strategy have again kept pace, and arguably the Group's strategy has driven 
its structure as the coordination of so many disparate activities could arguably have only 
been managed through a product oriented decentralized structure. 
5.2.3 Strategy Decisions at Norweb 
It is difficult to precisely assess the strategic process that Norweb followed with any 
certainty, but the secondary evidence suggests that while the process was not fully 
prescriptive, there was evidently strong guidance from within the dominant coalition. 
Norweb appeared to be an organisation where the senior managers made core business 
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decisions, and established the limitations of the options available to subordinate managers 
in their pursuit of the Company's objectives. However, this does not detract from the 
appearance that many aspects of day to day decision making was devolved to functional 
management levels. The philosophy of CEO Harvey, however, appears to be the key 
strategic factor in Norweb's early progress, and while devolution of responsibility appears 
to have occurred, Harvey's impact upon decision making of this kind would have been 
considerable. This suggests Farkus and Wetlaufer's (1996 and Section 2.3.2) 'strategy 
approach' was employed by the CEO. 
In looking at strategy making within Norweb it is important to acknowledge the 
significant changes that have occurred to the Company's strategy as a consequence of the 
takeover by North West Water. Consequently, it is proposed to address the questions of 
corporate and business decisions by phase, rather than by business. As such, Section 
5.2.3.1 looks at strategy decisions prior to the takeover in 1995, and Section 5.2.3.2 looks 
at strategy decisions after that date. 
5.2.3.1 Norweb 
Norweb was, after EME, perhaps the most extensively diversified of the RECs. 
Throughout the Company's period of independence, it took the view that its non-core 
activities needed to provide around 20% of its profits, by the target date of 1998. This 
was due to the expectation that distribution as a source of profitability was increasingly 
likely to be squeezed. As referred to earlier, prudence in all of its operations was also seen 
as being a key aspect of its approach. In distribution, it practised a concentrated growth 
approach based upon effective management of costs like each of the other RECs. It was 
regarded as having faster falling operating costs than other RECs, but this was against an 
initial position of a less modern network, making its cost management in difficult 
circumstances more laudable. After the price review of 1994, it announced a major cost 
reduction programme in its distribution business, severely reducing its staffing levels. This 
suggests that the Company was not managing its distribution business as effectively as it 
may have done, a criticism levelled by North West Water after the takeover. 
In supply, the Company sought to adopt the same operating principles as in distribution, 
and so followed a concentrated growth approach based chiefly upon marketing itself 
effectively, and providing an high quality service. While it initially lost a number oflarge 
customers, it was constantly at the head of the Regulator'S service performance leagues 
indicating a differentiation focus or segmented benefit focus approach for domestic 
customers in advance of market liberalisation. Norweb refused to sell electricity to large 
customers at a loss as a means of building market share, as some of the other RECs had 
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done. However, it was prepared to compete on price generally, and in 1995 offered the 
largest percentage cost reduction to its domestic tariff customers, and by 1996 was the 
lowest cost per unit supplier in the industry. This reflects a commitment to a mass market 
utility, or mass market benefit approach in domestic supply. After the takeover, the 
Company explored the potential of greater differentiation. 
In other businesses, Norweb was aggressive but still sought to maintain a prudent, 
concentrated growth approach. As the only REC to fully commit to appliance retail, it 
had to operate in a low margin industry which required a low cost approach, with a 
differentiation focus upon customer service. In generation, it was seeking low cost, low 
risk alternative sources of energy from various sources to support its core concentrated 
growth approach, as it did in its gas marketing business. In telecoms, it developed an 
alternate use for its core competencies in network management, and through its research 
and development activity created an innovative product with which it successfully 
differentiated itself in an increasingly competitive market. 
Overall, therefore, Norweb was an organisation that had a very clear approach to business 
which can be summarised as aiming to be low cost in all of its activities, but 
simultaneously looking to differentiate itself from its various competitors. Its strategy was 
much more measured and related than that ofEME, and its ability to make retail work6, 
speaks of considerable management capability. Its management clearly believed that they 
had developed a winning strategic formula, and were looking for a strategic partner with 
substantial financial resources, and an international outlook to facilitate this plan on a 
wider scale. 
5.2.3.2 United Utilities 
The new managers at United had based the business premise of the merger upon the 
availability of cost savings, and so unsurprisingly set about reducing costs throughout the 
organisation. In effect, the merger allowed the opportunity of a turnaround in the 
Company's activity, to enable it to refocus. The decision of the new management was to 
emphasise core businesses, but to retain an aggressive, outgoing approach. They defined 
their core businesses as being the traditional businesses of the original companies: water 
and waste management at North West Water, and distribution and supply at Norweb. To 
these were added those businesses that had developed within the companies that were 
related to existing core businesses such as gas and telecoms. Finally, new business 
6 
Although in truth its contribution to overall profitability was never substantial. 
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opportunities opened up by the merger: such as business processes management and 
international development, were also considered to be core. The other business activities 
the Group inherited were defined as being non-core, and subject to a programme of 
strategic divestment. 
Within the regulated core activities of water and electricity distribution, the cost 
management based concentrated growth approaches remained. Within other businesses, 
the potential for differentiation was explored. In supply, the Company's approach led to 
aspects of market and product development, based upon differentiation. The affinity 
agreement with T esco was such an innovation, being the first of its kind, successfully 
differentiating it from competitors in the newly competitive domestic market, as did the 
Company's duel fuel offerings. United Utilities was also seeking to become more active 
overseas. However the Company was subject to a second turnaround in 1997 when the 
Company's performance was thought to be poor, and the results produced suggested to 
some analysts that the takeover had not been worth the effort7. The new focus of the 
group is a rigid concentrated growth approach, based upon overall cost leadership. The 
Company has recently sold its electricity and gas supply businesses, and is thinking about 
floating its telecoms business. 
In February of 2000, the Company issued the following statement of its key priorities in 
order to meet the demands placed upon it by the regulators in both of its core industries. 
These priorities, focussed upon growing shareholder value, involved: 
~ controlling costs to meet the regulatory targets; 
~ maximising multi-utility synergies to outperform those targets; and 
~ developing its non-regulated businesses (CEO John Roberts, United Utilities, 2000a). 
Ultimately, therefore, the Company has adopted a strong concentrated growth approach 
for its main regulated businesses, while seeking risk averse related diversification to 
increase income generation within its unregulated activities. 
5.3 Northern Electric and Gas (formerly Northern Electric) 
Northern Electric is the REC for the North East of England. The Company's operating 
franchise covers an area of 14,400 square kilometres and is bordered by the Pennies in the 
7 
An initial review of the new company's perfonnance in relation to cost reduction had reached the view 
that most of the cuts could have been accomplished without the necessity of the fonnal takeover, 
suggesting that both organisations had not been operating as efficiently as they would have liked it 
believed. 
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west, the Scottish border to the north, the North Sea to the east, while is southern border 
is in North Yorkshire. The area historically was home to many heavy industries, but as 
these have relatively declined the composition of its customer base has become more 
varied. There is still much demand from industrial customers, and in particular the 
chemical industry, many centres of urban demand in the cities of Newcastle, Sunderland 
and Middlesborough, and new commercial developments. The large numbers of industrial 
customers made Northern relatively susceptible to attack when the 1MW supply market 
opened up, and its interests were thought to be closely tied to the economic strength of 
its economy. The Company is primarily of interest as it was the first REC to be subject 
to an hostile bid with the expiration of the government's golden share, and its defence 
strategy became the key factor impacting upon the process of regulatory review. 
5.3.1 Key Events: 1999-2000 
Northern entered the period with a strong reputation as a low cost organisation, as well 
as one which had proved itself extremely able in the recovery of bad debt. However the 
Company was thought to have an image problem, and requiring of itself to develop new 
skills in areas like marketing and advertising in order to prosper in the new operating 
environment (Sychrava, 1990d). Its management were also thought to be held in 
relatively low esteem by the City. Despite this, and a view that the Company 'lacked a 
strategy' (Pearson, 1991 b), Northern's activity in the early years following privatisation 
conformed to its objective of being tough on controllable costs, on improving asset 
utilisation, and on refining systems to measure company performance. It also had invested 
considerable time and effort to raise customer awareness among its staff (Lascelles, 
1992a). 
In support of these objectives, Northern was one of the first RECs to introduce a formal 
job reduction programme, when it announced it was to cut 500 jobs over 5 years 
(Sychrava and Bolger, 1991) principally in contracting, which appeared to be targeted for 
closure. It also sought to ensure it had access to cheap supplies of electricity. Northern 
was one of the RECs that was particularly keen on developing its own generation 
capability. Within the pathfinder prospectus, mention is made of three such investments: 
the Teeside Power project in a joint venture with Enron, ICI, and three other RECs; a 
joint venture with Scottish Hydro-Electric and BOC8; and a joint venture with Indeck 
Energy Services (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.444-445). The prospectus suggests that 
these investments were just the beginning, and that the Company would continue to seek 
Later joined by British Steel, fonning the Neptune Consortium (Buxton, 1990). 
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further investments of this kind. In 1991, it was one of three RECs that formed joint 
ventures with Combined Power Systems to develop and market CHP systems (Anon, 
1991b). 
The Company's interest in generation can perhaps be linked to its area's heavy industrial 
and coal mining heritage. This heritage presented Northern was significant problems in 
relation to retaining its existing large supply customers: firstly, as they were now able to 
choose to purchase their energy from another supplier, and secondly that, if they so 
wished, they could invest in generation plant, and supply themselves. Either way, 
Northern would need to be extremely competitive to retain its existing large supply 
customers, or win market share from competitors. 
Northern was also the REC most keen to develop a telecommunications business, with its 
company chairman acting as chair of the ESI's telecoms study group, although concrete 
plans for investment did not emerge until after floatation (Thomas, 1990h). When it did 
enter the industry, it was as a partner in Yorkshire Electric's Ionica venture, with Ivory 
& Sime, 3i, Robert Fleming, Kingston Communications and Symbionics. Telecoms 
provided for some of the RECs a solution to the question of where risk averse non-
regulated income was to be generated. Northern did not diversify as widely as other 
RECs, which placed a burden upon its generation and telecoms activities in reaching the 
intended target of 10% of income from non-regulated activities. Other activities 
developed in this period prior to the attempted takeover by Trafalgar House included: 
~ a joint venture power station with ScottishPower (Smith, 1993b); 
~ investment in a venture capital fund called The Quantum Fund aiming to exploit 
new developments with commercial potential coming out of the University of 
Newcastle (Tighe, 1993); 
~ applying for a supply licence in Northern Ireland (the first REC to do so); 
~ increasing its number oflarge out of area supply customers to 400 as it developed 
critical mass in this business especially after the opening of the 100kW market, 
while at the same time sought to recapture those of its own large customers lost 
since the introduction of competition9; 
~ retained a rolling cost reduction target of 3 % per annum; 
~ launched its own gas marketing business; and 
~ formed a joint venture with Neste, the Finnish state-owned oil and chemicals 
company, to own North Sea gas reserves (Lascelles, 1994a) to further its aim of 
9 
Northern was estimated to have 9% of the lOOkW and above market in 1994 (Lascelles, 1994d). 
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building an integrated gas supply business. 
From 1992, therefore, the City's views of the Company were subject to some change. 
The strategy favoured by Northern: tough management of costs, a focus upon service 
quality, and limited diversification based on generation, was finding favour as generation 
risk was increasingly perceived to be limited and the benefits of cost management 
identified as central to a REC's approach. Overall, however, the Company was thought 
to be an average REC, with the City in favour of its cost management but still sceptical 
about its attempt to build its supply business. It was hit by one of the hardest regulatory 
cost reduction targets following the 1994 price review. It reacted to the price review by 
announcing a further 800 job losses (Smith, 1994i). 
The events oflate 1994 and the whole of 1995 have effectively overshadowed all of the 
rest of the Northern Electric story. During this time it was subject to two hostile takeover 
bids: the first in the industry, the second of which was successful. Trafalgar House, the 
conglomerate building and shipping company, announced it was considering bidding for 
Northern in December 1994, four months before the Government's golden share elapsed 
(Smith and Wighton, 1994). Northern was chosen, analysts speculated, because of its 
relatively small size, and the belief that the Company's management had not achieved all 
that it could following privatisation. Another feature may have been Northern's 
prominence and success in the supply industry, and its developing share of the gas industry 
(Lascelles, 1994f). Trafalgar House's objectives, it was widely believed, were based upon 
the opportunities a RECs strong cash flow held to help with its financial engineering. 
Trafalgar House launched its bid by criticising Northern's record in unregulated 
businesses, specifically supply and retail (Hollinger, 1995a). Its bid valued Northern at 
£ 1.2 billion. 
Northern developed a defence of the' scorched earth' variety, involving handing back value 
to shareholders through a special dividend (Hollinger, 1995b). Even when the bid failed, 
due more to the Regulator's response to Northern's defence that the bid itself, the 
Company's board followed through with their promise of returning value, an act seen as 
being of questionable value, and one which left the company much weaker. 
In terms of strategy, or rather a reevaluation of strategy following the bid defence, 
Northern's only real change was to announce that it did not intend to pursue domestic 
customers with the same vigour as it had pursued larger customers. It maintained its 
record of success at winning large supply customers when it won the contract to supply 
all of the Sainsbury's supermarket chain stores, in November 1996. While the threat of 
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a second bid loomed, Northern entered into another generation venture, this time with 
Rolls-Royce Power Ventures, in a project called Viking Power (Holberton, 1996j). 
After the success of the bid defence, Northern became the least attractive investment in 
the industry, its reserves having been severely reduced by the cost of the defence 
(Holberton, 1996a) where it returned over £500 million to its shareholders. However, this 
did not prevent CalEnergy of Nebraska, offering £766 million in late 1996 (Holberton, 
1996n). Northern attempted to defend this prospective takeover, but lacked the resources 
it had employed against Trafalgar House. The lack of resources forced it to resort to a 
range of novel business solutions, such as suggesting it would merge its supply business 
with London's (Holberton, 1996h). After a long, acrimonious and contentious battle, 
CalEnergy finally gained the agreement of the Northern Board to the takeover on 30th 
December 1996 (Lindemann, 1996). 
After the takeover, the new owners announced that their success was to be followed by 
an expansion of the Group's activities in Europe, using Newcastle as its base, as it sought 
to break into electricity supply and distribution in Europe and Asia. Among the countries 
targeted for activity by the new company were the Philippines and Indonesia, in 
distribution and supply, and Poland and Hungary, in generation (Holberton, 1997a). The 
Company also sought to play a full part in the competitive gas and electricity supply 
markets which were due to open fully in 1998. It signalled its aggressive intent in the UK 
supply industry, by announcing a package of discounts worth up to £ 140 for customers 
buying both gas and electricity from it when the competitive market opened up (Anon, 
1997b), as well as buying seven licences from BG in support of its gas market activity 
(Corrigan and Lewis, 1998). This appears to represent a mass-market cost approach in 
domestic supply. It's owners international intentions were signalled by its purchase of 
fellow US utility Mid American Energy, making the combined company a significant player 
in the US domestic market. 
Following the 1999 regulatory review, the new Company showed it was still pursuing the 
underlying strategies of the old Company when it announced it was cutting 500 jobs, 
although after the threat of industrial action this compulsory cut was down-graded to a 
voluntary programme. Northern clearly intends to be a key player in the developing 
energy market in the UK. It is the only REC that is involved in both the traditional core 
businesses of Distribution and Supply, the new core businesses of Generation and Gas, the 
traditional non-core businesses of Retail and Contracting, the new unregulated business 
opportunities of metering and telecoms, as well as seeking new business applications of 
its core skills through a variety of its separate businesses. 
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5.3.2 Structure of Northern Electric 
In this section, the management and organisational structures of Northern Electric are 
presented, and significant changes to either during the period are highlighted. Firstly, the 
senior management structure. At privatisation, the Executive Directors on the Main 
Board of Northern Electric were as follows: 
Name Position Joined Northern in From 
David Morris Chainnan 1988 Delta Group 
Jack Hannsworth Managing Director 1949 ESI 
Ron Dixon Managing Director - 1954 ESI 
Power 
Alan Groves Finance Director 1974 ESI 
Northern possessed the smallest board from this sub-section of the RECs at privatisation, 
and was also the only REC from this group to boast a CEO with experience from outside 
of the industry. In other respects, however, the board conformed to the norm as it was 
comprised of engineers and accountants, and had a very long association with the industry, 
with the obvious exception of Morris (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.446). Inevitably, the 
demands of the new operating environment required a larger board and by 1993 an extra 
member had been appointed and new designations awarded. Morris was still Chairman 
but had been joined by Tony Hadfield as Managing Director, later CEO, after the 
retirement of Harmsworth. Hadfield was an industry man, joining from Northern Ireland 
Electricity. Bill Hook was promoted internally to become Operations Director, sharing 
some of the responsibility for the core businesses with Dixon, who became Commercial 
Director (Northern Electric, 1993, p.4-5). The Company was still, therefore, 
predominantly engineering and industry led. John Edwards replaced Groves as Finance 
Director in 1995 from Jaguar Cars (Northern Electric, 1996), but this change apart the 
same board remained in place during the two takeover bids by Trafalgar House and 
CalEnergy. 
After the Company lost its takeover battle with CalEnergy, the new owners moved quickly 
to introduce its personnel onto the board, initially by taking eight non-executive 
directorships. In contrast to other contested takeovers, such as SWEB, the changes to 
the board of Northern when they came were limited. As was to be expected, Morris 
stepped down as chairman and was succeeded by David Sokol, CalEnergy's US-based 
chairman and chief executive, who also took the role of chief executive. Greg Abel, the 
US Company's chief accounting officer, took over Northern's day-to-day operations in 
Newcastle, and to spearhead future moves by CalEnergy elsewhere in Europe. Morris 
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reciprocally joined the CalEnergy board. Hadfield stepped down from the board but was 
retained in a consultancy role, while Edwards and Dixon remained in their present roles 
for the time being. All the non-executive directors resigned (Caswell, 1997). Sokol 
shortly gave way to Abel, and Edwards and Dixon had both left before the end of 1997. 
They were replaced by Malcolm Chandler, Eric Connor and David Swan who were 
promoted from within Northern, and Don O'Shel Jr, formerly president ofCE Asia, who 
came to Newcastle to run the Company's generation business. 
CalEnergy itself was undergoing major structural change, as it merged with another US 
utility, MidAmerican. While CalEnergy was the dominant partner in the merger, it 
assumed the MidAmerican name. The principal impact of this development to Northern 
was that Abel returned to the USA to become president and chief operating officer of 
MidAmerican Energy Holdings Group, to be replaced by Connor as President of Northern 
(Tighe, 1999). Connor had been with Northern since 1992 after a career in a variety of 
Northern engineering organizations, and had previously been the managing director of its 
Northern Utility Services business. 
At the beginning of the privatisation process, Northern was organized around a two-tier 
structure within which four regions reported back to the Head Office. Northern was one 
of the few RECs to clearly operate a product oriented divisional structure from the period 
prior to privatisation. The three divisions: power, retail and building services each had its 
own divisional managing director, who reported directly to the Group Managing Director. 
The Power Division, which encompassed both distribution and supply was further divided 
into four departments: operations, finance, personnel and commercial. The relationship 
between the regions and departments within the power division was as follows: "the day 
to day business operations of the power division are the responsibility of the four regions, 
each headed by a regional manager. The regional managers report to the Managing 
Director, Power, and operate within a framework of central planning and policy making, 
target setting and control. The four departments of the power division provide functional 
policy and advice to the regions" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.446). Other central 
functions were undertaken within the Head Office, and reported to either the Chairman 
or the Managing Director. Northern therefore operated a product oriented-divisional 
structure, but had not as yet recognised the need to differentiate between the Company's 
two core business activities. 
However, this was a requirement under the Public Electricity Supply Licence granted in 
1990, and shortly thereafter the businesses were separated. Since this time, Northern has 
proceeded by developing a series of standalone businesses across its many areas of 
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activity. In 1994, its distribution business was divided into two: Northern Electric 
Distribution and Northern Utility Services. Northern Electric Distribution was to manage 
the network while Northern Utility Services was to provide services including 
construction and maintenance (Smith, 1994i). The new structure aimed to improve 
effectiveness while reducing the number of staff employed. The new structure is 
presented in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Current Structure of Northern Electric and Gas 
Northern Electric Distribution 
Ltd 
Northern Electric Supply Ltd 
Northern Utility Services Ltd 
Northern Metering Services 
Ltd 
Northern InfoCom Ltd 
Northern Electric Properties 
Ltd 
Northern Electric 
Generation Ltd 
"responsible for the development, maintenance and operation of 
Northern Electric and Gas's electricity distribution system" 
"NESL's business is the delivery of reliable supplies of competitively 
priced energy and associated services to meet the needs of customers 
throughout the UK" 
"NUSL is NE&G's electrical contracting business, providing design, 
construction and maintenance services up to 132kV and a complete 
utility services installation package. Applications include project 
management, diagnostic testing, commissioning, and the utilisation 
of trenchless technology to lay pipes, ducts and cables" 
"NMSL bases its business upon the provision, installation, 
refurbishment and replacement of metering, together with data 
collection for NE&G and other businesses throughout the UK" 
"NlCL provides products and services at competitive rates to internal 
and external companies, including application development and 
support, software sales and facilities management, consultancy, 
contrncting, desktop services and systems integration" and well as its 
telephony requirements and security systems. 
"NEPL holds the Group's non-distribution property assets. It 
manages the portfolio and acquires and disposes of premises to 
provide the maximum benefit to NE&G" 
"NEGL is responsible for the management of the existing assets and 
investment in generation projects and for the identification and 
development of new projects and business opportunities relating to 
electricity generation" 
In addition, there are a series of group functions performed at the centre of the organisation: 
Corporate Finance 
Personnel and Public Affairs 
Department 
Company Secretary's 
Department 
"responsible for financial planning, treasury and property matters" 
'The personnel function provides employee relations, personnel 
administratiol\ quality improvement, training and staff development 
services. Public Affairs is concerned with earning understanding and 
support for the Company and its activities" 
"responsible for services to shareholders and for legal compliance, 
insurance and Head Office services" 
(Source: Northern Electric and Gas, 2000a) 
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Clearly, as Table 5.1 shows, Northern Electric and Gas operates within a decentralised 
group structure of a portfolio of product oriented divisions. The functions of the 
corporate centre are limited to those activities that are legally required of the Company, 
or uneconomic to undertake within the businesses. While targets for strategic objectives 
can be expected to be set in the USA, and the main board of Northern would provide the 
outline strategy and to 'sign off' on major projects, much of the business decision making 
will take place within each of the separate business within the group. The concept of the 
Internal Network (Miles and Snow, 1992) is also developing within Northern. 
5.3.3 Strategy Decisions at Northern Electric 
The purpose of this section is to identify and key corporate and business strategies 
Northern pursued from 1989 until the takeover by CalEnergylMidAmerican. Part of the 
analysis seeks to determine whether there was a single company approach to strategy 
during this time, or whether each business developed an individual approach. This section 
also seeks to understand whether there is any difference between the strategies of the 
Company before the takeover, and those evident after. 
5.3.3.1 Corporate Strategy 
As has been suggested throughout this section, Northern's original strategy was based 
very closely upon a concentrated growth approach. In all aspects of the business, the 
emphasis was placed upon effectiveness and efficiency, of making each asset work as hard 
as it could to maximise returns. In some areas of its business, such as generation, it 
sought to deepen its concentrated growth approach by backward vertical integration. To 
enable it to price its products competitively, it sought to ensure that the controllable cost 
elements of its prices were minimised. Therefore, it sought a significant proportion of 
self-generation assets to improve the marginal cost of wholesale electricity. However, in 
other areas of its business such as electricity purchasing, this same impetus can be seen to 
have backfired on the Company to a certain extent. For example, when it signed long term 
contracts with the generators for coal-fired energy to hedge against future high prices, it 
saw coal prices fall. 
In other areas of its business, such as supply, the Company became an aggressive market 
developer in support of its concentrated growth approach. At one stage the success of 
this approach was evident as the Company held around 9% of the non-franchise electricity 
supply industry. Gas was and remains important for Northern. Its early concentric 
diversification into gas was taken around the same time as other RECs, seeing the 
possibility to some extent of convergence between the two industries. However, Northern 
was perhaps the first of the companies to realise the value of becoming fully integrated 
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into the gas industry, and how taking down-stream assets enabled it to more effectively 
pursue both its supply and generation ambitions, once again supporting the concentrated 
growth approach. Northern has again been aggressive in developing its gas market, and 
is reported to currently have over 2 million customers for either gas or electricity. 
Northern is unique among the RECs in seeking to be present in all of the conceivable areas 
of business, with the exception of water, that RECs have entered since privatisation. 
Aside from the industries already mentioned, Northern: 
~ is one of only two RECs to remain in appliance retail; 
~ retains a contracting operation; 
~ has investments in telecommunications and IT; and 
~ through its owners has increasing involvement overseas. 
Throughout the Group, therefore, a variety of different corporate strategies are being 
utilised, as appropriate to the very different operating domains. However, throughout the 
Company a traditional commitment to a concentrated growth approach is emphasised. 
5.3.3.2 Business Strategy 
In considering the Company's business strategy choices, this research inevitably focusses 
upon those areas of business that require competitive strategy, and consequently the focus 
is principally upon supply. In regulated businesses, like distribution, there is an absence 
of competitive strategy. In other areas, such as generation, the actions of the power pool 
distort the competitive process and lead the strategic options available to the companylO. 
In this area Northern's instinct has always drawn the Company towards being both a low 
price, and high quality organisation, giving the impression of a segmented utility approach. 
From an early stage the Company had a strong emphasis upon quality customer service, 
beginning with the innovative awareness raising initiatives that greeted the Company's 
arrival in the new era. Its performance across a range of standards, as demonstrated in 
the latest OfGEM report shows a company which is among the mid-range ofRECs. The 
Company has tended to perform very well in relation to complaints per 10,000 customers 
(OfGEM, 2000, p.23). However, the Company has not been able to sustain a high level 
of service throughout this period and in recent time has come under considerable criticism 
over problems experienced with its billing systems (Corzine, 1999). The Company was 
10 
A ex-planation of the stnltegic options available to generators will be discussed in more depth in the case 
study of Eastern Group, in Chapter Nine. 
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warned that if these problems were not resolved, it would be prevented from recruiting 
any further supply customers. 
Increasingly, however, relative price per unit has become key. The Company now makes 
a three point price promise to consumers of its domestic electricity and gas supply, as it 
seeks to develop a critical mass in the domestic market. These promises are: 
~ that it's 'Dual Fuel' gas and electricity will be cheaper than British Gas Trading, 
on equivalent combined annual bills for both fuels together at average 
consumption (electricity average consumption 3,300 kWh, gas average 
consumption 19,000 kWh) until at least 01 January 2002; 
that this price promise is in comparison with generally available offers from British 
Gas Trading. It may not apply to special, temporary or restricted reductions; and 
that they will honour this promise either by general price levels, or by credit/or 
vouchers in respect to claims unless there is intervention in relation to the promise 
by any government regulatory or statutory body (Northern Electric and Gas, 
2000b). 
Clearly, Northern has identified British Gas as its principal competitor, and is seeking to 
adopt a cost focus strategy, or a segmented cost focus strategy in its pursuit of domestic 
customers in competition with British Gas. The Company is also making use of the 
internet as a means of extending the recruitment of customers to every home in the 
country. Northern has not formed an affinity agreement, in an attempt to differentiate 
itself It has, however, established its own rewards scheme akin to the loyalty schemes 
in operation with large retailers. 
In relation to business customers Northern has developed a responsive package of advice 
and consultancy to allow large consumers to maximise their energy efficiency as a means 
of differentiating themselves, a segmented benefit focus or a segmented utility focus. The 
Company claims to have been the first REC to offer service of this kind, and to have been 
doing so since 1994. The elements of the scheme, known as VECT A (Visual Electricity 
Consumption Targeting and Analysis), aimed at improving energy efficiency, providing 
tighter control of power budgets, and highlighting any wasted energy consumption. The 
scheme produces daily and monthly, easy-to-understand reports based on half-hourly 
electricity consumption data for each customer. The current scheme developed out of the 
Company's "Better Ideas for Business" (Northern Electric, 1993, p.6) programme, which 
the Company identified as being a key element in their success in the franchise electricity 
market. 
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In summary, therefore, Northern conforms to the sector norm in striving to provide low 
cost energy to consumers, the order qualifying requirement in supply, while seeking to 
differentiate the product offering, the order winning criteria. It pursues a different 
business strategy in the domestic and commercial segments of its markets, having a 
segmented cost focus approach in its domestic markets, and a segmented benefit focus, 
or segmented utility focus, in its commercial markets, as determined by the particular 
needs of the customer. 
5.4 Yorkshire Electricity 
Yorkshire Electricity is the REC for the county of Yorkshire and surrounding area in the 
north east of England. The Company's operating franchise covers an area of 10,700 
square kilometres and includes all of the counties of West Yorkshire and Humberside, 
most of South Yorkshire, and parts of North Yorkshire, Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, 
Lincolnshire and Lancashire. The Company's customer base is diverse, including declining 
traditional industries such as iron and steel, coal mining, textiles and engineering, as well 
as agricultural and domestic demand, and demand from the newer commercial and service 
sectors. Yorkshire was expected to be one of the more aggressive RECs, and from an 
early stage the Company had expressed the intention of pursuing a strategy of increasing 
its critical mass of supply customers (Sychrava, 1990e). Therefore, customer service was 
an issue of considerable importance. As with most of the RECs, the managers of 
Yorkshire were bullish about the potential offered by the new freedom they enjoyed to 
pursue related activities "building upon its existing strengths" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, 
p.776), although they did not envisage nor intend to develop business opportunities in 
areas unrelated to the Company's traditional activities. Yorkshire is of primary interest 
as it was the first of the RECs to consider overseas activity as falling within this 
conception of being a core, related activity. 
5.4.1 Key Events 1990-2000 
Yorkshire expected all of their pre-privatisation business activities: distribution, supply, 
contracting and appliance retail, to continue to make contributions to the profitable 
operation of the Company, although distribution was once again expected to be the core 
business. They were also one of the RECs most keenly anticipating their participation in 
generation, and the first significant move taken by the Company occurred in 1989, when 
they explored the possibility of two generation projects with separate joint venture 
partners: 
~ a power plant to be build on South Humberside with Petrofina, Total Oil and 
Tractebel (Samuelson, 1989d); and 
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a 120-240MW CHP plant with British Sugar at Brigg (Samuelson, 1989t). 
Planning for both plants was undertaken by Yorkshire's New Ventures Division, which 
was established specifically to evaluate and plan new generation ventures. The Company 
also established very early on in the period a joint venture with Yorkshire Water, 
Yorkshire Wind power, to commission a windfarm to increase its self-generation portfolio 
(Hunt, 1990). Other key events that occurred early in the period included: 
~ becoming the first REC to diversify into cable TV, with a joint venture called SY 
Cablevision with partners Maseda Corp. and Pactel, justifying the business as 
being complementary to the main network management business (Samuelson, 
1990b); 
an early cost reduction programme aimed at reducing controllable costs by 2% per 
year over a five year period, mainly through manpower reductions, one of the first 
such programmes in the sector (Sychrava, 1991t). The severity of this programme 
stepped up the following year as concern mounted at what it perceived to be the 
slow speed of cost reduction (Lascelles, 1992e); 
becoming one of the top three RECs in winning IMW supply customers 
(Sychrava, 1991a); 
creating an holding company framework to encourage a competitive culture. The 
new framework would see an internal market pricing arrangement between the 
different arms of the group to encourage a competitive attitude in parts of the 
company usually shielded from the rigours of competition (Lascelles, 1992a) -
Miles and Snow's (1992) Internal Network concept; 
establishing Yorkshire Total Gas subsidiary, in ajoint venture with Total: the ninth 
REC to enter this market (Anon, 1992e); 
announcing the biggest price cuts for domestic users, from between 3.5-5.0% 
(Anon, 1993b); 
reportedly engaging in negotiations with Finnish city of Turku for acquisition of 
its electricity distribution and district heating businesses (Pearce, 1993); 
becoming the first REC to enter the telecommunications business when it took a 
stake in Ionica (Adonis, 1993b) in a joint venture with Robert Fleming and Ivory 
and Sime, later launching a joint venture with Kingston Communications, called 
Torch Communications (Holberton, 1996d); 
announcing a further restructuring of the Company to make its internal market 
work more effectively, with a further aim of maintaining the attack upon 
controllable costs (Smith, 1993t); 
seeking to establish a 20% shareholding in Stockholm Energi, the Swedish power 
group, and presenting the proposed transaction as a safe and appropriate use of 
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core skills (Anon, 1994c): the later rejection of the bid was, as will be seen, the 
end of Yorkshire's interest in overseas activities for a time; 
purchasing a 6.83% stake in the Armada gas field, from Amerada Hess (Anon, 
1994b); and 
having its focus on cost reduction re-affirmed in 1994, with the establishment of 
a new cost reduction target of 1000 jobs by 1997 (Lascelles, 1994g). 
Clearly, Yorkshire was a company that was extremely active in seeking new business 
opportunities which were related to its core businesses. It was perhaps the first of the 
RECs to view its core competence as being network management, enabling it to justify 
its move into cable television and telecommunications. Similarly, it was the first of the 
RECs to consider moving towards overseas operations. It was also one of the most active 
RECs in the early moves towards generation, although its innovative nature did not 
include gas where it was one of the latest movers. 
However the related diversifications led to only limited success. In telecommunications, 
overseas activities and to a certain extent generation, there has been a scaling back of 
activity. Overseas activities were the first to be reduced, with the closure of its overseas 
division in 1995 (Smith, 1995c), followed shortly afterwards by the sale of Torch 
Telecommunications (Kuper, 1996), and a scaling back of its investment activity in 
generation. It also sold its retail interests (Hollinger, 1995c). The decision mirrors that 
ofEME to attempt to refocus upon core activities, after diversification attempts proved 
to be less successful than had been anticipated. The Company's focus was now upon 
increasing the effectiveness of its distribution and supply businesses, without the 
distraction of other business activities, by further focussing upon cost management and 
customer service. 
When the Company became the penultimate REC to be taken over (Holberton, 1997b), 
its new owners American Electric Power and PS Colorado announced that they believed 
they were buying a low-cost producer with an excellent record of customer service 
(Corrigan and Holberton, 1997). The new owners set about restructuring the Company, 
as discussed below. The result was a much more streamlined company with separate 
business units exercising much greater autonomy. The business was now centred upon 
the three core activities: distribution, electricity and gas supply, and generation, and each 
sought to contribute to the Group's overall performance. 
Since the takeover, a number of key changes have occurred: 
~ In 1998, the Company signed a five year gas supply agreement with Conoco 
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guaranteeing prices for its domestic gas customers (Yorkshire Electricity, 1998); 
In 1999, Yorkshire Electricity's Generation business was sold to PowerGen for 
£94.9 million. The move was made to allow the Company to concentrate on its 
core businesses of distributing and supplying electricity and gas; 
The Company has recently agreed to take part in an affinity programme with 
American Express (Yorkshire Electricity, 2000b); and 
The loss of 350 jobs in a 'stream-lining' of both the remaining core businesses 
resulting from the latest regulatory price review (Yorkshire Electricity, 2000a). 
Clearly, Yorkshire's owners decision to focus upon the two core businesses reflects a 
desire to concentrate their resources upon extracting maximum profits from its regulated 
business, while building up critical mass within the competitive supply business. Its 
decision to leave all other areas of diversification reflects a return to its core business, 
which is becoming increasingly common within the sector. 
5.4.2 Structure of Yorkshire Electricity 
In this section, the management and organisational structures of Yorkshire Electricity are 
presented, and significant changes to either during the period are highlighted. Firstly, the 
senior management structure. At privatisation, the Executive Directors on the Main 
Board of Yorkshire Electricity were as follows: 
Name 
James Porteous 
John Tysoe 
Malcolm Chatwin 
Tony Coleman 
Graham Hall 
Position 
Chainnan and Chief 
Executive 
Group Managing 
Director 
Group Commercial 
Director 
Group Financial Director 
Divisional Director 
Energy Supply 
Joined Yorkshire in 
1984 
1985 
1987 
1985 
1980 
From 
Southern Electricity 
Southern Electricity 
North of Scotland 
Hydro-Electric 
Board 
CEGB 
Southern Electricity 
Once again, Yorkshire follows the pattern of entering the new era with a board comprised 
of managers from both an industry and an engineering or accounting background 
(Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.765). It was a smaller board than average, reflecting perhaps 
the dual role perfonned by Porteous and the new group structure, although the effects of 
the group structure on the board became more apparent later, as by 1993 the Board had 
changed to reflect the new group structure. Porteous had retired, and been replaced by 
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Tysoe as senior manager. However, in 1993, Tysoe became Non-Executive Chairman and 
Chatwin took on the post of CEO. Below him, Hall was redesignated Group Executive 
Director - Distribution, and Bryan Morgan promoted from within to the post of Group 
Executive Director - Supply. Coleman remained Finance Director (Yorkshire Electricity, 
1993, pA-5). 
By 1995, Tysoe had retired and was replaced as Non-Executive Chairman by Christopher 
Hampson, a former Non-Executive Director (Yorkshire Electricity, 1995, pA). Apart 
from this change the Board remained the same until the agreed takeover by American 
Electric Power (AEP) and Public Service Company of Colorado. Following the takeover 
the new owners replaced all of its non-executive directors. Linn Draper Jnr, President and 
Chief Executive of AEP, took over as chairman from Hampson. Wayne Brunetti ofPS 
Colorado also joined the board, along with six non-executives - three from AEP and three 
from PS Colorado. Chatwin, Coleman, and Hall all remained in post (Taylor, 1997). 
In late 1997, the Company undertook a major restructuring to prepare it for the impending 
development of competition in the industry. The Company was to restructure itself into 
three main divisions: distribution, supply and generation, which would each become "self 
sufficient businesses each headed by a Managing Director" (Yorkshire Electricity, 1997). 
The impact of this change upon the Group's management structure was significant. 
Chatwin and Coleman left the Company, and the new Group CEO was Hall, the existing 
Operations Director. Under Hall, the new management structure was as shown in Figure 
5.2, with Cooper moving from his Group role to become MD of Supply, Townsend and 
Eddington similarly moving from their Divisional roles to become MD's of Distribution 
and Generation respectively, with Donnelly being promoted from Group Financial 
Controller. The appointments were confirmed by Yorkshire's owners through their 
representatives on the Yorkshire board Draper and Brunetti. Subsequently, Cooper was 
replaced by Bill Wilkinson as MD of Supply, and with the sale of Generation to 
PowerGen, Eddington left the board. 
At the beginning of the privatisation process, Yorkshire operated a group structure with 
a focus upon the creation and operation of profit centres. The following explanation of 
the group structure comes from the Company's pathfinder prospectus: "Clearly defined 
group functions and divisional business units were established with the aim of reflecting 
the different types of business in which Yorkshire Electricity would be operating, and 
facilitating the development of any of these business as subsidiary companies where it 
would be beneficial to do so. Profit related objectives were introduced for each business 
unit and a system of transfer pricing was established" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.765). 
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Figure 5.2: Yorkshire Electricity Management Structure, 1997 
Linn Draper 
Chairman 
Bryan Cooper 
MD Supply 
Graham Hall 
CEO 
Keith Eddington 
MD Generation 
Wayne Brunetti 
Vice-Chairman 
Roger DicL:in son 
Com pany Secretary 
Tudor Townsend 
MD Dislrihution 
Andy Donnelly 
Fin an ce Dierctor 
The Company operated five divisions based upon products and business activities, which 
were as follows: 
~ The Energy Supply Division: with responsibility for the planning, design, 
construction, operation and maintenance of the distribution system, together with 
energy sales and customer services such as meter reading, billing and collection; 
The Appliance Retailing Division: with responsibility for the Company's 
showrooms and for appliance repair; 
~ The Contracting Division: with responsibility for all electrical contracting work; 
~ The Business Services Division: with responsibility for IT, transport and other 
services; and 
The New Ventures Division: with responsibility for exploring potential new areas 
of business that the Company might pursue, such as generation, cable TV, 
telecommunications and gas. 
Within this divisional system, managerial responsibility was arranged as follows: the 
overall management of the Company was undertaken by the Chairman and Chief 
Executive, together with the Managing Director and the three Executive Directors. 
"Activities which affect all of the business units are organised into four group functions. 
The Group Finance Department is responsible for the overall financial strategy of 
Yorkshire Electricity, relationships with major shareholders .... together with corporate 
financial and management accounting and audit. The Group Commercial Department 
deals with electricity purchase contracts, tariffs, contracts for the sale of electricity and 
contracts for connections to and use of the distribution system, corporate planning and 
relations with the DGES. The Group Personnel Department provides personnel services 
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and has responsibility for industrial relations, training and staff development. Company 
secretariat provides a range of company secretarial services and undertakes legal, 
insurance and corporate communications activities" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.766). 
Clearly, the model employed by Yorkshire was very different to the functional or hybrid 
structures operated by other companies at the beginning of the period. The decision to 
operate upon a divisional basis was taken early, and the model developed here can perhaps 
be said to have been copied by other RECs over the next decade. However, Yorkshire 
have undertaken further amendments to this model, to improve its effectiveness and to 
deepen the commitment to the development of the internal market concept. In 1993, the 
core Electricity Supply business was re-designated the Systems Division, and within it two 
new departments: Network Engineering and Energy Management were established 
(Smith, 1993t). Each of these two new divisions worked on a contract basis for the 
Systems Division. Hall, as Executive Director for distribution, led all three of these 
businesses, as well as other businesses such as contracting, property, R&D, Procurement 
and Community Relations. His counterpart, Morgan, as Executive Director for supply led 
the Company's activities in electricity and gas supply, upstream gas, generation, IT, 
regulation and environmental issues (Yorkshire Electricity, 1995, p.4). This change marks 
an awareness of the differing demands facing both businesses, and the need for different 
cultures to develop in each. 
As mentioned above, the change in ownership prompted a new organisational structure 
to be introduced, bringing a much more formal self-sufficiency to the management of each 
of the principal businesses (Yorkshire Electricity, 1997). The move reduced the role 
played by Head Office, leaving a corporate centre of only 30 people fitting the 
development of a holding company model. With the exception of the divestment of 
generation, this holding company structure persists. 
5.4.3 Strategy Decisions at Yorkshire Electricity 
Yorkshire, at the beginning of the period, was one of the RECs which adopted the widest 
definition of what constituted its core business. It was also one of the REC's which had 
signalled, through the development of its management structure, that it was seeking to 
become a recognisable 'business' from the very beginning. It therefore approached new 
opportunities with gusto. It is clear from the evidence presented in Section 5.5.1, that the 
Company operated a general concentrated growth approach throughout its operations, but 
in supply especially this approach was augmented by a variety of other corporate 
strategies. Generation was especially important for the Company. In seeking to become 
a low cost supplier, it required cheap wholesale energy, and its generation strategy was 
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based upon this objective. While it was relatively late into gas, it sought upon entry to 
become an integrated gas company, and develop the dual fuel approach in support ofthe 
concentrated growth strategy. The recent agreement with Co no co shows that the desire 
to manage risk in controllable costs of wholesale energy continues. Additionally, the 
Company was an aggressive market developer. In search of additional income streams, 
it was the first REC to enter telecoms and the first REC to seek to make extensive 
overseas investments that utilise its core capabilities. 
However, the impact of the takeover and the redefinition of the Company's core 
businesses has left Yorkshire operating in only the two traditional areas: distribution and 
supply. The Company's relaunch in 1997 led to a clear statement from the new 
management team of the strategies of both of these businesses. These were that in: 
~ Distribution, the Company's aim was "to maintain and improve the reliability of 
the electricity network In Yorkshire and Humberside and seek growth 
opportunities"; and in 
Supply, the Company's aim was "to substantially grow the business in the 
nationally competitive gas and electricity markets through winning customers and 
by seeking marketing and strategic alliances with other organisations" (Yorkshire 
Electricity, 1997). 
Therefore, in distribution the strategy was to continue to follow a concentrated growth 
approach, aiming to 'work the network' as effectively as ever. The reference to 'seeking 
growth opportunities' is interesting. For the income of distribution networks to grow, 
new demand needs to develop in an operating area. This suggests that Yorkshire intends 
to throw its weight behind any regional development programmes aimed at increasing 
employment opportunities in Yorkshire. It may also signal a desire to partner with other 
RECs, possibly by acquisition, to increase the size of the network, or to seek uses of the 
capabilities held by the networks business in other electricity markets. 
In supply the emphasis is clearly upon market and product development, to grow critical 
mass in the converged electricity and gas markets. The reference to 'marketing and 
strategic alliances' explains the affinity agreement with American Express, and the 
agreement with Conoco for assured supplies of wholesale gas. It might also leave the way 
open for future purchases of, or alliances with, competitor companies. 
In terms of competitive strategy, the Company as with all other RECs is left with few 
options. A low price offering is necessary to be competitive in the supply industry, and 
so differentiation is the key to developing a critical mass of customers. Yorkshire has 
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always been successful in developing its market, and was one of the first RECs prepared 
for competition in the domestic market. For its business customers, the Company 
provides a variety of consultancy services, and tools aimed at maximising energy 
consumption. These include a range of extensive and tailored energy reports, a half-
hourly data service to enable a customer to map consumption levels, pool data showing 
the historical cost structure of wholesale energy prices, and a software package called 
EASE, which maps energy consumption within an organisation and allows an insight into 
exactly when and where energy is being consumed. This suggests a segmented utility 
approach, or a segmented utility focus approach in areas of particular interest to the 
Company. As is becoming clear, all suppliers need to provide added value services of this 
kind, alongside low cost supplies of gas and electricity in a highly competitive immature 
market which will see a degree of 'shakeout' in the medium to long term. 
5.5 Analysis of Cases 
This chapter set out to explore the strategic content of four of the twelve RECs, and to 
begin the process of understanding what drove the decisions resulting in the content 
identified. It also set out to comment upon the viability of the strategic combinations 
identified during this process. As stated in Section 5.0, the reporting of these observations 
will be undertaken in discrete sections, the first addressing Objective One of this research, 
the second Objective Two, while two further sections note additional observations made 
by the author, and some concluding remarks. 
5.5.1 Observations: Objective One 
In each of the cases presented above, the qualitative assessment of the content of the 
strategies of each of the RECs was recorded. This section presents a more formal 
description of the analysis, with reference to a series of matrices showing the distribution 
of evidence across the chosen analytical frameworks, for each of the case study 
companies. The findings are then interpreted to show patterns: combinations and 
relationships, between corporate, business and organisational strategy. As stated in 
Section 3.4.3.2.1, the author did not follow a strict process of content analysis. Rather, 
the data represented in Tables 5.4 to 5.7 are an interpretation of the findings. 
Tables 5.4 to 5.7 present a summary of the key corporate and business strategies 
employed by the sub-sample during the period. The relative importance of each strategy 
to each company is shown, as indicated by the key accompanying each table. What is 
striking about the analysis are the similarities that can be identified, and these are 
summarised here. For the sub-sample: 
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11 
concentrated growth is the only suitable corporate strategy for distribution: this 
was perhaps to be expected, given the regulated nature of the industry. The 
question of business strategy is irrelevant here as the companies face no 
competition. None of these companies appear to have seriously considered the 
approach other RECs have sought in distribution; the pursuit of horizontal 
integration. However, Yorkshire has mentioned the need for this business to seek 
further growth, implying some form of market development, and Northern have 
made investments in this area; 
despite starting with different outlooks in relation to supply, each company has 
returned to approximately the same combination of corporate and business 
strategy. In each case the companies have adopted a cost leadership position as 
a prerequisite for competing within the industry, and have then tried to 
differentiate themselves by providing added value services. In Chrisman et aI's 
(1988) analysis, this represents at least a segmented utility strategy, as all 
companies seek to sell to both electricity and gas to both commercial and domestic 
customers, and in some cases a segmented utility focus, if a REC has targeted a 
particular neighbour's area within which it will seek market share. This clearly 
contradicts Porter's (1980) contention of being 'stuck-in-the-middle'. This 
differentiation takes the form of affinity programmes (Norweb and Tesco, 
Yorkshire and American Express), rebranding (Norweb Energi), dual fuel 
programmes (all of the companies), added value services for business (again, all 
of the companies), and green tariffs (Manweb, Yorkshire); 
beyond differentiating themselves in their home area, they often seek to adopt cost 
focus as a tactic in certain 'priority target area' - the segmented utility focus 
concept discussed above. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the regular tariff prices per 
kWh (p) and standing charges per quarter offered by each REC in its own and 
each others tenitoryll. Clearly, for example, all three companies are trying to take 
market share from Northern in its own area, although Norweb offers the better 
combination of tariff and standing charge if the customer is a low user, and 
Yorkshire if the customer is a high user. Inevitably, the suitability of one 
company's offer in relation to another for the consumer is unique. 
For consistency, all data used for price comparison has been drawn from the Datamonitor pricing sheets 
for April 2000, available from Of GEM. 
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Table 5.2: Price Comparison Table 5.3: Standing Charge Comparison 
MW NW NE YE MW NW NE YE 
MW 6.79 6.28 6.27 6.23 MW 47.29 54.23 48.47 58.47 
NW 5.80* 6.24 6.58 5.13 NW 60.63* 40.66 3l.58 46.97 
NE 6.16* 6.10 7.17 5.70 NE 56.95* 35.98 35.99 60.33 
YE 6.06* 6.01 6.35 6.33 YE 41.77* 41.26 41.98 41.77 
Notes: MW = Manweb, NW = Norweb, NE = Northern, YE = Yorkshire; * figures quoted are those of 
Manweb 's parent company ScottishPower as Manweb brand not used outside of Manweb area. 
However, clearly, some companies are using a cost focus approach to seek market 
share in certain operating areas. The companies have proved reluctant to reveal 
the size of their customer base in more than general terms. For instance, United 
Utilities states that it has 7 million customers but does not identify what these 
customers take from the multi-utility beyond saying that 325,000 of them buy gas 
from Norweb Gas. Clearly, with the industry in an immature phase, companies are 
keeping cards of this sort very close to their chests; and 
some companies have undertaken circuitous routes to get to the same place. 
Manweb announced a decision to focus upon Distribution and manage Supply 
effectively in 1989. Yorkshire have started and divested telecoms and generation 
business but are now left in the same industries as Manweb. 
Overall, this sub-sample has seen some significant differences in strategic outlook, 
principally between Manweb and the rest. Manweb was always the most narrowly 
focussed REC, making a virtue out of adopting a core focus. In contrast, Norweb and 
Yorkshire were among the most innovative and exploratory of the RECs and among the 
industry leaders in gas, telecommunications and generation. Northern was more akin to 
Manweb, in that it followed a clear core focus although it sought to engage in backward 
integration and market development to support the core concentrated growth strategy. 
Takeovers have impacted upon all of the companies. Manweb has been left as a brand 
name for ScottishPower, but is still involved in pursuing the same corporate strategy in 
its core distribution business. Norweb has also been subsumed within another multi-utility 
and has effectively shared the same fate as Manweb. Yorkshire became the European arm 
of an international company, but it has also been reigned in and returned to a core focus. 
Only Northern, which is now part of a larger US based international group but which still 
remains in all of its former business activities, appears to have developed and become an 
extension of its former self. 
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Table 5.4: Content Analysis of Manweb Table 5.5: Content Analysis of NorwebfUnited Utilities 
Corporate Distribution Supply Generation Other Corporate Distribution Supply Generation Other 
Strategies Businesses Strategies Businesses 
Concentrated Growth .,1.,1.,1 .,1.,1.,1 V Concentrated Growth .,1.,1.,1 .,1.,1.,1 .,1.,1.,1 .,1.,1.,1 
(contracting) (retail) 
Market DeVelopment V (lOOkW) Market Development .,1.,1.,1 .,1.,1.,1 
(retail) 
Product Development 
.,I (green Product Development V (dual fuel) 
tariffs) 
Innovation V Innovation V (Affinity) V (overseas) .,I (telecoms) 
(sustainable) 
Horizontal Integration Horizontal Integration .,1.,1.,1 
(retail) 
Vertical Integration Vertical Integration .,1.,1.,1 
(generation, 
power 
purchasing) 
Concentric .,1.,1.,1 (gas) V (metering) Concentric .,1.,1.,1 (gas) V (overseas) V (metering, 
diversification diversification telecoms) 
Conglomerate Conglomerate 
Diversification Diversification 
Turnaround Turnaround 1996 (takeover) & 1997 (refocus) 
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Table 5.4: Continued Table 5.5: Continued 
Divestment V (retail) Divestment 
Liquidisation Liquidisation 
Joint Venture V (Alliance Joint Venture 
Gas) 
Strategic Alliances # (considered with Welsh Water) Strategic Alliances 
Consortia Consortia 
Business Distribution Supply Generation Other Business 
Strategies Businesses Strategies 
N/A Segmented N/A Segmented 
Benefit Focus Cost Focus 
Key 
(where company has engaged in activity of this kind) 
(where company has been heavily engaged in activity of this kind) 
V Evidence 
vVVPriority 
# (Where company has considered activity of this kind, but not acted upon this interest) 
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V (Norweb V VV (retail, 
Energi) (generation, otherNWW 
overseas) businesses) 
V (Northern .,1.,1.,1 V (telecoms) 
Gas) (various 
generation) 
Some 
Numerous 
Distribution Supply Generation Other 
Businesses 
N/A N/A(but N/A N/A (but 
formerly formerly 
Segmented Segmented 
Utility) Cost) 
- L......~~---~- ---- ~-- -~ 
Table 5.6: Content Analysis of Northern Table 5.7: Content Analysis of Yorkshire 
Corporate Distribution Supply Generation Other 
Strategies Businesses 
Corporate Distribution Supply Generation Other 
Strategies Businesses 
Concentrated GrO\\ th VVV VVV VVV VVV Concentrated Gro\\th VVV VVV VVV VVV 
Market Development V (regional VVV v (overseas) V Market Development V (regional VVV 
development) (IMW, (contracting development 
IOOkW, and retail) and overseas) 
domestic, NI 
and overseas) 
Product Development v (dual fuel) Product Development 1/ (affInity) 1/ 
(windpower) 
hmovation v (Do\\TI V (telecoms) hmovation 
stream gas) 
Horizontal Integration # (London) Horizontal Integration 
Vertical Integration VVV vvv Vertical Integration I/v vv 
(generation, (do\\TI stream (upstream (upstream 
energy 
purchasing) 
gas assets) gas) gas) 
Concentric VVV (gas) V (telecoms, Concentric 1/ (overseas) 1/ (gas, 1/ (telecom, 
diversification IT) diversification overseas) Cable TV) 
Conglomerate Conglomerate 
Diversification Diversification 
Turnaround Turnaround 1995, 1998 
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Table 5.6 Continued Table 5.7: Continued 
Divestment Divestment 
Liquidisation Liquidisation 
Joint Venture V (Down .,1.,1.,1 V (lonica) Joint Venture 
stream gas) (including 
Teeside 
Power) 
Strategic Alliances Strategic Alliances 
Consortia Consortia 
Business Distribution Supply Generation Other Business Distribution 
Strategies Businesses Strategies 
NlA Segmented Cost Cost I Utility Leadership Leadership 
Approach in 
N/A 
conunercial, 
segmented cost 
focus in 
domestic 
- -
- --_ .... _-_ .. _-_._-
-- -- - -----
Key 
(where company has engaged in activity of this kind) 
(where company has been heavily engaged in activity of this kind) 
V Evidence 
VVVPriority 
# (Where company has considered activity of this kind, but not acted upon this interest) 
-246-
V (to V (retail) 
PowerGen) 
V (gas) .,IV .,1.,1.,1 
(telecom, 
Cable TV) 
Supply Generation Other 
Businesses 
Segmented N/A N/A 
Utility 
5.5.1.1 Combinations of Grand Strategy 
The following section presents diagrammatical representations of the strategic 
combinations of corporate and business level strategies, identified from within this sub-
sample. This activity follows on from the analysis presented in Section 2.6.3. There are 
inevitably some instances when RECs share the same pattern of combination, especially 
in their distribution businesses. Common patterns will therefore be labelled as per Figure 
2.6 of Section 2.6.3, and referred to as such. 
Variant 1: Concentrated Growth 
Concentrated 
Growth 
Variant 2: Organic Market Development 
Concentrated 
Growth 
Market 
Development 
(i) Manweb adopts the basic 
concentrated growth approach: 
Variant 1, which sees no combination 
at all. This variant is also employed by 
the Norweb distribution business. 
(ii)Both Northern and Yorkshire 
employ a slightly more advanced 
concentrated growth approach: 
designated Variant 2, an organic 
market development approach in 
Section 2.6.3. This market 
development takes the form of 
participation in regional development 
activity, which is arguably the only 
form of organic market development 
approach that can be attempted in the 
distribution industry. 
The combinations identified in relation to distribution, therefore, show the limitations 
available to the companies. In reality, only one further variant could be added to the two 
presented above, Variant 1 C, which shows horizontal integration and which will be 
witnessed in Chapter Seven in relation to London and Eastern's joint venture. As stated 
frequently throughout the chapter, these companies do not have business strategies 
associated to their corporate strategy combinations, as their operations are natural 
monopolies. All companies pursue a cost management approach in distribution. 
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Variant 3A: External Market Development 
Concentrated 
Growth 
Market 
Development 
Joint 
Venture 
(iii) Manweb develops an extended 
market development approach, 
including concentric 
diversification, designated Variant 
3 A. This indicates that (i) the 
company has moved into the 
convergent gas industry and (ii) 
that a combination of organic: 
electricity and gas, and external: 
gas, through its Alliance Gas joint 
venture, market development is 
evident. Within this combination a 
segmented utility focus business 
strategy is employed, which may 
be focussed on particular target 
groups. 
The combinations operated in supply show the more complex nature of the activity, 
reflecting the impact of competition. Companies have attempted relatively similar 
approaches, in the case of companies following Variant SA, to develop a competitive 
position in the industry through whatever means are available. Variant SA shows that all 
companies still involved in supply: (i) engage in both gas and electricity supply, (ii) have 
sought some form of backward integration, either through owning generation assets, 
signing long term wholesale contracts with generators, and/or having access to down 
stream gas reserves, (iii) have undertaken wide ranging internal and organic market 
development, including membership of joint ventures, and (iv) have engaged in product 
development. The exception to the use of this approach is Manweb, which has sought a 
more conservative and limited approach, reflecting its position as a subsidiary of 
ScottishPower. 
In all of the cases, the RECs are following segmented utility business strategies. This 
uniformity has resulted from the fact that (i) cost is a key issue to competitors, but (ii) 
added value services are also important. Customers are looking for added value, at a 
competitive price and hence the utility approach. It is a segmented approach, because all 
of the companies are seeking to reach both commercial and domestic markets, leading to 
variations in the service and prices offered. Some companies may also operate segmented 
utility focus approaches in particular target areas where they are seeking market share. 
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Variant 5A: Multiple Combination 
--'" .. , ... 
, , 
, , 
, \ 
\ 
VIAfB 
V4 V2 
V4A V3 
(iv) NOlWeb presented (before its 
sale to Eastern Group) a highly 
complex multiple approach, which 
includes elements of all four 
possible variants identified earlier. 
The combination includes: 
(1) an external concentrated growth 
approach, through backward 
integration (gas and generation), 
and concentric diversification into 
gas; 
(2) organic market development; 
(3) external market development 
through joint venture; and 
(4) a product development 
approach, featuring innovation (in 
NOlWeb's case, dual fuel offerings 
and affinity programmes). 
This variant is followed very closely 
by Northern and Yorkshire. 
In each case, the business strategy 
followed is a segmented utility 
approach, as discussed above with 
reference to Manweb. 
All of the above combinations are viable, as discussed in Objective One. The more 
complex supply strategy combinations may only be viable in the short run, however, if 
critical mass is not achieved. As stated previously, the supply industry is still relatively 
immature, and there will be substantial changes over time. 
5.5.2 Observations: Objective Two 
As stated in Section 5.0, a collection of key drivers of strategy were identified in Section 
2.2.3, and evidence of their significance will be sought throughout this research. To begin 
this process, an initial assessment of the relative importance of each driver has been 
prepared, based upon the preceding analysis, and is presented at Table 5.S. 
Table 5.8: Impact of Possible Strategy Drivers 
External Factors Internal Factors Leadership Regulatory 
Manweb V V VVV VVV 
Norweb VVV VVV VVV VV 
Nortllern VV VVV VV VV 
Yorkshire VV V VV VV 
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The above analysis is subjective; with the author estimating the impact of the respective 
drivers based upon the outcome of the content analysis and indicating a higher suspected 
impact by a higher number of v's, and reflects the difficulty of interpreting causal 
relationships from secondary source data. Consequently, the data presented here should 
be viewed as a tentative analysis, and requires further consideration in the light of the case 
studies presented later in the research. Allowing for the tentative nature of the analysis, 
the following observations are drawn: 
~ the key drivers of Manweb's approach were (i) its leadership and (ii) the 
regulatory environment. Manweb's strategy was a product of its leadership's 
early decision to focus upon its core distribution business. Having made that 
decision, the regulatory environment was clearly another key factor. Internal and 
external drivers were of some importance, but clearly not as important as if a more 
expansive approach had been adopted; 
the key driver ofNorweb's approach was its leadership. External and internal 
factors were also vital, but both were largely subordinate to the leadership of the 
Company which drove the strategic outlook. Inevitably, the resources of the 
Company and the behaviour of competitors influenced the ability of the Company 
to achieve its objectives, but they were led by the impact of the leaders. 
Regulation is still important, but less so than if the Company only had regulated 
income to rely upon; 
the key drivers of Northern' s early strategy were an even combination of all four, 
with no one area predominating. This reflects the Company's decision to pursue 
its strategy across all possible sectors of the industry, both existing and new, core 
and non-core. At around 1995, the importance of the Regulator became the key 
influence, but latterly following its takeover and new focus, the influence of its 
internal resources are crucial; and 
the key drivers of Yorkshire's early strategy were very similar to those of 
Northern, an even combination of all four with no one area predominating. Once 
again, a change in ownership has seen a change in emphasis and the decrease in 
activity in un-regulated areas has seen the rise in importance of the regulator in 
driving Yorkshire's strategy. 
Clearly, therefore, the following summary can be made. The companies ofthe sample will 
inevitably be influenced by the actions of the Regulator while they remain in the monopoly 
distribution industry. However, that influence will be incrementally reduced as the 
company's dependence upon monopoly profits diminishes. Therefore, as its competitive 
actions increase, other factors come into play, and in particular the influence of the 
market. Leadership is seen as vital, especially in situations where companies have sought 
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to develop strong streams of unregulated income. It is possible to estimate that resources 
are also vital in such circumstances, but any definitive statement on their importance will 
require deeper scrutiny, and therefore must await the case study chapters. 
5.5.2.1 The Question of Leadership 
As noted in Section 5.5.2, the author believes that an assessment of the impact of 
leadership on strategy is best left for consideration in the case study chapters. However, 
it is possible to inform that debate by considering some of the evidence presented in these 
cases, in relation to the composition of main boards, and the proximity of changes in main 
board composition and major changes in organisational direction. With this in mind, the 
following can be observed. 
As the analysis has shown, at the time of privatisation all of the companies of this sub-
sample predominantly drew their senior managers from the ESI. The exception was the 
Chairman and CEO of Northern, who was an industry outsider but who had only been in 
post for less than one year at the time of privatisation. Throughout this period there were 
changes to the dominant coalitions of each Company, but not substantially so until the 
various takeover's occurred. For Manweb and Norweb, takeovers saw them become 
subsidiaries of larger concerns and managed by functional level rather than board level 
managers. For Northern and Yorkshire, who both have US owners, the experience was 
slightly different for while they too lost independence they have retained recognisable 
organisational identities. The tendency within both companies has been for US managers 
to assume senior (ie chairmanships) rather than executive level posts. The similarity of 
management teams at the beginning of the period can not explain differing strategic 
outlooks. This suggests that an industry background is not a particularly important 
element in strategic decision making. This sub-sample does provide a useful further test 
of the influence ofleadership as one pair of companies are part of UK based multi-utilities, 
and the other pair are part of US lead international group's. This aspect will be returned 
to in the summary in Chapter Eight. In addition, the question of changing roles in main 
boards will be addressed, and its significance to the question of the nature of the 
companies considered. 
5.5.3 Other Observations 
Inevitably, the analysis conducted above has produced a number of other key observations 
which sit outside of the two main objectives of this stage of the research. One such area 
is the impact of structure, and its relationship to decision making. As Table 5.9 shows, 
there was some similarity between the structures of three of the RECs in this sub-sample, 
with Manweb, Northern and Yorkshire all operating product-focussed divisional 
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structures under a head office and alongside a regional network. Of these three, 
Yorkshire had moved the furthest towards a structure which formally separated the key 
businesses within the Company. Norweb operated a functional structure. Inevitably, 
divisional structures have become more prevalent, although Northern and Yorkshire's 
Table 5.9: Structural Matrix 
Manweb Norweb Northern Electric Yorkshire Electric 
Initial Structure A Product Functionally A Product Focussed A Product Focussed 
Focussed Structured Divisional Divisional 
Divisional Organization with Structure, with Structure, with 
Structure, with Geographically Leadership from Leadership from 
Leadership from Oriented-Divisions Head Office and a Head Office and a 
Head Office Regional Network Regional Network 
Current A Geographic Separate Businesses A Product Focussed A Holding 
Structure Subsidiary within a within a Product Divisional Company Model 
Divisional Focussed Divisional Structure, with with Autonomous 
Structure Structure Leadership from Business Units 
USA 
Major Changes Takeover by Takeover by North Takeover by Moved towards a 
( dates/changes) ScottishPower West Water (1995) CalEnergy (1996) holding company 
(1995) structure based 
around an internal 
marketplace 
(1992), but became 
true holding 
company after 1997 
structure's are now more akin to holding company structures reflecting the preferences 
of their new owners. Once again, Manweb and Norweb have tended to be reduced to 
operational units within a larger group structure. Norweb was the most aggressive yet 
centrally managed ofthis sub-sample, suggesting that structure was not a major element. 
This analysis does, however, suggest that different structural alignments are emerging. 
The question that needs to be addressed as a consequence is whether some companies are 
retaining recognisably utility-like structures, while others are moving towards 
organisational and managerial structures which are more akin to those of traditional 
businesses. This issue will be returned to in Section 8.4. 
In respect of other key issues that emerged from Chapter Two, it is clear that a strategy 
as pattern approach, with responsibility for the detail of strategy being devolved to 
operational and functional managers, has become more widespread as the divisional 
impetus described above has deepened. Similarly, strategy process appear to have become 
more emergent as autonomy for decision making has been spread wider. 
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5.5.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has suggested that at the beginning of the privatisation period, companies 
from this sub-sample did identify a series of different strategic approaches and set out to 
pursue them. These varied from Manweb's narrowly focussed niche approach, to 
Norweb's more aggressive and widely focussed approach. The evidence provided 
suggests that the composition of the dominant coalition, the structures developed and 
indeed the local area did not playa significant part in the decision of which direction the 
company took. This suggests that the dynamics within the main board itself are of more 
importance, with managers like Harvey at Norweb driving their company's strategy based 
upon their own perceptions of opportunity. This assessment of the initial impetus of 
strategic decision making will be assessed in relation to the other sub-samples, and 
explored in greater depth in the case studies presented in Chapter's Nine, Ten and Eleven. 
What has become clear, however, is that external factors have played a significant part in 
the development of company strategy after the initial period. This chapter has shown that 
strategies have been impacted upon by such external elements as new owners, the 
Regulator, and the City of London, as well as competitors and customers. Of these, a 
surprising and arguably disproportionate impact has been in evidence from the City of 
London who certainly undermined the otherwise apparently sound strategy adopted by 
Manweb, while supporting the strategic activities of Norweb against popularly held 
conceptions of how utility stocks should behave. The impact of new owners is predictably 
identified as being significant, and the future direction of all of the companies studied here 
has been shaped by the identity and ambition of their new owners. Overall, therefore, 
there is little evidence of companies adopting identical approaches, although there is clear 
evidence of the emergence of a number of archetypical generic responses in core areas. 
The author believes that while tactical differences remain, the companies are reaching a 
consensus as to the main strategic options available to them. The identity and impact of 
these trends will be explored in greater depth in the analysis to be presented in Chapter 
Eight. 
-253-
Chapter Six The Midlands and Agricultural RECs 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter continues the work begun in Chapter Five, with respect to the reporting of 
the preliminary stage of the research. In a similar fashion, the aims and objectives of this 
chapter are concurrent with those identified for Chapter Five, in Section 5.0, as are the 
frameworks of analysis and reporting utilised in this chapter. 
This chapter does diverge slightly from the pattern established in Chapter Five, and 
continued in Chapter Seven, in that it presents an analysis of two of the four sub-samples 
ofRECs, as identified in Section 3.4.2: the Midlands RECs, and the Agricultural RECs. 
This decision was primarily expedient, to bring this chapter into line with Chapter's Five 
and Seven, which both feature four case studies. Both of the sub-samples presented here 
have, however, been analysed separately at the conclusion of this chapter, in Section's 
6.5.1: Midlands RECs, and Section 6.5.5: Agricultural RECs. The determination of the 
composition of each sub-sample occurred as follows: 
The Midlands sub-sample includes two of the RECs: East Midlands Electricity (Section 
6.1) and Midlands Electricity (6.2). In characterising the companies of this sub-group, 
Holmes noted the following as being key similarities within the markets that each of these 
companies served: 
~ that demand was fairly evenly spread between domestic, industrial and commercial 
sectors; and 
that following a period of economic instability resulting from the decline of the 
automobile industry, industrial activity was stabilising and probably reviving 
(Holmes, 1992, p.56). 
Holmes therefore implies that the companies of this sub-sample would probably be facing 
a less arduous task than the RECs from the industrial north, in the new competitive 
environment. Demand had already stabilized following a structural realignment, and 
prospects were at least favourable. At the initial stage of electricity supply competition 
the threat to these RECs would probably be lesser than the Northern RECs considered in 
Chapter Five, as fewer large industrial customers operated from this region. Domestic 
consumers would also be expected to be more affluent. 
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The Agricultural RECs includes two of the RECs: SW ALEC (Section 6.3) and SWEB 
(Section 6.4). In characterising the companies of this sub-group, Holmes noted the 
following as being key similarities between the companies and the markets they served: 
~ that they were mainly rural areas; 
~ there was limited heavy industrial demand as the coal mining industry in South 
Wales was in decline; 
~ that both of the areas experienced widely dispersed populations; and 
~ that there was a heavy reliance upon domestic and light industrial demand 
(Holmes, 1992, p.56). 
Holmes therefore implies that the companies of this sub-sample were facing an uncertain 
future in the new era of privatisation, although that uncertainty took a slightly different 
form from that experienced in the companies of Chapter Five. Demand was relatively low, 
there being few large consumers, and the lack of population density brought extra costs 
to the companies distribution businesses. Therefore while the threat of lost supply demand 
was lower than elsewhere, the cost burden of the distribution network was higher, which 
could affect comparative performance. There was also uncertainty about the relative 
aflluence of the domestic consumers. There was, from an early stage, a desire shared by 
these companies to be regarded as special cases by the Regulator. 
6.1 East Midlands Electricity (EME) 
EME is the REC for the East Midlands area of England. The Company's operating 
franchise covered an area of 16,000 square kilometres and included all of the counties of 
Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Northamptonshire and Nottinghamshire, as well as parts of 
Warwickshire, Buckinghamshire, the West Midlands, Staffordshire, Bedfordshire, 
Cambridgeshire, South Yorkshire and Oxfordshire within its boundaries. The composition 
of customer types within EME's operational area was diverse, with high numbers of 
domestic customers, as well as a large industrial and commercial base. In the last twenty 
years financial services, distribution and construction have increased in importance whilst 
coal mining has declined. The Company is headquartered in Nottingham. EME is of 
particular interest as it was perceived to be the REC most keenly anticipating the advent 
of privati sat ion. The Company was relishing the prospect of privati sat ion with an "almost 
indecent zeal" (Tomkins, 1988), reflecting the "new challenges and opportunities" 
(Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.220) available to it. The preparatory work that EME had 
undertaken prior to privatisation had marked it out as a 'pioneer'. In areas such as 
customer service EME was recognised as leading the industry and the guarantees of 
service quality that it provided to its customers in as early as 1985 (when the concept of 
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privatisation ofthe ESI was as yet unformed) heavily influenced the thinking and actions 
of the Regulator when the statuary guarantees of service quality were written into the 
privatisation white paper (Tomkins, 1988). The Company introduced guarantees covering 
meter positioning, fixing, changing and special readings, appliance deliveries and electrical 
installation, as well as the original guarantee to respond to customers' requests for repairs 
within three working days, or waive the labour charge (Carrington, 1988, p.30). 
6.1.1 Key Events: 1990-2000 
As reported in Section 6.1, EME was perhaps the REC most keenly anticipating the 
advent of privati sat ion, and as a consequence of the arrival of the freedom and opportunity 
privatisation brought, it was also the most active company at this early stage. It is perhaps 
instructive at this point to indicate EME's stated strategic objectives, to provide the 
background to the key events that have unfolded over the last decade. In the issue 
prospectus, EME identified its principal strategic objectives as being to build upon its past 
achievements by: (a) achieving growth in operating profits from its distribution business; 
(b) continuing to offer prices that are competitive and profitable in the hope of enhancing 
profits from its supply business; (c) engaging in generation activities to release new 
sources of profits in the medium and long term; and (d) examining potential areas of 
development in all business areas (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.220). In pursuit of these 
objectives EME began the period with a series of aggressive moves in the areas of 
concentric and conglomerate diversification, with the aim of developing streams of 
unregulated earnings. 
Consequently, EME was: 
~ the first REC to apply for planning permission for its own gas-fired power station, 
with its involvement with the Corby Power joint venture with Hawker Siddeley, 
followed by involvement in a variety of other self generation projects, such as 
Bilsthrope and Leicester (Samuelson, 1989a); 
one of the first RECs to express this involvement in generation in terms of a 
strategy based upon self-generation of 15% of its total energy supply - the 
maximum allowed by the Regulator (Samuelson, 1989a); 
one of the most aggressive RECs in the area of market development, making EME 
one of the top three most successful RECs in winning customers from other RECs 
in the newly competitive IMW end of the supply market (Sychrava, 1991a); 
the first REC to issue a long term bond, raising £150 million on the international 
bond market; 
engaged in a variety of unrelated divestment projects, such as the purchase of 
Ambassador Security (Gourlay, 1991), where the rationale behind the purchase 
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was the VIew that security would fit into the Company's new Electrical 
Engineering Division, the establishment of which was itself designed to "develop 
businesses supplying services to buildings including data communications, 
mechanical and electrical contracting" (Gourlay, 1991). The Company did not 
view the investment in organisations such as Ambassador Security as unrelated 
diversification, but rather saw it as being related. However, the author suggests 
that to do so is evidence of a fairly 'loose' interpretation of what should be 
considered their core competencies. This point will be explored below; 
engaged in early actions to increase and strengthen some of the more peripheral 
areas of its existing activities such as contracting, when it purchased Thomas 
Robinson Group's contracting business in 1991 (Fuller and Sychrava, 1991). This 
purchase was rationalised as an attempt to create critical mass in this business with 
the aim of making EME one of the top ten electrical contractors in the country, 
and providing the Company with the potential to expand into building design and 
maintenance, which they believed would include the planning and installation of 
communications, heating and cooling systems (Fuller and Sychrava, 1991); and 
was one of the first RECs to apply to the DTI for a licence to supply regional 
customers with a range of telecommunications services (Smith, 1992), with the 
ultimate aim of generating up to 30% of its income from non-core businesses by 
the end of the decade (Sychrava, 1991e). 
At the end of its first reporting year, EME disclosed that it had spent £40 million on 
acquisitions, resulting in significantly higher gearing that the other RECs. Some of these 
investments, as discussed, were in areas that were either unrelated to, or only marginally 
related to, EME's core business. Throughout the early stages ofEME's development, 
when the Company was expanding rapidly there were considerable misgivings on the part 
of city institutions as to the veracity of the strategy. The City expected RECs and other 
utility stocks to be dull and predictable. Hence the activities of EME, despite a successful 
first year in terms of profitability, were causing concern. The City contrasted EME's 
approach with those of other RECs who were aiming principally to manage their core 
businesses more effectively, and were consequently uncertain ifEME's approach was the 
right recipe. The EME share price, as a result, lagged behind the rest of the industry with 
the Company achieving the lowest ranking at the 1993 interim profits stage (Smith, 
1993 g). EME's poor stock market performance was contrasted to the 'superior' 
performance of companies like Manweb, which had eschewed diversification for a clearly 
focussed strategy based upon distribution. EME's customers were also reported to be 
suffering some of the highest levels of service failure rates (Lascelles, 1993d). 
-257-
This position was felt to be unsustainable, and lead to a "fundamental realignment" of the 
company, according to new Non-Executive Director ofEME, Rudd (EME, 1994, p.2), 
with CEO Harris replaced by Askew, and a major internal review of corporate strategy. 
As a consequence of the review, EME initiated a turnaround strategy aimed at improving 
the fortunes ofthe Company by refocusing upon its original mission, which identified that 
the Company's prospects were likely to be "largely dependent upon the success of its 
distribution business, which itself will benefit from the development of the supply 
business" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.220). This involved a wide ranging divestment of 
loss making or ill fitting enterprises. This new approach saw, between 1993 and 1996 the 
following business decisions: 
~ 300 jobs cut in 1993, rising to 700 in 1994 (Smith, 1993c); 
~ the reduction and rationalisation of corporate headquarters; 
~ EME split into three divisions, in an attempt to focus upon the core business 
activities with a particular emphasis upon cost control and innovation within the 
core businesses (Lascelles, 1995b); 
the consolidation of organisational structure with a shift of focus to cost centres 
from the regional structure the company formerly maintained; 
three of the six contracting companies closed down while others, such as WJ 
Furse, were sold (EME, 1996, p.7); 
~ the sale of Ambassador security (Hollinger, 1995d); 
~ EME' s exit from retailing by selling its retail joint venture with Yorkshire 
Electricity, Homepower Retail, to PowerStore Trading (Martinson, 1996e); and 
the decision to take an exceptional loss of £ 13 0 million in its 1994 annual report 
to cover the losses incurred by the previous strategy. 
After these actions EME was focussed upon its core business activities, with an emphasis 
placed upon their effective management. The refocusing and restructuring of the company 
resulted in an increase in operating profits of 13.7% in 1995 "primarily as a result of 
sustained cost control and the elimination of losses" (Rudd, in EME, 1995, p.2). The 
turnaround of the company also reestablished EME as a company favoured by the City, 
which developed a high regard for the new management team. 
One aspect of the changed approach of the new management team at EME was a 
commitment to a continual search for improvement. Hence, the 1994 restructuring of the 
Company was followed by a further restructuring in March 1996 as it for the introduction 
of domestic competition in 1998. The main focus of the restructuring was the need to 
build customer service, lower prices, and to release value to shareholders. Within the new 
structure ofEME the following separate business units were established:-
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~ Network Management and Development; 
~ Metering; 
~ Construction; and 
~ Supply. 
The intention of the restructuring was to enable "management to monitor costs more 
closely and expose cross subsidies" (Holberton, 1996k). Another feature of the new 
structure was that EME spent £2 million on a new customer service centre. This was 
identified as a defensive ploy to protect existing customers in a competitive domestic 
market but could also be seen as an attempt to recover the ground that the Company had 
lost since 1989. It also reflected the fact that the 1996 review of the RECs by the 
Regulator showed EME to be the worse performing REC, on the basis of customer 
complaints. 
The outcome of the continuing restructuring of EME was a complete reversal of the 
perception of the Company, reflected in analysis from HSBC James Capel which stated 
that EME had one of the best management teams of all of the RECs, which now managed 
its business for cash, and which 'don't get carried away on diversifications' (Holberton, 
1996k). Rudd, in closing his 1996 Chairman's Statement, recommitted EME to 
developing its core business in the increasingly competitive market, restated the view that 
the restructuring ofthe Company would allow each of the businesses to concentrate upon 
the challenges and opportunities that faced them, and achieve the continuing aim of 
excellent customer service, and high share holder value (Rudd, in EME, 1996, p.3). 
EME was not to remain an independent company for much longer. The wave of 
takeovers which swept the industry after the expiration of the government's golden share 
in 1995 reached EME in November 1996 when Dominion Resources of Richmond, 
Virginia entered into an agreed takeover valuing EME at £1.3 Billion (US$2.2 Billion). 
Dominion is a holding company, which owns Virginia Power and North Carolina Power. 
The company serves more than 1.9 million customers in North Carolina and West 
Virginia. 
The purchase of East Midlands was intended to contribute to a strategy that saw 
Dominion "well positioned for growth in an era that finds many of (their US) industry 
peers wringing their hands about the onset of competition in the electricity industry" 
(Dominion Resources, 1996, p.2). The purchase of East Midlands contributed towards 
an ongoing process of diversification into related areas, principally involving Irevenue-
producing assets', adding to Dominion's earnings. One way in which Dominion foresaw 
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the potential for income growth, was through the opportunity East Midlands' 2.3 million 
customers offered them for market development in areas in which they had existing 
experience, such as gas and financial services. The key to the East Midlands takeover was 
its revenue raising potential. The CEO of Dominion explained that in any transaction "if 
we can't get it at a price at which we can expect to make money, we don't buy it" (Capps, 
in Dominion Resources, 1996, p.4). The Company required, as a condition of overseas 
operation, stable governments, clear enforceable laws, and regulatory systems that 
encourage low cost growth opportunities. However, Dominion's involvement in the UK 
industry was to be short lived. 
The sale of EME to PowerGen was announced in June 1998. PowerGen agreed to 
purchase EME for £1.9 billion (US$3.2 billion). The decision to accept the offer was 
explained by Dominion as being a "full and fair valuation of East Midlands" (Dominion 
Resources, 1998), which would enable it to re-deploy the funds into other projects closer 
to home. The deal brought Dominion a profit of around $650 million post-tax. It also 
relieved Dominion of the onerous task of completely the financing of the deal, which had 
seen the Company having to take on a very substantial degree of debt. 
Aside from the dual incentives of making profit and avoiding debt, a statement from Capps 
perhaps indicates the principal reason for the short lived nature of his Company's 
involvement with EME. Since the acquisition, Capps noted that Dominion had "been 
seeking to expand through mergers with other distribution companies, or other 
combinations. We thought that economies of scale were important. We made several 
enquires and contacts. We've been frustrated in our ability to grow our assets in the UK. 
When you can't grow, you're better off taking out the capital and re-deploying it into 
assets that you can grow. A full and fair offer turns out to be a better alternative" 
(Dominion Resources, 1998). This statement would seem to indicate that strategically 
EME under Dominion were seeking to explore strategic alliances in order to continue the 
concentrated growth approach determined under the former regime. The failure of this 
policy left EME in a very similar operational, structural and strategic position to that 
which had prevailed prior to the takeover. Two notable changes were that Dominion 
retains its 80% share in Corby Power!, while Askew stayed on at Dominion as Executive 
Vice President, and was later appointed President and Chief Executive Officer of Virginia 
Power, one of Dominion's principal subsidiaries. 
PowerGen was forced to divest itself of some of its generating capability to purchase EME, so buying 
further generating capability was a second order concern for the company. 
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PowerGen's strategy in purchasing EME was intended to advance its aim of becoming 
one of the major world energy companies. The purchase turned PowerGen's UK 
operations into a vertically integrated electricity and gas business featuring: 
.. electricity production, including fuel purchasing and trading and combined heat 
and power; 
.. electricity and gas trading; 
.. electricity distribution and gas transportation; and 
.. selling electricity and gas to domestic, industrial and commercial customers. 
(from PowerGen's Annual Report 1998 Operating Review) 
E1\.1E therefore lends its experience and market presence in each of the above businesses, 
and provides PowerGen's only presence in the area of electricity distribution. Purchasing 
this aspect ofE1\.1E's activities is the final link in PowerGen's energy chain. As for the 
strategy that E1\.1E as a subsidiary of PowerGen would pursue, a continuation of the core 
business cost leadership and concentrated growth approach appears to be the aim. This 
process of seeking continual improvement has prompted several new developments. 
Firstly, PowerGen has undertaken a benchmarking exercise to determine 'world's best 
practice' in electricity distribution. As a consequence, EME's distribution activities have 
been divided into two business groups: firstly, a distribution services group consisting of 
the service businesses of construction and metering, as well as EME'S remaining 
contracting business. Secondly, a networks group consisting of the core asset 
management business responsible for the operation of the distribution network 
(powerGen, 1998). 
Other activities aimed at improving the effectiveness of the distribution activity are 
planned. These include:-
.. rationalisation of management activities into a single site; 
.. reduction of the scale and number of field depots; 
.. provision of associated essential information technology project infrastructures; 
.. introduction of third party competitive service providers into the business; and 
.. an initiative to standardise all plant, equipment and procedures. 
(From the PowerGen 1998 Operating Review) 
Overall, PowerGen is aiming to integrate EME's activities into its wider UK business 
where possible. Areas such as distribution, which can not be integrated, will be run under 
a strict concentrated growth approach. The EME brand of electricity and gas will only 
remain in its own area, or areas where it has traditionally made an impact. In all other 
areas it will be replaced by the PowerGen brand. 
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6.1.2 Structure of EME 
In this section, the management and organisational structures ofEME are presented, and 
significant changes to either during the period are highlighted. Firstly, the senior 
management structure up until the takeover by PowerGen. At privatisation, the executive 
directors on the Main Board ofEME were as follows: 
Name Position Joined EME in From 
John Harris Chairman and Chief 1982 Norweb 
Executive 
DanCowe Managing Director 1985 Southern 
Michael Carus Finance Director 1977 Severn Trent Water 
Philip Champ Corporate Development 1987 Jordanian Electricity 
Director Authority 
Keith Jackson Marketing Director 1989 North of Scotland 
Hydro-Electric Board 
Keith Stanyard Technical and Operations 1960 ESI 
Director 
All of the initial executive director's, with the exception of the accountant Carus were 
chartered engineers, and all had significant or exclusive experience of the ESI (Kleinwort 
Benson, 1990, p.236-237). The board remained the same until 1992 when a number of 
changes occurred. Cowe retired, to be replaced by Norman Askew who joined EME from 
TI Group. Askew had no prior experience of the ESI. Additionally Jackson retired, and 
Champ stepped down from the board to assume a new role within EME managing its 
generation and overseas activities (EME, 1993, p.3). The other senior manager joining 
the board at this time was Jim Keohane, who had a wide experience of the ESI, and was 
an internal promotion. He became Commercial Director. 
Further changes occurred in 1994, reflecting the Company's changes strategic outlook. 
The joint posts of Chairman and CEO were separated following Harris' retirement, with 
Nigel Rudd being promoted to Non-Executive Chairman from the ranks of non-executive 
directors, and Askew taking over as CEO. In addition, Bob Davies replaced Carus as 
Finance Director (EME, 1994, p.4). This team were joined in 1996 by Chris Boon, as 
Corporate Development Director (EME, 1996, p.l0). Both Davies and Boon came to 
EME from non-ESI backgrounds. This was the team that lead EME into its takeover by 
Dominion Resources, and stayed together until 1997. 
In that year, Askew was appointed to run Virginia Power, one of the main businesses of 
the Dominion Group. He was replaced by Davies, who was promoted to CEO from the 
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finance portfolio. Other managers joined EME during the ownership of Dominion: 
Jonathan Hodgkin as Director of Corporate Development, joining from Arthur D. Little; 
and Paul Golby as Managing Director of EME's Networks Business, joining from 
Clayhithe. After the takeover by PowerGen Bob Davies, chief executive, Andy Halford, 
finance director, and Keith Stanyard, distribution director, rejected alternative job offers 
from the new owners, and left EME. EME's position within PowerGen was effectively 
reduced to that of a brand name, and its management merged into the management 
structure of Power Gen. 
In respect of its organisational structure, at the beginning of the privatisation process 
EME operated using a two-tier structure of a Head Office, and 13 districts wherein most 
of the customer contact occurred. Head Office was responsible for formulating strategy, 
policy direction and the provision of central and specialist functions. The districts were 
responsible for operationalising at a local level the policies relating to the various 
businesses based at head office. Each district was managed by a district manager who 
reported to the Technical and Operations Director. 
As for the organisation ofEME'S businesses themselves: "East Midlands Electricity is 
organised into regulated and non-regulated business groups. The regulated businesses of 
distribution and supply are managed as a single unit by the Technical and Operations 
Director, while generation is managed by the Corporate Development Director. There are 
two non-regulated business groups, appliance retailing and electrical contracting, each 
managed by the Marketing Director. Each of these three Executive Directors has profit 
responsibility for his respective business groups. In addition, the Directors provide 
corporate services across the entire range of the Company's activities" (Kleinwort 
Benson, 1990, p.237). 
At the beginning of the period, therefore, EME adopted a functional structure, with 
operational control and decision making undertaken at the head office, and with lower 
ranks responsible for implementing, but not shaping policy. There was, however, a degree 
of divisionalisation underway through the operation of product groups. The culture that 
accompanied this structure was in all probability a role culture, reflecting the dominance 
of the leadership elite. 
As was noted above in Section 6.1.1, the major turnaround of the Company launched in 
1994 saw a change to the structure of EME. In place of the two main business units a 
new structure based upon three divisions: Distribution; Supply; and Emco, which included 
all of the companies non-regulated activities, was introduced. Additionally, the thirteen 
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districts which had survived since privatisation were reduced to seven with the aim of 
achieving economies of scale, and improving customer service (EME, 1994, p.7). This 
restructuring sought to refocus the Company upon its core business activities, with a 
particular focus upon cost control and innovation within the core businesses (Lascelles, 
1995b). The changes brought about at this time moved EME from a functional structure 
towards a divisional structure, with each area gaining more responsibility but head office 
retaining authority for the direction of policy. The change in structure brought a slight 
accompanying change in the organisation's culture, with greater responsibility being 
passed to managers for costs and profits, although the new divisions were still required 
to report back to head office. The culture still most closely matched a role culture, 
although the allowance of greater autonomy reflected the beginning of a move towards 
a task culture. 
The 1994 restructuring was followed by a further refinement in 1996, as was discussed 
in Section 6.1.1. This further change was prompted by the need to prepare for the 
introduction of domestic competition in 1998. As previously noted, the main focus of the 
restructuring was the need to build customer service, lower prices, and to release value 
to shareholders. Within the new structure of the Company the following separate business 
units were established: 
~ Network Management and Development: the core regulated distribution business, 
which in 1996 had a turnover of £330 Million, a workforce of 1100, and an 
operational goal of "maximising efficiency and profitability of the regional 
distribution network"; 
Metering: which collects information on electricity usage, which in 1996 had a 
turnover of £35 Million and a workforce of 55, and an operational goal of 
"developing metering and data handling"; 
Construction: which was responsible for maintaining the electricity network, 
which in 1996 had a turnover of £100 Million and a workforce of 1350, and an 
operational goal of providing "resources for building and maintaining the 
network"; and 
Supply: which was responsible for the supply of gas and electricity to retail 
customers, which in 1996 had a turnover of £ 1.2 Billion and a workforce of 700, 
and an operational goal of providing "integrated electricity and gas sales with a 
strong marketing focus" (EME, 1996, p.3). 
The change, with the intention of enabling "management to monitor costs more closely 
and expose cross subsidies" (Holberton, 1996k), introduced even greater freedom and 
responsibility to functional managers, although it did not go as far as establishing each 
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company as separate legal entities, ensuring that the culture remained fundamentally role 
oriented. 
The takeover ofEME by Dominion Resources in 1996 did not produce major structural 
change, as the new owners of the Company were happy to continue with the structure 
developed in the previous era. However the sale in 1998 ofEME to PowerGen, ending 
PowerGen's search for a REC, which had seen it bid for Midlands in 1996 (Wighton et 
aI, 1996), brought about some further change, resulting in the following structure as 
illustrated at Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: The Current Structure of PowerGenJEME 
PowerGen 
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PowerGen 
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Where possible, PowerGen has integrated EME's business into its own. Therefore 
electricity retail is now carried out under PowerGen's brand name for EME's industrial 
and commercial customers, but EME's brand is now used for contact with domestic 
customers. Similarly, the customers of EME's subsidiary Sterling Gas have been 
incorporated into PowerGen's Gas retailing company PowerGen Gas, formerly Kinetica 
Ltd. Additionally, EME's Lincoln Green Energy has been integrated into PowerGen's 
Energy Management Business. Where PowerGen did not previously possess experience, 
such as the areas of Distribution and Metering, the EME brand has been retained. 
6.1.3 Strategy Decisions at EME 
This review ofEME's development since privatisation suggests the following: 
~ that at the beginning of the process the Company had a series of aims leading to 
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one principal objective, which was increasing profitability. This objective was 
initially established, but little in the actions of EME suggests that a planned 
approach to achieving this objective was set in place; and 
that after the failure of this approach, with its associated corporate strategy based 
upon diversification and a wide interpretation of core competencies, the Company 
sought radical change based upon a changed emphasis. The decision to focus 
upon the effective management of its core business may have seen a more 
prescriptive approach adopted at EME. 
EME was one ofthe RECs that was unable to provide further assistance with the research 
project, and did not permit any of its managers to speak to the author. As such, the 
observations made with respect to EME's strategy process will not be tested at this point 
in the research, but will instead contribute towards the development of general concepts 
of the strategy processes among the RECs to be tested in the case study chapters 
immediately following this set of chapters. The purpose of the following section is to 
identify the key corporate and business strategies EME pursued from 1989 onwards. 
Firstly, the corporate strategy decisions ofEME. 
6.1.3.1 Corporate Strategy 
It will be necessary to refer back to Section 6.1.1 throughout this section in order to 
identify the differing businesses that EME was engaged in. Initially, there were four: 
distribution, supply, appliance retail, and contracting. These were shortly joined by 
security services, generation, and gas retail, before the Company was finally integrated 
into the current operational activities of PowerGen. Most of the details about each 
business's corporate strategies have been alluded to in Section 6.1.1 of this chapter, but 
a more formal narrative is provided here, by business activity. 
(a) Distribution: the extent to which any REC could contemplate a corporate strategy that 
did not involve a concentrated growth approach is limited. The actions of the Regulator, 
reflecting the fact that distribution was and remains a monopoly activity, mitigates against 
any other approach. Service quality is obviously a key issue, in so far as it allows the 
Regulator to judge the effectiveness of a REC's performance in this area. Some RECs, 
in recognition of this concern chose to keep their contacting arm close by their distribution 
business to ensure it was focussed upon maintaining these performance levels. EME 
chose to seek to provide its contracting business with greater business freedom, and this 
may have had a detrimental impact upon its ability to achieve the key factors associated 
with concentrated growth. It is also important to note that when the turnaround strategy 
was applied to EME in 1994, distribution was one area that felt its impact, with significant 
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cost reduction being introduced. This may be interpreted as an acknowledgement that the 
original concentrated growth strategy had not been pursued as assiduously as it may have 
been. Within the industry as a whole, only three other strategies have been observed in 
distribution: the joint venture approach, as followed by Eastern Group (Section 7.2) and 
London Electricity (Section 7.3); the takeover approach favoured by SWEBIWPD 
(Section 6.4) and the regional development approach identified with companies like 
Northern (Section 5.3). There is no evidence that these approach have been sought by 
EME. 
(b) Electricity and Gas Supply: EME was identified as being a REC that was aggressively 
seeking large supply contracts from the beginning of the privatisation era, and was thus 
pursuing a strategy of market development, in support of a concentrated growth 
approach. The problems EME experienced with levels of service for its customers 
suggest that its eagerness to pursue large customers may have lost it some of the goodwill 
it built up with its domestic customers, pointing to deficiencies in its concentrated growth 
strategy. This was addressed to some extent during the turnaround period 1994-96, with 
the introduction of a new customer call centre aiming to improve its service to customers. 
EME was not one of the RECs seeking wide ranging product development, to the extent 
that a company such as Eastern Group (Section 7.2) has sought, although this has changed 
now that the supply business has been integrated into PowerGen's, and is able to bring to 
bear that Company's greater capabilities in this area. PowerGen speaks of its aim of 
bringing on line and continually improving its product development activity through "new 
systems and processes .... (to) .... enable it to adjust flexibly to the continuously evolving 
trading arrangements, changing customer and site numbers, and increasingly sophisticated 
customer requirements" (powerGen, 2000). In the gas supply business, EME's strategy 
was initially innovative, and then centred upon concentrated growth. EME chose not to 
pursue the aggressive market development experienced in its electricity supply business, 
preferring to focus upon its concentrated growth approach. This changed, as had its 
approach to electricity, when it was absorbed into PowerGen's gas business. 
(c) Appliance Retail, Contracting, and Security: the unregulated businesses that EME 
operated, which were either businesses that had been in existence prior to privatisation, 
appliance retailing and contracting, or developed after privatisation, security, were all 
intended to generate additional unregulated income for the group. Retail was immediately 
under threat from strong competitive forces, and its concentrated growth approach put 
to the test and found wanting. EME's reaction was initially to seek a joint venture 
partner, Yorkshire Electric, to share the risk involved, and when that failed to tum the 
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tide, the enterprise was divested. In contracting, EME attempted to follow a programme 
of market and product development, following a series of takeovers of other companies 
in the same industry. The venture failed to produce the required returns, and the business 
was partially liquidated, and partially divested. Security was identified as an area where 
EME felt its core competencies could be utilised, and so was arguably a concentric 
diversification rather than a conglomerate diversification. However, this venture did not 
perform as well as expected, and did not offer the synergies to justify retaining the 
business, and so was divested. 
(d) Generation: EME's involvement in generation represents an attempt to strengthen the 
Company's basic concentrated growth strategy through a combined approach involving: 
innovation, where EME was one of the first RECs to explore the potential of generation 
as a means of improving its operational effectiveness; horizontal integration, where Corby 
Power helped EME manage both its distribution and supply businesses more effectively; 
and joint ventures, as the Corby project was undertaken in association with Hawker 
Siddeley to spread the risk, and to develop compatible organisational skills. The 
Company's generation assets were retained by Dominion Resources after the sale of the 
rest of the Company, due to PowerGen's existing holdings in the generation field. 
This section has aimed to demonstrate that EME was initially the most adventurous of the 
RECs, and sought to build extensively upon a core concentrated growth strategy. 
However as part of this attempt EME very clearly was diverted from the successful 
pursuit of its central strategic objectives, based upon effectively managing its core 
capabilities in relation to network management. The EME case provides an example of 
what can happen to a company that is over ambitious, although the question of who 
judges the extent of 'over ambition' is key. Clearly, in the case ofEME it was the City 
of London that made this judgement and so influenced the behaviour of the managers of 
the Company leading to its turnaround. The EME case also suggests that after a 
turnaround strategy becomes necessary, a company is likely to tum to a core concentrated 
growth strategy. 
6.1.3.2 Business Strategy 
In relation to the question of how EME has decided to compete, it is again necessary to 
briefly consider each activity separately, but to draw conclusions collectively. In 
distribution, the business strategy that EME pursued was effectively chosen by its 
operating environment. Given the nature of the regulatory environment, the only available 
competitive approach was overall cost leadership, although as the distribution industry is 
a regional monopoly, and as argued throughout, to call it a competitive approach is 
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perhaps a misnomer. In supply, differentiation has grown in importance as competition 
has evolved. However differentiation is perhaps an order winning criteria, whereas cost 
leadership remains the order qualifying criteria2. While costs to domestic customers 
remain fairly constant across the industry, companies have sought to differentiate 
themselves to win orders. This suggests a segmented benefit approach to domestic 
customers. EME initially pursued a focussed differentiation approach, or a segmented 
benefit focus, in winning large out-of-area customers, while neglecting its domestic 
customers, a situation it sought to reverse after 1994. A full review of the aims and 
objectives of PowerGen is beyond the remit of this research. However, readers are 
directed to a recent review of that Company since privatisation (Jennings, 2000). 
6.2 Midlands Electricity (now known as GPU Power UK) 
Midlands is the REC for the west and central midlands of England. The Company's 
operating franchise covered an area of 13,300 square kilometres centred upon the densely 
populated conurbation of greater Birmingham, as well as parts of Staffordshire, and the 
largely rural areas of Gloucester shire, Hereford and Worcester and Shropshire. The area's 
demand profile includes a varied mixture of domestic, commercial and agricultural demand 
as the importance of heavy industry in the region diminished, to be replaced to some 
extent by widespread development among the small and medium size enterprises sector. 
The area has also seen significant inward relocation by financial service organisations, 
attracted by cheaper land costs and an improved transport infrastructure (Kleinwort 
Benson, 1990, p.376). The Company itself was favoured by the City at the beginning of 
the period, and was thought to be well managed (Thomas, 1990b). It had developed a 
young management team, drawing extensively upon non-industry experience under the 
Executive Board level, and had put in place a 20-strong team of economists "to model its 
local economy, believing this to be the key to understanding its prospects in the private 
sector: the amount of electricity travelling over its local distribution network, where most 
of its profits are made, will depend on the economic fortunes of its home territory" 
(Thomas, 1990b). Midlands had also shown foresight by moving into the Combined Heat 
and Power (CHP) market in anticipation of the possibility of losing some of its IMW 
customers to self-generation programmes. Furthermore, It was seen to be a low cost 
operator, with relatively limited scope for cost reduction after controllable costs were cut 
in the run up to privatisation. In other words, it was identified as the perfect utility stock: 
2 
Hill advocated the view that in a market place certain attributes of a good or service were necessarily to 
be offered to a conswner before the consumer would even contemplate a purchase. These were the order 
qualifying criteria. To make the consumer actually purchase the good or service, an added value should 
be attached to the product. This was the order winning criteria (Hill, 2000). 
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reliable, safe and consistent. However, at the same time, it was also the REC most keen 
to open up its overseas activities, to some extent contradicting its reliable, safe and 
consistent image. 
6.2.1 Key Events: 1990-2000 
Midlands was one of the most active of the RECs in the area of generation. Its 
participation in the Teeside Power joint venture was one of the first moves in this area, 
and signalled an intent to "pursue opportunities for profitable participation in this and 
other generation projects" (KJeinwort Benson, 1990, p.403) from the very beginning. This 
involvement in generation meant that, from an early stage, Midlands sought to identifY 
itself as an energy company, rather than a more conventional REC. Despite this, the 
Company was viewed as one of the more conservative of the RECs, given its explicit 
concern for cost management and the reduction of its gearing. As mentioned in the 
preceding section, Midlands had undertaken a cost review prior to privatisation and went 
into the period convinced that it was a lean, low cost company. It had also developed a 
divisional structure, and with the establishment of Central Power to manage its generation 
activities, was beginning the process of establishing separate business units for its various 
activities. 
Throughout the period Midlands strove to develop businesses which complemented the 
core distribution and supply businesses but which also enabled these core businesses to 
operate as cost effectively as possible, although its main priority was still to be maintaining 
and improving the distribution network. To this end Midlands: 
~ entered a variety of joint venture CHP projects, such as Elm Energy and Recycling 
(Samuelson, 1990e), Cory Environmental, marketing agreements with Unilever's 
H Leverton subsidiary (Sychrava and Pearson, 1990), and STEAG, the German 
power company (Anon, 1991a); and formed ajoint venture with American Ref-
fuel called Mass Energy aiming to market CHP projects to local authorities 
(Buckley, 1992b); 
~ set up its own CHP subsidiary, Cogen (Sychrava, 1991 d); 
~ explored the possibility of further investment in generation in projects such as the 
Seabank Power project with BG at A vonmouth (Hargreaves and Sychrava, 1991), 
and in a joint venture with Courtaulds and Mowlem CRSS (Thomas, 1990b); 
was a partner in Humberside Power joint venture with IVa, ABB and Tomen 
(Smith, 1994j); 
sought to defend its existing supply customers so that at the end of the first year 
of competition for IMW customers it had only lost 1 % to competitors (Sychrava, 
1991 a). Although it was not initially identified as one of the leading RECs in 
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tenns of market development, it was quoted as offering a 20% tariff reduction to 
prospective new customers at the opening of the 100kW market (Smith, 1994a) 
having established a subsidiary called Powerline to pursue new customers; 
became the first REC to enter the gas market in a joint venture called Midlands 
Gas with US utility Utili corp, and from even this early stage was looking at the 
possibility of a dual fuel product offering as a means of attracting customers 
(Sychrava, 1991c). Midlands Gas was at this time widely regarded as one of the 
strongest independent gas marketing companies; 
merged its appliance retailing activities into E&S Retail, the joint venture set up 
by Eastern and London (Thornhill, 1992), which was eventually divested in 1995 
(Hollinger, 1995t); 
cut some 460 jobs over the reporting year 1992 leaving a workforce of about 
7,500 (Sychrava, 1992e). These cuts were made in order to reduce overall costs 
by 4%. Jobs lost through this cost reduction programme were estimated to have 
risen to 800 by 1993, and the Company announced a plan in 1994 to cut further 
1200 jobs before 1997 (Smith, 1994g); 
described the process associated with reducing controllable costs (manpower) as 
one involving a contingent re-skilling of the workforce. The Company was aiming 
to find the proper number of people to run the business. CEO Hughes said that 
"This is not a long-tenn salami exercise. We have to run this business efficiently 
and safely and to do that you need people." The cuts were being implemented "by 
applying more sensible methods and working more flexibly and by investing in 
better equipment." Engineers were multi-skilling to prevent long waiting times, 
and multiple visits to complete jobs, and had altered the length of the working day 
to provide more flexibility (Smith, 1995a); 
claimed that the Regulator's 1993 report on perfonnance showed it was providing 
a better service than other RECS and had the lowest electricity bills in England 
and Wales (Lascelles, 1993d); and 
became involved in a major international consortium, Wing Merrill with US 
utilities such as Enron, seeking generation opportunities in Kuwait, China and 
Turkey (Midlands Electricity, 1993, p.IO). It also became a shareholder in the 
Enersis Group of Portugal (Anon, 1993e), and entering wide ranging series of 
other ventures overseas, in Bangladesh (Anon, 1995b) and in Hungary. 
The attitude of the City towards Midlands was largely determined by its approach towards 
seeking overseas investment opportunities. The concern was that this approach 
contradicted the safe utility 'bet' that Midlands represented in every other respect, and 
was thought to possibly be misplaced given Midlands problems in meeting its standards 
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of performance, which led to it failing OFFER's "overall standards" (Sychrava, 1992g). 
Despite this concern, a review of suggested 'buys' in the sector by analysts such as UBS, 
SG Warburg and Hoare Govett identified Midlands as one of the leading shares (Smith, 
1994f). 
The expiration ofthe Government's golden share lead to much anticipation about possible 
bids for Midlands. Midlands had previously looked at the potential offered by a merger 
with its fellow REC Southern Electric, but both parties had concluded that the savings 
realised by such a merger would not add sufficient value (Smith, 1995h). However, the 
proposed agreed takeover by PowerGen was based more upon a growth strategy, than the 
REC-REC merger which would have sought principally to realise synergistic savings 
opportunities. The deal, the first proposed between an English generator and a REC, 
followed the takeover by ScottishPower of Manweb. Midlands was chosen for several 
reasons. The size of Midlands' electricity supply business "which is one of the largest 
among regional electricity companies", would provide a significant market for PowerGen 
(Smith and Wighton, 1995b). Midlands was also considered by the City to have one of 
the strongest balance sheets among the RECs, as well as having experience of 
international generation projects. It would also provide an expertise in billing, marketing 
and customer service that PowerGen would otherwise have had to develop organically. 
Furthermore Midlands' supply business would complement PowerGen's existing supply 
business, which exclusively served large customers. The bid valued Midlands at £1.95 
billion (Lascelles et aI, 1995). 
However, from the early stages of the bid the industry regulator expressed some disquiet 
about the proposed takeover, and its implications for the wider development of 
competition within the industry. The move, he felt, would lead to vertical integration 
within the industry (Smith, 1995j). His opposition grew as the other English generator, 
National Power, also made a bid for a REC, Southern Electric (Section 7.5). The bids 
were referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission by the Secretary of State in 
late 1995 (Wighton, 1995g), who blocked them in early 1996 (Wighton et aI, 1996), 
overturning a favourable recommendation by the MMC. 
Midlands was not to remain independent for very long following the collapse of the 
PowerGen bid. A US consortium called Avon Energy, formed by General Public Utilities 
of New Jersey and CINergy of Cincinnati, agreed a takeover valuing Midlands at £1.7 
billion less than one month later (Harverson, 1996). The US group's motivations for the 
investment were varied, although they announced that they were acquiring Midlands 
because it offered them a chance to expand in profitable overseas markets and gain 
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experience of operating in the deregulated industry ahead of similar changes in the US 
(Harverson and Holberton, 1996). Operationally, the Company was expected to remain 
unchanged in relation to its management structure or its corporate objectives. 
Strategically, Midlands retained its existing objectives under its new owners. The 
Company sought to increase the profitability of its distribution business by controlling 
costs and improving performance, and of its supply business by aggressive selling and 
competitive pricing, helped by its UK generation investments. Its major unregulated 
business profits came from gas supply, and its overseas generation and associated 
investments. However, from early 1998 there were suggestions that Avon was among the 
US companies less satisfied with the performance of their investment principally as a result 
of the windfall tax on utility profits, and the government's proposals for business 
separation (Taylor, 1998a). This led eventually to the sale of Midlands' supply activities 
to National Power, in late 1998. The transaction, the first in the sector which saw the 
separation of a REC's licenced businesses, saw National Power agreeing to pay £180 
million to Midlands' owners for its supply business which has 2.2 million customers. It left 
a much reduced Midlands, consisting of its distribution and generation interests under the 
continuing ownership of Avon Energy. 
The future direction of the Company appears to lie in managing regulated networks. In 
mid- 1999, Midlands was reported to be seeking to purchase a water company (Taylor, 
1999a). Evidence of its continuing emphasis upon cost management came in Late 1999, 
when it announced the loss of a further 300 jobs in its distribution business, partially as 
a result of the regulatory price review (Taylor, 1999f). In March 2000, Midlands 
Electricity changed its name to GPU Power UK, in recognition of its new sole owner, and 
also of the ending of its involvement in the more visible supply business (GPU, 2000b). 
The new Company is comprised of GPU Power Distribution, the former Network Services 
division, which owns and operates the network, and GPU Power Engineering, the former 
Engineering Services division which carries out fault restoration, maintenance and repairs. 
Other subsidiaries of the new company include MEB Contracting, Metering Services, 
Midlands Power International, and Energy Services (UK) Limited. 
6.2.2 Structure of Midlands Electricity 
In this section, the management and organisational structures of Midlands are presented, 
and significant changes to either during the period are highlighted. Firstly, the senior 
management structure up to the present. At privatisation, the Executive Directors on the 
Main Board of Midlands were as follows: 
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Name Position Joined Midlands in From 
Bryan Townsend Chairman and Chief 1986 SWEB 
Executive 
Richard Young Managing Director 1982 CEGB Generation 
Peter Chapman Executive Director 1989 Triplex Lloyd 
Finance 
Garry Degg Executive Director 1987 SWEB 
Corporate Services 
Michael Hughes Executive Director 1990 GEC Alsthom 
Engineering 
Roger Murray Executive Director 1985 Electricity Council 
Marketing and 
Supplies 
All of the initial executive director's were either chartered engineers, accountants or 
secretaries, and most had considerable experience of the ESI, the exceptions being 
Chapman and Young. The Company split the roles of Chairman and CEO in April 1993, 
with Townsend remaining as Chairman and Hughes being promoted to CEO, Young 
having left the Company in 1993. Degg also changed job title, becoming Executive 
Director Operations (Midlands Electricity, 1993, p.12-13). The membership of the board 
then remained the same until the takeover by Avon Energy, when minor changes occurred. 
The most significant was the replacement of Townsend as Chairman by James Leva, of 
Avon Energy, the new owners. Other changes that occurred under Avon's ownership 
involved the replacement of Chapman by Stephen King of Seeboard, in 1996 and a change 
in role for Murray to Group Executive Director of Energy Services, Regulation and 
Competition, in 1998. The sale of the Company's supply business reduced the size of the 
main board, but the composition has remained largely the same. At present, Hughes is still 
CEO, Murray is Chief Operating Officer, and King is Group Finance Officer. 
At the beginning of the privatisation process Midlands, in common with other RECs, 
operated a two-tier structure consisting of seven divisions reporting to the Company's 
head office in Halesowen. Again as with other RECs, the head office was responsible for 
policy formulation, and the management of centralised operations such as electricity 
purchasing, the operation of the distribution system, the negotiation of major sales 
contracts and for research and development. The Company's generation business was 
also based at its headquarters. The divisions were responsible for customer related 
activities such as electricity sales, construction and maintenance of the distribution 
network, the retailing and servicing of appliances, contracting, meter reading, collection 
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of accounts and the maintenance of emergent services. Within the wider Company, a 
system of directorates had been established, and the managerial and structural relationship 
was as follows: "The management of Midlands Electricity is controlled by six Executive 
Directors, comprising the Chairman who is also the Chief Executive, the Managing 
Director and the four Executive Directors who have responsibility for the finance, 
corporate services, marketing and supplies and engineering directorates. There are other 
departments responsible for business planning and external affairs, trading and internal 
audit. There is significant delegation of authority to the seven divisional managers who 
are responsible for the conduct of day-to-day business in their division within a framework 
of central planning, target setting and control. All Executive Directors, heads of 
department and the seven divisional managers report to the Managing Director" 
(Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.394). 
Clearly, and despite the Company's claims of the devolution of authority, Midlands was 
a functionally structured organisation with a role culture, at the time of privatisation. It 
still operated on a departmental basis, and the coordination of the Company involved 
ridged centralised planning and control systems. Midlands was therefore one of the RECs 
that had altered its structure least at the time of privatisation. Shortly after privatisation 
the Company rationalised its structure to provide a platform for each business to adjust 
to the demands of its specific market. However, and unlike other companies, it did not 
at this stage formerly separate its distribution and supply activities. By the time of 
Midlands' third annual report (1994), the Company operated a divisional structure, as 
shown in Figure 6.2, which is reproduced from its 1994 Annual Report. This structure 
sustained the Company through until the sale of its supply business. This sale caused a 
major change in the structure of Midlands, now known as GPU Power UK. The present 
group structure is shown at Figure 6.3. 
6.3.3 Strategy Decisions at Midlands 
The sale of Midlands Electric's supply business to National Power reduces the scope of 
this section considerably. Therefore, it is proposed that the strategic decisions and 
processes of Midlands be explored in two phases: 1989 - 1998, and 1998 to the present 
day. Within the first phase, the separate corporate and business strategies of the different 
businesses of Midlands will be examined individually, but the second phase will be 
assessed collectively. 
6.3.3.1 Midlands Electricity 1989-1998 
An overall assessment of Midlands during this period would conclude that it was a 
fundamentally conservative organisation with an explicit commitment to lowering costs 
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Figure 6.2: Group Structure of Midlands Electricity, 1994 
Midlands Electricity 
Electricity Distribution and Supply 
Our distribuUon business delivers power to 2.2 million premises 
in the heart of Britain. We own and operate a 39,000 mile network of 
overhead lines and underground cables and 47,000 transforming points. 
Our Supply business buys electricity and sells it to customers in our 
franchise area and, through our energy trading service Powerline, 
to business customers all over the UK 
Central Power Holdings a wholly owned subsidiary, owns our 
power generation interests in the UK and overseas. 
Midland Gas supplies natural gas to industrial, 
commercial and large domestic customers throughout the UK. 
MER Contracting provides quality electrical installations and a 
wide range of home improvement products and services. 
Midlands Energy Services provides environmental consultancy, 
project management and energy efficiency services for clients nationally. 
Powerhouse Retail a joint venture with Eastern Electricity 
and Southern Electric, sells electrical goods through a 
chain of high street and out-of-town stores. 
From: Midlands Electricity, Energy: Annual Report and Accounts 1994, p.l 
Figure 6.3: Group Structure of GPU Power UK, 2000-1 
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International 
and raising quality, but which at the same time undertook risky investments particularly 
in overseas generation projects. The strategic approach of each business was as follows: 
(a) Distribution: Midlands pursued a strict concentrated growth approach in distribution, 
attempting through a number of staff reduction initiatives to reduce controllable costs. 
However, it sought at the same time to stress that staff reduction was accompanied by a 
programme of retraining to increase the effectiveness of remaining staff, and hence 
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improve the perfonnance of the network. Some of the highlights from the Regulator's last 
Quality of Service Report (MEB, 1999) demonstrate the service quality improvements 
Midlands has been making: 
~ Customer Minutes Lost 14% Lower than 1997/1998; 
~ 92.6% of Supplies Restored in 3 Hours; 
~ 100% of Supplies Restored in 24 Hours; 
~ 8% Reduction in Interruptions per 100 Customers; 
~ £72.6 Million Invested in Network; and 
~ ISO 9002 Quality Assurance Accreditation Awarded for Standards of Service 
Monitoring. 
(b) Supply: Midlands appears to have adopted a concentrated growth approach in its 
supply business, at least in the early stages following privatisation. The Company was 
recognised as having been very successful at retaining large supply customers, following 
the opening of the 1MW market, but not having an aggressive approach to market 
development in the search for new customers. By 1994 when the 100kW market opened, 
that situation had changed and Midlands was intent on growing its supply business. It was 
thought to have been successful in this objective, and this was a principal reason given for 
National Power's decision to buy Midland's supply business in 1998. Like other RECs, 
Midlands sought to reduce its prices to customers. Partially this was due to regulatory 
influence, but it was also a competitive decision aimed at larger customers, and in 
preparation for domestic competition in 1998. The desire for managing cost and risk in 
supply underpinned the Company's domestic generation strategy. Like other RECs 
Midlands operated a specialist team, Midlands Energy Services, to offer consultancy 
services to prospective customers to improve efficiency and reduce costs, a segmented 
utility focus approach. Midlands' efforts in this area involved sponsoring an award, the 
Business Energy Award, to encourage small businesses to think about their energy 
consumption (Midlands Electricity, 1995, p.8). They also supported local environmental 
groups to spread concern for energy efficiency. 
(c) Generation, domestic and overseas: Midlands' domestic generation activity was aimed 
at supporting its supply business. The Company was one of the leading domestic 
independent generators, with its investments in Teeside and Humberside Power groups, 
and in CHP. The approach was initially concentric diversification, in support of its overall 
concentrated growth approach. The Company's overseas activity was primarily a revenue 
generation activity, aimed at increasing unregulated profits. Midlands argued that the 
nature of the investments: in business areas they knew; in stable economies; and in large 
joint ventures or consortia, carried minimal business risk (Midlands Electricity, 1995, 
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p.lO). 
(d) Other Unregulated Businesses: Appliance Retail was managed to a strict concentrated 
growth approach, and when margins weakened was placed in a joint venture with other 
REC's businesses. However, continuing poor performance lead to divestment. 
Contracting was managed specifically for a concentrated growth approach, and continues 
as such today. The Company has recently established a separate metering business in 
anticipation of competitive and business separation developments in this area. 
6.3.3.2 GPU Power UK 1998-the Present 
The sale ofthe Company's supply business in 1998 drew MidlandslGPU back towards a 
core focus upon its distribution business. The Company now operates very firmly to a 
concentrated growth agenda, with limited unregulated revenue growth being sought by 
its generation and metering businesses, which pursue market development opportunities 
linked to the Company's overriding concentrated growth approach. Recent rumours have 
suggested that the Company is seeking to build upon its network management core 
competence by moving into the ownership of water or gas distribution networks. 
6.3 South Wales Electricity Case Study (also known as SW ALEC, a 
subsidiary of Hyder) 
SWALEC is the REC for the South of Wales. The Company's operating franchise 
covered an area of 11,800 square kilometres and included all of south Wales from central 
Powys in the north to the Bristol Channel in the south, and from the Dyfed coast in the 
west to the eastern border ofGwent. The area's population has remained relatively static, 
at 2.1 million, for twenty years. Most of this population live in the southern coastal belt, 
and the remainder of the area is sparsely populated. Heavy industry, coal and steel, have 
declined in recent years but the area has been identified as a development area, and in 
recent years inward foreign investment and regional development funds have been 
substantial, leading to the development of light industrial and commercial demand. As a 
result, the Company's customer base is more diverse than it had been previously, although 
in 1990 over 50% of its demand still came from industrial customers. The managers of 
SW ALEC were relatively circumspect in estimating their future prospects after 
privatisation. They, along with all other companies, noted their reliance upon their local 
economy (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.642), but also noted that they foresaw lower growth 
in their immediate future. Furthermore, they downplayed the importance of supply, 
stating that they did not "expect the supply business to provide a material contribution to 
the Company's earnings, taking one year with another" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.642). 
Consequently their statement indicated a focus on effective management and upon 
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strengthening the core distribution business. SW ALEC is of interest principally, therefore, 
in its role as one of the smaller RECs, and its reaction to the new opportunities made 
available to it. The next section deals with the key events involving SW ALEC in the 
decade since privatisation. 
6.3.1 Key Events: 1990-2000 
As reported in Section 6.3, SW ALEC was from an early stage a company seeking to focus 
upon its core business, with the result that it approached other existing or new business 
opportunities from a more cautious, concentrated growth based attitude. It wanted to be 
one of the RECs who were identified as a distribution company first and foremost, and 
was not expected to engage in unrelated diversification. This approach was perhaps in 
part a reaction to the concern expressed in various quarters about its viability in a 
competitive environment, and in part a recognition of its relative weakness. It was 
identified as early as 1990 as being a potential takeover target (Thomas, 1990e), reflecting 
its status as the smallest of the RECs by capitalisation. It also performed weakly in the last 
reporting round under government ownership, and was regarded in some quarters as 
having a weak leadership (Thomas, 1990i). It also had a poor reliability record (Lascelles, 
1991), ultimately recognised in official OFFER statistics (Lascelles, 1993e), but blamed 
this upon prolonged exposure to inclement weather. In the early days following 
privatisation analysts such as UBS saw the company as an high risk investment although 
Smith New Court rated it is a modest risk as it expected the government to treat it more 
gently than other RECs, reflecting its demographic and infra-structural problems (Thomas, 
1990e), and it was provided with the most favourable price setting formula in the initial 
regulatory review. SW ALEC's preference for an approach based upon its distribution 
business was demonstrated by its efforts to involve itself with the Cardiff Bay 
development programme, which would enhance the earnings potential of that business 
(Sychrava, 1990a). 
SW ALEC's seeming lack offocus on its supply business was reflected in the apparent lack 
of concern for significant losses among its portfolio of larger supply customers. For 
example, it was reported to have lost 37% of its 1MW customers within months of the 
market opening to competition (Thomas, 1990d). However, it was one of the RECs to 
take the view that it would not seek to retrain or obtain a customer base at uneconomic 
prices, despite investor disquiet at the news of this loss of custom. It felt that the 
companies taking away its customers were doing so at uneconomic prices. SW ALEC 
rationalised that the cost oflosing even very large supply customers did not have a undue 
detrimental effect upon the Company's performance (Thomas, 1990e). However the 
development of self-generation capability among its larger customers would have a direct 
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and negative impact upon its core distribution business. This was a real threat to 
SW ALEC's earnings growth potential. 
The only area that SW ALEC felt confident enough to predict non-core business 
development was generation. It's prospectus stated that it was keen to pursue 
participation in generation projects where the potential for "attractive long term" returns 
had been identified (KJeinwort Benson, 1990, p.642). Consequently, they were among 
the RECs that agreed to participate in the Teeside Power joint venture with Enron 
(Thomas, 1990c). They were also identified as being a potential partner in a joint venture 
with Texaco and Mission Energy in South Wales (Thomas, 1990a). 
SW ALEC's approach in the years immediately after privatisation were therefore very 
closely based upon a concentrated growth approach. It: 
~ announced a plan to reduce its controllable costs by between 2% and 3% per 
annum (Sychrava, 1991 b), but cost cutting eventually became much more severe 
over this initial period (Lascelles, 1994c) running at 8% per annum in 1994; 
spent £56 million on improvements to improve the integrity of its network in 1992 
(SWALEC, 1993, p.15); 
~ was among the first of the RECs to leave retail (Sychrava, 1992d); and 
~ summarised its strategic intent in 1995 when it announced that it would drive its 
core business hard, taking out costs and improving services (Adburnham, 1995). 
It did however reject the potential synergistic opportunities presented by the possibility 
of a joint venture with Welsh Water (Dalby, 1991). Against this, it also sought to develop 
non-core unregulated business to account for one fifth of its profits by 2000 (Smith, 
1994h), leading to some concern over its exposure in areas like contracting that were not 
performing as well as hoped (Lascelles, 1993a), particularly after some horizontal 
acquisitions by its contracting subsidiary Celtic Contracting Services. It was the second 
REC to enter the cable telephony industry, as a partner in the CableTeI joint venture 
(Adonis, 1993 c), and was among the RECs to enter the gas industry in its joint venture 
with Amerada Hess, to be known as South Wales Energy (Anon, 1992f). CableTel was 
expected to generate up to 10% of group earnings by 2000. Progress during this time was 
seen as being steady. Its cost reduction programme was effective, and it was the first 
REC to cut its prices after privatisation (Sychrava, 1992d). 
The expiration of the Government's golden share in the RECs in March of 1995, saw 
SW ALEC in a stable economic, but precarious organisational position. During the early 
months, there was much speculation that SW ALEC would be one of the first RECs to 
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receive a bid, but in actuality that bid did not come until late in 1995, when several of the 
RECs had already changed ownership. The bid came from Welsh Water, which had 
caused controversy early in the period by taking a large preemptive stake in SW ALEC 
(Dalby, 1991). The bid was not welcomed by the board of SWALEC, but the City 
identified it as a logical step, to reduce costs through synergy in an area of the country 
where operating costs were seen as being substantially higher than elsewhere. Indeed, the 
lack of any early bid was put down to the questionable benefit of acquiring SW ALEC for 
any investor that did not realise substantial synergistic savings (Hollinger, 1995g). 
Analysts placed an expected saving of £35 million on any merger between the two Welsh 
companies. Welsh Water throughout the bid process refused to estimate the expected 
level of savings. After some negotiation, the bid was finally cleared in early 1996 
(Wighton and Lascelles, 1996). 
After the takeover Hyder, as the merged companies were to be known, set about a 
process of severe rationalisation aimed at pairing its assets down to its core businesses. 
The first step in this process was to establish a common services company to manage a 
range of support services including customer inquiries, training and information 
technology. This decision appeared to suggest that central functions, rather than core 
business functions could expect to see cost reductions. In June of 1996, the Company 
announced 900 jobs were to be cut, of which 570 came from the combined services 
company (Martinson, 1996a). Overall, 10% of the Company's workforce was to be cut, 
with the aim of realising £46 million worth of savings directly from the merger, and a 
further £54 million as a result of post-merger efficiency savings. These cuts were 
followed by further cost reduction measures, such as the formal merger of the water, 
electricity and gas businesses which achieved a reduction of 3 50 jobs. The Company also 
merged its non-core businesses to form Hyder Infrastructure Developments, and realise 
more savings (Terazono, 1997). At the 1998 reporting stage, Hyder announced that its 
cost reduction programmes had realised a further £ 17 million in savings that year, with 
further savings anticipated (Taylor, 1998d). 
The programme also included the divestment of non-core businesses. The following 
divestments occurred after the takeover: 
~ CableTel SW, to their US partner International CableTel for £50 million 
(Martinson, 1996d); 
~ Property to the value of £ 1 0 million; 
~ Welsh Water's stake in Czech water group Severoceske Vodovody a Kanalizace 
(Anderson, 1998); and most significantly 
SWALEC's supply business to British Energy, for £105 million (Taylor, 1999d). 
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The decision to cease participation in the supply side of SW ALEC's business is indicative 
of a number of trends. Firstly, it was indicative of how difficult it was becoming to 
compete in this industry, especially when a national generator makes an offer for the asset 
that the owner finds hard to resise. Secondly, it showed that Hyder was seeking to 
remain true to its objective of concentrating upon its core businesses. This question of 
'what is core?' was clarified in 1997 when Hyder announced that it viewed its core 
expertise as being the whole life management of assets, an extension of the 'network 
management' core capability that many of the RECs were seeking to emphasise (Marsh, 
1997a). Hyder took this concept further, and this underpinned the Company's decision 
to enter the apparently unrelated area of motorway construction, and other infrastructural 
activities. Managing assets such as these were identified as representing a logical 
extension of the existing skills inherent in the two core infrastructure/network businesses 
(Jowit, 1998). The diversification was necessary because, the Company thought, they 
were rapidly approaching a situation where all cost savings had been 'wrung' from its 
water and distribution businesses, thus threatening profitability. 
The impact of this observation is evidenced by the Company's involvement in large 
consortia, as it has sought opportunities to extend its core skills into projects with an 
emphasis upon major infrastructure development. Hyder was a member of the Cardiff 
Gateway consortium (Adburnham, 1996), the consortium building the Lewisham Link on 
the Docklands Light Railway (Batchelor and Suzman, 1996), the UK Highways 
consortium created to upgrade the M40 (Taylor, 1996), and as part of the Tube Lines 
Group, bidding to take over London Underground lines if they were privatised (Parker 
and Voyle, 1999). In addition, Hyder formed a formal joint venture with John Laing, 
called Hyder Laing, specifically to bid for Public Finance Initiatives (PFI) (Timmins, 
1998). It was also active in consortia bidding for major infrastructure projects in Australia 
and the Far East (Martinson, 1996b). 
The decision to divest the Company's supply business was justified on the basis of it not 
being a core activity. However, the decision Hyder took to consider a divestment of its 
distribution business was more to do with the continuing difficulties that the Group was 
experiencing. The decision was principally located in the review conducted by the water 
regulator which reported in November of 1999. In addition to price cuts, Hyder was 
required to make investments of up to £ 1. 7 billion to improve the quality of its 
3 
Although the valuation of SW ALEC's business was considerably less than those of Midlands, at £180 
million, and SWEB, at £235 million. 
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infrastructure. The extra demands placed upon Hyder by this adjudication were thought 
to be particularly difficult for the Company to meet, especially as Hyder was seen as being 
"particularly vulnerable" at this time (Taylor, 199ge). The proposed sale saw two main 
bidders seeking to buy the distribution business: Western Power Distribution (WPD) and 
Nomura. A bitter takeover struggle followed which saw the UK company, formerly called 
SWEB (Section 6.4), victorious over the Japanese investment bank (Barker, 2000), who 
had aimed to hold the ownership of SW ALEC distribution, but to pass its management 
to United Utilities (Section 5.2), the other major multi-utility organisation operating in 
England and Wales. WPD's aim was to formally merge the two businesses. The sale was 
intended to partially allay concern about the Group's debt which was estimated to have 
exceeded £ 1. 9 billion. 
6.3.2 Structure of SW ALEC 
In this section the management and organisational structures of SW ALEC are presented, 
and significant changes to either during the period are highlighted. Firstly, the senior 
management structure up until the takeover by Welsh Water. At privatisation, the 
Executive Directors on the Main Board of SW ALEC were as follows: 
Name Position Joined SWALEC in From 
Wynford Evans Chairman 1984 London Electricity 
David Jones Managing Director 1988 SWEB 
James Eddyshaw Energy Trading 1972 another Area Board 
Director 
David Myring Finance Director 1988 Peat Marwick 
Mitchell 
Bryon Samuel Operations Director 1950 ESI 
Alan Worth Corporate Services 1969 another Area Board 
Director 
The Main Board of SW ALEC, with the exception of Finance Director Myring, were all 
experienced industry men (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.659). All of these managers, again 
with the exception of My ring, were also chartered engineers. The very seniority of the 
managers who took SW ALEC into the new era ensured that a number of changes 
occurred in short order, and within three years Jones had been redesignated Group Chief 
Executive, Eddyshaw and Worth had both left the board to be replaced by David Gibbard, 
promoted to replace Eddyshaw as energy trading director in 1991, and Michael Mackey, 
promoted to replace Worth as Commercial Director in 1993. Gibbard later, in 1993, 
replaced Samuel as Operations Director on Samuel's retirement. Both Gibbard and 
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Mackey were also ESI men. The changes continued in 1994, as Jones left to join the 
NGC, to be replaced by Andrew Walker from the TI Group, while Evans stood down as 
Chairman, to become Non-Executive Chairman in November of 1994. There were two 
further significant changes to the board before the takeover discussions with Welsh Water. 
Adrian Auer joined from ICI Paints to replace Myring as Finance Director, and Peter 
Morgan replaced Evans as Non-Executive Director in late 1995. After the takeover, 
Morgan was replaced as Chairman by Graham Hawker of Welsh Water, and all of the 
other SWALEC directors were replaced by Welsh Water employees (Anon, 1996). The 
current Main Board of Hyder is as follows: 
Name Position Joined Hyder in From 
John Robins Non-Executive group 1997 Guardian Royal 
Chairman Exchange 
Graham Hawker Group Chief 1993 Water Industry 
Executive 
Paul TwamJey Group Finance 1992 Coopers and 
Director Lybrand 
Michael Brooker Managing Director, 1980 Welsh Water 
Hyder Operations 
John James Group Commercial 1992 non-executive 
Director director 
In relation to organisational structure, SW ALEC was an organisation operating a 
geographically oriented divisional structure at the time of privatisation. This structure 
divided the SW ALEC region into Western, Eastern and Central operating divisions, each 
with a general manager operating with some autonomy from the Head Office within "a 
framework of central planning, target setting and controls" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, 
p.659). The Company also operated a specialist central engineering services unit, in 
addition to other centralised functions at Head Office. Within the Head Office "the Board 
of Directors sets the overall objectives, strategies, policies, budgets and targets for the 
Company" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.659). The corporate centre of the Company 
underwent a reorganisation in 1992, and the Central Group services were slimmed down 
and refocused into four Head Office divisions: Corporate Services, Personnel, Finance and 
Public Affairs (SW ALEC, 1993, p.8). At the same time the core distribution business was 
established as a separate Network Services Division, focussed upon effective operational 
performance. The supply businesses were grouped under the Customer Services Division, 
aimed at enhancing customer satisfaction (SW ALEC, 1994, p.9). At the time of the 
takeover by Welsh Water, therefore, the Company had evolved into a product oriented 
divisional structure, as more autonomy was decentralised from the Head Office. As has 
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been indicated before, part of this change resulted from the instigation of the Regulator, 
but some undoubtably resulted from the growing trend among the RECs to organise their 
various businesses along product divisional lines. 
Hyder, as an organisation, was therefore involved in a wider variety of businesses. These 
included: 
Energy Water Transportation Buildings Services 
power generation water supply bridges specialist consultancy 
on-si te installations water management tunnels structures environmental 
distribution waste water highways public buildings assessment 
networks services ports and airports facilities contact centre 
resource railways and metros management revenue collection 
assessment fleet management procurement 
utility outsourcing payroll 
training 
IT managed services 
Source: Hyder (2000) 
The Company's main operating division is called Hyder Utilities. However, the sale of the 
former SW ALEC distribution business brought a further organisational restructuring, as 
its interest in energy was markedly reduced. 
6.3.3 Strategy Decisions at SW ALEC 
As became clear from the analysis of key events, SW ALEC was an organisation that 
sought to operate a concentrated growth strategy across its whole organisation, but with 
a particular focus upon its core distribution business. This decision manifested itself 
through a focus upon cost management in this area, to maximise the profits allowed by 
the regulatory regime. It also involved large scale infra-structural investments to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the network: a network that was under greater threat 
than most due to the inclemency of the local weather. This concentrated growth approach 
was augmented by market development initiatives such as the Company's participation in 
the Cardiff Bay redevelopment which increased the demand for its network services. 
Once again it is necessary to state that in this monopoly area there was no potential for 
a business strategy of any kind, although the approach pursued closely approximates a 
cost leadership strategy. 
The concentrated growth approach dominated all other aspects of the Company's 
activities. SW ALEC's supply activities suffered initially because of their reliance upon 
industrial demand. However, the Company took an early decision that this problem would 
be combatted by adopting a differentiation focus or a segmented benefit focus approach, 
rather than a cost leadership or cost focus approach, because they did not believe in the 
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economic veracity of entering into a bidding competition with other industry players. 
Having decided not to compete on price, therefore, they sought to compete on service. 
The infrastructure investments already mentioned played a part in this process, as did 
investments like the CROESO computer systems project, a joint venture with SWEB 
which was supposed to improve the Company's responsiveness to customer needs4 . 
SW ALEC, like the other RECs, developed a series of products that it offered to the 
market in an attempt to convince customers of the non-cost benefits of retaining their 
supply from the Company. However, SW ALEC was not one of the innovators in this area 
of the industry and was not prepared to back up its customer service efforts with 
underpriced electricity, a focus benefit approach, in domestic supply. It was, however, 
active in attempting to hedge against fluctuations in its energy costs, by agreeing longer 
tenn supply contracts with both National Power and PowerGen, as well as exploiting the 
scope for cheaper energy generated at Teeside Power, of which it was a part owner 
(SW ALEC, 1995, p.25). After the takeover by Welsh Water and the fonnation of Hyder, 
supply was identified as a non-core business and divested in early 2000. 
The Company's other business activities have all been subject to the same concentrated 
growth approach. SW ALEC's appliance retail operation was one of the first to be 
divested as trading reality began to undermine its operational effectiveness and its 
customer service contribution began to be eroded by other company functions. 
Contracting was initially identified as an area of potential non-regulated earnings growth, 
but over time this also has been principally governed by a concentrated growth approach, 
after early horizontal integration. Generation continued to be an activity principally 
undertaken in support of a competitive supply offering, but since the divestment of supply 
has been run along asset management lines, seeking to improve its contribution to group 
profits through a concentrated growth approach. Other investments, such as the cable 
telephone investment CableTel, have been divested as they no longer conform to the 
concept of a core business. 
Overall therefore, SW ALEC prior to privatisation was one of the RECs that had focussed 
its corporate strategy efforts primarily upon concentrated growth, with only occasional 
forays into diversification, although this diversification was always either concentric or 
based upon horizontal or vertical integration. Among the various businesses, the 
Company was by nature attempting a cost leadership business strategy, but not at the cost 
4 
However, the system ran into considerable problems and was abandoned by Hyder soon after the takeover 
(Holberton, 1996i). 
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of profitability. In situations where attempting to develop cost leadership was leading to 
uneconomic business activity, as it felt was the case in supply, it would seek to develop 
differentiation or focussed differentiation approaches. 
Since the takeover by Welsh Water, SW ALEC as an organisation has become a much 
more abstract concept. The sale of its supply business to British Energy and of its 
distribution business to Western Power Distribution (WPD) effectively mark the end of 
SW ALEC as an identifiable entity: WPD aim to merge SW ALEC's distribution business 
with its own contiguous distribution network once regulatory approval is granted, while 
Nomura were proposing to hold it as an asset, to be managed on its behalf by the other 
multi-utility operating in England and Wales, United Utilities. 
6.4 South Western Electricity Case Study (also known as SWEB, and 
latterly as Western Power Distribution) 
SWEB is the REC for the South West of England. The Company's operating franchise 
covered an area of 14,400 square kilometres from Bristol and Bath in the north east, along 
the south western peninsula to Land's End, and also the Isles of Scilly. The area is largely 
rural, but does include the major towns and cities of Bath, Bristol, Exeter, Plymouth, 
Taunton, Torquay, and Western-super-Mare, as well as many coastal holiday resorts. In 
1989 the population of the SWEB area was estimated at 2.7 million, and growing. The 
demand for energy in the SWEB region was predominantly domestic, with smaller 
amounts of industrial, commercial and agricultural demand. SWEB' s business was 
recognised as being closely tied to the prevailing weather conditions in the most exposed 
region of the UK. In distribution, the location of the Company caused a larger than 
average pressure upon the network system, as maintenance levels are higher due to the 
effects of weather, and corrosion. In supply, with the high proportion of domestic 
customers, demand is seasonally influenced by the weather (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, 
p.694). It's directors believed that the Company's future prospects were very much linked 
to the economic development of the area. They also stated the view that its prospects 
were very closely linked to the prevailing regulatory climate. SWEB, like SW ALEC, is 
of interest principally because of the challenges facing it in the new era which were felt to 
be considerable, and exacerbated by the Company's small size. 
6.4.1 Key Events: 1990-2000 
SWEB's senior managers stated very early on that the Company's distribution activity was 
to remain its core business, contributing the majority of its profits (Pearson, 1990c). 
While they stated a belief that costs could be controlled within that business, they did not 
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initially outline a concerted cost reduction programme. Supply remained a key function, 
but one where performance was very much linked to external factors. They did not 
indicate that market development was on the Company's agenda, nor particularly a policy 
to aggressively pursue new IMW customers in the liberalised franchise market. SWEB 
did, however, indicate at an early stage that they were hoping to make early and repeated 
investments in generation, starting with the decision to take an equity stake in the Teeside 
Power joint venture (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.696). The company also initially 
intended to remain active in, and seek to grow, its appliance retailing business. 
This focus upon distribution and generation, and de-emphasis of supply, was reflected in 
1990 when the Company was reported to have lost up to 70 of its largest supply 
customers in the newly competitive 1 MW supply market (pearson, 1990c). Within its 
existing monopoly business, SWEB was intending to drive out costs and improve its 
customer service. Overall it could be argued, therefore, that SWEB was committed to 
pursuing an archetypal set of strategies that a REC might be expected to pursue based 
upon an emphasis on its core distribution business, identification of generation as a 
potential source of unregulated income, and a commitment to its existing supply and retail 
activities, albeit a less aggressive commitment to supply than many of its peers. 
SWEB was one of the first RECs to move towards developing a divisional structure to 
manage its businesses, and had the new structure in place prior to privatisation. The 
divisions included an operations division, to manage the network; a trading division, which 
included the unregulated contracting and appliance retailing operations; a commercial 
marketing division, which managed the supply business; an information systems and 
personnel division; and a resources and external affairs division, to manage legal and 
external affairs, facilities and property. This configuration was fine-tuned after 
privatisation, but characterised the structure of the company until its takeover by Southern 
Company in 1995. 
The Company identified early on the need to manage costs effectively. It established a 
rolling cost reduction programme aimed at reducing its controllable costs by 10% within 
the first 5 years after privatisation. Although this process was completed a year early, 
SWEB stilI came under criticism from some quarters for not pursuing this approach as 
devotedly as was expected by many observers in the City, and having a lower performance 
level in areas such as keeping customer appointments and so on (Adburnham, 1993). 
SWEB was effectively judged by the performance of other RECs in relation to cost 
reduction, although this is perhaps to do SWEB an injustice. SWEB has always been seen 
as having higher costs than most of the RECs. However, this has been a product of the 
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nature of the operational area SWEB inhabits, which is significantly more challenging than 
for many of the other RECs. 
The key business decisions taken by SWEB during this time included: 
~ Merging with, then taking over, SW ALEC's appliance retailing operations 
(Nakamoto, 1992); 
~ Becoming the third REC to make significant investments in the telecoms services 
sector, by establishing a fibre-optic network across its electricity network (Adonis, 
1993d); 
Taking a stake in the UK's first commercial wind farm, Windelectric (Hunt, 1991); 
and 
Launched a gas marketing subsidiary, Western Gas, in a joint venture with 
Utilicorp (Lascelles, 1992c). 
Overall though, SWEB was identified as being a middle of the road REC, one that had 
made no obviously poor moves but which had failed to shine (Smith, 1995d). It was 
expected to be among the first RECs to receive a bid upon the expiration of the golden 
share, and did so in July 1995. 
SWEB was subject to a contested takeover bid by the US integrated utility Southern 
Companl in July 1995, which was eventually successful in August 1995 (Smith, 1995g). 
SWEB was the first of the RECs to lose its independence, after the original SWEB board 
decided against undertaking an exhaustive defence of their independence after the manner 
of Northern Electric (Section 5.3), and eventually amicably concluded the deal with 
Southern. Immediately following the takeover, the board was replaced by a team 
predominantly drawn from Southern6. 
Southern's objective in its takeover of SWEB, was linked to its company objective of 
becoming the "best investment in the electric utility industry" (Southern Company, 1996, 
p.2). Southern's overseas expansion programme was aimed at bringing on line 'non-
traditional' profit streams to account for 30% of their net income by 2003, in part to offset 
the advent of competition in its home market. It felt that it could bring a number of 
Not to be confused with the UK REC Southern Electric, reviewed in Section 7.4. 
6 
Southern Co. sold 25% of SWEB to another US utility, PP&L, in July 1996 for £189 million (Holberton, 
1996g), and a furtller 26% in June 1998 for £100 million (Cave, 1998). PP&L therefore were the majority 
shareholders, but Southern Co. retained operational control. 
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positive benefits to SWEB, particularly in the area of customer service which as has been 
made clear was a perceived area of weakness for the UK Company. Upon winning the 
takeover, it became clear that SWEB was to be used as a bridgehead for Southern in an 
ever-more competitive European market place, and that Southern wished to become a key 
player in the UK market. This was to be achieved by ownership of generation capacity 
and it is Southern's 'fiustrations' in this area that characterises the Company's experience 
in the UK industry, and explains SWEB's current incarnation as Western Power 
Distribution. 
In pursuit of its goals, SWEB's new board instigated: a wide ranging and severe cost 
reduction/efficiency improvement programme in distribution; a step improvement in 
customer service and competitiveness in supply; and an aggressive acquisition policy in 
generation, while other businesses were divested. Southern also sought to change the 
operating culture of SWEB, by making it more entrepreneurial yet team focussed at the 
same time. Southern's plans for SWEB were disrupted in two of the three key business 
areas, and witnessed a recent retreat from the industry. This retreat was principally due 
to two major setbacks in its strategy for generation: firstly, the blocking by the then 
Conservative administration of its intention to bid for National Power (the largest UK 
generator) (Harverson, 1995), and secondly, by the moratorium placed upon new build 
CCGT power stations by the incoming Labour administration, after Southern had 
succeeded in winning planning consents for a station in the north east of England 
(Holberton, 1997 g). 
These decisions were major setbacks for Southern, especially when viewed alongside the 
decision of the Labour government to levy a tax on the windfall profits of the privati sed 
utilities. The windfall tax levied upon SWEB was £90 million, which effectively cost the 
company its first two years of operating profits from its investment. All of these set backs 
impacted upon SWEB' s commitment to its supply business. With supply becoming an 
increasingly competitive business, and with margins in the business being forced lower due 
to that competition, it was becoming clear to SWEB/Southern that the only way to 
succeed was to have a critical mass of customers, across both electricity and gas. SWEB 
estimated that it required 5 million customers for the business to be viable. 
In June of 1999, SWEB's supply business was sold to EDFlLondon Electricity for £235 
million (Taylor and Wighton, 1999). In announcing the decision, a spokesman for 
Southern Company said that the Company had been faced with four possible options in 
supply, and it had chosen the final option of divestment as the other three options had not 
proved feasible. The options open to SWEB and the problems associated with them were 
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as follows: 
(i) Organic Growth: This option was perceived as being too slow and too costly to 
be realistic in an highly competitive market place; 
(ii) Acquisition of another REC's supply business: This option was discounted as the 
asking price for another firm's supply business was felt to be too high for the 
Company to pay; 
(iii) Joint venture: This option was not open to SWEB as none of the other RECs that 
SWEB approached were willing to enter into such an agreement'; leaving 
(iv) Divestment: Having all of the other avenues closed to them, and having received 
an offer from EDFILE that it felt it could not refuse, being higher than the 
earnings SWEB expected from the supply business, the business was sold. 
The price SWEB paid was the effective end of its owner's plans in the competitive parts 
of the UK market, and a shifting of their emphasis to Germany. 
Therefore SWEB no longer exists in a form recognisable to that in which it was privatised. 
While technically South Western Electricity still holds the combined distribution and 
supply licenses for the region, the supply licence is now managed by EDFlLondon, who 
now own the brand name. SWEB distribution is now trading as Western Power 
Distribution, and will formerly change its name to reflect this change when the licences are 
formerly separated by the Regulator after the passing of the Utilities Act 2000. 
Western Power Distribution is simply a distribution company, managing as efficiently as 
possible its network of overhead cables to perform its obligation to distribute electricity 
over the south west, and to attempt to grow unregulated profits in its telecoms activity. 
It is therefore pursuing a niche strategy, based upon the elements of a concentration 
approach which emphasise efficiency and reliability. However, the Company recently 
extended its activities in the distribution sector by successfully bidding for the distribution 
business of SW ALEC, when it was put onto the market by its owner Hyder (Bennett and 
Taylor, 2000 and Barker, 2000). 
6.4.2 Structure of SWEB 
In this section, the management and organisational structures of SWEB are presented, and 
significant changes to either during the period are highlighted. Firstly, the senior 
7 
It is instructive that this was also identified by Dominion Resources as a reason for its decision to sell 
EME, in Section 6.1. 
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management structure up until the present day. At privatisation, the Executive Directors 
of the Main Board of SWEB were as follows: 
Name Position Joined SWEB in From 
William Nicol Chairman and Chief 1987 London Electricity 
Executive 
John Seed Managing Director 1986 Eastern Electricity 
John Bonner Contracts and Tariffs 1973 another Area Board 
Director 
Malcolm Carson Operations Director 1989 Seeboard 
Stephen Marshall Resources and 1957 solicitor 
External Affairs 
Director and 
Company Secretary 
Randoll Meadows Trading Director 1976 ESI 
David Mutton Corporate Services 1987 another Area Board 
Director 
John Sellers Finance Director 1989 Land Rover Ltd 
The senior managers of SWEB, the largest main board at privatisation, retained the 
conventional industry bias evident in most if not all of the other RECs. As with most of 
the other RECs, the only non-industry managers were the company secretary and the 
finance director, while most of the managers were engineers. The early period following 
privatisation saw some changes in job designation, with Bonner becoming Commercial 
Director and Seed becoming CEO, both in 1992, when SWEB became the third REC to 
split the posts of Chairman and CEO. Other managers, such as Meadows, retired. 
Essentially, the SWEB team which led the Company into the new era was that which 
contested the takeover by Southern. After the takeover, the board was replaced. The 
scenario was unlike other RECs where these departures were acrimonious, with Sellers, 
Bonner and Carson staying on to oversee the transition period (Smith, 1995i). The senior 
board managers were replaced by managers from Southern's home companies in Atlanta: 
Gale Klappa as CEO, Mike Harreld as Finance Director, Alan Harrelson as Director of 
Operations, and Philip Saunders as Commercial Marketing Director. In addition, Chuck 
Whitney was appointed as President of Southern Electric International - Europe to 
oversee business development in Europe. This team stayed together until the sale of the 
supply business signalled a scaling down of Southern Company's involvement in the UK. 
Many of the expatriate US managers were repatriated leaving the board of the new 
company comprised of Paul Bowers as CEO, Robert Symons as Distribution Director, 
Chari Oostthuizen as Finance Director and Maurice Fletcher as Resources and External 
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Affairs Director. Bowers and Oostthuizen were US managers, while Symons and Fletcher 
had been promoted through the Company ranks. 
At the beginning of the privatisation process, SWEB was organised around a 
geographically oriented divisional structure, based upon four divisions: Cornwall, Devon, 
Somerset and Severnside, with strategic decisions being taken at the corporate head 
office. However, as stated above in Section 6.4, the functional activities of SWEB were 
also divisionalized prior to privatisation. The managerial and structural relationship was 
as follows: "The management of SWEB is controlled from head office by the Executive 
Directors comprising the Chairman and Chief Executive, the Managing Director and six 
Executive Directors who each have responsibility for one of the six divisions of SWEB. 
Head Office is responsible for formulation of policy, co-ordination of Divisional 
operations and direct management of centralised operations. The Operations, Contracts 
and Tariffs, and Trading Divisions control SWEB's three principal businesses, namely 
distribution, supply and trading. The finance, Corporate Services and Resources and 
External Affairs Divisions both support these activities and contribute to the formulation 
of the Company's overall strategy ..... The day-to-day management of the field activities 
in the distribution and supply businesses is the responsibility of the four area managers 
who report to the Operations Director. The retailing and contracting activities of SWEB 
are controlled centrally by the Trading Director" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.713). 
SWEB therefore operated one of the more advanced organisational structures within the 
industry, which saw a more sophisticated divisional structure in place, which allowed for 
a greater degree of delegated authority to be passed to operational managers. This initial 
structure was continuously refined during the period of independence, prior to the 
takeover by Southern. Principally, in 1992, a more entrepreneurial approach was 
engendered by the use of subsidiaries to encourage a more commercial approach in 
SWEB's non-regulated businesses, a further example of the internal network concept 
gaining wide currency within the industry (Miles and Snow, 1992). In 1992, SWEB Retail 
and SWEB Connect were established to operate the Company's appliance retail and 
contracting activities. This formula was repeated for SWEB Training and Consultancy, 
SWEB Property and even SWEB Helicopters. 
The takeover by Southern did not affect the structure of the Company, more the 
managerial philosophy. This principally involved de-emphasising the concept of a 
divisional structure, although formally the structure was still based upon divisions. The 
Company did seek to build upon the concept of an internal market between the various 
SWEB activities, to encourage entrepreneurialism. Eventually, it was envisaged that this 
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internal market could be extended to allow external suppliers into the SWEB network. 
However, the sale of SWEB Retail placed a halt upon this development, and Western 
Power Distribution has reverted to a functional structure as suits an organisation with a 
single business, although functions are organised into directorates within the Company. 
6.4.3 Strategy Decisions at SWEB 
SWEB has been through several key phases since privatisation, and this section reflects 
these phases. The first phase was roughly 1989 to 1995, when the Company was 
independent. The second phase was 1995 to 1999, under the ownership of Southern 
Company and PP&L, while the third and current phase, 1999 to the present day, sees the 
Company re-designated as Western Power Distribution, with a much reduced scope of 
business activity. 
(a) 1989-1995: During this first phase, SWEB was focussed very closely upon operating 
a concentrated growth approach in its distribution business, in line with all of the other 
RECs. SWEB sought to keep a close control on its cost base, and undertook a rolling 
series of cost reduction measures. It is interesting to note the extent to which this 
approach was also the norm within the wider industry, as the extent of the cuts initiated 
by SWEB was seen to be insufficient by the City and industry observers alike. The 
Company was also seeking to improve the effectiveness of its network by undertaking 
significant capital spending. The development of a cable telephone business represents an 
attempt to diversify its non-regulated earnings through the use of its existing network -
concentric diversification. Once again, the distribution business of a REC can not be said 
to have a recognisable business strategy, as it was not in competition and a form of cost 
leadership was all it had available to it. 
As has been noted, immediately post privatisation SWEB principally focussed upon its 
distribution business. It took the view that supply was a high turnover, low margin 
business so did not put a great emphasis upon defending its large supply customers when 
the franchise market opened, and similarly was not aggressive in seeking to win the 
customers of other RECs in this market. It did not operate the sort of market 
development strategies that other companies utilised. Once again, it sought a 
concentrated growth approach through differentiation. SWEB prided itself upon its 
customer service, and was an innovative company in some respects such as the areas of 
metering and billing. It therefore operated a focus benefit approach in domestic electricity 
supply. SWEB also engaged in the process of competitively reducing its tariff. However, 
in the early post privatisation period the company was consistently regarded as the worst 
performing REC in relation to customer service, and the performance standards 
-294-
established by the Regulator. The only difference to this approach came in gas supply, 
where SWEB was considerably more aggressive, operating a segmented cost focus 
approach in domestic and industrial gas supply, and as a new market entrant was seeking 
market development opportunities. 
In Appliance Retail, SWEB initially sought to build a strong presence through market 
development (the acquisition of SW ALEC's retail outlets), but shortly after took the 
decision to divest its assets in this area. Similarly, an initial commitment to compete in 
contracting has been ended, and its businesses divested. In generation, SWEB sought to 
develop a source of cheaper energy in support of the Company's concentrated growth 
strategy in supply. However, there was a general feeling that the strategies that the 
Company was pursuing in distribution and supply were generally not performing well. 
(b) 1995-1999: However, following the takeover by Southern Company, this poor 
performance was generally seen to have been reversed. The Company placed a much 
greater emphasis upon both product and market development to win new customers, and 
upon enhancing its previous concentration approach to ensure that its existing and future 
customer's experiences with SWEB supply were much improved. Part of this success, 
which saw a complete reversal of the Company's position in relation to customer 
perception, involved increasing its role as a corporate citizen, and to improving service 
delivery and customer service. 
Southern's plan for SWEB was to be based upon the following grand strategies: 
~ Distribution: a concentrated growth strategy based upon continually improved 
Supply: 
efficiency and cost management; 
a combined strategy based upon concentrated growth (defending 
existing customers through greatly improved customer service, 
raising the profile of the Company through corporate citizenship 
and advertising, and competitive pricing), market development (a 
more aggressive policy of winning large franchise customers, and 
providing a dual fuel package, and a segmented utility approach), 
and product development (offering a green tariff, dual fuel); and 
Generation: contributing to a vertical integration strategy based upon building, 
buying or co-owning generation capacity to secure cheaper 
supplies of electricity and to enable its supply business to 
competitively price its products. 
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Other Businesses were to be divested unless they were perceived as being concentric 
diversification. Hence the company divested its appliance retail, contracting and telecoms 
retail activities, but retained its telecoms network interests as they were consistent with 
the asset management core competencies developed by the company's distribution 
business. 
SWEB under Southern was therefore a much more dynamic organisation, seeking to grow 
out of its core concentrated growth strategy, and elevating supply to a much more 
significant position in the Company's plans. SWEB's approach in supply was based upon 
both differentiation and cost leadership, with a particular differentiation and cost focus in 
its own operating area, due to the choice of the South West as a test bed for both 
electricity and gas privatisation plans. 
(c) 1999 to the present: The various setbacks experienced by SoutherniSWEB 
documented in Section 6.4.1 culminating in the sale of SWEB Retail brought about a 
significant change in the operations of the Company. WPD is now solely a distribution 
company, with few non-regulated activities. While it still owns a share, for example, in 
Teeside Power that business is run for profit rather than to serve any wider strategic 
objectives. WPD operates a company wide concentrated growth approach. However, 
SouthernlWPD's recent bid for the distribution business of Hyder indicates a desire to 
engage in horizontal integration in support of that core concentrated growth approach. 
6.5 Analysis of Cases 
This section continues the work of Section 5.5, in examining the strategic content offour 
of the twelve RECs, and begins the process of understanding the factors driving these 
strategies, as well as commenting upon the strategic combinations identified during this 
process. The structure of this reporting will be the same as in Chapter Five, except that 
this chapter's dual focus: on the Midlands RECs (Section 6.5.1-6.5.4) and the agricultural 
RECs (Section 6.5.5-6.5.8), is reflected in a separate analysis. 
6.5.1 The Midlands RECs: Observations: Objective One 
The methodological procedure followed in this chapter was the same as followed in 
Chapter Five, and readers are referred to Section 5.5.1 for an explanation of the process. 
Table 6.1 and 6.2 present a summary of the key corporate and business strategies 
employed by the sub-sample during the period. The relative importance of each strategy 
to each company is shown. Once again, as with the analysis of companies in Chapter Five, 
there are notable similarities as well as an initial dissimilarity. These are summarised here: 
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there is a clear dissimilarity in the companies attitude towards un-regulated 
earnings. Midlands had initially, and indeed continued, to adopt the view that 
unregulated earnings needed to come from related business development -
generation principally but also appliance retail and contracting. EME initially 
adopted the view that unregulated earnings should be sought from areas of 
unrelated business development, such as security services, and from aggressive 
market and product development in traditional areas such as contracting. As has 
been shown, EME did not consider areas such as security as 'unrelated'. Rather, 
the Company appears to have adopted a much wider definition of what constituted 
its core competencies and included security as an extension of its core contracting 
capability; 
there is a clear similarity in the selection of a concentrated growth strategy for 
distribution, but as noted this is an effect of the regulatory environment rather than 
a conscious business decision; 
that in effect supply is no-longer an issue for either company as EME's supply 
business has been mitigated to PowerGen's efforts in this field, and Midlands' 
have been sold to National Power; and 
while both companies have attempted to make a real contribution to profitability 
through diversification, this has not arrived. There are differing reasons for this: 
in EME's case the failure of these activities led to the necessity ofa turnaround 
strategy and return to core focus, while Midland's efforts to grow its overseas 
generation activity have been on a relatively small scale, although seemingly 
successful. 
Overall there are few similarities in this sub-sample, although a more common approach 
may have developed if the companies had not been subject to their various takeover's, 
successful or otherwise. Both companies were returning to the pattern of concentrated 
growth in distribution, market development in supply, and considered concentric 
diversification. Neither appeared to be aiming towards developing a significant 
international presence within the industry, as Eastern has done (Section 7.2). Rather both 
were seeking to establish a strong position within the ESI, and possibly seeking to develop 
within Europe backed by their US owners. 
The review of business strategies in this sub-section is not particularly illuminating, as both 
companies have either exited from supply, or have only limited non-regulated business 
activities, which have adopted primarily cost focus approaches. 
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Table 6.1: Content Analysis of East Midlands Table 6.2: Content Analysis of Midlands 
Corporate Distribution Supply Generation Other Corporate Distribution Supply Generation Other I 
Strategies Businesses Strategies Businesses I 
Concentrated Growth .,1.,1.,1 VVV V V Concentrated Growth VVV VVV VVV VVV 
Market Development VVV V Market Development VVV V (overseas) 
(contracting) I 
Product Development V (through V Product Development V (Dual 
PowerGen) (contracting) Fuel) 
Innovation V V Innovation V (gas) V 
Horizontal Integration V Horizontal Integration V 
(contracting) 
Vertical Integration VVV (gas Vertical Integration V (gas, 
and generation) 
generation) 
Concentric V (gas) V (telecoms, Concentric # water, gas V (gas, V 
diversification metering) diversification networks generation) (metering) 
Conglomerate V (security) Conglomerate V 
Diversification Diversification (overseas) 
Turnaround 1994, 1998 (sale to PowerGen) Turnaround 
Divestment V Divestment V (to V (retail) 
( contracting, NPower) 
security, 
~-~-
retail) 
L-. ____ .. _~ 
~-
- -
-~- - ... _- -_ ...... - ---
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Table 6.2 Continued Table 6.2: Continued 
Liquidisation t/ (partial liquidation of contracting,) Liquidisation 
Joint Venture t/ (gas) t/ t/ (retail) Joint Venture 
(generation) 
Strategic Alliances Strategic Alliances 
Consortia Consortia 
Business Distribution Supply Generation Other Business Distribution 
Strategies Businesses Strategies 
N/A N/A (now N/A N/A N/A 
part of 
PowerGen 
w h i c h 
operates a 
Segmented 
Utility and 
segmented 
I 
Utility Focus 
Approach) 
_ .. _-- ~-
- - --
~- ...... -
Key 
(where company has engaged in activity of this kind) 
(where company has been heavily engaged in activity of this kind) 
t/ Evidence 
t/t/t/Priority 
# (Where company has considered activity of this kind, but not acted upon this interest) 
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t/ (gas) t/t/t/ t/ (retail) 
# Southern Electric 
t/ (many, including Wing Merrill) 
Supply Generation Other 
Businesses 
N/A Cost Focus Cost Focus 
6.5.1.1 Combinations of Grand Strategy 
This section continues the work of Section 5.5.1.1, in presenting diagrammatical 
representations of the combinations of grand strategy witnessed in this sub-section. 
However, the combinations in this section vary slightly from those in the earlier chapter. 
Presented below are combinations which have, in effect, failed; a change from the 
preceding chapter which shows viable combinations. This change is justified on the 
following basis: (i) that both EME and Midlands' distribution businesses follow Variant 
1, as illustrated in Section 5.5.1.1, and (ii) that both EME and Midlands' no longer 
operate in the supply business, as EME's business has been merged into PowerGen's, and 
Midlands' sold on to National Power. This does, however, enable an opportunity to 
present the highly complex multiple combination that EME operated prior to its 
turnaround in 1994, and to comment upon its lack of viability. 
The combination, titled Variant 6, shows an organisation which displays all possible 
variants identified in Section 2.6.3. Therefore it was engaged in concentrated growth; 
concentric diversification; vertical integration; market and product development; and joint 
ventures, as well as conglomerate diversification, although EME would debate whether 
its investments in security were conglomerate or concentric diversification. If the 
distinction argued by EME is accepted, the combination looks very similar to that 
presented in Section 5.5.1.1, and associated with success. Its failure, therefore, can not 
be attributed to this additional activity, although this activity may be indicative of the 
problems leading to its failure. It is probable that the viability of the combination was 
undennined by a variety offactors. As the narrative presented above indicates, confidence 
in EME was low due in part to the wide ranging nature of its activities. This suggests that 
key stakeholders: specifically the City of London, acting for the shareholders of the 
Company, did not consider that EME had either (i) the leadership nor (ii) the resources 
to follow such a combination through to success. This highlights a serious observation 
that must be made in relation to strategic combinations, and that is that merely arriving at 
the right combination is not a guarantee of success. There is also the relationship of 
strategy to the drivers of strategy to be considered. 
6.5.2 The Midlands RECs: Observations: Objective Two 
Table 6.3 presents an estimation of the importance of the key strategy drivers for this sub-
sample. Once again it is necessary to state that an accurate assessment of the impact of 
internal factors on strategy is difficult from the standpoint of using secondary source 
material. A fuller picture of the importance of leadership, and resources, will develop 
following the field study cases. 
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Variant 6: A Failed Multiple Approach 
.···t. 
Ve~al Integration 
Conglomerate 
Diversification 
Concentric 
Diversification: 
Product 
Development 
Table 6.3: Impact of Possible Strategy Drivers 
. 
External Factors Internal Factors 
East Midlands VVV VVV 
Midlands VV VV 
Concentrated 
growth 
Organic Market 
Development 
External Market 
Development 
Leadership 
VV 
vv 
Regulatory 
VVV 
vvv 
The above analysis is subjective; with the author estimating the impact of the respective 
drivers based upon the outcome of the content analysis and indicating a higher suspected 
impact by a higher number of ..... 's, and reflects the difficulty of interpreting causal 
relationships from secondary data. Allowing for the tentative nature of the analysis, the 
following observations are drawn: 
~ the key driver ofEME's approach was, initially, its leadership in seeking a very 
expensive strategic programme. Latterly, as was shown, external factors 
influenced the organisation, leading to a turnaround strategy reflecting a possible 
concern over the availability and suitability of internal resources. As an 
organisation still involved in regulated activity, the influence of regulation has been 
considerable throughout. At the present time another influence is key, and that is 
the ownership ofEME by PowerGen; and 
the key drivers of Midland's early approach would appear to be a combination of 
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all four drivers, with no one predominating. As a company seeking market 
development, it was influenced by external factors, while it was a larger 
organisation suggesting that the availability of resources enabled the chosen 
approach. As was shown in the narrative, the approach was also very much a 
product of the Company's leadership. Today, the principal driver is regulatory, 
reflecting the fact that the Company no longer engages in the principal competitive 
business. 
This sub-sample therefore presents an interesting case study of the relative impacts of (i) 
companies with boundless ambition but limited resources and (ii) companies with limited 
ambition but appropriate resources, and the result that these combinations have upon the 
success of strategy. It would appear the case that when EME brought its ambition into 
line with its resources, it more noticeably prospered. 
6.5.2.1 The Question of Leadership 
As the analysis has shown, at the time of privati sat ion both EME and Midlands had boards 
comprised mainly of managers drawn from the ESI. The exceptions were the Finance 
Director and Executive Director for Engineering within Midlands, who both came from 
industrial backgrounds. Essentially, and despite this difference in personnel, the 
expectation would be that both boards would conform to the expected pattern of 
behaviour of utility managers - conservatism, a cautious approach to commercial 
activities, and a focus upon the core engineering business. While this largely held true in 
Midlands, it was completely unfounded for EME. EME were the most adventurous of 
the RECs in the period 1989-1994, and undertook the most risky conglomerate and 
concentric diversification decisions. Clearly, there was no link here between traditional 
utility experience, and a lack of adventure. However, the subsequent failure ofEME to 
satisfy the City led to major changes in leadership and the development of an approach 
much closer in fact to that of Midlands, which has maintained roughly the same senior 
management team to the present day despite US ownership, and the divestment of its 
supply business. However, EME had at the time of its takeover by PowerGen a main 
board principally drawn from a non-ESI background, suggesting that in their case at least 
the lessons of failed divestment had been learned and managers recruited specifically for 
their ability to retain a core focus. 
6.5.3 The Midlands RECs: Other Observations 
The first such observation relates to the structure of organisations. As Table 6.4 shows, 
there was considerable similarity between the structures of EME and Midlands at the 
beginning of the period. Initially, both operated functionally structured organizations with 
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geographically oriented operating divisions in the field. Arguably, they may have aspired 
to a divisional structure but fell into the trap, identified by Miles and Snow, of seeking to 
retain "extensive corporate staff coordination" (Miles and Snow, 1992, p. 61). Both 
developed more classically divisional structures as the period progressed. Each companies 
are now in much diminished states, for differing reasons. The loss of its supply business 
has left Midlands a functionally structured business, with some separate subsidiaries. 
EME has now been mitigated into the structure of its owner, PowerGen, and only exists 
as separate businesses within a wider divisional structure. 
Table 6.4: Structural Matrix 
East Midlands Midlands 
Initial Structure A Functionally Structured A Functionally Structured 
Organization with geographically Organization with geographically 
oriented operating divisions oriented operating divisions 
Current Structure Separate Businesses within a Functionally Structured 
Product Focussed Divisional Organization 
Structure 
Major Changes Restructuring 1994, 1996; Restructuring in 1994 saw the 
(dateS/changes) Takeover by Dominion Resources, introduction of a divisional 
1996, and PowerGen, 1998 structure, but sale of supply 
returned Company to a functional 
structure 
In respect of other key issues that emerged from Chapter Two, it is clear that a variety of 
approaches to strategy have been evident. Midlands has been a more planning oriented 
company throughout, while EME may have adopted a strategy as pattern approach 
initially, although that was reigned in somewhat following the Company's turnaround. 
After the same fashion, strategy making has been in turns emergent or prescribed. 
6.5.4 Midlands RECs: Concluding Remarks 
As with the conclusions drawn at the end of the preceding chapter, it would appear that 
the analysis of this sub-sample has shown the existence of differing strategic approaches. 
The evidence presented suggests that EME's initially more broadly focussed assessment 
of what constituted core business, or even what businesses it could expect to prosper in, 
is at least similar to the approach developed by Norweb (Section 5.2). Midlands' 
approach, while not focussing upon diversification to the same extent as EME's also 
shows that REC managers were not inhibited by a lack of experience when trying to 
expand their organisations' activities. The findings of this sub-sample support those of 
the preceding chapter - that evidence of more entrepreneurial attitudes were prevalent in 
REC boards dominated by industry managers, which runs counter to the expectation. The 
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impact of individual leaders will be explored in Chapter Eight. What is clear here is that 
the two companies were more entrepreneurial and this may reflect more confidence in 
their operating areas, indicating that geography may have been a factor. 
EME and Midlands both provide examples of companies who, initially at least, adopted 
wider definitions of what constituted their core competencies. EME was perhaps the most 
extreme example of this approach. It had stated early in this period that security systems, 
because they involved aspects of electrical wiring common to its contracting business, 
fitted into its core competencies. Involvement in security therefore was a concentric 
diversification. To non-EME observers, security systems represented a conglomerate 
diversification, and hence was identified with risk. Midlands' principal diversification was 
in domestic and overseas generation. The initial impression of this extended core 
competence was also to view it as risky, even though both investments in generation and 
in overseas activities are now normal in the sector. 
This perhaps suggests that the principal determinants of company policy, in the case of 
EME especially, have been external. The turnaround pursued by EME between 1992 and 
1994 was largely a response to the perceived concerns of the City of London to the 
direction that the Company's strategy was taking it, and the fact that its share price was 
consistently lower than the average. When the Company re-focussed upon a narrower 
core range of activities, the City's perception of it changed and its risky status was 
removed. Midlands' commitment to generation similarly led the City to mark down its 
shares, but the external factor with the most impact upon that company was external 
ownership. Once again, as with the companies of Chapter Five, the impact of new owners 
has been considerable for both Midlands and EME. Prior to its take over, Midlands styled 
itself an 'Energy Company' and was the most pro-active REC in terms of overseas 
investments. Now it is a narrow distribution company. Prior to its takeover, EME was 
in turn the most adventurous REC and then one of the most effectively managed. Now 
it is a subsidiary of a much larger company. 
Overall, therefore, there is once again little evidence of companies adopting identical 
approaches, although once again there are clearly some discernable trends emerging at the 
conclusion of examinations into half of the RECs. This chapter has detected some 
influence of geography and regional affluence upon behaviour, but has identified the 
personality of leaders, and the impact of external factors as the key drivers of strategy. 
These views will be explored at greater length in Chapter Eight. 
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6.5.5 The Agricultural RECs: Observations: Objective One 
This section continues the work begun in Chapter Five, and readers are referred to Section 
5.5.1 for an explanation ofthe process. Table 6.4 and 6.5 present a summary of the key 
corporate and business strategies employed by the sub-sample during the period. The 
relative importance of each strategy to each company is shown. What is striking about 
this sub-sample is the similarity of the approach of these companies, suggesting that the 
impact of geography is significant here. What is also evident is the impact of ownership 
upon the new directions each company pursued after 1995. Firstly, the similarities. 
At the beginning of the period, both companies announced an intention to focus upon the 
core distribution business. Both companies initially lost supply customers, with 
SW ALEC's losses the more substantial, but decided against entering into a cost leadership 
competition with larger and more affiuent competitors. Both companies sought to defend 
their existing and remaining supply customers by means of enhanced service, a focussed 
differentiation or benefit approach. This was particularly the case for SWEB which was 
among the most innovative of the RECs in relation to customer service. However, both 
companies operated in harsh climates where inclement weather could impede service 
delivery, and hence this differentiation focus approach yielded mixed results. Both 
companies sought to develop non-regulated incomes from telecoms and generation. Both 
were members of the Teeside Power joint venture, aiming to support their supply activities 
by securing access to cheaper fuel supplies. Both sought to enhance this approach by 
developing other generation activities, mostly through renewable sources. 
At takeover the differences between the strategic objectives of Welsh Water and Southern 
Company became clear. Welsh WaterlHyder clearly sought to develop by focussing upon 
core businesses, and as a consequence set about rationalising the business activities of 
SW ALEC, leading ultimately to the sale of the SW ALEC electricity and gas supply 
business to British Energy. Southern saw SWEB as a growth business, and sought to 
break out of the core concentrated growth focus by undertaking aggressive market and 
product development activity driven by the convergence of the gas and electricity 
industries. They sought also to significantly increase their involvement in generation, 
seeking to become a fully integrated major player in the UK. 
The difficulties experienced by both Hyder and Southern in accomplishing their objectives 
led to further reappraisals. Hyder's problems stem mainly from the requirements of the 
water regulator, which has led to a further rationalisation of its business and the possible 
sale of water concerns, and the actual sale of its distribution business, ironically to WPD, 
the new company name ofSWEB. 
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Table 6.5: Content Analysis of SW ALEC/Hyder Table 6.6 Content Analysis of SWEBIWPD 
Corporate Distribution Supply Generation Other 
Strategies Businesses 
Corporate Distribution Supply Generation Other 
Strategies Businesses 
Concentrated Growth t/t/t/ t/t/t/ t/t/t/ t/t/t/ Concentrated Growth t/t/t/ t/t/t/ t/t/t/ t/t/t/ 
Market Development t/ (regional t/ (gas) t/ Market Development t/ (regional t/t/t/ 
development) ( contracting) development) 
Product Development Product Development t/ (duel fuel, 
green tariffs) 
Innovation t/ (telecoms) Innovation t/ t/ (telecoms) 
(windpower ) 
Horizontal Integration t/ Horizontal Integration t/t/t/ # National t/ (retail) 
(contracting) (Swalec) Power,own 
generation 
Vertical Integration t/ (power, Vertical Integration t/ (energy t/ 
purchasing, purchasing, 
generation) generation) 
Concentric t/ (gas, t/ (telecoms, Concentric t/ (gas, t/ (telecoms 
diversification generation) motOIways) diversification generation) retail & 
network) 
Conglomerate Conglomerate 
Diversification Diversification 
Turnaround Turnaround 
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Table 6.5 Continued Table 6.6: Continued 
Divestment 
'" (to '" (to British '" (retail, Divestment 
SWEBfWPD) Energy) telecoms, 
various water 
related 
acti vi ties) 
Liquidisation Liquidisation 
Joint Venture '" (gas) '" (T eeside '" (telecoms, Joint Venture 
Power) Hyder Laing) 
Strategic Alliances # Welsh Water, before takeover Strategic Alliances 
Consortia '" Cardiff Bay Development, as SW ALEC, "''''''' Consortia 
numerous as Hyder 
Business Distribution Supply Generation Other Business Distribution 
Strategies Businesses Strategies 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
'----- ---------
L ___ .. ___ .. ___________________________ 
Key 
(where company has engaged in activity of this kind) 
(where company has been heavily engaged in activity of this kind) 
'" Evidence 
'" '" firiority 
# (Where company has considered activity of this kind, but not acted upon this interest) 
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'" (to London '" (retail, 
Electricity) contracting, 
telecoms 
retail) 
'" (gas) '" (Teeside '" (retail) 
Power) 
, 
I 
I 
, 
Supply Generation Other 
Businesses 
N/A Cost Focus Cost Focus 
- - .. _ .. - ------- --
As such, there is no longer a company that is identifiably 'SW ALEC' remaining within 
the electricity industry. One core business has already been absorbed by a generator 
(British Energy initially, and now the Scottish and Southern Group), while the other has 
been taken over by WPD. Southern has effectively retreated to its core distribution 
business, but in succeeding in buying the SW ALEC business from Hyder shows that it is 
still seeking market development through horizontal integration. However, the remainder 
of its ambition to become a large player in the UK market has lapsed, and its European 
focus is now principally centred upon Germany. 
In short, therefore, the geographical location of each of these companies and the 
restrictions this imposed was initially a limitation upon their strategic ambitions. Changed 
ownership brought a changed strategic direction for each, and the end of their immediate 
similarity. However, both Hyder and Southern's growth plans in the UK, can be seen to 
have failed to achieve their intended objectives leading to processes of rationalisation 
which have effectively ended the existence of one of the companies, and restricted the 
future activities of the other. 
The review of business strategies in this sub-section is not illuminating, as both companies 
have exited from supply, or have only limited non-regulated business activities, which have 
adopted primarily cost focus approaches. 
6.5.5.1 Combinations of Grand Strategy 
This section continues the work of Section 5.5.1.1, in presenting diagrammatical 
representations of the combinations of grand strategy witnessed in this sub-section. 
However, this is necessarily limited as SW ALEC in effect no longer exists, and 
SWEBIWPD is no longer involved in supply. However, the variant presented by 
SWEBIWPD in distribution; Variant 2B, is worthy of consideration, as it presents a 
combination that up until this point, not been witnessed. 
This approach is the first significant extension of the concentrated growth approach in 
distribution, and presents a possible, although limited, blueprint for future development 
in the industry. Distribution companies, as natural monopolies, face no potential threat 
from industry entrants. The sale of the SW ALEC business, by Hyder, resulted from 
regulatory and cash flow problems, leading to the sale of this strategic asset. This was the 
first takeover of one distribution business by another, following the merger of Eastern and 
London to be discussed in the following chapter. This leaves only a further eight 
independent businesses, so the scope for this approach is limited. SWEBIWPD's decision 
marks an attempt to overcome the increasingly limited returns to be achieved through 
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distribution due to regulatory action, by expanding the size of the business, and driving 
even greater costs out. 
Variant 2B: Extended Organic Market 
Development 
.... -
, 
l 
.. 
---
Horizontal 
__ I n,!egration 
---
.. 
) 
, 
--" 
Market 
Development 
(i) SWEBIWPD employs an 
extended market development 
approach which sees the first 
instance in this review of horizontal 
integration in distribution. The 
takeover of the SW ALEC 
distribution area follows on from the 
limited organic market development 
activity the Company already 
undertook through involvement m 
regional investment schemes. 
6.5.6 The Agricultural RECs: Objective Two 
The same limitations as discussed in Sections 5.5.2 and 6.5.2 apply to this review of 
drivers of strategy, presented in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7: Impact of Possible Strategy Drivers 
External Factors Internal Factors Leadership Regulatory 
SWALEC t/t/ t/t/t/ t/t/ t/t/t/ 
SWEB t/t/ t/t/t/ t/t/ t/ t/t/t/ 
Once again, the above analysis is subjective, as discussed in Section 6.5.2, and requires 
more in-consideration in case studies. However, and allowing for the tentative nature of 
the analysis, the following observations may be made: 
~ the key drivers of SW ALEC's early strategy were an even combination of all four, 
with no one area predominating. This perhaps reflects the difficulty the smaller 
companies encountered in strategy formulation - they were constrained on all 
sides: by the actions of competitors and the expectations of external bodies; by 
their limited resources; by the regulator; and ultimately by the limited options 
available to their leadership. As noted previously, SW ALEC effectively no longer 
exists as a strategic entity; and 
the key drivers of SWEB' s early were very similar to SW ALEC, reflecting their 
similarity. However, after the takeover by Southern Company, the key drivers 
were very clearly leadership, ownership, and regulatory. The clash between these 
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three factors was described in the narrative, and explains why the regulatory 
influences are the key at the present time. 
The experiences of small companies are clearly different, therefore, to those of larger 
companies suggesting that resources are a key issue. Lack of resources make 
organisations more susceptible to external pressures, and limit the opportunity to spread 
the scope of its activities, limiting the options available to leaders and increasing the 
influence of the Regulator. The change in the outlook of SWEB after the takeover by 
Southern, which brought with it enhanced resources, indicates the relative importance of 
this strategy driver, based upon the evidence of this sub-sample. As SWEB is one of the 
case studies featured later in the thesis, this theme can be explored in greater detail. 
6.5.6.1 The Question of Leadership 
Both SW ALEC and SWEB were staffed by ESI industry managers at the time of 
privatisation. In both cases, the exceptions to this rule were the company finance 
director's who in common with other RECs were recruited from industry. Both boards, 
therefore conformed to the industry norm:- engineers, who had been appointed from 
within or from other RECs, and who had little or no non-industry experience. Therefore, 
there would have been an expectation that each board would conform to the expected 
behaviour patterns of pursuing conservative strategies based upon core businesses. As 
Section 6.5.5 showed, this was indeed the case with these two RECs. Both SW ALEC 
and SWEB underwent marginal change during the period, but none ofthe senior managers 
brought into the companies, or promoted from within, can be said to have had the same 
sort of impact as, for example, John Devaney at Eastern or Ken Harvey at Norweb. The 
takeover by Welsh Water and the formation of Hyder effectively ended SW ALEC as an 
organisation, although the impact of senior managers within Hyder such as John Roberts 
have been considerable. The impact made by Gene Klappa within SWEB was 
considerable, in terms of the strategies pursued (Section 6.5.5) as well as the 
organisation's operational culture. Klappa and colleagues brought American business 
concepts and values to the Company and changed it completely. However, the problems 
which faced SWEB and its expansion plans ultimately ended that experiment and brought 
back a more conventional UK utility management structure to Western Power 
Distribution. 
6.5.7 The Agricultural RECs: Other Observations 
The first such observation relates to the structure of organisations. As Table 6.8 shows, 
SW ALEC and SWEB adopted quite different structures at the opening of the period. 
SWEB in fact entered the period with one of the more sophisticated organisational 
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structures, gaining it perhaps two years advantage upon some of its rivals including 
SW ALEC8. The Companies both experienced initially similar receptions from analysts and 
observers, suggesting possibly that the structure adopted does not have particularly 
dominant impact upon business performance. However, as the question of performance 
is subjective, and especially so in the case of SW ALEC and SWEB who faced harsher 
operating conditions than other RECs, it is not possible to expand upon this point. 
SWEB's structure was thought to be effective by its new owners, who sought to improve 
upon it only by expanding its contribution to operational effectiveness through the 
introduction of an internal market. However, developments since their respective 
takeovers have brought about considerable change within each company. SWEB, or 
WPD as it is now called, is a functionally structured business after the sale of its supply 
business while SW ALEC no longer exists in a recognisable form. 
Table 6.8: Structural Matrix 
SWALEC SWEB 
Initial Structure A Functionally Structured A Divisionally Structured Organisation 
Organisation with geographically by function, and by geography 
oriented operating divisions 
Current Structure Separate Subsidiaries of Different A Functionally Structured 
Parent Groups Organisation 
Major Changes Major restructuring in 1992 Company developed an entrepreneurial 
(dates/changes) introduced a divisionalized ethos to enhance its divisional structure 
structure in relation to functions but sale of supply returned Company to 
and core businesses. Taken over a functional structure 
in 1995. 
Both of these RECs have followed fairly closely a prescriptive approach to strategy, even 
allowing for the internal market that was intended to be created within SWEB. The new 
owners of SWEB preferred a strategy as pattern approach, but made sure that the lines 
of command and control were firmly in place even within that framework. SW ALEC was 
for the most part a traditionally structured, traditionally managed utility. 
6.S.S The Agricultural RECs: Concluding Remarks 
This analysis has provided perhaps the first example of companies from the same sub-
sample adopting markedly similar strategic approaches. Furthermore, the evidence 
presented in this chapter suggests that this similarity of approach was due to the marked 
8 
'This assumes that a divisional structure has inherent advantages over a functional structure. The actions 
of the Regulator were, however, to make a divisional structure an operational necessity for each REC. 
-311-
similarities between the two companies: principally their physical and economic 
geography, and the impact that their physical and economic geography had upon external 
factors such as the City of London, the Regulator and their eventual new owners. Both 
SWEB and SW ALEC were unarguably not blessed with the most advantageous operating 
environment. This led to a focus upon distribution, as the main source of revenue 
generation, and innovative non-regulated activities aimed at supplementing that core 
business. Supply was a matter of defence, rather than attack, due to the relative financial 
weakness of each company. Both companies, it could be argued, therefore took a more 
'resource based view' of the potential of their assets and capabilities (Grant, 1991) in 
order to survive and prosper in the industry. 
After their respective takeovers, the futures for each company were intended to be 
contrasting, but have resulted in a further marked similarity. SWEB, its new owners 
intended, was to spearhead concerted market development in UK. initially and then 
Europe. SW ALEC, on the other hand, was to contribute to the development of a 
synergistic and essentially regional business entity with at best national and narrowly 
focussed ambitions. The reasons for the failure of each new company to achieve its 
objectives are varied and diffuse, but have resulted in each inhabiting a form which is 
currently less than the sum of its original parts. SWEB/Southern failed because its 
ambitions were arguably bigger than the market, and its Regulator could support while 
Hyder failed because, arguably, a business founded upon monopoly activities under 
constant review could not be sustained. 
Overall, therefore, this analysis does suggest that similarity of conditions - if they are 
severe enough - will produce similar strategic configurations. Geography, and its impact 
upon the views of external factors, influenced and limited organisational approach. In 
these cases the impact of leaders was less significant, until those limitations were 
overcome as in the case of SWEB following takeover where Klappa was arguably more 
of a determining factor on strategy development than either of his predecessors. 
However, in both cases, the impact of the Regulator has been crucial: in blocking SWEB's 
business objectives; and imposing stringent demands on Hyder's regulated core 
businesses. These views, and their relationship to the factors affecting the other 
companies of the industry, will be explored at length in Chapter Eight. 
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Chapter Seven The Southern Suburban RECs 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter continues the work begun in Chapters Five and Six, with respect to the 
reporting of the preliminary stage of the research. In a similar fashion, the aims and 
objectives of this chapter are concurrent with those identified for Chapter Five, in Section 
5.0. The frameworks of analysis and reporting utilised in this chapter are also concurrent 
with those identified in Section 5.0. 
The Southern Suburban sub-sample includes the remaining four of the RECs: Eastern 
Group (Section 7.1); London Electricity (7.2); Seeboard (7.3); and Southern Electric 
(7.4). In characterising the companies of this sub-sample, Holmes noted the following as 
being key similarities between the companies and the markets they served: 
~ that the four were among the biggest of the RECs; 
~ that their franchise areas were among the most affiuent; and 
~ that although there was limited industrial demand throughout the region, there was 
growing commercial and domestic demand reflecting growing regional affiuence 
and an increasing population. 
Holmes therefore implies that the companies of this sub-sample would be expected to be 
among the strongest and most confident of the RECs, drawing strength from their solid 
and growing markets. Demand would be high and growing, and none of the companies 
would be unduly threatened by the loss of large customers. Indeed, the companies of this 
sub-sample would in all probability have to wait for the opening of the 100kW and full 
domestic markets in 1994 and 1998 respectively, to experience the impact of supply 
competition. There was an implicit suggestion that these would be the companies leading 
the industry. 
7.1 Eastern Electricity 
Eastern Electricity is the REC for East Anglia. The Company's operating franchise 
covered an area of approximately 20,300 square kilometres and included all of the 
counties of Norfolk, Suffolk and Hertfordshire, most of Cambridgeshire, Essex and 
Bedfordshire, part of Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire, and the Northern Suburbs of 
London within its boundaries. The range of customer types within Eastern's boundaries 
is diverse, including densely populated urban areas, as well as sparsely populated rural 
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areas with agricultural demand, as well as an increasing demand from manufacturing and 
commercial business, including the ports of Felix stowe, Ipswich, Harwich and Tilbury and 
the airports at Luton and Stansted. Eastern's area is generally seen as being one of the 
most economically prosperous in the UK. The Company is headquartered in Ipswich. 
Eastern is primarily of interest given its position as one of the two largest REC's, and its 
longstanding reputation as an aggressive company aiming to become the industry leader. 
The Company entered the new competitive era with a reputation of being: the most 
efficient REC, in terms of manpower per unit sold (Wilkinson, 1988b); the most advanced 
technically, with a higher investment in computing than any of the other RECs; and as one 
of the most prepared for the new demands of the market. As the period began it was 
already aggressively marketing itself, and had identified a whole raft of new skills it 
needed to develop for the new operating environment, including capability in writing 
contracts, in finance, taxation, planning and law as well as investor relations. It had not, 
however, developed beyond a functional organisational structure at the time of 
privatisation. 
7.1.1 Key Events: 1990-2000 
As reported in Section 7.0, Eastern was one of the RECs of which the most was expected 
in the new competitive era. Early statements from the board at Eastern indicted that the 
Company was keen to grow, but that their strategic approach to achieving growth was 
likely to be different to that witnessed at, for example, EME (Section 6.1), as Eastern had 
indicated a preference for a strategy based upon organic growth. In the issue prospectus, 
Eastern identified its principal strategic objectives as being: 
~ to seek improvements in productivity and efficiency in pursuit of real earnings 
growth principally through its core distribution business, while expecting supply 
to contribute a small profit; 
~ to continue its policy of building a strong brand name for the Company; 
~ to engage in generation projects to produce profits for the Company; and 
~ to continue operating existing businesses to take advantage of business 
opportunity as it arose (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.168). 
The message sent out by the original objectives was distinctly different from that sent out 
by EME, relying principally upon cost control for its competitive advantage. However, 
for the first two years after privatisation, Eastern did not seek to employ strict efficiency 
measures in support of its stated approach, resulting in a low rating from the City despite 
its position as one of the biggest and theoretically most favoured of the RECs. In short, 
the City approved ofthe Company's focus upon generation, but disliked it's failure to cut 
costs. This suggests an inherent incongruity within the strategic direction adopted by 
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Eastern. Some elements of a cost leadership approach were present, but some were not. 
An early indication of a focus upon backward vertical integration came with Eastern's 
decisive early movement into generation, a decision heavily influenced by the then 
Chairman of Eastern, James Smith (Thomas, 1990t). The offer prospectus revealed an 
aim to invest up to £31 million in generation over the first three years, and within that time 
Eastern had: 
~ formed a joint venture with Hawker Siddeley to plan, build and operate 
Peterborough Power, a 340MW gas cycle generator (Samuelson, 1989t); 
actively explored the possibility of a joint venture to build the world's first 
offshore wind turbine (Newham, 1989); 
~ reported interest in taking a stake in BNFL generating plant (Thomas, 1990t); 
~ announced a plan for a new 380MW generator at Lawford, in ajoint venture with 
Enron (pearson, 1991a). 
Additionally, Eastern was among the first of the RECs to establish a gas marketing 
subsidiary: e gas, in a joint venture with Utili corp (Sychrava, 1991 e). This move indicated 
that the board was of the view that in the future the gas and electricity markets would 
increasingly converge. The publication of the first year results saw the Company receiving 
a favourable response from the City as these early movements into generation were 
perceived as sensible and cautious. However, the City also marked the Company down 
for its failure to realise the positive benefits of a strict efficiency regime in its distribution 
business. 
The second year after privatisation saw the Company continue upon the road towards 
greater involvement in generation, while at the same time seeking to resolve its problems 
with efficiency, of which more was expected (Sychrava, 1992t). The new focus upon cost 
reduction appears to have resulted from the appointment of a new Managing Director, 
with experience gained in the industrial sector. To an extent, this change in emphasis must 
be represented as an attempt to turnaround the Company, but that the perceived need for 
this action was not as great as that witnessed with EME. However, the Company was not 
performing to expectations, and consequently action was required. Interim reports 
showed an immediate effect, and indicated that following the remedial action Eastern had 
the lowest prices, as well as lowest costs in the industry. Costs had mainly been reduced 
by harsh trimming of staffing levels. 
In the 1993 Annual Report, Eastern's three key objectives were set out by the then 
Chairman. These were to: 
~ optimise returns from the supply and distribution of electricity; 
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~ provide top quality service across the company; and 
~ develop profitable new business outside the sphere of regulation. 
(from Smith, Chairman's Statement, Annual Report and Accounts, Eastern Electricity, 1993). 
In effect, this was principally a restatement of the original corporate objectives, except 
that the desire to develop new income generating activities was more forcefully stated. 
In short, the Company committed itself to effectively manage its existing businesses, and 
to seek new business opportunities more aggressively. In support of these newly revisited 
objectives, the following actions occurred across the various operational areas of the 
Company: 
~ the establishment in 1994 of full ownership of Peterborough Power (Smith, 
1994k); 
~ the taking of equity shares in Barking Power, Fibropower Ltd, and Fibrogen Ltd; 
~ the taking of shares in the output of various North Sea gas fields: the Johnston gas 
field (Anon, 1993c); the Schoner gas field (Smith, 1994k); and the Tyne gas field 
(Anon, 1995a); 
the establishment of e gas in 1991, followed shortly by a change of name to 
Eastern Natural Gas. Eastern was reported to be one of only two RECs that 
sought to compete on a national scale in the area of gas retailing (Wighton, 
1995e); 
became the most active REC in seeking new 100kW customers after market 
liberalisation (Smith, 1994a) including, for example, winning the contract for all 
of the McDonalds restaurants in UK (Smith, 1994b); 
~ actively seeking to improve the value-added element of its supply products to 
large customers, through consultancy in energy efficiency measures, and so on, as 
the following statement from McDonalds shows: 
<tEE's Willingness to supply power and other facilities as part of the service yet still 
undercut offers from rival power companies was one of the reasons why they won the 
business" (Smith, 1994b); 
~ the freezing of domestic electricity prices at 1992 levels in 1993, and again in 
1994; 
the introduction of performance related pay and ending of union involvement in 
pay bargaining (Taylor, 1994); 
~ divestment of its retailing operation in 1995 (Buckley and Smith, 1995); and 
~ managing the largest staff reduction programme in the ESI, which saw 1100 jobs 
cut in 1991, and continued with the loss of 1250 jobs in the year to September 
1993, including shedding of 100 contracting jobs with the aim of making the 
Company's contracting operation profitable, and a further 200 jobs cut as two 
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customer service centres were established replacing 10 local offices within the 
regional area. A further 400 jobs were cut in 1995. 
Eastern, therefore, was an organisation that possessed a very clear understanding of its 
principal strategic objectives from an early stage of the new operating era. Firstly, the 
Company was detennined to stick to areas that it knew, distribution and supply, and aimed 
to win new customers by virtue of lower costs and greater efficiencies. This aspect of its 
strategy was not fully formed until the importance of cost reduction became apparent in 
1992. Secondly, the Company understood the importance of backward vertical 
integration as a device for driving out cost, and for ensuring control over their operating 
process1. Thirdly, the Company appreciated the value of market development, and of the 
opportunity for growth offered by the liberalisation of energy markets in the UK. In the 
view of analysts the Company was, in 1995, innovative and the sector leader having 
developed a coherent strategy for growing out of the core business, to become an 
integrated energy company with in particular major upstream interests (Smith, 1995f). 
Much of this success was attributed to the influence of the Managing Director and the 
Finance Director: Devaney and Anstee, both of whom were not ESI men. 
There is evidence, provided by examples like Eastern's approach to large potential 
customers such as McDonald's, and Eastern's venture in the domestic gas market, of what 
Chrisman et at (1988) identified as a segmented utility focus approach. Within the 
industry, cost is the key consideration in holding on to market share, marking the industry 
out as a commodity market. However, competing upon cost is not enough, and some 
form of differentiation is also necessary to win market share, hence the utility strategy. 
This element of competition in the industry suggests that the industry does not conform, 
for example, to Porter's analysis. This discussion will be returned to in Chapter Eight and 
Twelve. Some companies, like Eastern, have offered consultancy services while others 
have offered bundled services to create this competitive advantage through differentiation. 
Eastern has recently entered into affinity association with Barclaycard in an attempt to 
differentiate itself from other suppliers of electricity. 
Eastern was subject to an agreed takeover bid by diversified conglomerate Hanson on 31 
July 1995. The successful bid was £2.5 billion. Market analysis expected an agreed bid, 
as Eastern's investment activities were seen to preclude an exhaustive defence on the 
The extent to which this was a 'strategic' decision is returned to in Chapter Nine, which presents a more 
in-depth case study of Eastern Group. 
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Company's part due to a lack of available capital. The parties involved in the bid rejected 
this analysis and portrayed the deal as being a logical extension of each company's 
strategy. Hanson gained, in its view, the strongest and most competitive REC in the 
industry (Wighton and Smith, 1995), while Eastern gained the financial backing to 
advance its aim of becoming a fully integrated energy organisation. Finance Director 
Anstee expressed the view that Eastern "started to recognise that being bigger would be 
better on a number offronts" (Wighton, 1995a), especially in generation and gas. Being 
part of Hanson, it was argued, would enable Eastern to grow in these non-regulated areas 
at a much faster pace than if the Company remained independent. Prior to the takeover, 
Eastern was already: 
.. the largest supplier of electricity out of its own region; 
.. owned the most self generation plant; and 
.. the 7th largest purchaser of gas in the UK, for retail or generation. 
The first demonstration of this objective came with the early attempts to lease, over an 
extended period, generating capability from the main national generators. Both of these 
generators were obliged, by the industry regulator, to divest a certain proportion of their 
capacity to encourage the growth of competition within the generation industry (OFFER, 
1996). Eastern was the principal bidder for this capacity, and was successful in leasing 
600MW of generating capacity from National Power (Wighton, 1996) and PowerGen 
(Holberton, 1996t). As a consequence Eastern became the third largest conventional fuel 
generator. 
The takeover by Hanson precipitated a major organisational change intended to further 
enable the Group to meet its corporate objectives. Eastern was demerged from Hanson 
to form The Energy Group, which also included Hanson's US coal interests (Holberton, 
1997d). Eastern remained very much a separate entity, retaining operational control and 
with guarantees of financial support from the senior managers of The Energy Group. Its 
managers expected to be able to pursue their original objectives from within this new 
structure, but upon a wider international stage. However The Energy Group was fated 
not to be in existence for very long, as it was purchased in early 1998 by Texas Utilities 
(TXU), of Dallas, Texas (Lewis and Taylor, 1998). Eastern is now an integral part of 
TXU's global strategy, and with that role has had to cede some managerial initiative. It 
continues to pursue a very aggressive market development strategy in electricity and gas 
supply, leading to its takeover of the Norweb Energi business. It has developed a new 
core competence in electricity trading which drives all of its generation assets, and also 
its supply activities to a large extent. It has also sought, through a proposed joint venture 
with the distribution business of London Electricity, to continue to pursue an extended 
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concentrated growth in this sector of its business. Arguably, however, the Company's 
focus upon energy trading has meant it is perhaps the only REC for whom distribution is 
no longer the key core business activity. 
7.1.2 Structure of Eastern Group 
In this section, the management and organisational structures of Eastern Group are 
presented, and significant changes to either during the period are highlighted. Firstly, the 
senior management structure up until the takeover by Texas Utilities. At privatisation, the 
Executive Directors on the Main Board of Eastern were as follows: 
Name Position Joined Eastern in From 
James Smith Chainnan and Chief 1982 East Midlands 
Executive Electricity 
Walter Waring Managing Director 1983 East Midlands 
Electricity 
Laurence French Personnel and Public 1969 National Coal Board 
Affairs Director 
Richard Leveritt Finance Director 1970 North Western 
Electricity 
Douglas Swinden Marketing Director 1987 East Midlands 
Electricity 
William Watson Engineering Director 1986 London Electricity 
All of the Eastern Board were ESI men, and the majority were engineers. Therefore 
Eastern conformed very closely to the archetypical REC model. Indeed the appointment 
of Leveritt from within as Finance Director meant that the Company initially had even 
fewer senior managers with experience of other sectors than their contemporaries. As 
noted in Section 7.1.1, Eastern made a slow start to life after privatisation and in 1992 
decided to change the composition of their main board as a precursor to turning the 
Company's performance around. Waring retired, and was replaced by John Devaney. 
Devaney brought with him experience of a wide range of industrial sectors, most recently 
the US motor industry, and was appointed Managing Director. Other significant 
appointments followed with Steve Connock (personnel and Corporate Affairs Director) 
and Eric Anstee (Group Finance Director) arriving in 1992 and 1994 respectively and 
other managers were redesignated: Swinden to Group Strategy Director, Watson to 
Managing Director of Eastern Generation. Devaney became CEO in 1993, and when 
Smith retired in 1995 he was replaced as Non-Executive Chairman by Niven Duncan. 
This team led Eastern into the takeover by Hanson. During the time the Group was 
owned by Hanson, small changes occurred, and Devaney remained CEO until the takeover 
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by Texas Utilities in September 1998. 
Although there does not appear to be any evidence of pressure being applied by the new 
owners on the management team which had convinced them to pay £4.45 billion for the 
Company, it is clear that many of the existing managers were seeking new challenges. In 
addition to Devaney's resignation, Anstee had resigned in September of 1998. They are 
now working together on new projects within the energy industry. Connock had resigned 
in 1997, although ill health played a significant part in this decision, and Watson had 
resigned in march 1998. Swinden retired in 1996. 
The new board consisted of: PC Marsh, replacing Anstee; Jim Whelan, who had been 
running the Eastern Power and Energy Trading (EPET) division and who had been 
appointed a main board director for the same business; Jim Keohane, who joined Eastern 
from East Midlands in October 1997 to take over as Managing Director-Energy Retail, 
while David Huber joined the Company from Safeway in September 1997 to become 
Group Human Resources Director to replace Connock. David Owens joined Eastern from 
ABB as Managing Director-Networks in May 1998, while Jarrell Gibbs was appointed to 
the board from Texas Utilities, the new owners, in July of 1998. Devaney initially 
remained with the Group as Non-Executive Chairman. His eventual replacement was 
Philip Turberville, who joined Eastern in January of 1999 from the Royal Dutch Shell 
Group of companies, where he was President of Shell Europe Oil Products, responsible 
for refining and marketing activities in 26 countries. Prior to this post, Turberville was 
Vice President of Planning and Finance and Chief Financial Officer, Shell Oil Company, 
USA. 
The latest significant changes in the senior management structure of the company has 
come with the merging of the networks business of Eastern and its neighbour, London 
Electricity. David Owens has been named as the Chief Executive designate of the joint 
venture company, subject to regulatory approval being granted. David Jefferies, former 
Chairman of the National Grid Group, has accepted an invitation to become non-executive 
Chairman ofthe new company, called 24seven. In addition, in December of 1999 Roger 
Partington was appointed President of Eastern Energy, the electricity and gas retail 
business. Partington was previously Main Board Director responsible for Customer 
Development with Safeway, having joined the company as its Marketing Director. Prior 
to that he was Marketing Director at Nestle UK. 
Clearly, the process of introducing commercial expertise has continued throughout the 
period. None of the original board remain, but the Company still retains managers with 
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previous experience of the electricity industry, in Whelan and Keohane. It is noticeable 
that while the new owners have made appointments, the only appointment not prompted 
by a resignation was that of Partington. This differs considerably from the experience in 
other RECs which, having been taken over by foreign owners, have seen considerable 
expatriate involvement in their management. Clearly, however, Eastern as a company is 
now attracting senior managers of considerable commercial experience, reflecting the 
distance it has travelled in ten years. The current main board of EasternffXU Europe is: 
Phil Turberville, Chief Executive* 
David Owens, Chief Executive Officer, Networks and Executive Vice President, TXU 
Europe* 
David Jephson, Director ofInformation Technology 
David Huber, Human Resources Director* 
Eddie Hyams, President - TXU Europe Power* 
Phil Hardy, Head of Group Regulation, TXU Europe, Senior Vice President 
Tony Holmes, Chief Operating Officer, Eastern Energy 
Martin Stanley, President - TXU Europe Power and Energy Trading* 
Paul Marsh, Chief Financial Officer* 
Joy King, Director of Corporate Communications 
Roger Partington, President, Eastern Energy* 
* signifies main board member 
The board ofTXU Europe looks less like the other REC boards presented in this thesis, 
and more like the board of a conventional non-utility company. The presence of director's 
of IT, Corporate Communications and the amount of experience the board can provide 
from the marketing function indicates that it has moved further than most of its peers 
arguably towards a different industrial sector altogether. 
In respect of its organisational structure, at the beginning of the privatisation process, 
Eastern operated using a two-tier structure comprising a Head Office, and eight managed 
areas through which most customer contacts were conducted. Head Office was 
responsible for the management of the principal businesses and for the centralised 
functions of finance, public relations, personnel, computer operations and the secretariat. 
From this early stage, there was considerable delegation of responsibility to the 
operational areas, which were established as profit centres in order to more effectively 
facilitate the meeting of performance objectives. The relationship between the different 
levels, in terms of responsibility and decision making was complex, as the following 
extract from Eastern's issue prospectus shows: "The Directors are responsible for policy, 
strategy and the profitable performance of Eastern Electricity. Operational management 
of Eastern Electricity is by Executive Directors and Area General Managers. Greater 
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emphasis will be placed upon the profitable operation of the separate businesses and each 
is headed by a manager who reports directly to an Executive Director. The Area General 
Managers are responsible for the day to day conduct of the businesses in their areas and 
are supported by Area Business Managers. This matrix structure operates within the 
overall framework of central planning, target setting and control of the Company by the 
Executive Directors" (Kleinwort Benson, p.184-185). 
At the beginning of the period, therefore, Eastern was attempting to develop a structure 
that resembled a divisional structure, but with limited decision making for operational 
managers, and strict centralised command structures to ensure that senior managers 
managed the direction of strategy. The structure was therefore something of a hybrid, 
attempting a divisional structure but maintaining functional control systems. 
As the Company developed, and especially following the change in management in 1992, 
accompanying the turnaround of the Company's activities, Eastern developed a more 
recognisable divisional structure, with an increasing amount of decision making being 
delegated from Head Office to the separate business units. The Company established a 
series of "free standing businesses for each activity" (Eastern Group, 1994), and in 
reflecting this significant change in the status of each of its activities, changed its formal 
designation from Eastern Electricity to Eastern Group (Eastern Group, 1994, p.5). In this 
new structure, Head Office's day- to-day involvement in decision making was reduced to 
setting overall objectives, and managing certain key functions that were more 
economically managed centrally on behalf of the group. Day to day strategic decision 
making was passed to managers in each of the separate business units. 
As has already been mentioned Eastern has been taken over twice, first by Hanson 
(Wighton and Smith, 1995) and second by Texas Utilities (TXU) (Taylor, 1998b). During 
the Hanson/Energy Group period of Eastern's existence, its structure remained unchanged. 
However, following the takeover by TXU, changes have occurred. Eastern has now been 
integrated into TXU's wider business activity in Europe. While the activity and identity 
of some of its businesses, most notably Eastern's distribution business, have remained 
relatively stable, other businesses have changed. As can be seen from Figure 7.1, TXU 
Europe's structure emphasises a wider set of operational priorities, reflecting recent 
changes in the nature of the industry. 
TXU's emphasis is now focussed upon extending Eastern's own energy trading activity 
and upon building generation capability, rather than upon its supply and distribution 
businesses. Interestingly, as will be discussed below, Eastern Electricity and London 
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Electricity have begun the process of merging their distribution businesses, perhaps as a 
recognition of an increasingly difficult regulatory climate, and the need to locate other 
answers to the problem of the reduced profitability of distribution. 
Figure 7.1: Group Structure of TXU Europe 
TXU Europe Power 
and Energy Trading 
TXU Europe Ltd 
Eastern Energy 
7.1.3 Strategy Decisions at Eastern Group 
TXU Europe 
Power 
Eastern Electricity 
Eastern presents an interesting portrait of a company that turned itself around in pursuit 
of a dominant role in the market. As indicated, Eastern was a company that had 
committed itself to Itcentral planning, target setting and control of the Company by the 
Executive Directors lt (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.l85), and as such was committed to the 
pursuit of a prescriptive strategy process. The Company's early performance suggests 
that they had not arrived at a satisfactory strategy-structure-performance configuration. 
This failure resulted in a change of senior management and the turnaround strategy 
between 1992-1994, accompanied by a change in emphasis, and the development of a 
more emergent approach. In keeping with the concept of emergent strategy, objectives 
were clearly set by senior management, but they no longer prescribed the business level 
strategies to achieve these objectives. This perception, of the development of a more 
emergent approach, can be examined in greater detail as Eastern Group is one of this 
report's case study companies, and this debate is rejoined in Chapter Nine. 
7.1.4.1 Corporate Strategy 
Initially, Eastern operated within the four traditional business that all of the RECs were 
engaged in: distribution, supply, appliance retail and contracting. These were shortly 
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joined by investments in generation, and the gas industry. Over the period, a separate 
energy trading business has developed from out of these original business areas, and in the 
long run this may become the Company's operational core. 
(a) Distribution: as has previously been noted, the scope for any company to attempt to 
engage in any corporate strategy that is not based upon concentrated growth in this 
industry is severely limited. As was noted in Section 7.1, Eastern set out with the 
intention to pursue a concentrated growth strategy based upon effective cost management. 
However, the Company was felt to have underestimated the severity required in its cost 
management, resulting in the need for it to follow a turnaround strategy in 1992-94, to re-
focus its efforts. Since that time, however, Eastern has assiduously pursued a cost 
minimisation approach in pursuit of its concentrated growth strategy, with the result that 
the workforce in distribution has been substantially reduced. It has also been keen to 
explore methods which improve employee productivity and service quality within a tighter 
cost regime, as will become clearer in Chapter Nine. 
One interesting development that the business has pursued has been the proposed joint 
venture between Eastern and London Electricity's distribution businesses. This decision 
has been identified as an attempt to continue to find added value from a business activity 
that has been increasingly tightly regulated by the Regulator, and is therefore undertaken 
in support of the underlying concentrated growth approach. This decision is the first of 
its kind in the industry, and may well mark a significant change in the way that all of the 
companies come to manage their distribution activity. 
(b) Electricity and Gas Supply: Eastern has been from the very beginning of the 
privatisation period one of the RECs that has most aggressively sought a market 
development approach to its supply businesses. As was noted at the beginning of this 
section, Eastern has always been a company that has sought to create a market awareness 
of itself and its products, and that has not changed during this period. Eastern was one 
of the first RECs to identify the opportunities available to increase its market share in 
respect of new non-franchise customers in the 1 MW and lOOkW markets, and has sought 
a variety of product development improvements to aide its market development activity. 
Earlier in this section, reference was drawn to the sort of added value services Eastern 
provides to large customers, and to the added features it is also offering domestic 
customers. As the electricity and gas markets have converged, there is an emerging need 
to create a critical mass of customers, forcing companies to innovate and develop product 
packages which acknowledge the need to marry low prices with added features. 
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( c) Other Non-Regulated Businesses: At the beginning of the privatisation period, Eastern 
recognised that its other non-regulated business activities: appliance retailing and 
contracting would face difficult trading conditions, and although high expectations were 
not attached to either activity, the Company announced that it would seek to operate each 
so that a contribution to overall profitability was made. In the case of appliance retail, the 
Company soon realised that its operations would not be effective and profitable if some 
form of cost reduction did not occur. The route chosen, joint venture, was a reaction 
common among the RECs. In 1991, Eastern merged its retail business with that of 
Southern to form E&S Retail (Maddox, 1991), later called PowerHouse. Despite the fact 
that Midlands Electricity later joined the joint venture and further improved cost 
management and exposure to risk, the business was not thought to be producing sufficient 
returns, and was divested to Hanson just prior to Hanson's purchase of Eastern Group 
itself (Hollinger, 1995f). The strategy adopted in relation to contacting was similar to that 
of appliance retail, wherein the activity was managed as effectively as possible in difficult 
trading conditions through a concentrated growth approach. However, and again as with 
retail, the contracting business was not thought to be contributing significant returns to 
the Group, appeared out of place in the developing group strategy, and so was divested 
to a management buyout in January 1998 (Eastern Group, 1998, p.3). 
(d) Generation: From the beginning of the privatisation period, Eastern has been the most 
aggressive REC in relation to its involvement with generation. Eastern was among the 
first to obtain planning permission to build Closed Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) power 
stations, a strategy of either concentric diversification or backward vertical integration 
depending upon one's view as to the potential offered by the electricity industry for 
vertical integration. Following that initial involvement, and the takeover by Hanson, 
Eastern sought to build the importance of generating within its portfolio of businesses by 
leasing generating plant from both National Power (Wighton, 1996) and PowerGen 
(Holberton, 1996f). This horizontal integration substantially increased Eastern's 
importance as a generator, making it the third largest non-nuclear generator in England 
and Wales, with 7,OOOMW of generating capacity at its command. Within the generation 
business, a concentrated growth approach is pursued, but one linked very closely to the 
Group's emergent energy trading activity. This complex relationship is a crucial 
component of the Company's approach, and is explored immediately below. As part of 
TXU in Europe, the Company has sought to extend its generation investment activity. To 
this end it is also developing generation projects overseas and currently has interests in the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Finland, and India: indicative of a market development approach 
in support of the core concentrated growth approach. 
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(e) Energy Trading: Eastern's involvement in energy trading has been an example of 
innovation on a significant scale within an industry where innovation is usually 
incremental, if it exists at all. Eastern was the first REC, indeed arguably the first 
European electric utility, to realise that the convergence of the electricity and gas markets 
provided new opportunities in the area of risk management, and more specifically 
managing the arbitrage between different fuel markets. Eastern's energy trading activity 
grew out of its previous innovative behaviour in support of its generation business. The 
Company pursued a strategy of backward integration in its generating business, when it 
developed a policy securing guaranteed access to supplies of natural gas by buying stakes 
in North Sea gas fields (Anon, 1993c, Smith, 1994k, Anon, 1995a). Eastern had 
previously engaged, as had all the other RECs, in energy purchasing activities to manage 
its exposure to fluctuating fuel prices. It's decision to develop energy trading as a 
business started from the desire to manage its own risk more effectively, and was extended 
by the realisation that other organisations also required risk to be managed, so presenting 
a new market opportunity. Having established this' gap in the market', the strategy of the 
new business was immediately to seek market development opportunities. As such the 
new Company, TXU Europe Power and Energy Trading, has established offices 
throughout Europe offering innovative and bespoke packages to prospective customers, 
a product development activity. Eastern's energy trading business is now regarded as the 
customer for its generation company, which is seen as principally an asset management 
company concerned only with managing its assets as effectively as possible, and with all 
of its market risk now managed by the energy trading company. This complex 
relationship is explored in more depth in Chapter Nine which presents a case study of 
Eastern Group. 
Eastern Group, therefore, after a cautious start has been the most aggressive of the RECs, 
and has sought to extend its business activity across the whole of the energy industry. It 
has pursued market development at every opportunity, and product development in supply 
and energy trading in particular. In addition it has been innovative: becoming the first 
REC to make generation a truly core business activity; being the first REC to backwardly 
integrate its generation and gas supply businesses by securing access to natural gas fields; 
and by developing energy trading as a separate business. Throughout all of its businesses, 
the Company retains a foundation of a concentrated growth approach, and this is 
especially true in distribution. 
7.1.4.2 Business Strategies 
As previously noted, distribution is a monopoly business, and therefore no competitive 
strategy can be said to be in operation, although management of costs is the key concern. 
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The Company's need to pursue a turnaround strategy, and the requirement to increase the 
severity of its cuts to operating costs, suggests that Eastern was not managing its costs 
as rigorously as it may have been. This is no longer the case, as the Company pursues 
even greater operating efficiency through its 24seven joint venture with London 
Electricity. In relation to its supply activities, if it is assumed that once again cost 
leadership is a prerequisite to enable it to compete in the industry, then Eastern has also 
pursued a differentiation approach, or the segmented utility approach described 
previously. It would be fair to say that all of the RECs that have decided to remain in 
supply are attempting to differentiate themselves, but that Eastern have been amongst the 
most aggressive in pursuit of this policy. 
In its generation business, Eastern's business strategy has focussed very firmly upon 
overall cost leadership. As stated above, Eastern's generation activity is now solely an 
asset management business, making any other approach inappropriate. In its energy 
trading business, Eastern is focussing very much on differentiation. The rationale for 
beginning the business in the first instance was that no other company was providing such 
a service, and so Eastern achieved first mover advantages. Now, as other companies 
attempt to enter this business Eastern seeks to maximise the competitive advantages of 
being first to market, and build its reputation based upon this differentiation. In 
attempting to open new markets, it is also making use of focussed differentiation. 
As with other RECs, therefore, it is clear that Eastern has actively developed different 
business strategies to meet specific market need. In businesses which are still regulated, 
cost is the key issue. Cost management is also the key in businesses which no longer carry 
competitive risk, such as the case with the Company's generation assets. In businesses 
where there is a high level of competition, but where the profit margin on continuing 
business is low, then differentiation has become all important. This is the position with 
supply, which was always a low margin activity, and due to competition these margins are 
being forced even lower. Hence, the only way in which it is possible to compete is to 
attempt to differentiate the package accompanying the service, rather than the service 
itself which must be kept low cost in order to retain competitiveness. 
7.2 London Electricity 
London Electricity is the REC for London. The Company's operating franchise covered 
an area of 665 square kilometres in the centre and southern suburbs of the UK's capital 
city. The Company is primarily of interest as it is the most urban of the RECs, with a 
disproportionate reliance upon domestic and commercial customers. At privatisation, 
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17% ofall energy sold to commercial enterprises was sold by London (pearson, 1990c). 
The Company possesses the lowest number of industrial customers, which was felt to 
minimise its initial exposure to the actions of predatory boards in the 1MW and 100kW 
competitive markets. While this provided some comfort to the company, it was presented 
with the unique responsibility of keeping the nation's capital supplied, leading to a higher 
level of scrutiny of its actions. 
7.2.1 Key Events: 1990 - 2000 
London entered the newly liberalised era by explaining the extent of the work that it as a 
company had undertaken to prepare itself for change. London's culture and the 
Company's way of doing things had undergone 'several revolutions' in the preceding 
years. In the four years prior to privatisation, costs had been reduced by 20%, and in the 
preceding seven years the employee head count at London had been reduced by 25%. 
Additionally, new information technology had been introduced to various areas of the 
Company, including the distribution network, the high street showrooms, company 
payroll, and the company telephone system. London, its managers claimed, was ready for 
change and focussed upon its customers (Kellaway, 1988). However, analysts still 
believed the Company to be ill-prepared for the new operating environment. It was 
thought to have higher operating costs than other RECs (Pearson, 1990c), while its 
managers were not thought to be particularly entrepreneurial, although this was a criticism 
levelled at all REC managers (Kellaway, 1988). The initial view of the senior managers 
was that the privatisation would allow boards to broaden the range of their business, and 
possibly to become better at what they already did. This is quite a contrast to the 
viewpoint ofthe board ofEME (Section 6.2). 
Caution was therefore the key word in the early strategic activities of the Company. Its 
core business, the seventh largest in the sector, was stable due to its composition. London 
did not suffer many raids from predatory competitors due to the proportionately small size 
of demand from its customers. The company was identified as being 'cautiously keen' to 
enter the generation industry (Pearson, 1990c), and approached its exposure in this 
industry exclusively through joint ventures. London's caution was again demonstrated 
when the Company became the eleventh of the twelve to enter into the gas market, again 
in a joint venture, with Total Gas Marketing (Anon, 1992g). Overall, the City saw the 
company as dull due to a concentration upon core businesses and an unwillingness to 
overexpose itself in unregulated areas. 
However, and despite this dull image, the Company in the early years following 
privatisation achieved a number of considerable successes:-
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it claimed its price raise of7.7% prior to privatisation was the lowest in the sector 
(Wilkinson, 1988a); 
it was found to be the REC with the lowest number of service interruptions in both 
1991 (Lascelles, 1991) and 1992 (Lascelles, 1992d)2; and 
it came top of the Regulator's rankings, based upon the ten guaranteed service 
standards tested for by Offer, with a failure rate of only 1 per 10,000 customers 
(Sychrava, 1992g). As part of this focus upon customer service London offered 
to pay customers compensation if employees are over 2 hours late for 
appointments (Anon, 1992g). 
London therefore would appear to be a company that is aiming to focus upon core 
business areas, and to only extend into new areas with extreme caution. The company 
justified this interpretation with a number of significant strategic decisions in 1992-93. 
The company: 
~ exited from retail at an earlier stage than any of the other RECs (Adonis, 1993a); 
~ made early and decisive cuts to its contracting business, 300 out of 400 jobs, and 
announced it was abandoning appliance servicing (Sychrava, 1992c); and 
made the most significant market development advance of the early post 
privatisation years, in taking over the British Airport Authority's (BAA) 
distribution network (Betts, 1993). 
The BAA acquisition was a perfect example of risk averse market development. The 
network fitted exactly into London's operating capabilities, and as it entailed supplying 
the electricity needs of Heathrow, Gatwick, and Stansted airports, it represented a major 
coup for London. The purchase, the largest non-core purchase by a REC up to that date, 
fitted the Company's strategy for non-core business development. London's strategy, as 
revealed by the company review of 1992-93 was "to concentrate on what we do best, 
building a portfolio of unregulated activities which is closely associated with our electricity 
business" (London Electricity, 1993, p.2). Overall, by 1993, the view was developing that 
London had successfully 'cleared its decks' of inappropriate business activities, and was 
now in a position to "diversify into areas close to the core business, utilising the 
company's skills and its strong financial position" (Lascelles, 1993c). This position was 
achieved through a major restructuring exercise, which had refocused the business upon 
core capability, and upon the regulatory frameworks overseeing each business stream. 
2 
London Electricity is an unique case in that most of its cables run underground. This means that failures 
are potentially more disruptive as excavation must occur first. London therefore had invested more 
recently in newer infrastructure which may explain the superior performance. 
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London was now organised around three divisions: 
~ Network Service; 
~ Customer Services; and 
~ Energy Services. 
Therefore, the pattern that is emerging is of a company that is settling upon a concentrated 
growth strategy, involving prudent market development. In other words, one that is 
"focussed, exploiting key strengths and ensuring that we are able to make the necessary 
investments in our infrastructure to maintain the high standards that our customers 
expect" (Reid, in Chairman's Statement, London Electricity, 1994, p.3). This approach 
also involves a cautious attitude to innovation. Indeed, London's approach to innovation 
is characterised by its use of joint ventures, and membership of consortia as a means of 
achieving risk averse growth. Therefore the period from 1994 onwards saw a 
continuation of earlier themes: 
~ costs continue to be targeted, with jobs cuts resulting in £30m of savings in the 
financial year to June 1994 (Smith, 1994c); 
~ the exploration of the potential of a joint venture in the areas of customer service 
and information technology, offering the potential for considerable synergistic 
savings, with Thames Water (Hollinger, 1995e), and the exploration of the 
potential for merged supply activities with other local RECs; 
movement of the Company's customer service operation to a new, cost effective 
call centre out of area in Wearside (Tighe, 1995), a move that proved so 
successful London was able to sell consulting services to other companies 
planning similar moves (Gooding, 1996); 
the award of BS 5750, the first to any REC, for monitoring the delivery of 
guaranteed standards to customers (Urwin, in London Electricity, 1994, p.7); 
the virtual elimination of residential disconnections for non-payment (Urwin, in 
London Electricity, 1994, p.7); 
involvement in the London and Continental consortia bidding for the Channel 
Tunnel rail link; 
~ involvement in the City Greenwich Lewisham rail link consortia; 
~ a strategic alliance with Thames Water, resulting in London winning a supply 
contract worth £100m; and 
a cut in residential bills of 16% in real terms since April 1991 (Urwin, in London 
Electricity, 1995, p.7). 
During this time, London's reputation in the City improved markedly. The Company was 
now viewed as a well managed, narrowly focussed company providing good value to 
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shareholders, and high quality, low cost service to customers. It must be recognised that 
London possessed an advantage over other RECs in that a very high proportion of its 
supply business was effectively 'ring fenced' and would not be 'in play' in a competitive 
sense until the liberalisation of the sub-1 OOkW market intended for 1998-9. Whether the 
Company would have been in a position to remain focussed upon its core business if it had 
been losing large numbers of supply customers is of course a matter of conjecture. 
However, the fact that at various times London has explored the possibility of mergers, 
alliances or joint ventures with other retail suppliers suggests that the same concentrated 
growth approach based upon efficiency, service and cost leadership would have been 
applied. 
London was purchased by US utility Entergy, during the 'second wave' of REC 
takeovers, at a cost of£1.3 Billion (Holberton, 19960). Entergy defended the decision 
to pursue the takeover on the grounds that it would contribute a "significant step in our 
drive to be a winner in the global energy market" (Entergy, 1996, p.4). Entergy believed 
that the ESI was an "attractive market with good growth potential", and expected to see 
the generation of "a stable and growing stream of earnings and cash flow at an attractive 
risk adjusted internal rate of return" (Entergy, 1996, p.5). Entergy had also recently 
purchased an Australian distribution company, CitiPower, which combined with London 
was expected to improve Entergy's future earning potential. In addition, Entergy 
expected that the advances achieved towards liberalisation of the UK and Australian 
energy industries would provide them with experience which would prove "invaluable as 
we prepare to compete in the US" (Entergy, 1996, p.5). 
However, Entergy's ownership of the Company was not to last for very long, and it sold 
London to the French national electricity utility Electricite de France (EdF) for £ 1. 9 billion 
in December of 1998 (Taylor, 1998e). Underlying the decision was the destabilising 
impact these investments had upon its performance as Entergy found itself over extended 
by its investments away from its home market. In an attempt to turn itself around, 
Entergy divested both London and CitiPower at around the same time. Since the takeover 
by EdF, the Company has continued to pursue roughly similar approaches in its main 
businesses, albeit with slight adjustments to account for changes in the operating 
environment. One such change was the takeover by EdF of the supply business of SWEB 
(see Section 7.3) in June 1999, for £235 million. The takeover has resulted in a 
synergistic merger of the two businesses, with savings being made through the managed 
combination ofIT systems, property portfolios, customer service and call centre activity, 
and functional department mergers. For marketing purposes, however, the Company 
continues to operate under both London Electricity and SWEB brand names. 
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The preceding Section has already discussed the formation of24seven with Eastern Group 
(Section 7.1.1), and London's objectives in agreeing this merger. It is clear from this 
action, the takeover ofSWEB Supply, and increased investments in generation that EDF 
see the UK as an industry offering real potential for growth and proving a compliment to 
its own activities in main-land Europe (which includes supplying bulk energy to the ESI). 
The investment in London represents an attempt by EDF to build a very strong energy 
concern in the UK, which it hopes to float in the near future. 
7.2.2 Structure of London Electricity 
In this section, the management and organisational structures of London Electricity are 
presented, and significant changes to either during the period are highlighted. Firstly, the 
senior management structure. At privatisation, the executive directors on the main board 
of London Electricity were as follows: 
Name Position Joined London in From 
John Wilson Chainnan and Chief 1986 Midlands Electricity 
Executive 
Roger Urwin Managing Director 1990 Midlands Electricity 
Alan Towers Finance Director 1988 GPG 
Clive Myers Marketing and 1978 South of Scotland 
Supplies Director Electricity Board 
Andrew Curry Trading Director 1989 Zodiac Toys Ltd 
London generally abided by the pattern evident in most of the preceding cases: the 
majority of managers were both engineers and possessed extensive experience within the 
ESI, while the Finance Director was recruited from industry. However, London was one 
of the few RECs to begin introducing non-industry managers to its team to manage 
specific functions. In the case of London, Curry was appointed to run the Company's 
trading activity after a lengthy career in retail. However, Curry was the first of the 
original board to leave, in June 1992, to be followed by Myers in July 1993. In 1994, 
Wilson retired and London adopted the managerial arrangement favoured by the majority 
of the RECs, bringing in a non-Executive Chairman, Sir Bob Reid, and promoting the 
Managing Director, Urwin, to CEO. Other changes occurred around the same time, with 
Ian Beament being appointed Network Services Director, and Mike Brown being 
appointed Customer Services Director, both internal appointments in June 1993, and Mike 
Kersey being appointed Energy Services Director, joining from AMEC in January 1994. 
This was the board composition as the takeover by Entergy approached. 
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Inevitably, the takeover by Entergy brought changes to the composition of the main board. 
However, these were not as extreme as in the case of companies such as SWEB. While 
the Chairman of the new company, Ed Lupsburger, was from the parent, the CEO was 
Mike Beamis, from London Electricity. The short lived ownership by Entergy, and the 
takeover by EDF brought about further changes to the board, and a further injection of 
new managers, this time from the new French parent. The composition of the new 
London Electricity is as follows: Bruno Lescoeur, Chairman and CEO; Ian Beament, MD; 
Kevin Morton, Public Networks; John Morris, Metering; Martin Wenborn, Retail; Derek 
Lickorish, Customer Service; Angus Norman, Private Networks; Gerald Wingrave, 
Finance; Paul Cuttill, Corporate Services; and Bernard Cottrant, IT. 
In respect of its organisational structure, at the beginning of the privatisation process 
London operated a two-tier system, with the Company being organised into five areas 
reporting back to Head Office. Head Office was responsible for the formulation of 
policies, the management of centralised operations such as electricity purchasing, the 
operation of the distribution system, the negotiation of major sales contracts, the retailing 
and servicing of appliances, contracting, and research and development. The operational 
areas were responsible for the local operations of the centralised customer services and 
engineering divisions, including the operation of the distribution system, for meter reading, 
collection of payments, and the maintenance of emergency services. The relationship 
between managerial and organisational structure was as follows: "The management of 
London Electricity is controlled by five Executive Directors, comprising the Chairman, 
who is also Chief Executive, the Managing Director and three Executive Directors who 
have responsibility for the finance, marketing and supplies, and trading divisions. There 
are five further divisions: engineering, customer service, personnel, information 
technology and secretarial. Apart from the Finance Director and the Company Secretary, 
who report direct to the Chairman, the head of each division reports to the Managing 
Director. Over the past two years, changes have been made in organisational structure 
at Board level and at the head office in readiness for the requirements of the privatise 
sector. New teams have been established in the areas of electricity purchasing, regulation, 
taxation and corporate finance" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.291) 
Clearly, London operated a divisional structure, but within this divisional structure a role 
culture is also evident. London stated at the beginning of the process that it had been 
through several organisational revolutions, and that the culture greeting the new era was 
more customer focussed and decentralised than during the nationalised period. During 
this time, in addition, costs had been reduced by 20% (Kellaway, 1988). However, there 
was still a belief that London was not among the most entrepreneurial of companies. 
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The structure developed for privatisation was retained until 1993, when a new structure 
based upon three divisions was introduced. These three divisions were: 
~ Network Service: comprising its distribution services, the remaining electrical 
contracting activities, and the BAA airport distribution network; 
~ Customer Services: its retail activity; and 
~ Energy Services: comprised of all of its activities in competitive markets such as 
bulk electricity trading, pooling and settlement operations, and the London Total 
Gas joint venture. 
This divisional structure was thought to provide the best support for the clearly focussed 
business activity of London, and has survived largely to the present day with some 
modifications. Some businesses, such as metering and contracting, are now standalone 
subsidiaries with their own independent management teams. The remaining three areas 
of business London is currently engaged in: distribution, supply and generation, remain 
in separate divisions within the Group, as illustrated by Figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2: The Current Structure of London Electricity 
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London has therefore not yet witnessed the sort of strategic turnaround experienced by 
some of the other RECs. It has also, despite undergoing two takeovers, not witnessed as 
much turmoil as for example EME or Eastern. As will become clear below, it appears to 
have fluctuated little from its original strategic objectives. Similarly, the structure 
developed by the Company at the beginning of the process has persisted, with only the 
occasional alteration as operating environments have changed, and been reflected in 
strategic as well as structural shifts. Therefore, it is argued, London provides an example 
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of a company wherein structure and strategy are closely related, and whose evolution is 
similarly related. 
7.2.3 Strategy Decisions at London Electricity 
The overall strategic objectives of the managers of London were principally related to the 
Company's distribution business, which they intended to manage explicitly to "exploit 
opportunities for cost savings" to benefit from any growth in number of units distributed. 
Other businesses were expected to contribute to profitability in a small way, and any 
future participation in generation was not included in the Company's formal expression 
of its expected prospects (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.273). With such a limited objective, 
and with the divisional structure described above, it is conceivable that London may have 
been more prescriptive in its strategy process than other RECs already examined. Indeed, 
during the period senior managers have referred to an approach in which "disciplined 
management and rigorous financial control" (Urwin, in London Electricity, 1995, p.5) 
were central to the achievement of cost reduction and profitability targets, and where 
meeting the Regulator's set of performance targets was given a high priority. Despite 
announcing initiatives aimed at devolving responsibility in order to give "management and 
staff better opportunities to develop more flexible, responsive approaches" (Urwin, in 
London Electricity, 1995, p.5) London would seem to have been a company with a more 
prescriptive than emergent approach, at least prior to its second takeover. 
7.2.3.1 Corporate Strategy 
It is clear from the discussion in Section 7.2, that London has not attempted to develop 
as wide a scope in its businesses as other RECs have done, at least when it was an 
independent company. The Company announced at the beginning of the period that 
managing its distribution business was its principal concern, and it is with distribution that 
this review begins. 
(a) Distribution: It has already been noted that in the distribution business, companies 
have little option but to pursue a concentrated growth approach. In the ESI, the principal 
method at a company's disposal to achieve this objective is cost reduction, allied to 
performance improvement. London appreciated this 'fact of regulated life' earlier than 
most, and included a clear statement of their strategy in their issue prospectus. They 
would "exploit opportunities for cost savings .... under the distribution price control 
formula" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.273) meaning in effect that costs would be cut early, 
and harshly, following each price review to maximise the returns available. This was a 
lesson other RECs only learnt after painful experience (see, for example, Eastern in 
Section 7.1). 
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As has already been noted in the preceding study of Eastern Group, London has recently 
sought even greater cost reduction in its distribution business by announcing the 24seven 
joint venture between itself and Eastern. A press release by London expressed the aims 
of the joint venture as involving "significant cost savings through the consolidation of 
operations. This will be achieved through improved procurement, use of single IT systems 
and processes, reduced property costs and other economies of scale" (London Electricity, 
1999b). The cost reductions were to come primarily from reducing staff numbers, with 
an anticipated cut of 400 at the beginning of the joint venture, with a further 400 to follow 
over the next 18 months. The majority of the job losses were expected to be from office 
and administrative functions, rather than front-line engineering staff. The joint venture 
therefore extends the concentrated growth strategy that the Company has been following 
since privatisation. 
(b) Supply: In supply, a similarly concerted concentrated growth strategy has been utilised. 
As mentioned earlier, the merger of London's electricity and gas supply businesses with 
those of SWEB has presented the Company with real opportunity to reduce operating 
costs, in order to maximise the profits from sales. London has remained a leading 
company in service management and provision and service quality remains a high concern. 
It has shown less interest in product development than other RECs, and has less 
aggressively pursued market development, beyond buying SWEB Retail. However, it has 
sought to participate in large scale consortia as a matter of course, and has been involved 
in several notable successes. This suggests a desire on the part of London to create 
critical mass through buying market share, and then managing that critical mass 
effectively, while at the same time winning very large distribution and supply contracts. 
This contrasts with the aggressive organic market development approaches of some of the 
other RECs. 
(c) Other Businesses: As noted earlier, London undertakes business in other areas, all of 
which are related to the main business. Its contracting and metering businesses are 
managed as stand alone subsidiaries which must generate their own profits in competitive 
markets. These each adopt a concentrated growth approach within limited operating 
environments. They are not actively seeking to break out of their local niche markets. In 
generation, London has limited capability and its aim is principally to provide relatively 
small scale support in the form of backward integration to its main supply businesses, 
although this may be about to change due to the influence of the new owners. Recently, 
London extended its portfolio of generation capacity by buying Sutton Bridge Power 
Station from US utility Enron (London Electricity, 2000). 
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London has clearly pursued a more consistent corporate strategy approach than other 
RECs. Throughout this period, concentrated growth opportunities have been emphasised, 
aiming at defending their hold on existing customers by offering high quality service and 
competitive pricing rather than attempting to grow their business through diversification. 
What investment London has allowed has been on large risk averse assets, like power 
stations, or substantial investments in support of key areas of business, like the purchase 
of SWEB' s supply business. It has not been particularly innovative, except in seeking 
greater cost reduction through its joint venture with Eastern in distribution. Historically, 
it has tended towards horizontal, rather than vertical integration, but this latter 
development may be evident in the future, as with its recent addition to its generation 
capability. 
7.2.3.2 Business Strategies 
As with the Company's decision making in relation to corporate strategy, London's 
business strategies have also been markedly consistent. In distribution, London has 
pursued a programme of cost management, but more resolutely than some of the other 
RECs. In supply, the Company has along with the other RECs accepted that low costs 
are a priority, and has chosen a combined cost focus/differentiation focus, focus utility 
approach to retaining old customers, and win new customers. As mentioned above, 
London was in an unique position in respect of competition. With its high proportion of 
'low use' domestic customers and low proportion of 'high use' industrial customers, it 
was not as exposed to the early effects of competition as other RECs. Therefore, it was 
possibly in a better position than most of the other RECs to prepare itself for the advent 
of domestic competition. Its solution to its competitive problem was therefore low costs 
and high customer service. London claimed that a recent OFGEM report showed that it 
had achieved the greatest number of, and largest proportional, price reductions of any of 
the RECs (London Electricity, 1999a). Additionally, London has also been one of the 
most effective suppliers of electricity, according to the Regulator's performance tables. 
7.3 Seeboard (Formerly the South Eastern Electricity Board) 
Seeboard is the REC for the South East of England. The Company's operating franchise 
covered an area of 8,200 square kilometres and included all of the county of East Sussex, 
almost all of Kent, and most of Surrey and West Sussex. Seeboard's area contained a 
contrasting mixture of domestic demand in the densely populated urban area of Southern 
London and major towns such as Brighton, as well as agricultural demand from rural 
areas. However, the area has seen significant and growing demand from the service 
sector, and is among the most aftluent in the country. Seeboard has the highest proportion 
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of domestic customers of all of the RECs, and can suffer through the vagaries of seasonal 
demand. There is very little heavy industry, the third lowest proportion among the RECs, 
but substantial transport hubs: Gatwick Airport, the Channel ports, and Ashford 
international rail interchange. There were some doubts as to Seeboard's prospects at the 
beginning of the period, with BZW questioning whether they would be among the 
stronger RECs (Thomas, 1990g). The Company was not expected to be amongst the 
RECs likely to engage in extensive diversification, which was seen as a positive feature 
(pearson, 1990b), making the company averagely ranked in the sector. Any investments 
it did seek to make, it claimed, would be derived from its existing skills and commercial 
base (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.564). 
7.3.1 Key events: 1990-2000 
As indicated above, Seeboard was not one of the RECs that appeared to view 
privatisation as an opportunity to seek either related or unrelated investment 
opportunities. Indeed, there were only two major developments at Seeboard in the years 
immediately following privatisation, although one of these events was truly notable. 
Seeboard made one of the earliest, and most significant, market development moves in 
March 1990 when it won from Southern Electric the contract to supply Heathrow Airport 
(Thomas and Samuelson, 1990). The Company then supplied the two largest airports in 
the country and was exploring the possibility of helping BAA, the owner of the airports, 
establish Combined Heat and Power (CHP) stations at each in order to further reduce the 
cost of supply. However, Heathrow returned to its original supplier a mere one year later, 
with the accompanying announcement from Seeboard that it would not chase large supply 
customers at an uneconomic price. The other, less revolutionary, development saw 
Seeboard beginning to explore the possibility of building a gas fired power station. 
From its first year of operation, Seeboard was regarded as a sound investment, but lacking 
in dynamism. Seeboard sought to make a virtue out of limiting its business focus to those 
businesses that it had been traditionally engaged in. This included a joint venture with 
Sainsbury's to attempt to reposition its appliance retail business (Thomas, 1991), and a 
second such deal with Habitat. It also sought to manage its costs effectively, but without 
making the sort of dramatic cuts in evidence elsewhere. From 1992, it began to act 
slightly more adventurously, but only in support of its core business activities. It: 
~ purchased Nene Electrical Installations from the Nene Group for £4 million, to 
enhance the product offering of its contracting business (Anon, 1992a); 
established a gas marketing company: Southern Gas, in a joint venture with 
Utili corp, the fourth REC to do so (Lascelles, 1992b); 
developed a more extensive partnership with Amoco to market gas to domestic 
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customers when the domestic market began its phased opening in April 1996 
(Corzine, 1995), which absorbed Seeboard's Southern Gas business after the 
Company bought out its partner Utilicorp. The company was thereafter known 
as Beacon Gas; 
brought in outside assistance, from computer company Oracle, to develop a 
database to more effectively channel its marketing effort; 
commissioned, in ajoint venture with Southern Electric, AES Corp. and General 
Electric, the 660MW CCGT Medway Power generating plant (Betts, 1992); 
~ provided domestic consumers with a £ 1 0 rebate in 1992; 
~ initiated a job reduction programme ultimately aimed at cutting 500 jobs, which 
had seen the staff total fall by 180 by the end of financial year 1991-1992 
(although the City believed there remained further potential for cost reduction); 
established a wholesale contract with EdF to hedge against higher electricity pool 
pnces; 
was the first REC to announce a price freeze for its domestic customers (Anon, 
1993a); 
was one of the top 6 RECs winning contracts out of area in the IMW and 100kW 
non-franchise market, and was one of the first three RECs ready for the 
introduction of full domestic competition in 1998-99; and 
was part of a consortia bidding to win the channel tunnel rail link contract. 
However by the beginning of the 1993-94 financial year, the increasing competitive 
pressures experienced by all of the RECs led Seeboard towards a major cost reduction and 
restructuring programme. Consecutively, the Company set about a major cultural change, 
and refocused itself upon profits, results and shareholder value. The Company established 
a new corporate goal, of being the most efficient of the RECs, and further distanced itself 
from the possibility of diversification3. Up to 600 jobs were expected to be lost and the 
businesses of Seeboard were refocused to improve operational effectiveness (Smith, 
1993a). From 1994, the Company sought to cut a further 750 jobs over the following 
three years to further control costs. It refocused its activities on three separate profit 
centres: distribution; supply; and The Business Group, containing all of the other 
unregulated business activities that the Company was engaged in. The development of 
a more cost focussed approach was further emphasised later in 1993, when its retail staff 
agreed to newer, and less favourable, pay and conditions as the Company adapted to 
3 
Although concern was voiced ahead of the 1994 price review that without some form of diversification 
the company would be "bulging with cash" (Lascelles, 1994b). 
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difficult trading conditions in that sector (Anon, 1993d). 
The focus upon quality service was rewarded in 1993 when Seeboard was said to be one 
of the best RECs in the Regulator's disconnection league (Lascelles, 1993d). In early 
1994, the Company was the first REC to cut its prices to business customers (Lascelles, 
1994b), cuts which were shortly extended to its domestic customers when it became the 
first REC to pass on price cuts that had not been required by the Regulator to this group 
of customers (Smith, 1995e). At the time of the first regulatory review, Seeboard was 
regarded as one ofthe most efficient of the RECs, which was effective at marketing itself, 
and with a good record for customer service. 
In November 1995, Seeboard was the subject of a friendly takeover bid by the US utility 
Central South Western Corp. (CSW) (Wighton, 1995f, of Dallas, Texas, the seventh to 
receive such a bid. The agreement tends to suggest that, following its aggressive move 
into the domestic gas industry, the Company was looking to become a more dominant and 
expansive company within the industry. CSW was attracted to Seeboard because of its 
low cost, high quality service reputation. CSW's happiness with the manner in which 
Seeboard was progressing was shown when the board of the Company were retained by 
their new owners, who were also happy to allow operational control to rest in Sussex. 
The new Seeboard was set aggressive market development targets, of 10% of the 
domestic gas market and increasing its 7% of the electricity supply market, at the same 
time as realising further opportunities in generation. As part of this process, a Seeboard 
led joint venture: Seeboard Powerlink, successfully tendered for the contract to operate, 
maintain and upgrade electricity supplies to London Underground Ltd (Batchelor, 1997). 
The other members of the alliance were BICC and ABB. It also sought to aggressively 
grow its share of the gas market through its Beacon Gas subsidiary. Additionally, the 
Company set about increasing its involvement in generation, by agreeing to participate in 
a joint venture CCGT power plant in Shoreham harbour with ScottishPower called South 
Coast Power (Marsh, 1997b). The decision to sell its retail outlets to Dixons reflects the 
influence of the new owners upon the management of the Company, as Seeboard fully 
focussed upon its core business activities (Wright, 1998). 
7.3.2 Structure of Seeboard 
In this section, the management and organisational structures of Seeboard are presented, 
and significant changes to either during the period are highlighted. Firstly, the senior 
management structure. At privatisation, the Executive Directors on the Main Board of 
Seeboard were as follows: 
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Name Position Joined Seeboard in From 
George Squair Chairman and Chief 1983 Southern Electric 
Executive 
David Lovesey Managing Director 1987 SWALEC 
Terry Boley Corporate Strategy 1989 Electricity Council 
Director 
Jim Ellis Commercial Director 1967 Yorkshire Electricity 
Len Jones Operations Director 1983 Southern Electric 
John Quin Finance Director 1989 EMAP 
Maunder Wide Administration Director 1979 British Gas 
and Company Secretary 
Seeboard's initial Main Board was in some senses very similar to those of other RECs, but 
in another sense quite different. The majority of managers were again drawn from the 
industry, and only Quin had experience of a non-energy sector in the preceding 20 years. 
However, the designation's applied to the roles of the executive director's shows a 
company which is arguably more aware of the demands of the coming era. For example 
none of the other RECs had an executive director in place specifically to examine 
corporate strategy, although this alinement of responsibility would not survive long in the 
new environment. In 1992 the board was restructured following the retirement of Squair. 
The Company split the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive, with Sir Keith Stewart 
becoming Non-Executive Chairman, and Jim Ellis stepping up as Chief Executive. In 
addition, Boley retired, to be replaced by John Weight who became Managing Director, 
Business Group. In addition, other executive director's were re-designated Managing 
Figure 7.3: Executive Director's Areas of Responsibility, 1993 
CHAIRMAN Sir Keith Stuart 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE Jim Ellis 
GROUP FINANCE MANAGING MANAGING MANAGING 
DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR SUPPLY DIRECTOR 
DISTRIBUTION BUSINESS GROUP 
John Quin Len Jones Stephen Gutteridge John Wright 
Corporate Finance; Network Services - Power Purchasing; Retail; Electrical 
TaxationfTreasury; Engineering; Tariffs and Contracts; Contracting; 
Financial Planning; Policies and Southern Gas; SEEBOARD 
Statutory and Operations; Changes marketing of International ; 
Regulatory Accounts and Regulatory Issues; Electricity; Generation; Transport and 
Marketing of Regulatory Matters Support Services 
Distribution Services 
Source: Seeboard, 1993, p.5 
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Director's of the various new divisions: Jones, as MD Distribution, and Gutteridge, as 
MD Supply. Stephen Gutteridge had been appointed Commercial Director to replace Ellis 
upon his promotion. An indication of the responsibilities each of these new MD's held is 
shown at Figure 7.3. 
Some changes occurred between the restructuring of the management team and the 
takeover by CSW: Quin retired and was replaced by Michael Pavia in October 1994, while 
Jones also retired to be replaced by Weight as MD Distribution with Tony Smith being 
promoted to replace him as MD Business Group. However, this structure remained, with 
composition evolving over time. The current board of directors comprises: 
Name 
Jim Ellis 
John Weight 
Michael Pavia 
John Harper 
E RBrooks 
Thomas Shockley 
Position 
Chainnan 
Group Managing 
Director and Chief 
Operating officer 
Group Finance Director 
Director 
Director 
Director 
Joined Seeboard in 
1967 
1993 
1994 
1998 
1996 
1996 
From 
Yorkshire Electricity 
ESI 
Lasmo 
CSW 
CSW 
CSW 
The current composition clearly shows a change, in that the owner has significant 
representation on the Board. This suggests that the board itself is a formal body, with 
responsibility for setting the Group strategy, but not for day-to-day management, which 
is undertaken by the Officers of Seeboard: the Distribution Director, the Energy Supply 
Director, the Customer Services Director, the Company Secretary, and the Group 
Financial Controller. The role of the board has therefore changed, as the Company has 
become more divisionalized over the period. 
At the beginning of the privatisation process, Seeboard operated a two-tier structure of 
a Head Office and four divisions, which reported back to the Head Office. These divisions 
were geographically defined, and were designated the Central, Northern, Kent, and Sussex 
Coast divisions. The Head Office was responsible for policy formulation and the direct 
management of centralised operations such as electricity purchasing and marketing, tariff 
formulation, control of the distribution system, the negotiation of major sales contracts, 
IT and Telecommunications, appliance retailing, corporate development, personnel, legal 
and public relations. New functions, such as treasury, taxation, corporate planning and 
shareholder administration were added in the run up to privatisation. Within the divisions 
managers held responsibility for electricity sales, network construction, maintenance and 
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operation, servicing of appliances, electrical contracting, meter reading, collection of 
accounts and the maintenance of emergency services. At the head office level, the 
organisation was based around five executive directors who were responsible for the 
finance, commercial, operations, corporate strategy, and administration directorates. At 
the divisional level, there was "significant delegation of authority" to the general manager 
who headed each of the divisions (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.553-554). 
At the beginning of the period, therefore, Seeboard operated an hybrid structure 
combining both functional and divisional elements. The Company was initially criticised 
for this arrangement, as it was thought to be neither one thing nor the other. As the 
Company had decided to focus upon its core business activities from an early stage, the 
view of analysts was that the Company's structure should have been constructed to reflect 
this, and thus see Seeboard evolve to a much more pronounced divisional structure. 
This move was taken in early 1993, when the organisation's geographically oriented 
structure was amended to a more product based structure. Therefore, the former 
geographical divisions and Head Office directorates were replaced with three product 
divisions centred on distribution, supply and the other business conducted by the 
Company, designated as The Business Group, which included retailing, contracting, and 
generation (Seeboard, 1994). The Company sought also to rationalise the management 
of Seeboard, and the restructuring brought a reduction of around 400 jobs, as head office 
functions were allocated to the separate business units, and as such Head Office's role was 
redefined. The restructuring saw Seeboard's IT activities contracted out to Anderson 
Consulting (Smith, 1993a). The takeover by CSW has not markedly altered the structure 
Seeboard, and a close variation on the structure introduced in 1993 persists, although 
some businesses, such as appliance retailing, have been discontinued. It is possible to 
argue that there was some initial confusion at Seeboard as to the extent to which the 
Company was looking to decentralise decision making, or maintain formal central control 
after privatisation. This confusion was addressed with the 1993 restructuring which 
allowed business decision making to be devolved to the businesses. This suggests that the 
strategy of Seeboard at the beginning of the period was only partially defined due to 
failure to appreciate the limitations of a central strategic function in a divisionalized 
structure. The structure therefore effectively accompanied a redefinition of the strategy 
of the Company after 1993. The latest overview of the structure of the Company and its 
relationship with its owners if presented at Figure 7.4. 
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7.3.3 Strategy Decisions at Seeboard 
The origin of the initial lack of congruence between strategy and structure perhaps lays 
in the question of strategy process within the Company. Seeboard identified a very clear 
initial objective for itself, which was to manage its core activities effectively with the aim 
of achieving benefits for shareholders. At the beginning of the period, much of the 
responsibility for the achievement of this aim was placed with the managers of the 
dominant coalition, suggesting a prescriptive approach to strategy formulation. 
Decentralisation allowed decisions to be taken on operational rather than strategic matters 
further down the organisation. However, after 1993, the process appears to have become 
more emergent. Fundamental business objectives were still formulated at the head of the 
organisation, but responsibility for determining a path to the achievement of these 
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objectives was increasingly left to managers within the separate businesses. 
7.3.3.1 Corporate Strategy 
Seeboard was one of the RECs that has remained relatively loyal to its original business 
activities, including being one of the last to consider leaving appliance retail, a business 
that many of its contemporaries left considerably earlier. This analysis of strategic 
decisions, therefore, focusses upon the core businesses principally, and joins all of 
Seeboard's other business areas under a single heading of the Business Group, as used by 
the Company. 
(a) Distribution: the extent to which RECs could utilise any grand strategy other than 
concentrated growth has been discussed elsewhere. As with other RECs, Seeboard based 
its strategy in distribution on such an approach, although cost reduction did not feature 
as prominently nor as early as it did with some of the other RECs. Seeboard was 
identified as one of the smaller RECs, and potentially therefore its ability to reduce costs 
in its core businesses was limited. It is noticeable that when the Company was exposed 
to its first, and only, period of cost reduction - between 1994 and 1997 - the majority of 
cuts were expected to come in middle management rather than the network business. The 
Company has not been identified as seeking further cost reduction by organisational 
synergy, as has been the case between a neighbouring REC, London and its discussions 
with Eastern Group. 
(b) ElectriCity and Gas Supply: Seeboard was seen as being extremely keen on marketing 
itself outside of its service area from the beginning of the period, and this market 
development activity in both electricity and gas continues. Seeboard scored the first 
significant success in the newly competitive 1MW market, although it shortly lost its 
Heathrow supply contract to Southern. In other major deals, Seeboard has won the 
supply contract for the London Underground, and participated in a number of consortia 
to further extend its market reach. In gas, through its joint ventures initially with Utili corp 
and then Amoco it has aggressively sought new supply customers across all levels of 
demand and across the whole country. It has not tried to emulate the extensive product 
development approaches of some of its competitors. Throughout, it has sought to pursue 
a concentrated growth approach underpinning its strategic objectives in supply. 
(c) The Business Group: throughout its remaining unregulated businesses, the key has 
always been the basic concentrated growth approach, although this approach was 
supplemented as considered appropriate in some of these areas. For instance, in 
generation the Company has formed joint ventures with partners in order to spread risk 
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and benefit from compatible skills sets. In retail, the Company sought to pursue a market 
development approach by shifting its focus away from its traditional high street location, 
towards out-of-town superstore locations, reflecting a changing demographic amongst 
shoppers. Ultimately, the new owners of the Company decided that the retail activity was 
incompatible with the core activity of the Company, and it was divested. 
It would appear that Seeboard has remained very loyal to its original intention of seeking 
to manage its core businesses as effectively as possible, through a concentrated growth 
approach. While the various businesses have become more adventurous, as shown in 
Section 7.3.1, there has not been diversification or innovation on a scale witnessed 
elsewhere. Seeboard has therefore remained very consistently focussed upon its core 
businesses, and the core strategies those businesses have pursued. 
7.3.3.2 Business Strategy 
As for its business strategies, Seeboard has again shown considerable consistency. While 
management of cost has again been the dominant objective used in distribution, a 
combined cost focus and differentiation, or utility, approach has been used in the supply 
business. Seeboard had established for itself in 1995 the aim of being the best utility in the 
UK. As demonstrated above, Seeboard was the first REC to voluntarily cut its own prices 
to demonstrate the effect of a cost focus approach resulting from improved efficiency and 
reduced costs. At the same time, it set itself the target of attaining the highest standards 
within the industry, and used quality of service as a means of differentiating itself. It has 
not chosen to pursue other differentiation strategies as witnessed among its competitors: 
its affinity programme for example is based upon offering discounts at restaurants and 
hotels rather than the alliances with well known companies favoured by some of the other 
RECs. It has not launched a green energy tariff. 
7.4 Southern Electric, now part of Scottish and Southern Energy 
Southern Electricity is the REC for the South of England. The Company's operating 
franchise covered an area of 16,900 square kilometres and comprises all or part of the 
counties of Hampshire, Oxfordshire, Berkshire, Wiltshire, Dorset, Somerset, West Sussex 
and Devon as well as the Isle of Wight, within its boundaries. The composition of 
customer types is varied, including sizable domestic and small business users, as well as 
agricultural demand, in an area of the country where incomes have grown at higher than 
the national average in recent years. The major ports of Portsmouth and Southampton 
are included in this area, and the extended motorway system continues to bring new jobs 
to the UK's 'silicon valley', the M4 corridor from Reading to Swindon. The Company 
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was headquartered at Maidenhead in Berkshire, although it is now headquartered at Perth, 
in Scotland following its merger with Scottish Hydro-Electric. 
Southern is of particular interest as it was identified as being the largest of the RECs, in 
terms of market capitalisation, at the beginning of the period, and second largest by 
proportion of electricity distributed, holding 11 % of the market. Its rate of sales growth 
were expected to increase after privatisation. It was also identified as being one of the 
RECs most prepared for privatisation, having embarked upon a market-oriented 
reorganisation four years in advance of the announcement of privatisation in 1988 
(Samuelson, 1989c), and well in advance of many of the other RECs. To this end, 
Southern established in early 1986 a list of criteria for success, that would guide the 
Company's progress. As part of this process they identified a number of obstacles and 
established six task forces to tackle them. These problems were: communications and 
involvement; operating as a business enterprise; customer-staff and information 
technology interface; systems and procedures; customer relations; and corporate image. 
Their aim, in undertaking this enterprise "was to improve both the productivity and 
efficiency of the board's personnel which accounts for two thirds of its controllable costs. 
In the following five years, it achieved a 14.5 per cent real increase in the workload of its 
non-trading staff, while manpower fell by 4.5 per cent" (Samuelson, 1989d). As a result 
of this activity, glaring weaknesses were highlighted by a survey of customer attitudes, 
including concerns for poor and unimaginative levels of service. The action taken to 
remedy these weaknesses saw the Company enter the new era with a considerable 
reputation for cost management and customer service. 
7.4.1 Key Events: 1990-2000 
Southern was identified as one of the RECs most keen to build up critical mass in its 
supply business, while at the same time acknowledging and defending distribution as its 
core activity. It was also one of the many RECs keen to explore the possibilities of 
generation, but that was probably the extent of the Company's early intentions with regard 
to new business opportunities. As the pathfinder prospectus notes, the Company only 
committed itself to examining "possible new business opportunities which have strong 
links to existing activities, or which will build on existing strengths, and where prospects 
for profitable growth can be identified" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.616). The Company 
was an early favourite of the City, partially because its aims were rational and limited4, the 
good early work it undertook to align itself with its new operating environment, 
4 
A target of only 15% of earnings to come from non-core business by the year 2000. 
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considerable marketing ability, the high esteem with which the Company's management 
was held, and the fact that it was one of the larger RECs. 
Other events during this period encouraged the City to continue viewing the Company in 
a favourable light. These included Southern being: 
~ one of the earliest to venture into self generation and became a partner in the 
Thames Power generation plant with joint venture partners Eastern and London 
Electricity, and the Medway Power generation plant, with joint venture partners 
GE, AES, and Seeboard; 
one of the RECs making the most conscious effort to win big customers. It won 
one of the first IMW competitive supply contracts when it agreed to supply the 
new Honda car plant in Swindon, which despite being within its own region was 
subject to considerable attention by the national generators (Samuelson, 1990a), 
in addition to 31 large out of area customers (Samuelson, 1990d). Although it 
initially lost the supply contract for Heathrow Airport (Thomas and Samuelson, 
1990), the contract was won back in 1991; 
actively looking at productivity improvements as a result of investing in new 
technology; 
a leader in customer service by initiating a quality improvement programme called 
'Quest for Quality', based upon and extending earlier initiatives originating further 
down the organisation aimed at successfully targeting customer needs, to update 
and improve its own systems and procedures with the aim of continually 
improving its product offering (Taylor, 1992), and was the second most successful 
REC in the Regulator's assessment of service quality in 1992 (Sychrava, 1992f); 
a leader in operating flexible work programmes among its 5000 employees to 
increase the Organisation's flexibility and responsiveness, and to improve 
productivity (Taylor, 1993); 
involved in a programme of rolling job losses in an effort to mange controllable 
costs, leading to it claiming that it had the lowest costs of any of the RECs when 
it reported in 1993 (Lascelles, 1993b), strengthen by the intention of cutting 1000 
more jobs between 1993 and 1996; 
involved in merging its retail activities with that of Eastern Group (Maddox, 
1991), to be joined the following year by Midlands; 
engaged in horizontal integration with the purchase of Rightmain, the parent 
company ofMP Burke, a utility contractor for the major English and Scottish gas 
and water utility companies (Anon, 1992c); and 
involved in concentric integration by entering into an agreement with Phillips 
Petroleum Company UK to acquire and market gas in a joint venture, as part of 
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its strategy to increase its non-regulated businesses and to become a leading 
energy utility (Anon, 1992d). 
All of these activities were undertaken, while simultaneously remaining one of the leading 
RECs in terms of dividend payments. By the end of 1993, therefore, the Company was 
viewed as one of the stronger RECs, focussed upon its core businesses, but whose non-
regulated activities were also performing creditably well, and almost uniquely well in the 
area of contracting. As the non-regulated activities it was engaged in were principally 
traditional REC activities: retail (ultimately divested in 1995) and contracting, or activities 
such as generation or gas which were becoming recognisably core REC activities, the 
contentment with the Company was further enhanced. 
At the beginning of the takeover period, therefore, Southern was one of the strongest of 
the RECs, and hence subject to a wide range of speculation as to its intentions with 
respect to neighbouring utilities, such as SWEB and Southern Water. It was thought to 
be one of the RECs least likely to face an hostile bid. It was also thought to be amongst 
the bidders for the generation capacity the main generators were required by the Regulator 
to divest. It was, however, viewed as one of the most conservative of the RECs, as 
opinions within the City with respect to the potential of the RECs altered and managed 
risk taking became more fashionable. This innate conservatism did not prevent the 
Company from acknowledging that merging with another REC was a potential course it 
might chose to follow, the first REC to do so. It identified the potential tightening of 
regulatory control following the extraordinary regulatory review of 1995 as a principal 
factor leading to the possibility of merger. Rumours suggest that the REC it was thinking 
of merging with was Midlands. 
While Southern did entertain the possibility of a merger with SWEB, the two companies 
were unable to reach an agreement and SWEB was eventually taken over by Southern 
Company of the USA (Smith and Wighton, 1995a). The reason behind the decision was 
given by Southern Electric as being regulatory, although the attack upon the Company's 
share price that accompanied the speculation may also have had a part to play, as was the 
concern that any merger would not generate sufficient funds to cover its expenses. 
Southern was more definite about the value of an agreed takeover by National Power, 
which launched a bid worth £2.8 billion for Southern in late 1995 (Wighton, 1995c). The 
bid lapsed when it was referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) later 
in the year, but was revived in early 1996 when the MMC appeared poised to allow it. 
However, in April 1996 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry blocked the 
proposed bid, along with a similar bid by PowerGen for Midlands, citing the anti-
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competitive nature of the proposals as a justification (DTI, 1996a). Ultimately, Southern 
was to be the last of the RECs to enter into a merger/takeover. 
Southern had entertained the possibility of bidding for Southern Water, the water 
company whose area was contiguous to its own. The decision not to continue the bidding 
was based upon an unwillingness to match the price offered by ScottishPower, who placed 
a higher value upon the water company (Holberton, 1996e). Analysts had viewed the 
businesses of both Southern Electric and Southern Water as being highly complementary 
in terms of geography, customers and core operational skills. Southern's aim in entering 
the bidding was to create a strong multi-utility group with a sound financial base, a strong 
and experienced management and significant potential for growth, according to a senior 
Southern Manager interviewed at the time (Holberton, 1996b). Southern Electric was of 
the view that post-1998 success will only be won by companies that can offer electricity, 
gas and water to large numbers in the name of one utility. Ultimately, however, it could 
not compete with its Scottish rival. It announced later that year that it had put its plans 
for growth by acquisition on hold (Holberton, 1996m), and set about a share restructuring 
programme to return some of its extensive capital assets, built up for its acquisition 
programme, to its shareholders. This differed from the share buy-back schemes 
undertaken by the majority of the other RECs. 
Southern's capability to manage cost was clear however, as the bid allowed a 
reassessment of how successful it had been since privatisation. The Financial Times 
reported that Southern Electric's workforce in its core distribution and supply businesses 
had been reduced from 5,955 in 1990-91 to 3,304 at March 31 1996. Additionally, 
controllable costs were cut by 12.9% in the financial year 1994-95, a reduction of35.6% 
on a cumulative basis since 1990-91 (Holberton, 1996c), and by 46.2% by financial year 
1996-97 (Holberton, 1997c). 
During this period of potentially distracting activity, the Company continued to pursue its 
ongoing strategy of high quality service at a low cost. Southern increased its focus upon 
cost management. This it did by seeking to ensure that the most volatile element of its 
controllable costs, energy purchasing, was risk managed. This it did by two means. 
Firstly, it signed a fifteen year wholesale agreement with the nuclear generator British 
Energy (Holberton, 19961). This mutually beneficial agreement was seen to remove the 
possibility of fluctuations in the cost of energy allowing the Company to better plan its 
marketing activity, by introducing certainty into its pricing. Secondly, the Company 
planned to spend £75 million on five 40MW power stations to increase the proportion of 
its wholesale needs that it supplies itself. Together, analysts believed, these measures 
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should ensure Southern Electric's energy costs are among the lowest in the industry 
(Holberton, 1997c). The partnership with British Energy was extended in late 1997, when 
Southern announced it was to build a series of conventionally fuelled power stations with 
British Energy (Marsh, 1997c). Southern also expressed an interest in any further 
generating capacity divested by the main generators. The Company was an industry 
innovator when it launched the first affinity deal in the industry, in partnership with the 
retail chain Argos. Under the agreement Southern would advertise in Argos catalogues, 
and provide new Southern customers with points that they could use in Argos stores 
(Holberton, 1997e). Agreements of this kind are now widespread within the industry. 
However, the Company was also criticised for seeking to remain independent in an 
industry where 'financial muscle' was increasingly looking like an absolute necessity. This 
was remedied in late 1998 when Southern agreed to merge with Scottish Hydro-Electric, 
to form a new company called Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE). The merger favoured 
Southern who were seen to become the dominant partner. Although the headquarters of 
the new company would be in Scotland, the chief executive would be Jim Forbes, the 
CEO of Southern (Taylor, 1998b). The rationale underlying the decision was provided 
at the new company's launch. The themes detectable in Southern's latter strategy: 
developing certainty in wholesale electricity purchasing, as a protection against price 
volatility, were the main motivations provided. This, the new CEO argued was of 
particular importance as competition in domestic supply was introduced. The merged 
company would also command greater capital resources to fund expansion. There was 
also the possibility for synergistic savings through the elimination of duplicated costs in 
areas like information technology and through the increased purchasing power of the 
combined group. Moving the headquarters to Scotland, rather than remaining in 
Berkshire, is indicative of the potential of the cost reduction measures. Overall, savings 
in the region of £40-£50 million were estimated. 
At present, the new company is seeking to consolidate its position in the UK energy 
market. A report issued by PriceWaterhouse Coopers in late 1998 identifies SSE as one 
of the likely five biggest companies in the industry by the year 2005. Unlike others 
mentioned in this group, SSE were reported not to be looking at international ventures, 
preferring to concentrate upon the domestic market (Taylor, 1998e). The new group's 
priorities were identified as being to increase its generation portfolio, and to build its 
supply customer base to around 6 million across gas and electricity. Growth by 
acquisition was said to be on the 'medium-term' agenda, as the Company sought to 
consolidate its position as one of the five largest UK energy companies (Taylor, 1999b). 
The recent purchase of the SW ALEC supply business from British Energy (British 
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Energy, 2000) shows how this approach is developing. At the end of its first trading year, 
analysts identified a straightforward strategy within the group: "bear down on the cost 
structure and search for growth in the pipes and wires business" (Blackwell, 1999). 
Following regulatory approval of the merger, the Company offered the following 
assessment of its ongoing strategic outlook: "Scottish and Southern Energy will continue 
to focus on its core strengths and exploit these for future strategic growth in the UK. 
Scottish and Southern Energy has a proven track record in managing network assets and 
this expertise positions the Group well to capitalise on the opportunities which become 
available for either ownership or management; Following the recent round of regulatory 
price reviews, the Group clearly leads the field in the UK for efficiency and customer 
service standards. Our focus will be on maintaining this edge and exploiting these skills 
further in the developing UK utility market; Scottish and Southern Energy has the lowest 
cost to serve the mass market supply business driven by leading edge CS systems 
developed for the competitive market. This positions the Group well for further 
development in mass market supply by organic growth, affinity deals and potential 
acquisitions; In Generation, plans are well advanced for further development of small scale 
embedded plant and a significant number of sites have been secured. Options for the 
development of a second power station at Keadby are also under active consideration so 
that the Group will be well placed when the gas moratorium is lifted. This will maintain 
its position as the UK generator with the youngest and most efficient portfolio of assets." 
(Source: Scottish and Southern Press Release, 2000b.) 
7.4.2 Structure of Southern Electric 
In this section the management and organisational structures of Southern are presented, 
and significant changes to either during the period are highlighted. Firstly, the senior 
management structure. At privatisation, the executive directors on the main board of 
Southern were as follows: 
Name 
Duncan Ross 
Henry Casley 
John Deane 
James Hart 
Frederick Lockey 
Position 
Chairman and CEO 
Managing Director 
Finance Director 
Strategic Development 
Director 
Operations Director 
Joined Southern in 
1984 
1986 
1986 
1986 
1973 
From 
SWALEC 
Eastern Electricity 
CEGB 
London Electricity 
anotherREC 
Peter Woodhart Corporate Services Director 1986 North Thames Gas 
Southern's Main Board conforms to the archetypical REC formula, of employing 
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managers with long term experience of the ESI, or other energy industries. However, 
Southern had a lower proportion of engineers among its senior managers (only Ross, and 
operations director Lockey) than other RECs, suggesting that the restructuring of the 
management and operations of the Company prior to privatisation led to a careful 
consideration of the sort of skills necessary for the new era. It is notable that four of the 
senior managers were appointed in 1986, and that while they possessed ESI backgrounds, 
most had held non-engineering positions. 
In common with many other RECs, Southern split its senior management posts in 1993, 
with Ross retiring, to be replaced by Geoffrey Wilson as Non-Executive Director, and 
Casely stepping up to become CEO. The remainder of the board remained the same, apart 
from the introduction of Jim Forbes, as Operations Director in 1991 on the retirement of 
Lockey. Forbes joined from Northern Electric. In 1995, the board saw the redesignation 
of two of its members, with Forbes becoming Managing Director Electricity, and Hart 
becoming Managing Director Business Development. Forbes was henceforth responsible 
for the operation of the Company's traditional business, and was further re-designated 
Chief Operating Officer in 1996, while Hart was responsible for new business 
developments. In effect, the same management team guided Southern until 1996, when 
a number of changes occurred. 
Wilson was replaced by Ken Coates, another former non-executive director. In addition, 
Casely retired, to be replaced by Forbes, although Casely stayed with the Company as the 
non-executive deputy chairman. The board continued with no effective replacement for 
Forbes, into 1997. Hart remained, although redesignated as Managing Director Energy 
Trading, and a new finance director, Ian Marchant was appointed from within in June 
1996. Following the unfortunate death of Coates, Bruce Farmer became non-executive 
chairman of the Company in April 1998. This was the team that lead Southern into its 
merger with Scottish Hydro. The merger of the two companies inevitably caused 
significant changes to board structure, and the current membership of the board 
acknowledges the contribution of both companies to the new organisation. The board of 
Scottish and Southern Energy (1999) is therefore: 
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Name Position Joined Scottish Hydro From 
(SH) ISouthern 
Electric (SE) in 
Lord Wilson of Chairman 1993 (SH) Governor of Hong 
Tillyorn Kong 
Bruce Fanner Deputy Chairman 1998(SE) Non-Executive Director 
Jim Forbes CEO 1991 (SE) Northern Electric 
David Gray Business 1998 (SH) Caledonian Paper 
Development 
Director 
Jim Hart Commercial Director 1986 (SE) London Electricity 
Ian McMillan Power Systems 1961 (SH) CEGB 
Director 
Ian Marchant Finance Director 1992 (SE) Coopers and Lybrand 
James Martin Generation Director (SH) CEGB 
David Sigsworth Energy Trading 1962 (SH) CEGB 
Director 
In relation to organisational structure, Southern operated using a two-tier structure of a 
Head Office to which six divisions reported. This structure was introduced in 1987, and 
was accompanied by significant change. Two layers of management below Head Office 
were scrapped, and the former district network replaced by operating divisions. At the 
same time, the Head Office staff count was reduced by 320, more resources were 
established for marketing, and the Company increased its investment in IT. The functions 
performed by Head Office included formulation of policy, co-ordination of divisional 
operations and the direct management of centralised operations such as electricity 
purchasing, the operation of the distribution system, and negotiation of major sales 
contracts. Additionally, new corporate responsibilities such as business planning, contract 
selling, regulatory relationships, taxation and finance were located at the centre. The 
divisions were geographically oriented, and were largely responsible for customer-related 
activities, such as electricity sales, construction and maintenance of the network, the 
retailing and servicing of appliances, contracting, meter reading, account collection, and 
the maintenance of emergency services. The dominant coalition of the Company 
comprised the Chairman, Managing Director and four Executive Directors responsible for 
finance, strategic development, operations and corporate services, with a considerable 
degree of autonomy passed to the six Divisional Managers. This structure, a 
geographically based divisional structure with a strong corporate centre, was retained until 
1994. 
-354-
Responding to the dominant trend within the industry, and to the increasingly different 
demands upon each of its business activities, Southern restructured its divisions along 
product lines. These new divisions included: a supply division, managing both Southern's 
gas and electricity supply businesses; a business development division, tasked with finding 
new business opportunity for the Company in the wake of the 1994 regulatory review; and 
a distribution division to manage the Company's core business. The traditional businesses 
of supply and distribution were managed by the MD Electricity, while other continuing 
and new business were managed by the new MD Business Development. This structure 
prevailed, with minor adjustments, until the merger with Scottish Hydro. 
SSE 
SSE: 
Distribution, Generation and Energy Sen'ices 
Southern Electric 
Con tractin g 
Scottish Hydro Southern Electric 
Supply of Electricity and Gas 
Figure 7.5: Structure of Scottish and Southern Energy 
The new organisation has sought to exploit the synergies available to it presented by the 
merger. To this end, the Company has relocated to Scotland, and has sought to manage 
its business jointly where possible, although it has retained its recognisable brand names 
in their former locations. The structure of Scottish and Southern Energy is illustrated at 
Figure 7.5. Hence, activities such as generation, distribution and energy services are 
managed as separate divisions, and contracting within a separate company, while supply 
of gas and electricity are managed in separate companies under their existing brand names. 
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7.4.3 Strategy Decisions at Southern Electric 
Southern has to be viewed as belonging to the group of RECs, along with Manweb 
(Section 5.1) and London (Section 8.2) that determined at an early stage to pursue 
corporate level strategies which focussed very closely upon their core businesses. 
Southern's decision, and its consequences, was explored in Section 7.4.1. As such, a 
strong concentrated growth approach runs through the Company's corporate strategy 
making, and underpins its approach to competition. In distribution, as has already been 
addressed on numerous occasions within this review, a concentrated growth approach is 
the only conceivable direction in which a distribution business can be driven. Southern 
in particular appear to have learnt the lesson's necessary to make a success of such an 
approach, and their business has prospered. Interestingly, the Company has in the past 
sought to merge with other RECs (Midlands and SWEB were potential partners), 
although this action was probably supply lead, rather than aimed at improving distribution 
efficiency and effectiveness, although this may have followed. The merger with Scottish 
Hydro has allowed the merger of their distribution businesses, although as the two are not 
contiguous the savings resulting from a joint concentrated growth approach will have been 
evident in areas such as administration, purchasing, and technology transfer rather than 
the more obvious operational improvement. 
In supply, as was noted in Section 7.4.1, Southern was one of the more aggressive RECs 
in relation to market development as that market opened. However, it is perhaps correct 
to say that the 'lead' the Company developed in terms of market development has not 
been sustained, as other companies have sought to develop critical mass of their own. 
Southern was viewed as having 'taken its foot off of the peddle', and to be the least 
prepared of the RECs for full domestic competition. This was despite leading the industry 
in product development with the signing of one of the first affinity agreements, between 
itself and the retailer Argos. The merger with Scottish Hydro may well have reversed this 
'decline'. Southern always sought, through a business strategy emphasising low prices 
and high quality service, to differentiate itself from its rivals, and this utility approach 
continues through the new group. However, it is possible to argue that despite its size, 
the new Company is not developing the same range of product development concepts as 
some of its competitors. 
Throughout its other business activities, the Company has sought to develop and sustain 
its underlying concentrated growth approach. Southern is one of very few RECs to have 
made a success of its contracting business, growing through judicious horizontal 
integration and tight management of costs. Its generation business, before the merger and 
latterly in conjunction with its new partner, has sought to grow through organic means, 
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and it now considers itself in a position to bid for capacity that any of the other generators 
release. The Company undertakes its generation activity principally in support of its 
supply business, but also increasingly to generate profits on its own accord. Overall, 
therefore, Southern has been one of the least adventurous, but most successful and stable 
of the RECs. Its size was an advantage in its strategic activity, and it has sought a partner 
which possesses a similar view, focussed upon national and regional, rather than 
international expansion. Its approach remains rooted in a concentrated growth approach, 
based upon high quality service, and low cost. 
7.5 Analysis of Cases 
This section continues the work started in Section's 5.5 and 6.5 in examining the strategic 
content of four of the twelve RECs, and beginning the process of understanding the 
factors driving those strategies, as well as commenting upon the strategic combinations 
identified during this process. The structure and reporting of this analysis will follow the 
same pattern as that developed in Chapter Five. 
7.5.1 Observations: Objective One 
The methodological procedure followed in this chapter was the same as followed in 
Chapter Five, and readers are referred to Section 5.5.1 for an explanation of the process. 
Tables 7.1 to 7.4 present summaries of the key corporate and business strategies employed 
by the sub-sample during this period. The relative importance of each strategy in each 
company is shown. Once again, as with the analysis of companies in Chapter Five, there 
are notable similarities among the companies, as well as some dissimilarities. Firstly, 
similarities: 
~ all of the companies of the sub-sample began the period with a very clear core 
business focus, emphasising the importance of their distribution business and of 
the control of costs. Some of the companies, and in particular Seeboard, were 
also keen on market development activities but only as long as core concentrated 
growth principles were conformed to; 
most of the companies were early movers in relation to generation and gas 
through joint ventures with a variety of partners, although it is appropriate to say 
that London was more cautious than the other RECs in this group (who were 
themselves among the most cautious of the whole population of companies), and 
among the last to enter the new gas and generation businesses; 
most of the companies have sought to make their existing non-regulated 
businesses: appliance retail and contracting, work. However, all have now 
divested their retailing operations, some (London in 1993) considerably in advance 
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of others (Seeboard in 1998). The same is not true of contracting, which still 
constitutes a significant business for both Seeboard and Southern. 
The question of dissimilarity arrises from the timing of each companies decision to move 
away from their original strategic approach. The companies within this sub-sample are 
all recognisably the same companies that entered the new era, which is not the case in any 
of the other sub-samples, and so present an interesting commentary upon the development 
of the industry. While each, with the exception of Southern, has been taken over at least 
once they have not been' diminished' by the progress of change in the way that companies 
such as SW ALEC, Manweb, Norweb or SWEB have been. The progress of change has 
made each company markedly different from its peers: 
~ Eastern Group, now part ofTXU Europe, started out as a cautious and relatively 
conservative company but is now arguably the market leader in many areas and 
in particular the new business of energy trading and risk management. The 
Company's turnaround in 1993-94 created a much more aggressive and 
entrepreneurial organisation which under its various owners (Hanson, preceding 
TXU) has sought to establish itself as an international player; 
London Electricity, now part of the EdF Group, has also moved away from its 
cautious origins with the aim of becoming at least a significant player on the 
regional stage. The takeover by EdF, following the short ownership by US 
company Entergy, has reinvigorated the Company and made it much more 
ambitious. This was signified principally by the purchase of SWEB Supply; 
Southern Electric, now the dominant partner in Scottish and Southern Energy, 
was the last independent REC and arguably the least inclined to alter its initial 
strategic outlook before the changing circumstance within the industry brought 
about the merger. Even then the merger has been relatively conservative, and the 
new Company is only targeting growth in its regional markets rather then 
venturing overseas. It is, however, seeking to grow its generation assets, and 
recently took over the SW ALEC supply business; and 
Seeboard, now owned by US utility CSW, has changed the least in this period. 
It still seeks to be the best REC, but is more narrowly focussed than its peers: it 
is still closely focussed upon being effective in distribution, and in growth through 
focussed differentiation in supply. Of this sub-sample, it has perhaps the least 
certain future if the US withdrawal from the ESI continues (Ghobadian and Viney, 
2000). Uncertainty also exists as its US owner has recently merged with the US 
owners of Yorkshire Electric. 
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Previous analysis of business level strategy in Chapter's Five and Six has not been 
particularly illuminating, as a large proportion of the companies reviewed in those 
chapter's have exited from the main competitive business, supply. However, this is not 
the case with this sub-sample, and consequently the analysis is more revealing. It is clear 
that in all cases the companies of this sample have adopted one of two approaches: 
~ a segmented utility approach; or 
~ a segmented utility focus approach. 
This observation reflects the current reality in the UK supply industry, which as is noted 
previously is still an immature market, and hence arguably subject to a limited range of 
viable business strategies. The keys to the limited choice of approach available to the 
compames are: 
~ customer expectation; and 
~ customer choice. 
The customers, both industrial and domestic, expect to be offered low prices and added 
value service. Inevitably, the added value concern is greater for commercial users than 
for domestic customers, but is there nevertheless for both sets. Therefore, a utility 
approach utilising both price and non-price competitive weapons is the only available 
approach. This approach will be segmented to reflect the differing markets: domestic and 
commercial, as well as the different target markets that each company will seek to serve. 
This relates to the competitive reality of the market, where a REC may choose to try to 
sell in only a limited number of areas, as defined by the old REC distribution area 
boundaries, or in some of the cases with large companies like Eastern may seek to reach 
the whole country. The segmented utility focus approach is available if one specific target 
area or sector of industry is a particular priority for a REC, which needs to compete 
especially hard to obtain the required market share. It may be that as the industry 
matures, and the expected shake-out occurs (James et ai, 2001) a different range of 
business strategies may become viable, although the author doubts that this range will ever 
become particularly wide. 
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Table 7.1: Content Analysis of Eastern Group Table 7.2 Content Analysis of London Electricity 
Corporate Distribution Supply Generation Other 
Strategies Businesses 
Corporate Distribution Supply Generation Other ! 
Strategies Businesses I 
Concentrated Growth vvv vvv vvv vvv Concentrated Growth vvv vvv v vvv 
Market Development V V V (gas vvv Market Development V V v (gas, I 
and Norweb) andSWEB) 
I 
Product Development V (various) Product Development V ! 
Innovation V V V V (gas, v (wind 
affinity, power, 
Innovation v v (call ! 
centres) I 
energy energy 
trading) trading) I 
Horizontal Integration V vvv V (organic 
(Norweb and 
Horizontal Integration VV (BAA, v (SWEB) t/ I 
Eastern) I 
Energi) acquisitions) 
I 
Vertical Integration V V v (gas v v v (gas 
fields, fields) 
Vertical Integration I 
generation, 
power 
purchasing) 
Concentric v v v (gas, v (overseas) Concentric v (gas, v(meterin 
diversification generation) diversification generation) g) I 
Conglomerate Conglomerate 
Diversification Diversification 
Turnaround 1992-1993 Turnaround 
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Table 7.1 Continued Table 7.2: Continued 
Divestment t/ (retail, Divestment 
contracting) 
Liquidisation Liquidisation 
Joint Venture t/t/t/ t/ (gas) t/t/t/ t/ (retail) Joint Venture t/ (Eastern) 
(London) (various) 
Strategic Alliances Strategic Alliances 
Consortia Consortia 
Business Distribution Supply Generation Other Business Distribution 
Strategies Businesses Strategies 
N/A Segmented Cost Focus Energy N/A 
Utility and Trading: 
Segmented Segmented 
Utility Focus Utility Focus 
Key 
(where company has engaged in activity of this kind) 
(where company has been heavily engaged in activity of this kind) 
t/ Evidence 
t/ t/ t/Priority 
# (Where company has considered activity of this kind, but not acted upon this interest) 
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t/ . . (retali) 
t/ (gas) t/ t/ (retail) 
# Thames Water, # Midlands 
t/t/ various 
Supply Generation Other 
Businesses 
Segmented Cost Focus Cost Focus 
Utility and 
Segmented 
Utility Focus 
Table 7.3: Content Analysis of Seeboard Table 7.4 Content Analysis of Southern Electric 
Corporate Distribution Supply Generation Other 
Strategies Businesses 
Corporate Distribution Supply Generation Other 
Strategies Businesses 
Concentrated Growth VVV VVV VVV VVV Concentrated Growth VVV VVV vv V VVV 
Market Development V V V (gas, Market Development VVV V 
lMW, 
IOOkW) 
Product Development Product Development V 
hmovation hmovation V (affinity) 
Horizontal Integration V V Horizontal Integration V (Scottish V (Swalec) V V 
Hydro) # National (contracting) 
Power 
Vertical Integration V (power Vertical Integration vvv 
purchasing, (purchasing 
generation) agreement, 
generation) 
Concentric V (gas) Concentric V (gas, 
diversification diversification generation) 
Conglomerate Conglomerate 
Diversification Diversification 
Turnaround TurnarOlmd 
Divestment I I I V (retail) 
- -
Divestment V (retail) 
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Table 7.3 Continued Table 7.4: Continued 
Liquidisation Liquidisation 
Joint Venture t/ t/ t/ (gas, t/ t/ Joint Venture t/ (gas) t/ t/ (retail) 
PowerLink) (Sainsburys, 
Habitat) 
Strategic Alliances Strategic Alliances #Midlands, #SWEB, #Southern Water, t/ Scottish Hydro, t/ 
British Energy 
Consortia t/ (various) Consortia 
Business Distribution Supply Generation Other Business Distribution Supply Generation Other 
Strategies Businesses Strategies Businesses 
N/A Segmented Cost Focus Cost Focus N/A Segmented Cost Focus Cost Focus 
Utility and Utility and 
Segmented Segmented 
Utility Focus Utility Focus 
----_ ... _-_ .. _----_ .. _- _ .... _--
-
----_ ... _- ~- ~~-
-
Key 
(where company has engaged in activity of this kind) 
(where company has been heavily engaged in activity of this kind) 
t/ Evidence 
t/ t/ !/Priority 
# (Where company has considered activity of this kind, but not acted upon this interest) 
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7.5.1.1 Combinations of Grand Strategy 
As with Section's 5.5.1.1, 6.5.1.1, and 6.5.5.1, this section seeks to identify viable 
strategy combinations, based upon the Pearce and Robinson typology of grand strategies 
(1994), which have been witnessed within the industry in the distribution and supply 
sectors. This sub-sample firstly presents an interesting, and innovative, combination in 
distribution which presents a small labelling problem, which has been reflected in Tables 
7.1 and 7.2 above. The merger of Eastern and London's distribution businesses in April 
2000 formed 24seven (TXU, 2000), a joint venture company owned by the two RECs. 
In the tables above, this has been portrayed as both horizontal integration, and a joint 
venture. For the purposes of this discussion, it is diagrammatically shown as a joint 
venture. Of the other two companies in the sub-sample, the combinations witnessed have 
been observed previously: Seeboard operates the standard Variant 1 concentrated growth 
approach, while Southern, in its new partnership with Scottish Hydro, operates the 
Variant 2B identified in the preceding chapter in relation to SWEBIWPD. 
In terms of supply activities, the four companies all present multiple combination 
approaches, some of which have been witnessed before. Seeboard operates the standard 
Variant SA approach associated with Norweb, Northern and Yorkshire. However, 
Eastern, London and Southern all present a new Variant, as discussed below. 
Variant 3C: External Market Development 
Company A Company B 
Joint Venture 
(i) Variant 3C differs from Variant 3 
only in that it does not identify any 
internal market development on the 
part of the partner companies (the 
second company is added merely for 
illustration). In all probability, both 
Eastern and London have low level 
involvement in regional regeneration 
programmes, or have contributed to 
consortia seeking to attract business 
to the region. However, as the areas 
they serve are among the most 
affluent in the country, this activity 
does not receive much publicity, and 
has therefore been excluded from the 
diagram. 
As discussed earlier, this approach would be combined with a segmented utility, or 
segmented utility focus business strategy. The complexity of this approach also 
reflects the concern of each of these companies to be involved in all aspects of the new 
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UK energy industry, and to seek critical mass in all of their operations as a means of 
ensuring commercial survival. It is also interesting to note that London and Eastern 
are competitors in the supply industry, but working together in distribution. This 
perhaps indicates the distance that these two industries have drifted from each other 
since privatisation. 
Variant 5B: Multiple Combination 
, 
.. 
---~~ 
---
V4 
V4A 
I 
I 
~ -,. .. 
" , , , 
I , 
I \ 
VlIAIBIC 
---
---
V2 
V3 
7.5.2 Observations: Objective Two 
\ 
'" 
(ii) The fundamental difference 
between Variant 5B, and 
Variant SA is the presence of 
horizontal integration around 
the core concentrated growth 
activities. Eastern, having taken 
over Norweb, London, having 
taken over SWEB, and 
Southern, having merged its 
supply business with that of 
Scottish Hydro, now all have 
horizontally integrated their 
core electricity and gas supply 
businesses. There are 
differences in degree among this 
group. For example, London's 
generation and down stream gas 
resources are limited in 
comparison to Eastern, but the 
same combination of strategies 
is evident in each. 
Table 7.5 presents an estimation of the importance of key strategy drivers for this sub-
sample; with the author estimating the impact of the respective drivers based upon the 
outcome of the content analysis and indicating a higher suspected impact by a higher 
number of v's. Once again, the concern that the analysis be viewed as tentative is voiced, 
as the author can not be certain of being able to gauge the precise influence of the factors 
ofleadership and resources from a review based upon secondary source data. This sub-
sample provides two of the three in-depth cases presented in this thesis, and hence the 
issues of influence identified in this section will be explored in much greater depth for the 
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purposes of verification or refutation. 
Table 7.5: Impact of Possible Strategy Drivers 
External Drivers Internal Drivers Leadership Regulatory 
Eastern VVV vvv vvv V 
London VVV vvv vvv VV 
Seeboard VV VV VV t/vv 
Southern VV vvv vvv vv 
Allowing for the tentative nature of the analysis, the following observations are drawn: 
~ the most consistently important driver for Eastern over the period has been 
leadership. This firstly limited, and then latterly expanded, the scope of the 
business and continues to playa key role. When the Company began to assume 
a leadership role, the importance of market opportunity, and the resource base 
also assumed key importance. Eastern's approach to strategic alliance 
partners/owners has been strongly influenced by the resource needs of its strategy. 
Regulation has been, comparatively, less of an influence; 
London has witnessed a more varied range of influences, with the regulatory 
influence being greatest possibly until the takeover by EDF. Since then the 
company has, under new leadership, sought the same sort of expansionist 
approach as Eastern and is therefore subject to the same sort, and intensity, of 
influences; 
Seeboard, of this sub-group, has the most familiar pattern of influences held 
commonly with a number of other RECs. Regulatory and leadership influences 
have been key throughout, while the influence of the market has been tempered 
by a view as to the strength and capability of their resources to undertake a more 
expansive strategic approach; and 
Southern, despite acting in a very similar fashion to Seeboard for most of the 
period, has been less influenced by the Regulator than its neighbour, arguably due 
to its size and the power that confers. Possibly, therefore, leadership was the key 
driver in the early period, evident in limiting the scope of the company's activities. 
Under new leadership, the Company has altered its approach, and like London 
now crucially balances external and internal influences in determining its strategy. 
The sub-sample therefore presents a very interesting picture, which illustrates the 
particular influence of a fifth factor: ownership, and its impact upon leadership and internal 
factors like resources. Clearly, the right ownership provides greater resources and more 
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demanding leadership and this has demonstrably lead to an impact upon the direction of 
strategy. This issue will be addressed further in Chapter Eight, and the field work 
chapters. 
7.5.2.1 The Question of Leadership 
As the analysis has shown, at the time of the privatisation most of the RECs in this sub-
sample confonned to the industry norm, with main boards largely comprised of managers 
with considerable experience of the ESI. The exceptions were few: both Seeboard and 
Southern had managers from the gas industry, while London employed a finance director 
previously employed by one of the major accounting companies. However, as has been 
shown, appointments of this kind were not unusual. In fact the only 'unusual' 
appointment was made by London, with the employment of a retailing expert to run their 
appliance retail operation. As stated previously, therefore, there would be an expectation 
of innate conservatism and an initially cautious approach. This was, in effect, an accurate 
expectation. All of the group's initially held core business focusses, and were not amongst 
the most innovative RECs. Exceptions may have been in Eastern's and Southern's 
approach to generation, and the market development activity of Seeboard. However, they 
did not seek to emulate the diversification undertaken at companies such as EME (Section 
6.1) and Norweb (Section 5.2). 
However this situation changed, and consequently the question of the impact of leadership 
upon performance is well served by this sub-sample, although the nature of that impact 
is quite different. Inevitably, it is easier to associate major change with a particular leader, 
and the turnaround performed by Eastern after 1993 is strongly linked to its new CEO, 
John Devaney. Other companies, pursuing less dramatic change can also be associated 
with personalities, for example Jim Ellis at Seeboard, and Jim Forbes at the new Scottish 
and Southern Energy (SSE). Each of these managers have clearly shaped the direction 
that their companies have moved in since they assumed control. The sub-sample provides 
a interesting mix between companies that have sought to introduce much external 
managerial ability (Eastern, and even more so the new TXU Europe) and those that have 
retained considerable industry experience (London and SSE). This analysis suggests that 
there is a considerable impact upon decision making based upon the attitude of individual 
sentor managers. 
7.5.3 Other Observations 
The first such observation relates to the structure of organisations. As Table 7.6 shows, 
there was a degree of innovation undertaken by companies of this sub-sample in respect 
of their operational structures prior to the privatisation. Of these companies, only London 
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operated a traditional functional structure, based upon a strong head office supported by 
a network of regional offices. Eastern, Seeboard and Southern all sought to develop at 
an early stage degrees of autonomy among their operational units, while still driving their 
businesses from head office, and retaining their regional structure. 
Subsequently, all of the companies of this sub-sample restructured along product lines and 
sought to develop each separate activity as a separate business. There is considerable 
homogeneity among the current structures operated by this group ofRECs, although they 
look considerably different. TXU Europe perhaps offers the most interesting new 
structure, driving all of its activities, with the exception of distribution, from its energy 
trading business. Both London and Southern have incorporated elements of other 
companies into their structure: London after its takeover of SWEB Retail, and Southern 
following its merger with Scottish Hydro which has seen some of its activities joining with 
its Scottish counterparts, and some standing alone. Overall, it would seem that strategy 
has driven the structure of each of the companies, and that their structures have changed 
to reflect the emergent demands of the industry. 
Table 7.6: Structural Matrix 
Eastern Electricity London Electricity Seeboard Southern Electric 
Initial A Complex Product Functionally Structured A Complex Product A Product 
Structure Focussed Divisional Organization with Focussed Divisional Focussed 
Structure, with Geographically Structure, with Divisional 
Leadership from Oriented-Divisions Leadership from Head Structure, with 
Head Office and a Office and a Regional Leadership from 
Regional Network Network Head Office and a 
Regional Network 
Current Separate Businesses Separate Businesses A Product Focussed Separate 
Structure within a Product within a Product Divisional Structure, Businesses within 
Focussed Divisional Focussed Divisional with Leadership from a Product 
Structure Structure USA Focussed 
Divisional 
Structure 
Major Takeover by Hanson Takeover by Entergy Takeover by CSW Merged with 
Changes (1995), and Texas (1996) and EDF (1998) (1995) Scottish Hydro 
(dates! Utilities (1998) ( 1998) 
changes) 
As with the other sub-samples, there has been a variety of approaches relative to the 
emergent or prescriptive nature of strategy, and the autonomy for decision making 
provided to managers. Eastern was initially a relatively prescriptive, top-down 
organisation until its turnaround when it became much more entrepreneurial as Chapter 
Nine will further demonstrate. London similarly followed this pattern, although it is less 
entrepreneurial under EdF than Eastern under TXU. Seeboard and Southern have both 
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tended to be more prescriptive in their outlooks, although there has been evident of the 
establishment ofSBU's and internal market places in each. 
7.5.4 Concluding Remarks 
Overall, therefore, there is little remaining similarity between the companies of this sub-
sample beyond the fact that they are all presently viable and growing organisations. In any 
future 'shake-out' of the industry, it is possible to see three of these companies (TXU 
Europe, SSE and London/EdF) among the remaining powers within the industry. These 
companies have therefore all developed differing solutions to their strategic challenges 
over the period, some more innovative than others, from similar starting points. This is 
evidence of differing strategic perspectives, although within this group the influence of 
individual personality and changed corporate ownership have been marked. Eastern, led 
by Devaney and backed by Hanson, saw an opportunity to lead the market and took that 
opportunity. Its success has now been built upon through its position within the wider 
TXU organisation, with its own global aspirations. London was only an average REC 
until EdF bought it from Entergy, and transformed its outlook to one of seeking market 
development opportunities upon a national level. Southern was a large but unadventurous 
REC which was focussed upon organic growth until it reassessed the direction in which 
the industry was moving and initiated the merger with Scottish Hydro, leading to an 
approach very similar to that of London. Seeboard was perhaps the REC best suited to 
a 'narrower' ESI: it had successfully established itself as the 'best' REC in the view of the 
Regulator, the City, and its customers. However, it has persisted with this approach and 
while it continues to perform well its relatively small size may count against it in the 
future. 
Therefore, within this sub-sample, once again there is evidence of a number of different 
approaches, especially in relation to tactics, developing from fairly similar beginnings. 
However, and again as noted in the preceding chapters, there is some evidence of 
identifiable trends in behaviour developing among this sub-sample. The content of these 
trends is summarised in Chapter Eight. It is perhaps possible to argue that the geographic 
location, prevailing economic conditions, and relative wealth of the customers of each of 
these companies has played a significant part in their ability to realise their objectives 
within the industry. 
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Chapter Eight Mapping the Industry: Concluding the Preliminary 
Stage Research 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter is the final of the four chapters which comprise the preliminary stage of this 
thesis. The chapter has two principal objectives. The first of these seeks to summarise 
and draw conclusions from the preliminary stage of this research. This objective has three 
key stages, which are to: 
~ summarise what has been observed; 
~ determine the degree of confidence it is possible to have in the conclusions drawn; 
and 
outline the necessary future work needed to improve this degree of confidence. 
This effort to improve confidence in the conclusions is the beginning of the process of 
verification that will follow on from this thesis's exploratory research. The second 
objective, in support of the above, aims to develop a set of working propositions from the 
two core propositions outlined in Section 1.3, for testing in the field research. 
The chapter will be structured to reflect the analysis undertaken in the case studies 
presented in Chapter's Five to Seven. Therefore, Section 8.1 reports the analysis 
conducted in pursuit of Objective One, while Section 8.2 undertakes a similar appraisal 
of Objective Two. Section 8.3 attempts to classify the behaviour identified in Section's 
8.1 and 8.2 to enable the pursuit of Key Objective Three to commence. This chapter is 
concluded in Section 8.4, which serves to outline the key areas of consideration to be 
addressed in Chapters Nine to Eleven. 
8.1 Summary of Objective One 
Objective One of this research was previously outlined in Section 1.3. In summary, 
Objective One involved the identification of viable corporate and business level strategies 
within a regulated environment. This involved firstly identifying the content of the 
strategy pursued by the companies of the sample, and then to determine whether these 
strategies correspond to existing portfolio's of strategic options, or systems of 
classification, identified in Section 2.5. Secondly, Objective One involved establishing 
whether any combinations of strategy were visible, and if they were visible, were they 
viable. To achieve this objective the preliminary stage of the research involved an 
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extensive analysis of a range of textual data, derived from a variety of sources, and subject 
to a process of triangulation. The nature of this process was described in Section 
3.4.3.2.l. The outcome of this process was a series of twelve case studies, presented in 
Chapter's Five to Seven. Each Chapter concluded with a summary of the findings, of 
which there were four, one for each of the sub-samples examined. The findings of this 
process are collected and further analysed here, in order to continue to identify dominant 
patterns. 
This results in a classification of the sample, which is presented in Section 8.3. During this 
chapter, the question of viability is raised. At this point, it is necessary to outline the 
author's perspective on this issue. Early in the thesis, in Section 1.4, the author's 
intention not to comment upon 'the success' of various strategies was described, and the 
author further argued, in Section l.6.3, that work of this nature was already being 
undertaken by other authors. However, part of Objective One involved the question of 
the 'viability' of strategy, and retaining this aim may appear contradictory. The author's 
view is that patterns of strategy which both persist within the industry, and which are 
producing positive outcomes - that is profitability for the companies - must be seen as 
viable, at least in the short to medium term. Such a perception may be classed as 
simplistic, and indeed the author is at pains to argue that patterns evident in an immature 
industry will vary over time as the industry matures, but that at this stage in the research 
such a perception is valid. Having made this necessary clarification, it is possible to move 
on to the main objectives of this chapter. This process of further examination of the 
preliminary stage of the research is divided into three sections: analysis of content; analysis 
of combinations; and development of propositions. 
8.1.1 Analysis of the Content of Strategy 
The analysis presented in Chapter's Five to Seven enabled the development of an 
understanding of the content of the corporate and business strategies of the companies 
under investigation. This section aims to draw together this analysis to enable the 
identification of any general patterns across the sample as a whole. This exercise results 
in two tables, 8.1 and 8.2, which show the strategies pursued by the companies in two 
periods: from 1989-1995; and 1995-2000. The decision to choose 1995 as the break 
between the two periods has been influenced by the expiration of the Government's 
golden shares in the RECs in that year. The expiration resulted in wholesale changes in 
the ownership of the RECs, as related in Section 4.5. Breaking the analysis at this point 
enables a discussion about the influence of ownership in strategic decisions, which will 
follow in Section 8.2. 
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Table 8.1: Evid ,fC -~----- ---- - ------- -- --- t dB· Strat --~ -- ---- - --- ----- ------"'~, 1989-1995 
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EME tI' Utility Utility 
Distribution tI' Focus Focus 
Supply tI' tI' tI' tI' tI' tI' 
Eastern tI' Utility Utility 
Distribution tI' Focus Focus 
Supply tI' tI' tI' tI' tI' tI' tI' 
London Utility Utility 
Distribution tI' tI' Focus Focus 
Supply tI' tI' tI' tI' tI' tI' 
Manweb Utility Utility 
Distribution tI' Focus Focus 
Supply tI' tI' tI' tI' tI' 
Midlands Utility Utility 
Distribution tI' Focus Focus 
Supply tI' tI' tI' tI' tI' tI' 
Norweb Utility Utility 
Distribution tI' Focus Focus 
Supply tI' tI' tI' tI' tI' tI' 
Northern Utility Utility 
Distribution tI' tI' Focus Focus 
Supply tI' tI' tI' tI' tI' tI' 
-
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Table 8.1: Evidence of Corporate and Business Strategy, 1989-1995 continued 
Seeboard Utility Utility 
Distribution t/ Focus Focus 
Supply t/ t/ t/ t/ t/ 
Southern Utility Utility 
Distribution t/ Focus Focus 
Supply t/ t/ t/ t/ t/ 
SWALEC Utility Utility 
Distribution t/ t/ Focus Focus 
Supply t/ t/ t/ t/ t/ t/ t/ 
SWEB Utility Utility 
Distribution t/ t/ Focus Focus 
Supply t/ t/ t/ t/ 
Yorkshire Utility Utility 
Distribution t/ t/ Focus Focus 
Supply t/ t/ t/ t/ t/ t/ 
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Table 8.2: Evid ,fC 
----- - ----- -- --- - - - - - --
t dB . Strat 
- ---- ---- - -------- - -- --'""'J;:....l 1995-2000 
-.::l i: i: .: - .: .: .: -.::l i: rJl ~ ~ 0 S 0 0 0 g ~ I~ ~ ~ . .;:: _.- . .;:: ~ 2 E E E C'"";:::: ~tti .§ OJ o OJ u OJ ~ aJ ~ .... 0.. ;. .~ 5h .- 5h 1; ~ a rJl ~ U 0 0 ;::1- ] 1::: ~ .:.- § ~ ;. tZI tZI ~- 02 ~ .... ;. a ~ -.::l ~ ::r::.E >.E ~ ~ Q .... rJl rJl ~ . .8 .: 0 o ;. 
.S rJl rJl o .... ::20 .... ~ ::: ~ r< ~ ~ ~ rJl ut) p.,Q o ._ 0 .S .S .~ e UQ ...... :g :g ~8 ~HO 
EMEI Utility Utility 
I 
Distribution v Focus Focus 
Supply v v v v v 
Eastern Utility Utility 
I Distribution v v v Focus Focus 
Supply v vC v v v 
London Utility Utility 
Distribution v v v v Focus Focus I 
Supply v v v v v 
Manweb 2 Utility Utility 
I 
Distribution v Focus Focus 
Supply v v 
Midlands v (Utility (Utility 
Distribution v Focus) Focus) 
Supply (v) (v) (v) (v) t/ 
Norweb 3 v (Utility (Utility 
Distribution v Focus) Focus) I 
Supply (v) (vC) (v) (v) v 
Northern Utility Utility 
Distribution v v Focus Focus 
Supply v v v v v v t/ 
---- - - ---
, .. 
-
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Table 8.2: Evidence of Corporate and Business Strategy, 1995-2000 continued 
Seeboard Utility Utility I 
Distribution r/ Focus Focus 
Supply r/ r/ r/ r/ r/ 
1 
Southern Utility Utility i 
Distribution r/ r/ r/ Focus Focus I 
Supply r/ r/ r/ r/ r/ r/ 
SWALEC 4 (Utility (Utility I 
Distribution (r/) r/ Focus) Focus) 
Supply (r/) (r/C) r/ 
SWEB (Utility (Utility I 
Distribution r/ r/ r/ Focus) Focus) 
Supply (r/) (r/) (r/) (r/) r/ 
Yorkshire r/ Utility Utility 
Distribution r/ r/ Focus Focus 
Supply r/ r/ r/ r/ (r/) r/ 
Notes: The advent of takeovers in the industry has presented a problem of assessing strategy in four cases in particular. These are 
1 EME: bought by PowerGen in 1998, and now effectively a subsidiary; 2 Manweb: bought by Scottish Power in 1995 and now effectively just a brand name; 3 Norweb: bought 
by North West Water in 1995 and now effectively a subsidiary within United Utilities; 4 SWALEC: bought by Welsh Water in 1995, and subsequently divested 
Key: v indicates current strategy position 
(V) indicates discontinued strategy position, usually following divestment 
VC indicates membership of a consortia, as part of market development activity 
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The analysis of strategic content involved referring to the work of authors such as Pearce 
and Robinson (1994), Porter (1980) and Chrisman et al (1988), on systems of 
classification. Details of each were reviewed at some length in Section 2.5, and their use 
as a framework for research justified in Section 3.4.3.1. Readers will note, however, that 
the full range of grand strategies (pearce and Robinson, 1994 and Section 2.5.4) have not 
been included in the variables presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2. The decision to exclude 
four grand strategies: conglomerate diversification; liquidation; strategic alliances; and 
consortia, has been taken on the grounds that none of these strategies were particularly 
common with the RECs over this period, as the various tables presented in Chapter's Five 
to Seven will attest. However membership of consortia is proving increasingly popular, 
and their impact upon market development activity will be reflected in Table 8.2. EME 
is the only REC to engage in marked conglomerate diversification, and reference to that 
activity will be made in relation to its need for a turnaround strategy, as described in Table 
8. 1. Readers will also note that the full range of business level strategies provided by 
Chrisman et al (1988, and Section 2.5.5.4) have not been included in this analysis. This 
decision is based upon the evidence presented, which suggests that companies had a very 
limited range of options available to them in relation to business strategy, at least in 
relation to generic concepts of strategy. The author judged that a full representation of 
all sixteen options was therefore unnecessary. 
8.1.1.1 Summary of Observations 
Before beginning this assessment, it is necessary to make the following key clarification. 
This exercise is aimed at identifYing patterns of strategy that conform to generic 
conceptual definitions. As a result, for example, to say that Company A and Company B 
both engage in market development does not imply that they both engage in the same form 
of market development, nor that they achieve the same degree of success in this 
endeavour. Inevitably, some form of differentiation occurs in the detail of the chosen 
strategy, and approaches can expect to have differing degrees of impact depending upon 
a variety of factors. The details of the precise content of strategy was presented in each 
individual case study in Chapter's Five to Seven, while factors impacting upon strategy 
are addressed in Section 8.2. The purpose of this exercise is, therefore, simply to identifY 
the generic areas of similarity or dissimilarity between the companies. 
Taking this clarification into account, Table 8.1 presents a picture of a relatively 
homogeneous industry, where strategy choices appear to be fairly uniform. All of the 
companies pursue a concentrated growth approach in both distribution and supply, and 
all are engaged in some form of market development activity in their supply activity. Such 
patterns can be seen as being almost integral for a company seeking to prosper at this 
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time, as they must seek to make their existing businesses as effective as possible, and they 
must also seek some fonn of organic growth. The sample's behaviour in other areas of 
grand strategy selection does point to some differences, however. 
Firstly, with respect to innovation. A number of the companies have taken on the role of 
innovator within the industry, although the extent of this innovation role can not be 
compared with that of a prospector as identified by Miles and Snow (Section 2.5.6.2.2). 
Innovators have led the industry: 
~ into the concentric gas market; 
~ into backward integration in support of the core concentrated growth approach 
by either developing generation capability, or securing access to down-stream gas 
assets; 
into new products like green tariffs, or the area of energy management and 
consultancy for large customers; 
~ into duel fuel, or bundled product offerings in supply; or 
~ into the use of affinity arrangements to widen the appeal of their product offering. 
The key aspects to identify in relation to this period are that: 
a) the innovative companies have led their peers into new areas or the use of new 
approaches; and 
b) that that role has often been shared amongst companies. 
Innovation in the industry has therefore tended to be relatively non-controversial, and 
related, and acts to inform the rest of the industry about viable business opportunities 
which are perceived to exist. It is not particularly speculative, although there are cases 
such as EME's experiment with conglomerate diversification that do count as being 
speculative. It is an interesting reflection upon the conservatism of the industry at the 
time, that EME's conglomerate diversification did not provide a blueprint for their peers, 
who preferred to follow clearly related lines of business development. Some companies, 
like Eastern or Midlands, have been more innovative than others, but as stated previously 
there was at the time no single company that was leading on all fronts. 
Secondly, there were companies who took a more cautious approach. In this early period, 
companies like Manweb, London and even Southern made a virtue out of limiting their 
diversification away from their core distribution business. They adopted new 
developments, such as entry into gas or generation when it became clear that these were 
now regarded as core activities (although Manweb did not ever develop meaningful 
generation assets), but saw these new developments as being secondary to running their 
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Table 8.3: Strategy in 1990 
Company Statement of 'Prospects' 
East Midlands " ... distribution will continue to be the primary business activity ... the strategy in the supply business will be to continue to offer tenus, which it believes to be 
competitive and profitable, to customers both within and outside its area ... (and) ... make a small contribution to profit...participation in generation projects will 
provide an opportunity for a potential new source of profit....appliance retailing and electrical contracting businesses are not expected to contribute 
significantly .. .intends to build upon its past achievements and examine potential areas of development in all business areas ... aim of improving standards of 
performance" (Kleinwort Benson, p.220). 
Eastern Electricity " ... committed to further improvements in productivity and efficiency ... distribution of electricity will remain (the) core business and that most of its future profit 
will come from this business ... supply business is expected to make a small positive contribution to profit....has progressively developed marketing and sales 
strategies ... also aims to invest in generation schemes in order to produce profit...in a sound position to take advantage of any upturn (in retailing and contracting 
sectors) (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.168). 
London Electricity "distribution is the core business of London ... and is expected to contribute the great majority oLtotal operating profits .... the directors intend to exploit 
opportunities for cost savings such that....(allied to) ... expected growth in the number of units distributed .... (will achieve) .... profit growth in the distribution 
business ... supply will make a small contribution to total operating profit....appliance retailing and electrical contracting businesses together will make a modest 
contribution" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.273). 
Manweb "distribution is the core business and contributes almost all of its operating profit...growth in revenue coupled with firm control of operating costs should enable 
real growth in profits ... supply is likely to generate a small proportion of operating profit and aim to manage to enable a contribution to overall 
profitability ... appliance retailing and electrical contracting are unlikely to be profitable" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.326). 
Midlands Electricity "distribution to remain the Company's core business and to account for the great majority of its future profits ... supply business will over time contribute a small 
proportion of the total operating profit...is involved in Teeside power project and intends to pursue opportunities for profitable participation in this and other 
generation projects .... appliance retailing unlikely to contribute to operating profits ... (while) ... electrical contracting business should continue to contribute a 
small proportion" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.378). 
Norweb "distribution \vill account for a substantial part of profits ... (through) ... in units distributed ... and the achievement of operational efficiency 
improvements ... supply ... should contribute to total operating profit...steps to improve productivity and to contain costs should enable appliance retailing and 
electrical contracting to return to profitability ... continue to have a high priority ... Norweb Generation .. .is not expected to contribute significantly in the medium 
term" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.484). 
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Table 8.3: Strategy in 1990 continued 
Northern " ... objectives to achieve growth in profit and to promote enterprise and quality of service throughout its businesses ... expect that distribution of electricity will 
remain the primary business activity ... and will contribute the majority of profit...(through) ... increased turnover and greater efficiency ... aims to achieve 
profitability in the supply business and will pursue a policy of minimising purchase cost risk. .. has an option to make an equity investment in Teeside Power 
and is also involved in detailed appraisals of two other major generation schemes ... has established strategies for the future development (of retailing and 
contracting) (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.430). 
Seeboard "distribution. .. .is expected to remain Seeboard's core business, providing the major source of the Company's profits ... (with) ... the prospects of growth in units 
distributed and the potential for cost savings ... (present a) ... sound basis for real earnings growth ..... expect the supply business to make a small positive 
contribution to profits ... has a strategy to improve the current level of profitability of the electrical contracting business .... will consider investment in generation, 
most probably in joint venture ... as long as the fmancial returns appear attractive" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.536). 
Southern Electric " ... the distribution business will be the main contributor to operating profit, providing a sound basis for real profit growth .... expect the supply business to make 
a small contribution to the Company's profits in the medium term ... the Company's trading businesses will continue to be developed so as to be in a position 
to take advantage of any improvements in trading conditions ... equity participation will be considered in generation and CHP projects .... privatisation has offered 
new challenges and opportunities" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.589). 
SWALEC "distribution should be able to achieve real growth. .. and contribute the great majority of profits ... do not expect supply business to provide a material contribution 
to earnings ... objective to improve the fmancial performance of appliance retailing and electrical contracting businesses by building on their strengths; a 
comprehensive review of appliance retailing is underway ... will consider participation in generation projects where they believe an attractive long term return 
\vill be achieved and accordingly the Company is involved in the Teeside power project" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.642). 
SWEB "distribution .. .is expected to remain the core business and contribute the majority of its profits ... believe that costs can be controlled without adversely 
affecting the quality of customer service .... the prospects for supply ... (are for) ... small profits in the medium term .... has an option to invest in Teeside Power 
and intends to pursue opportunities for profitable participation in this and other generation projects .... the trading business is not expected to contribute 
significantly to profits ... well placed to take advantage of wider commercial opportunities that will be available" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.696). 
Yorkshire Electricity "distribution will remain the core business and .... the majority of future profit will come from this business ... supply ... should contribute a small proportion of 
the overall profit..appliance retailing and electrical contracting will continue to play an important role in complementing the primary businesses .... will continue 
to examine opportunities for profitable participation in generation projects ... the directors recognise that there will be opportunities to extend ... activities by 
building on its existing strengths and they plan to extend the Company's activities when suitable commercial opportunities arise in areas related to the 
Company's existing activities ... (aim to) take advantage of the wider commercial opportunities available" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.748). 
--.--. 
I 
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Table 8.4: Strat 
- _.- - - - - - - - -- -- --
. 1994 
--- -- -
Company Statement of 'Strategy' 
East Midlands "we have concentrated management time and effort on developing our core electricity businesses. This has involved reorganising our structure, changing work practices, 
building on our considerable experience and success as a low cost electricity company and introducing improved information systems. At the same time our non-core 
businesses have been reviewed with the emphasis being placed on eliminating losses" (Efv1E, 1994, p.6) 
Eastern strategy at floatation involved "concentrating on our core electricity business and focussing our interest in other opportunities on related businesses, where our skills 
Electricity and experience could add value ... electricity generation and gas supply. In keeping with this we developed free-standing businesses for each main activity .... our vision 
is to provide a quality of service in the energy and network management sectors which will make us the customer's choice. Our core business of electricity supply and 
distribution will remain central to our success, but we aim to enhance shareholder value by further developing our investments in electricity generation, expanding our 
gas business and searching out other profitable opportunities where our core skills and experience can add value" (Eastern group, 1994, p.5). 
London "our core business will continue to be regulated" (London Electricity, 1994, p.3), "we provide network services not only within the regulated franchise area, but 
Electricity increasingly to private customers including the London airports and commercial centres in the capital. We supply electricity and a range of regulated services to nearly 
1.7 million smaller customers in London leading the industry with out standards of performance. We compete to supply electricity and other energy related products 
including gas and energy management both within London and in the wider markets that are opening rapidly as deregulation proceeds" (London Electricity, 1994, p.4) 
Manweb "inunediately after privatisation, we concentrated on reducing costs in the business. We implemented best practice, improved performance, and increased our efficiency. 
We have more recently been focussing upon improving our customer service. 1he twin strands of our strategy - to increase efficiency and improve service - will continue 
to be the driving force in ensuring we achieve our objectives of being a high quality, low cost utility" (Manweb, 1994, p.7). 
Midlands "our major business is electricity distribution and supply. 1brough subsidiary, associate and joint venture companies we are also active in power generation, the supply 
Electricity of natural gas, electrical contracting, energy services and retailing. We aim to provide the highest standards if service to our customers and to produce superior long 
term fmancial returns for shareholders" (Midlands Electricity, 1994, p.l) 
Norweb "at present the vast majority of profits come from the regulated businesses. Looking to the future it is important to increase profits from non-regulated businesses to 
provide a better balance for long term growth. The Company's strategy is to diversify and expand profitably in those business areas where there is already considerable 
expertise and experience" (Norweb, 1994, p.2) 
Northern "at the time of privatisation Northern Electric identified and targeted five key elements of business strategy. These were: marketing for unit volume growth, especially 
in higher margin categories; achieving excellence in customer service; reducing our costs; maintaining a profitable and low-risk electricity supply business; and prudently 
developing new businesses that are clearly related to the Company's expertise and strengths. These targets have been pursued consistently since privatisation" (Northern 
Electric, 1994, p.6) 
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Table 8.4: Strategy in 1994 continued 
Seeboard "Our strategy is to invest in the distribution and supply of electricity whist developing related businesses in a way which draws on our skills and knowledge within energy 
markets. We strive to optimise value and service to customers and to maximise returns to shareholders" (Seeboard, 1994, p.1) 
Southern Electric "our aim is to deliver services of the highest possible quality at the lowest achievable cost, and to promote the efficient use of energy by marketing competitively priced, 
highly efficient applications and systems. Our long-term strategy for growth is to continue to develop, in conjunction with the electricity business, our range of high 
quality utility and energy-related services, so that these businesses will provide at least 15% of our operating profits by the end of the decade" (Southern Electric, 1994, 
p.1) 
SWALEC the company had adopted a consistent strategic approach since privatisation. "This has been to drive the core electricity business hard, taking out costs and increasing 
productivity, to improve the quality of customer service; to reduce electricity prices in real terms; and to develop an increasing stream of earnings from non-core activities, 
focussing on areas where we can add value in combination with a competent partner" (SWALEC, 1994, p.3). 
SWEB "we are committed to concentrating on the distribution and supply businesses and, in particular, the pursuit of cost reduction whist improving customer service. In 
assessing potential corporate development beyond this, the central criterion is that we will develop new business activities only if they add greater value for our 
shareholders than they could achieve for themselves by direct investment". These included energy related developments such as "selective entry into gas market sectors 
and judicious investment in electricity generation and renewable energy projects", while investment in utility services included "selective development of opportunities 
in digital communications" (SWEB, 1994, p.2). 
Yorkshire "a well balanced strategy ·which focusses on the efficiency of our core business and the development of quality earnings through related activities. While our distribution 
Electricity business v.ill continue to be our main strength, other parts of the business are increasingly making an important contribution" (Yorkshire Electricity, 1994, p.3). 
-- --- .. _-- ... - _._- --- .. _- ---
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distribution businesses as effectively and as efficiently as possible. 
Fundamentally, however, the differences discussed here are only matters of degree. As 
discussed in Section's 5.5.4, 6.5.4, the companies have tended towards adopting relatively 
similar generic approaches, with differences existing primarily at the margin. All of the 
companies were relatively risk averse, as witnessed by the extensive use of joint ventures 
to provide missing expertise, and the tendency to engage in related diversification, if they 
sought diversification at all. This convergence upon similar strategies, divided only by the 
degree to which they are pursued, presents an interesting question about the extent to 
which divergent strategy was expected, or predicted, by the companies. Did they expect 
to proceed cautiously, or was there an expectation that a wide range of opportunity was 
available to each in the new era? Some illustration of this matter may be forthcoming 
from an examination of the stated strategic objectives of the companies at key points in 
this early stage following privatisation. 
Table's 8.3 and 8.4 show the public expression's of strategic intent from the companies 
in 1989 and 1994. The first set of statements are all drawn from the RECs pathfinder 
prospectus (Kleinwort Benson, 1990), and the second set from the annual reports issued 
at the end of financial year 1993-94. What they show is a fairly homogeneous picture of 
companies that are not by their nature particularly speculative, which all acknowledge the 
necessity of a core focus, and all perceive that growth will be incremental and related. 
Exceptions do appear. EME in 1990 was arguably more aggressive in its outlook, but by 
1994 had been subjected to a turnaround and was much more conservative. Indeed, the 
most aggressive and outward looking of the companies in 1994 was Norweb. This 
suggests that there was a more widely accepted understanding that a conservative 
approach was the appropriate one to adopt in this industry as the companies sought to 
understand the changes they had been SUbjected to. Alternatively, it may reflect failings 
on the part of the managers of the companies to understand the potential offered by their 
capabilities and resources. 
The final observation to be drawn from Table 8.1 regards the choice of business strategy. 
Table 8.1 shows that in every case companies followed a utility focus strategy, which as 
Chrisman et al note (1988) involves basing their domain navigation attempts upon both 
price and non-price weapons. This reflects a reality of competitive life within the ESI, 
where customers will expect low prices to be the norm, and will differentiate between 
suppliers upon the basis of non-price attributes like service or other added value factors. 
This, as the evidence of Chapter's Five to Seven shows, was especially the case in the 
commercial sector, where customers were able to chose their supplier during this period. 
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While many customer decisions were no doubt taken on the basis of price alone, the ability 
of suppliers to offer radically lower cost quotations was limited, by simple economic 
reality. All of the companies came to accept that the business community demanded both 
a low price, and added value services, making an utility focus approach the imperative. 
In the domestic arena, the companies were compelled to provide a utility approach to 
customers by the Regulator, who demanded both low costs and high levels of service. 
While these customers were at that time unable to chose their supplier, the Regulator 
acted as a surrogate on their behalf, and drove prices down and standards up through the 
exercise of regulation. Overall, therefore, companies had to adopt a segmented utility or 
segmented utility focus approach in supply, and this lack of choice persists. As stated 
throughout the research, the companies did not have the option of developing a business 
strategy for distribution as it remains a monopoly activity. 
There is a more marked difference in generic approach evident from an examination of 
Table 8.2. While the table shows a number of companies whose profiles look very similar 
to those shown in Table 8.1, key changes are evident. These are that: 
~ firstly, a number of companies have stopped participation in the supply business, 
as well as other non-regulated activities. Midlands, Norweb, SW ALEC and 
SWEB are all no longer engaged in supply, and now maintain a very focussed 
concentrated growth approach centred upon distribution; 
secondly, that as a result of the decisions taken by the above companies to divest 
their supply activities other companies have increased the size of their involvement 
in competitive activities. Eastern, London, and Southern have all horizontally 
integrated their existing businesses with those of the companies that have divested 
their interests: Norweb, SWEB and SW ALEC respectively, while Midlands' 
business is now owned by National Power, which also purchased the supply 
business ofIndependent Energy. In addition to this trend, other RECs: EME and 
Manweb, have had their supply activities absorbed by their new owners: 
PowerGen and ScottishPower respectively. Consequently, while the total number 
of companies involved in both industries falls, a considerable number of the key 
industry players retain or have developed a duel focus upon distribution and 
supply; and 
thirdly, and additionally, companies are beginning to develop horizontally 
integrative approaches in distribution. To date, London and Eastern have merged 
their businesses, while SWEB has taken over SW ALEC's business, and 
Southern's business has been merged with that of its partner, Scottish-Hydro. 
More developments of this sort can be expected. 
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Table 8.5: Current Strategy 
PowerGen (owner of "Our vision is to create one of the world's leading independent electricity and gas businesses. We aim to grow by generating, distributing and supplying power both 
EME) in the UK and other countries in which we operate" (PowerGen, 2000) 
Texas Utilities "TIm is well positioned to continue its leadership role in the utility industry with an established strategy to achieve excellent operations of significant scale in selected 
( owner of Eastern regions, v.mch optimize a portfolio of assets, capabilities and customer relationships across multiple products and services" (TXU, 2000) 
Group) 
London Electricity "A world operator in the power field, Electricite de France has developed an international strategy based on investment and the sale of services. The company relies 
(part of EdF Group) on partnerships with electrical utilities, manufacturers and investors. Electricite de France is thus present in a wide range of foreign companies. Electricite de France 
carries out its activity on all continents where the company develops its know-how in the fields of electricity generation, transmission and distribution, as well as utility 
management" (EDF, 2000). 
ScottishPower "The markets in which we operate are changing at a speed unthinkable only a few years ago. But we have created a group with a unique set of businesses, geographic 
(owner of Manweb) range and skilled management These should ensure that your company is in the best position to meet the challenges and exploit the opportunities presented by fiuther 
global consolidation, as well as the rapid changes taking place in the web and Internet technologies. We remain focussed firmly on exploiting these advantages to create . 
outstanding shareholder value" (ScottishPower, 2000). I 
GPU UK (formerly "GPU Power UK's aim is to be the best performing electricity distribution business in the UK, providing customers with outstanding service and value for money" (GPU 
Midlands Europe, 2000a). 
Electricity) 
, 
United Utilities "United Utilities is a multi-utility with a focussed strategy to: improve the efficiency of its regulated businesses; maximise multi-utility synergies; and develop its non-
(o\\llers of Norweb) regulated businesses using its core skills of asset management and customer relationship management. We seek to provide growth for shareholders, value-for-money 
for customers, challenging and rewarding jobs for employees, and positive benefits for society and the environment" (United Utilities, 2000) 
Northern Electric "MidAmerican has continuously made investments in advanced facilities and technological improvements, allowing the Company to provide electricity at a lower, more I 
( par t of competitive price. Many utility companies are operating technologically outdated power plants at a relatively high cost because the lack of competition has not provided 
MidAmerican incentive for upgrades" (MidAmerican Energy, 2000) I 
Group) 
Seeboard and "As a result of our merger, AEP is not only a bigger company, we're a better one. We've reviewed all of our operations and compared them against the best 
Yorkshire practices in the world. We've reduced costs and become more efficient so we can offer our customers reliable service at low prices. And we're continuing to 
Electricity (both streamline operations so we remain competitive in the future" (AEP, 2000). 
I 
parts of merged 
AEP/CSW Group) 
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Table 8.5: Current Strategy continued 
Scottish and "we are detennined to maintain our position as the most efficient operator in distribution and supply and to improve our customer service still further in terms of 
Southern Energy efficiency and cost effectiveness. We will continue to grow our mass market supply business .... we will look to develop further our generation portfolio whenever such 
(including Southern investment makes sound economic sense .... our focus remains within the UK., and in the regulated utilities market, where we are able to bring our core skills to bear" 
Electric) (SSE, 2000a, p.7) 
Hyder (owners of "Hyder is principally concerned with water, waste water, power, roads, bridges, tunnels, buildings, railways, ports and airports - all vital to everyday life and economic 
SWALEC) growth. For infrastructure schemes to succeed, they must demonstrate that they meet the needs of the end users and operators and they can be delivered at the lowest 
possible 'whole life costs. Hyder provides infrastructure - for life. For 150 years, across five continents, Hyder has been committed to serving the infrastructure needs 
of people. With assets of over UK£2.5bn and more than 9,000 employees, Hyder is uniquely able to operate as a whole or in a modular way to meet client needs" (Hyder, 
2000). 
Western Power "With a company-wide focus on customer service, SWEB now has the fewest number of customer complaints of any of the regional electricity companies. Overall 
Distribution customer satisfaction is approximately 95 percent with nearly 65 percent of customers being very satisfied with the service they receive from SWEB. Reliability of 
(fonnerly SWEB) SWEB's distribution network has improved by 45 percent since 1995, despite southwest England's rugged terrain and frequent storms" (Southern Company, 2000). 
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Therefore, since 1995 real change has occurred, and different perspectives have emerged. 
Some companies are now solely operating in regulated sectors, while others have built up 
their competitive activities in an attempt to achieve critical mass. Some, like Eastern and 
London, are attempting to be key players in both a consolidated distribution industry and 
the converging supply industry. The other companies: Seeboard, Yorkshire, and 
Northern, are all pursuing similar generic approaches to those recorded in Table 8.1, with 
the exception that all are now owned by US utilities and hence may have equally expansive 
objectives to those evidenced by Eastern, London, and Southern, but are distinct because 
their attempts to grow have been organic rather than based upon acquisition. The 
evidence suggests, therefore, that very distinct strategic approaches exist within the 
industry in relation to the content and generic characteristics of corporate strategy. This 
can be reflected by reference to Table 8.5 which shows the current strategic objectives of 
the companies of the group, or of their new owners. The same can not be said for 
business strategy, however, where the imperative to offer a utility approach is arguably 
greater than before 1995, due to the increasingly competitive nature of both the 
commercial and domestic supply markets. 
Therefore, it would appear that there now exists three distinct strategic approaches within 
the REC industry. These are: (i) the local service provider; (ii) the integrated energy 
company by organic growth; and (iii) the integrated energy company by acquisition. Up 
until recently, it was possible to argue that a fourth distinct approach existed: the multi-
utility. However, after a series of divestments by Hyder and United Utilities, the only 
possible example of such a company would be ScottishPower which more accurately fits 
within the integrated energy company by acquisition grouping. The evidence of change 
after 1995 points to the influence of changing patterns of ownership upon strategy, and 
even suggests that ownership has become the crucial factor driving strategy. This issue 
will be returned to in Section 8.2 of this chapter, and will become a key consideration 
during the following field work chapters. 
The author argues that the evidence presented in Chapter's Five to Seven, and analysed 
here provides a compelling argument that this assessment is accurate, and that a high 
degree of confidence can be placed in this conclusion, even though it is constructed from 
secondary source material, and is arguably a subjective interpretation. The author does 
recognise the need for external verification of these conclusions, and sees the building of 
the propositions in Section 8.1.3, leading to the development of hypotheses for empirical 
analysis in future research, as contributing to this process. 
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8.1.2 Analysis of Strategic Combinations 
This section presents an assessment of the strategic combinations evident within the 
industry over the period since privatisation, as reported in Chapter's Five to Seven. This 
process continues the work of extending Pearce and Robinson's (1994, p.246-247) 
analysis of grand strategies, as described in Section 2.6. Pearce and Robinson (1994, 
p.264-265) presented a selection of matrices which showed grand strategy clusters, but 
did not specifY how these grand strategies interrelated. This section aims to synthesise the 
preceding analysis to enable the identification of any general patterns across the sample 
as a whole. This exercise is undertaken by the use of two tables, Tables 8.6 and 8.7, 
which show the combinations adopted by the companies in two periods: from 1989-1995; 
and 1995-2000. The decision to use 1995 as the break between the two periods follows 
the logic explained in Section 8.1.1, in particular to ensure consistency and to observe the 
impact made by changing patterns of ownership. Readers are referred to Figure 2.6 for 
a full explanation and diagrammatical representation of the combinations under discussion. 
It is perhaps not surprising, following the analysis of strategic content in the preceding 
section, to witness a considerable degree of similarity among the strategic combinations 
developed within the industry. In the period 1989-1995, there were only two variant's 
evident within distribution: the core concentrated growth approach (Variant 1), and the 
organic market development approach (Variant 2). 
This reflects the limited nature of growth opportunities within distribution leaving 
organisation's with the limited options of working their existing business as hard as 
possible, and attempting to attract new business only through involvement in regional 
development activity and large infrastructural projects. In the area of supply, there is 
evidently as much commonality as in distribution. Four variants are presented, including 
the non-viable Variant 6, which strictly speaking had been altered to a Variant 5 by EME 
by the end of 1995. The three other variants were: 
~ Variant 3A, external market development, utilised only by Manweb and reflecting 
its limited ambition in developing its presence in supply; 
Variant 5, a simple multiple approach, as used by London and also reflecting that 
Company's limited ambition which principally involved a limited amount of 
backward integration in support of the core concentrated growth approach; and 
the more commonly observed Variant 5A, used by all of the other RECs and 
showing a fully integrated approach to extending the core concentrated growth 
option including backward integration, and both organic and external market and 
product development. 
-387-
Table 8.6: Strategy Combinations 1989-1995 Table 8.7: Strategy Combinations 1995-2000 
Distribution Supply Distribution Supply 
EME Variant 1 Variant 6 EME Variant 1 Variant 5A 
Eastern Variant 1 Variant 5A Eastern Variant 3C Variant 5B 
London Variant 1 Variant 5 London Variant 3C Variant 5B 
Manweb Variant 1 Variant 3A Manweb Variant 1 Variant 5 
Midlands Variant 1 Variant 5A Midlands Variant 1 N/A 
Norweb Variant 1 Variant 5A Norweb Variant 1 N/A 
Northern Variant 2 Variant 5A Northern Variant 2 Variant 5A 
Seeboard Variant 1 Variant 5A Seeboard Variant 1 Variant 5A 
Southern Variant 1 Variant 5A Southern Variant3C Variant 5B 
SWALEC Variant 2 Variant 5A SWALEC N/A N/A 
SWEB Variant 2 Variant 5A SWEB Variant2B N/A 
Yorkshire Variant 2 Variant5A Yorkshire Variant 2 Variant 5A 
These findings largely support the conclusions of Section 8.1.1 regarding the relative 
similarity of generic content and strategy among the sample. There is also relative 
similarity between the strategic combinations on display, with most companies operating 
both Variant 1 and 5A in their two core businesses. 
The second period, 1995-2000, witnesses the development of a more complex picture. 
The first point to note is that the RECs who have left the supply industry are simply 
operating combinations within their core distribution business. Within this sub-group 
SWEBIWPD stands out as it is operating Variant 2B, an extended market development 
approach featuring horizontal integration, in recognition of the Company's recent take 
over of the SW ALEC distribution business. 
The second point to note is that among the remaining RECs, a clear pattern emerges 
between the integrated energy company by organic growth, and the integrated energy 
company by acquisition forms identified in the preceding section. The former group 
employs a Variant 1 or 2 in its distribution business, and a 5A in supply, while the latter 
group employs a Variant 3C in distribution and a 5B in supply. This is in no way 
surprising, as the characteristics that place each company in the forms identified in Section 
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8.1.1 are simply reflected in the combinations identified in this sector. 
This exercise does help to illustrate the points made earlier in relation to: 
~ the similarity in a generic sense between the patterns of behaviour being identified 
within the sample1; which in tum suggests that 
the strategies the companies are able to pursue within this industry are to a large 
extent prescribed by the prevailing conditions within the industry. 
This analysis, and the development and identification of areas of clear consistency, may 
also be seen to reassure the reader as to the confidence that can be placed in the discussion 
thus far in respect of Objective One. In addition, and given the quite dramatic changes 
evident in a number of cases between the first and second periods, it may be possible to 
further suggest that ownership has played a very significant part in the choice of strategy 
of these companies. 
8.1.3 Developing Propositions 
Objective Four involved the development of a series of working propositions to be derived 
from the two core propositions presented in Section 1.3. The aim of developing 
propositions during this exploratory research was to establish a series of hypotheses which 
could be empirically tested in wider research, covering the whole of the UK privatised 
sector, in research following on from this thesis. This section begins the process, by 
identifying five propositions that can be tentatively proposed, based upon the analysis 
presented to this point in Section 8.1. The core proposition which relates to Objective 
One was 'that companies will adopt different approaches to achieve their strategic 
objectives'. The analysis presented above shows that this may be the case, but only a 
limited difference can be observed from an analysis of generic behaviour. As such, the 
following tentative working propositions are established: 
PI companies will employ a limited concentrated growth approach m ongomg 
operations within their regulated businesses 
P2 companies will seek to employ approaches to develop critical mass in most if not 
all of their continuing un-regulated businesses 
Although once again it is necessary to state that this generic similarity does not imply a precise match 
in every detail of the strategic content of these companies, nor in the operational processes followed to 
implement these strategies. 
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P3 the approaches mentioned in P2 will of necessity involve a combined price and 
non-price generic approach, so backing the arguments of a variety of authors 
against the conclusions of Porter (1980) 
P4 'new core' businesses will evolve incrementally as companies take on the 
responsibility for identifying viable concentric diversification 
P5 companies will inevitably seek consolidation, either vertically or horizontally, 
regardless of the regulatory regime within the industry, supporting the work of 
Helm and Jenkinson (1997) 
These propositions have been largely proved by the research conducted during the 
preliminary stage of this research, but will receive the appropriate degree of scrutiny in the 
field stage. The author has intentionally made the propositions 'non-industry specific' so 
they can be employed beyond the electricity industry. However, they are clearly specific 
to industries which are or retain an element of regulatory supervision. 
8.2 Summary of Objective Two 
Throughout the analysis presented in Section 8.1, the importance of an understanding of 
strategic drivers has become clear and has been constantly emphasised. The author 
believes that it is necessary to understand the impact of the various drivers on each 
company to establish whether the consistency of patterns of strategy identified in the 
preceding section results from consistency in the influence of strategic drivers, or is a 
product of other factors such as tradition, or even coincidence. 
Objective Two of this research was previously outlined in Section l.3. It involved the 
identification of factors which impact upon the direction ofREC strategy, in relation to 
choice and content as identified in Objective One, and understanding the nature of that 
impact. Once again, however, it is necessary to note the qualification made in Section 1.3 
that it is not the author's intention at this stage to attempt to correlate strategic drivers to 
the patterns of strategic content identified earlier, although this is an area that will be 
returned to in Chapter Twelve. The aim of this section of research was to comment upon 
general patterns, rather than seeking specific relationships. To this end the relative weight 
ofa variety offactors, identified in Section 2.2.3, was assessed during the content analysis 
process undertaken for Objective One. The findings for each of the cases study companies 
were presented at the conclusion of Chapter's Five to Seven, and this information is 
collected and presented in Tables 8.8 and 8.9. 
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However, while the process in relation to Objective Two was underway, a number of 
concerns became apparent which assigned doubt upon the degree of confidence that could 
be placed upon the observations: 
~ firstly, there was a concern that all of the factors impacting upon the strategy 
process had been identified and accounted for. During the analysis a number of 
additional factors which could have impacted upon the process were identified, 
additional to the four core factors identified in Section 2.2.3. Of these, ownership 
has emerged as a clearly very important factor, especially following the expiration 
of the Government's golden shares in 1995; 
secondly, there was a concern that textual or content analysis of influencing 
factors was less likely to be able to gauge the impact of internal factors, giving the 
erroneous impression that external factors were more important. It is logically 
easier to gauge the impact of external factors from a secondary analysis of the kind 
undertaken in Chapter's Five to Seven, by virtue of the fact that it is inevitably 
harder to gauge the impact of internal factors from the outside; and 
thirdly, the degree of subjectivity inherent in any process of this kind. Clearly, the 
process of triangulation is much more complicated when subjective detail, rather 
than verifiable facts, are concerned. The observations developed here 
consequently need to be triangulated against other sources and forms of data. 
These three concerns illustrate the importance of further investigation of this issue, to 
extend and validate the tentative analysis which now follows. One immediate impact of 
these concerns is that the analysis of Objective Two requires two discrete sections to 
achieve its objectives: the first to explore the possible influence of deductively identified 
strategic drivers, and the second to explore the inductively identified strategic drivers. 
8.2.1 Deductively Identified Drivers 
The deductively identified drivers are those presented in Section 2.3.3, and include 
external factors, internal factors, leadership and regulatory factors. While the analysis is 
inevitably tentative, the following observations are possible with reference to Tables 8.8 
and 8.9: 
~ the regulator was a greater influence over strategy in the early period, than were 
external factors: more companies were more focussed upon their distribution 
activities than their competitive activities and this is reflected in the regulator's 
greater influence; 
that the companies that were more interested in expanding their competitive 
activities were more influenced on the one hand by their available resources, and 
upon the other by their organisational leadership; but 
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that it would be unwise to argue that a decision not to pursue a competitive 
approach did not also require strong leadership, as is evident in the case of 
Manweb; and 
that there are very few cases identified in Table 8.8 of factors being 'less 
important': represented by 1 tick. This may reflect the fact that the industry was 
still in the early, uncertain, days following liberalisation, and consequently 
companies needed to pay close attention to all possible factors. However, this 
may of course be a subjective interpretation and does require further analysis. 
In relation to the latter period, the following patterns can be identified: 
~ that the basic principal equating the Regulator's influence with the extent of a 
reliance upon regulatory profits remains; 
that the close relationship between external factors, leadership and resources also 
remains; 
that the impact of leadership is reduced for companies which are owned and 
operated within larger groups, and where autonomy has not been provided to 
internal managers; 
that the companies identified as integrated energy companies need to be aware of 
influences from all possible quarters; and 
that some companies retreat from competitive markets has removed the influence 
of external factors, and is indicative of the increased intensity of competition 
among a smaller number of organisations. 
This analysis suggests that as companies have become more specialised, and have adopted 
focusses which are market specific, so the key influences related to their particular focus 
predominate and the other influences appear to have less importance. Therefore the 
regulator is more influential in organisations like Manweb, Midlands and SWEB than 
organisations like Northern or Eastern. It should be noted, however, that moves like that 
which saw Eastern merge its distribution business with London do act to increase the 
Regulator's influence over these companies when their high competitive markets profile 
would initially suggest otherwise. 
All of the above analysis is, however, speculative and needs to be assessed further. The 
above analysis will be SUbjected to further testing in the field study stage of the research 
through in-depth interviews with senior managers. To help in this process, a series of 
tentative propositions will be developed in this section to identify the key issues to be 
pursued. Before that occurs, however, it is necessary to address the question of the 
inductively identified drivers of strategy and to assess their contribution to this debate. 
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Table 8.8: Strategy Drivers, 1989-1995 Table 8.9: Strategy Drivers, 1995-2000 
ca ca 0.. ~ E E :E 0 (I') ~ (1) (1) 
"'" Jj 1:: (1) -"0 ! """" ro (1) ...:l 
- ca 0.. ~ ro E E :E 0 (I') ~ (1) (1) 
"'" 1,;( 1:: (1) ~ "0 ~ """" ro (1) 
...:l ~ 
EME 11'11'11' 11'11'11' 11'11'11' 11'11' EME II' II' II' 11'11' 
Eastern 11'11'11' 11'11'11' 11'11'11' II' Eastern 11'11'11' 11'11'11' 11'11'11' 11'11' 
London II' 11'11'11' 11'11' 11'11'11' London vvtl' vvtl' 11'11'11' 11'11' 
Manweb II' 11'11' 11'11'11' 11'11'11' Manweb II' II' 11'11'11' 11'11'11' 
Midlands 11'11' 11'11' 11'11' 11'11' Midlands nla vtl' 11'11' vtl'v 
Norweb 11'11'11' 11'11'11' 11'11'11' 11'11' Norweb nla II' 11'11'11' 11'11'11' 
Northern 11'11'11' 11'11' 11'11' 11'11'11' Northern 11'11'11' 11'11'11' 11'11' 11'11' 
Seeboard 11'11' 11'11'11' 11'11' 11'11'11' Seeboard 11'11'11' 11'11' 11'11' 11'11'11' 
Southern 11'11' 11'11' 11'11' 11'11' Southern 11'11'11' 11'11'11' 11'11' 11'11' 
SWALEC 11'11' 11'11'11' 11'11' 11'11'11' SWALEC nla nla nla nla 
SWEB 11'11' 11'11'11' 11'11' 11'11'11' SWEB nJa t/t/t/ t/ t/t/t/ 
Yorkshire 11'11'11' 11'11'11' 11'11' 11'11'11' Yorkshire t/t/t/ t/ t/t/ t/t/ 
Note: Readers will note discrepancies between these tables, and the tables estimating the drivers of 
strategy in the separate chapters. The former set of tables were subjective assessment's of the influence 
of strategy over the whole period, while the tables above are attempts to identify the specific influences 
evident during the two periods. 
Key: 11'11'11' = a high level of influence; 11'11' = a moderate level of impact; t/ = a limited 
impact; nJa = no longer an issue. Readers should note that this assessment is subjective, 
based upon the author's interpretation derived from the content analysis of secondary 
source material. 
8.2.2 Inductively identified Drivers 
During Chapter's Five to Seven, the principal focus of the examination of drivers of 
strategy rested upon the four areas described above. However, during this preliminary 
stage other possible key influences were identified. These included structure, the nature 
of the process, physical location and more significantly ownership. The analysis presented 
in Chapter's Five to Seven concluded that: 
~ structure did not drive strategy. The evidence from the data suggested that in 
some cases strategy drove structure, while in others strategy emerged alongside 
structure; 
that it was difficult to judge whether strategy processes were predominantly 
-393-
prescriptive or emergent using secondary source data, but that in any case the 
question of process was closely linked to the question of leadership, strategic 
choice and the impact of other drivers like industry competitiveness; 
that location may have been an element in 'market power'/organizational 
capability but that no conclusive pattern emerged prior to the expiration of the 
Government's golden share; but 
that ownership was a particularly important driver of strategy, which was made 
extremely apparent after the expiration of the golden shares in 1995. Evidence for 
this contention is provided by the analysis presented in Section 8.1 of this chapter. 
It is clear from the analysis conducted in Chapter's Five to Seven, that different patterns 
of ownership can be witnessed. These patterns, along with the relevant examples from 
the industry, are presented here: 
~ (i) Strategic Asset Seeking Investments: this concept, favoured by economists 
like Dunning (1993), describes companies which are seeking to take investments 
which"protect, sustain or advance the global competitive position of the investing 
company vis-a-vis its major national and international competitors" (Dunning, 
1993, p.380). Consequently, these investments tend to be made overseas. There 
would appear to be two forms of companies that fall within this classification: 
those that see the investment as an 'arms length' purchase allowing a degree of 
autonomy to rest with the existing managers, and those that do not: 
~ examples of the former group include CSW and Seeboard, Entergy and 
London, Dominion and EME, Yorkshire Holdings and Y orkshire, Avon 
Energy and Midlands, Hanson and Eastern; 
examples of the latter group include Southern Company and SWEB, 
Texas Utilities and Eastern, CalEnergy and Northern, EdF and London, 
although inevitably there will be some blurring around the respective edges 
of the groups; 
(ii) Integrating Investments: the companies in this group have purchased assets 
with the intention of subsuming them within their existing operations. These 
investments tend therefore to conform to the characteristics of either vertical, 
horizontal, or both vertical and horizontal integration: 
~ examples of this group would include PowerGen and EME, ScottishPower 
and Manweb, EDFILondon and SWEB Supply, WPD/SWEB and 
SW ALEC Distribution, National Power and Midlands Supply, Eastern and 
Norweb Supply, Eastern Distribution and London Distribution, Southern 
and SW ALEC Supply, and Southern Electric and Scottish Hydro; 
although again there would be blurring on the boundaries, particularly with the 
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following grouping; and 
(iii) Multi-Utility Investments: where the companies of this group acquire assets 
from similar organizations to achieve synergistic savings. These investments tend 
towards achieving similar characteristics to the integrating investments previously 
identified, but the focus tends not to be upon merged operations, rather than 
merged infrastructures: 
~ examples of this group would include Welsh Water and SW ALEC (to 
form Hyder), and North West Water and Norweb (to form United 
Utilities). 
In all cases the purchasing, or dominant, company is presented first. The analysis hints 
at different motivations for the taking of investments, and consequently offers a variety 
of different factors that come to play in influencing strategic decisions and content. The 
author therefore believes that ownership is now a truly significant factor in this debate, and 
requires attention during the field study. 
The choice of companies for this part of the exercise involved specifically targeting 
particular RECs to extend this process, as discussed in Section 1.6.1. The three 
companies chosen were Eastern Group, Seeboard, and SWEB, as: 
~ Eastern Group was initially an arms length strategic asset seeking investments, 
when taken over by Hanson, but became a more 'hands on' strategic asset seeking 
investment when taken over by Texas Utilities. It itself has twice engaged in 
integrating investment when it took over Norweb Supply, and merged with 
London Distribution; 
~ Seeboard was and remains an arms length strategic asset seeking investment; while 
~ SWEB was initially a 'hands on' strategic asset seeking investment, when taken 
over by Southern, which has become more of an arms length strategic asset 
seeking investment after the sale of SWEB Supply, and it itself has engaged in 
integrating investment when taking over SW ALEC Distribution. 
Consequently, three of the four groups identified above are represented in the field case 
studies. The failure to achieve entry to a multi utility type company is mitigated by the 
fact that the two examples of multi-utilities have largely failed to achieve their objectives, 
as witnessed by Hyder's divestment of both SW ALEC Distribution and Supply, and 
United Utilities' divestment ofNorweb Supply. 
8.2.3 Amending Framework 
The framework for the analysis of strategy drivers was established in Section 2.2, and in 
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particular with reference to Figure 2.3. However, ownership has inductively emerged 
during the preliminary stage of the research as an issue of clear importance, and needs to 
be acknowledged in order that it may be examined for in the field stage of the research. 
Figure 8.1, therefore, is a revised version of Figure 2.3, which acknowledges the impact 
of leadership and provides a new framework for the continuation of the analysis into 
Chapter's Nine to Eleven. The framework will provide the opportunity for the 
consideration of a key issue in respect to the question of drivers: whether the strategic 
drivers identified as being important in an analysis of a regulated industry are 
demonstrably the same as the drivers that can be seen to be important in an analysis of a 
Figure 8.1: Drivers of Strategy (Revised Version) 
Industry Competitors 
Threat of New Entrants 
Threat of Substitutes 
(A) Bargaining Power of Buyers 
Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
(C) Leadership 
(D) Legal-Regulatory Influences and Social Expectation 
(E) Ownership 
Company Skills and 
Company Resources 
(B) 
Innovation 
Capital 
Culture 
Processes 
Adaptability 
Technology 
Content 
of Strategy 
in tenns of 
(i) Domain Selection 
(ii) Domain Navigatio 
more traditional, and less regulated environment. If the drivers are demonstrably different, 
it becomes consequently much harder to suggest that the various approaches, models and 
concepts developed in non-regulated environments can be argued to be applicable in non-
regulated environments. This issue will be returned to in Chapter 12. 
8.2.4 Developing Propositions 
Objective Four of this thesis involved the development of a series of working propositions 
to be derived from the two core propositions presented in Section 1.3. This section 
continues this process, by identifying five propositions that can be tentatively set out, 
based upon the analysis presented in Section 8.2 to date. The core proposition which 
relates to Objective Two was "that different influences will be felt by the different 
companies during the process (of developing strategy)". The premise underpinning this 
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objective was that the literature had suggested a variety of drivers which were said to 
impact upon strategy decisions in traditional competitive environments, but that there was 
a need to ascertain whether the same would be true of regulated environments. As such, 
the following tentative working propositions are established: 
P6 that the influence of an industry regulator upon a company's strategy will depend 
upon the relative proportion of its profits generated from regulated activities 
P7 that companies pursuing a strategy across a range of sectors will be subject to 
influences from a variety of different drivers, but that the extent of the influence 
each exerts will be situational 
P8 that organisational size will be a key factor in an organisation's management of its 
relationship with strategic drivers 
P9 that companies will seek to develop greater control over the impact of strategic 
drivers by developing key internal capabilities to achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage 
PI0 that ownership is the key influence over strategy 
These propositions, unlike proposition's PI to P5, have not been largely proved by the 
research conducted during the preliminary stage of this research, and therefore require a 
greater degree of scrutiny in the field stage. The author has again intentionally made the 
propositions 'non-industry specific' so they can be employed beyond the electricity 
industry. However, they are clearly specific to industries which are or retain an element 
of regulatory supervision. 
8.3 Classification 
To date, this chapter has identified the strategic content, strategy combinations and drivers 
of strategy of the twelve companies that make up this research's sample. Before 
concluding the preliminary stage of this research, and moving on to review the field work 
element, it is necessary to begin the process of pursuing Objective Three of this research. 
Objective Three, as defined in Section 1.3 involved classifying the strategies identified in 
Objective One, against existing generic management typologies. To date, the systems of 
classification developed by Pearce and Robinson (1994) to describe corporate level 
strategy, and Porter (1980) and Chrisman et al (1988) to describe business level strategy, 
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have been deployed, and have influenced the analysis reported throughout this thesis. 
However, thus far the research has not considered the organisational level systems of 
classification, as identified in Section 2.5.6. This section begins this process, by 
developing tentative organisational classification's for each of the companies of the sample 
based upon the generic organisational strategy, structure and process model developed 
by Miles and Snow (1978). 
The Miles and Snow model, as discussed in Section 2.5.6.2, sought to relate corporate 
strategy decisions in three areas within an organisation: the solution of the entrepreneurial, 
engineering and administrative problems faced by an organisation, to the environment that 
it was hoping to serve, its leadership, its resource base and so on. The aim was to 
determine a classification which was contextually rich in that it suggests a 'whole system' 
approach: an implied relationship between corporate aims, strategy, structure, leadership, 
resources and environment. In making tentative assessments of the companies of this 
sample against the Miles and Snow framework; which as section 2.5.6.2 noted contains 
four original archetypes to which they and others have added further variant archetypes, 
the conclusions drawn from the earlier work undertaken in this chapter have been 
displayed, as illustrated in Table 8.10. This initial analysis refers to the observations made 
of the latter period, 1995-2000. 
Table 8.10 demonstrates the remarkable similarity between the observable patterns of the 
companies that remain within the industry, as identified by this research. Indeed, given 
the evidence presented in Table 8.10, it may be possible to suggest the existence of two 
broad archetypical configurations among the RECs. These REC archetypes are: 
~ the integrated energy company: those companies that are present in the gas and 
electricity supply industry, generation, distribution and assorted other related 
activities; which are seeking market share across the whole of the UK and possibly 
further; and who are competing on both price and non-price grounds. These 
companies are effectively developing a dual approach, engaging in both 
competitive and regulated businesses, where the balance of priority has switched 
from the traditional regulated distribution business, to the newer competitive 
energy business. This marks a substantial change in the guiding philosophy of the 
companies within this archetype; and 
the local distribution company: those companies that have largely retreated 
from the competitive side of the industry, and which are purely focussed upon 
their core distribution business, the traditional approach to the industry. 
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Table 8.10: Classification of the Sample 
Strategy Approaches Combination Key Influence O\\nership Classification 
Company (DistlSupp) Profile 
EME Local service provider. Variant II O\\ner Integrating O\\ner 
O\\ner is an integrated Variant 5A Investment PowerGen 
energy company by would appear 
acquisition, utilising utility to be an 
approach to compete Analyzer 
Eastern Integrated energy company Variant 3CI External 'Hands on' Analyzer 
by acquisition, utilising Variant 5B Factors! strategic 
utility approach to compete 
Resources! ass e t 
Leadership! seeking 
O\\ner investment 
London Integrated energy company Variant 3CI External 'Hands on' Analyzer 
by acquisition, utilising Variant 5B Factors! strategic 
utility approach to compete Resources! ass e t 
Leadershipl seeking 
Owner investment 
Manweb Local service provider. Variant 11 O\\ner Integrating Owner 
Owner is an integrated Variant 5 Investment ScottishPower 
energy company by would appear 
acquisition, utilising utility to be an 
approach to compete Analyzer 
Midlands Local service provider. Variant II Regulator ' Arm s Defender 
N/A Length' 
strategic 
ass e t 
seeking 
investment 
Norweb Local service provider. Variant II Regulator Multi- Defender 
N/A Utility 
Northern Integrated energy company Variant 21 External 'Hands on' Analyzer 
by organic growth, utilising Variant 5A Factors! strategic 
utility approach to compete Resources! ass e t 
Leadershipl seeking 
O\\ner investment 
Seeboard Integrated energy company Variant II External 'Arms Analyzer 
by organic growth, utilising Variant 5A Factors! Length' 
utility approach to compete Resources! strategic 
Leadershipl ass e t 
O\\nerl seeking 
Regulator investment 
Southern Integrated energy company Variant 3CI External Integrating Analyzer 
by acquisition, utilising Variant 5B Factors! Investment 
utility approach to compete Resources! Leadershipl 
O\\ner 
SWALEC No longer in existence N/A Owner N/A N/A 
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SWEB Local service provider. Variant 2B/ Regulator ' Arm s Defender 
N/A Length' 
strategic 
ass e t 
seeking 
investment 
Yorkshire Integrated energy company Variant 2/ External 'Arms Analyzer 
by organic growth, utilising variant SA Factors! Length' 
utility approach to compete Resources! strategic 
Leadership/ ass e t 
Regulator seeking 
investment 
The existence of archetypical REC configurations and strategies, and their evaluation, and 
validation or falsification now becomes part of the remaining objectives of this chapter. 
Part of this process involves evaluating the applicability of the use of the Miles and Snow 
approach for the purposes of classification. Does the model, as it currently exists, enable 
a full understanding of the dynamics of the relationship between the companies within the 
industry? How, for example, does the model explain the lack of a prospector organisation 
from the analysis presented in Table 8.10? The validity of the analysis presented above 
inevitably needs further examination. All of the concepts discussed in this section will be 
focussed upon in the field cases. 
An interesting aspect of the debate about classification was raised in Section 2.5.6.2.6, and 
concerns Miles and Snow's view that different configurations of company types will be 
evident within industries at different stages of industry development. They estimated, for 
example, that embryonic industries would have more prospectors, mature industries more 
defenders, and transition industries would witness a mixture. This inevitably creates the 
possibility of changes in the classification applied to certain companies, as they adapt to 
accommodate the changes to their industry. Of course, it may be noted that some 
companies may not change, despite the dominant trends within the industry. 
The ESI presents some evidence that classifications have changed over the ten years of 
the study, but also question's Miles and Snow's assumptions about the configurations that 
will be evident at particular times. This suggests to the author that once again a theory 
has been developed in the literature that is not generally applicable, as it does not account 
for the special conditions of a liberalising but still regulated former state owned 
enterprises. Details of the changes witnessed are shown in Table 8.11. 
The overall pattern presented by the ESI, in relation to Miles and Snow's comments, 
would seem almost to be the inverse of their expectations. Firstly, in the industry'S 
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embryonic period, there are more cautious companies than adventurous companies. This 
perhaps indicates that there is a difference between a 'naturally occurring' new industry 
and one where 'forced competition' has been witnessed. The mid-period matches Miles 
and Snow's transition phase, with a variety of types observable, while the current stage 
witnesses more adventurous types of organisation throughout the industry. It would 
appear, therefore, that opportunity for expansive approaches in an industry of this type 
comes after the development of experience and understanding, rather than from innovation 
at the outset. It also comes later, rather than sooner. 
Table 8.11: Classifications 1990-2000 
Company 1990 1994 2000 
East Midlands Elements of Defender! Tumanllmd to reestablish Owner PowerGen would 
Analyzer! Prospector itself as a Defender or appear to be an Analyzer 
all evident Analyzer 
Eastern Electricity Elements of Defender! Elements of Defender Analyzer 
Analyzer both evident and Analyzer evident 
London Electricity Defender Defender Analyzer 
Manweb Defender Defender Owner ScottishPower 
would appear to be an 
Analyzer 
Midlands Electricity Elements of Defender! Defender/Analyzer Defender 
Analyzer both evident 
Norweb Defender Analyzer Defender 
Northern Elements of Defender! Defender/Analyzer Analyzer 
Analyzer both evident 
Seeboard Defender Defender/Analyzer Analyzer 
Southern Electric Defender Defender/Analyzer Analyzer 
SWALEC Defender Defender/Analyzer N/A 
SWEB Elements of Defender! Defender/Analyzer Defender 
Analyzer both evident 
Yorkshire Electricity Elements of Defender! Defender/ Analyzer Analyzer 
Analyzer! Prospector 
all evident 
8.4 Other Key Issues 
A variety of other key issues have emerged during this analysis, which help to develop 
further understanding of the processes under examination. These issues have not 
necessarily been the core focus of attention, but a brief review of their features broadens 
the analysis and the understanding of the change that is being witnessed. The first of these 
areas is the debate surrounding the differing concepts of strategy in relation to the firm. 
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8.4.1 Competitive Forces verses the Resource Based View 
Throughout the case studies presented in Chapter's Five to Seven, a picture has emerged 
of a variety of different positions being adopted by the organisations under study in 
relation to this debate. Some of the companies have, in their concern for backward 
integration for example, shown a clear concern for addressing the competitive forces at 
play within the industry, and a desire to orient themselves competitively towards their 
industry. Others of the RECs have displayed a much clearer concern that they amply 
deploy and exploit to the full their existing organisational resources and capabilities. An 
example of the former is perhaps Midlands, which engaged in extensive backward 
integration as a means of improving its ability to compete in its supply business. An 
example of the latter is probably Eastern, as the following case study in Chapter Nine will 
demonstrate. The study also shows that in so far as the different drivers are concerned, 
the relationship described by the model presented at Figure 2.5 is increasingly evident 
within the industry, as remaining companies attempt to develop the appropriate 
congruence between each of the competing factors driving organisational strategy. This 
issue will be returned to following the completion of the case study chapters. 
8.4.2 Strategy Making At Different Levels 
The analysis to date clearly shows a variety of different approaches to the question of the 
location of strategic decision making among the sample. Very clearly, at the beginning 
of the period, most of the companies operated functional structures, or close variants of 
functional structures, which saw a 'command and control' style leadership, as will be 
discussed. Consequently, the 'strategy as plan' approach was much in evidence, with 
corporate level strategy establishing not only the boundaries but also the detail of decision 
making at SBU levels. However, as the period has moved forward, increasingly head 
offices appear to be adopting the 'strategy as pattern' concept, and devolving decision 
making to the business and operational levels of organisations. This behaviour is perhaps 
not unsurprising, as most concepts of organisational development argue that decision 
making close to the functional activities makes sense from the standpoint of the flexibility 
and suitability of outcomes. Within the ESI, it should also be noted, the forced separation 
of the two core businesses: distribution and supply, has created the need for organisations 
to develop two quite distinct skill sets, which emphasises network management skills in 
one, and a more entrepreneurial approach in the other. Clearly, while a command and 
control culture could function in the more measured, and stable distribution business, it 
would appear to be a clear disadvantage in the more fast paced, entrepreneurial supply 
business. 
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8.4.3 Leadership 
Following very closely on from the preceding debate, is that of leadership. Once again, 
there are more examples of transactional leadership among the companies in the early 
stage, and an increasingly transformational approach developing later. However, it should 
be noted that the recent development of companies focussed solely upon distribution 
activities has seen revisitation of more transactional leadership approaches. Once again, 
the increased entrepreneurial nature of the industry has encouraged a more delegatory 
attitude among leaders, creating transformational leadership. Clearly, the concepts in 
8.4.3 and 8.4.4 are closely interlinked. The delay in the development of transformational 
leadership can be attributed to the period of caution encountered at the beginning of the 
period that was referred to in Section 8.3. 
Debate on the issue of dominant coalitions will of necessity have to wait until the in-depth 
case study chapters. While it has proved possible to identify, for example, that Eastern's 
dominant coalition was principally comprised of its CEO and its finance director, this was 
an exception case, resulting from the viability of these senior managers and the attention 
they drew to them. Such a situation was not always the case among the RECs. What is 
interesting to note here is that, if we again consider Eastern's example, that Miles and 
Snow's analysis appears to be erroneous. The involvement of the finance director in a 
dominant coalition was supposed to indicate a defender organisation, rather than the 
analyzer/market leader company identified in Table 8.10. Clearly, this is a simplified 
overview of both their analysis and the findings of the research, suggesting that further 
assessment is necessary to establish an authoritative view of this issue. 
What it may be possible to discuss at this stage is the changing nature of main board 
composition among the RECs, which may be indicative of the existence of the two key 
archetypes identified in Section 8.3. The two archetypes recognise a differing perspective 
on the pursuit of viable business opportunity within the industry: one view, the integrated 
energy company view, holds that a wide scope may be adopted while the other, the local 
distribution company view, holds that a narrow view may be adopted. The current 
composition of main boards inevitably reflects this divergence, as the former companies; 
operating in more areas, will need larger boards in order to manage their more varied 
activities. There are inevitably differences between companies who have adopted 
narrower (such as SWEB), or wider focusses (such as Northern) within the industry, and 
other RECs (such as Seeboard) who have large contingents drawn from their owners on 
the main board. However, if the composition of, and roles held among, company main 
boards are any indication the research may point to more fundamental differences among 
the RECs. For example a company like Eastern; whose main board composition, as 
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demonstrated at Section 7.1.2, is virtually indistinguishable from the main boards of more 
traditional organisations, appears to share little in common with a company like Yorkshire; 
which as Section 5.4.2 demonstrates possesses a board that remains very clearly that of 
a utility organisation. This may suggest that Eastern has moved away from the traditional 
concept of an utility company, while others within the industry have not done so. The 
position of Eastern vis-a-vis its contemporaries within the industry, will be explored in 
Chapter Nine. 
8.4.4 The Impact of Structure 
The same points made in 8.4.3 and 8.4.4 have a clear association with the observations 
to be made in relation to structure. A more entrepreneurial organisation, featuring greater 
delegation in decision making and hence witnessing decisions being taken lower down the 
organisation, will almost inevitably seek a more divisional structure within which to pursue 
these objectives. The sample has witnessed the increasing proliferation of divisional, and 
even holding company structures over the period, as the need to manage differing skills 
in relation to different market demands has become increasingly clear. While some 
companies had anticipated this new feature of the operating environment relatively early, 
some took time to develop an awareness of this need. For example, SW ALEC did not 
move to a divisional structure until 1994. However, the divisional structure is only a 
viable option for organisations which remain involved in a variety of segments within the 
industry. For companies like WPD and Midlands, which are now only operating in the 
distribution segment, the need for elaborate divisional structures has diminished as the 
focus returns to functional structures, with transactionalleaderships, and a 'strategy as 
plan' approach to decision making. 
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
The conclusion of this chapter marks the end of the reporting of the preliminary stage of 
the research. It is necessary, at this time, to reflect upon what has been observed, and 
how these observations impact upon: the remainder of this research; the objectives of the 
research; and consequently upon the wider management literature in general. These issues 
are addressed with reference to the four key objectives set out in Chapter One. 
8.4.1 Objective One: Observations and Future Aims 
To date, this research has established an accurate and reliable picture of the content of the 
strategy of the twelve companies in the sample since privatisation. This has been achieved 
by the use of a form of content analysis of textual material, which has been corroborated 
by reference to (i) differing sources of data and (ii) different methods of analysis, to ensure 
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its reliability. Consequently, a detailed knowledge of the nature of strategy within the 
sample has been obtained, and the following conclusions drawn: 
~ that following initially divergent impulses, the industry has settled upon a very few 
key strategic approaches which have proven to be viable within the circumstances 
of the industry: 
a) companies inevitably will pursue a concentrated growth approach in the 
regulated portion of their business, and consideration of competitive 
business strategy does not appear to be relevant. Instead, they must 
pursue a strict cost control regime in a heavily prescriptive strategic 
environment; 
b) companies tend to pursue a more expansive combined strategy in the 
unregulated, but related portion of their business. These approaches 
include market and product development, vertical and increasingly 
horizontal integration, and the use of joint ventures and consortia to 
enhance the effectiveness of their market development. The environment 
dictates that segmented utility or segmented utility focus strategies are the 
only viable business level strategies that can be deployed. Non-regulated 
activities tend to witness a more emergent strategy process than their 
regulated counterpart; 
that particular formulations of strategy are becoming evident, which reflect the 
reality of the sort of archetypical strategies the companies are pursuing, as 
discussed above. These combinations reveal that there are three possible and 
distinct strategic approaches evident within the industry: 
a) the local service provider; 
b) the integrated energy company by organic growth; and 
c) the integrated energy company by acquisition. 
This reflects the observable phenomenon that some companies are exiting the 
competitive portions of the industry while others are seeking to establish a 
dominant market position in industries like supply or generation; a process that is 
being encouraged by the behaviour of the local service providers in exiting the 
competitive portions of the industry; 
that combinations of grand strategy match the patterns of strategic involvement 
identified here, and once again present an industry that is relatively homogeneous 
in approach. However, it is necessary to note that this homogeneity is evident in 
generic approaches, and not necessarily in the detail behind those generic 
approaches; 
that there is strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that the principal 
developments in terms of strategic content, and strategic combinations have 
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followed the expiration of the golden shares, and hence is linked to the new 
perspectives brought by the new owners entering the industry; and 
arguably, therefore, there is greater commonality among the remaining companies 
within the industry than at any time since privatisation, which may be interpreted 
as an indication that the industry is approaching maturity. 
8.4.2 Objective Two: Observations and Future Aims 
To date, this research has only developed a series of broad concepts with respect to 
strategic drivers, requiring the application offurther attention during the field work stage. 
These concepts have developed as a consequence of an interpretation of the content 
analysis, and other textual analysis undertaken in support of Objective One. These 
tentative conclusions are as follows: 
~ that the influence exerted by an industry regulator on company strategy will be in 
direct proportion to the share and importance that regulated earnings play in an 
organisation's overall profitability: rising as that proportion rises, and falling as it 
falls; 
that other influences like the market and competitor behaviour (external factors), 
resources (internal factors) and leadership need to be in alignment, and to be 
congruent for an organisation to make a success of a competitive, largely non-
regulated approach; but that 
among companies attempting such an approach the relative importance of these 
three factors will vary, with each displaying a different hierarchy of importance: 
some being more market led, some concentrating upon superior resources, some 
being driven by the dominant coalition; 
that as the industry has matured, there is some evidence of companies adopting a 
resource based view, and focussing upon particular capabilities to obtain 
competitive advantage; 
that ownership has become a key factor in driving strategy, if not the key factor 
in some cases; and 
that there were a variety of different forms of ownership evident within the 
industry, including: strategic asset seeking investment, which may either be 'arms 
length' or 'hands on'; integrating investment; and multi-utility investment, 
suggesting different forms of motivation underlying the impact ownership has 
upon strategy. 
However, many of the above observations have principally been inferred from the patterns 
of behaviour observed among the companies. It would be difficult to argue that the 
confidence placed in each would be high, unless further confirmatory research be 
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conducted. This confirmatory research is therefore identified as a principal objective of 
the forthcoming field research. 
8.4.3 Objective Three: Observations and Future Aims 
This chapter saw the first consideration of the question of classification of the observable 
behaviour against an established management model: the Miles and Snow typology 
(1978). From the data collected and analysed in relation to Objectives One and Two, the 
following observations were made: 
~ firstly, that two broad archetypes have emerged from the industry following the 
first ten years after privatisation. These were (a) the integrated energy company; 
and (b) the local service provider; 
secondly, that an initial analysis of the various characteristics of the sample 
allowed for a tentative classification to be undertaken. However, this 
classification was identified as being less than satisfactory, as it did not provide an 
explanation of some ofthe key elements of the Miles and Snow model. Principal 
among these was a need to identify the source of innovation within the industry, 
as this was missing from the initial classification of company types. 
Within the case studies, therefore, the interrelationship of the companies within the ESI 
requires further attention to determine (a) where the missing functions of the industry are 
to be located, and (b) whether the model itself offered a realistic explanation of what has 
been observed within the industry, or whether, following Supporting Objective One, there 
was a need for some form of amendment to be proposed. 
8.4.4 Objective Four: Observations and Aims 
This Chapter has taken the two tentative core propositions identified in Section 1.3 and 
elaborated upon them to form the ten working propositions presented in Section 8.1.3 and 
8.2.4. Both sets of propositions will receive scrutiny in Chapter's Nine to Eleven, and will 
be further evaluated in Chapter Twelve. The author has, at this preliminary stage of the 
research, greater confidence in the accuracy of P 1 to P 5, reflecting the author's overall 
confidence in the accuracy of the analysis presented in Section 8.1 with respect to 
strategic content and combinations. Less confidence exists in P6 to PlO, reflecting the 
difficulty noted here in obtaining a clear understanding of the respective impacts of the 
drivers of strategy from an analysis based upon textual analysis. 
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Chapter Nine Case Study of Eastern Group 
wholly owned subsidiary of the Texas Utilities Group 
9.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to further extend the investigation into the content and drivers 
of strategy, following on from the analysis presented in Chapter Eight. Specifically, this 
chapter will examine the ten tentative propositions established in Chapter Eight: five in 
relation to content, five in relation to strategic drivers, with the aim of confirming their 
validity and legitimising their use in future research, or else modifying them to improve 
their validity as deemed necessary. The ten propositions have been developed from earlier 
work in relation to Objectives One and Two of this thesis. The chapter also presents other 
data of relevance and interest to other aims of this research, and in particular the question 
of classification, which will be addressed in full in Chapter Twelve. In so doing, a richer 
illustration of the relationships identified and discussed in Chapter Eight emerges. 
This chapter will not feature an extensive biographical section on Eastern, as that function 
has been performed in the separate case study of the Company presented in Section 7.1. 
That case study presented: 
~ detail of Eastern's operational area under the 1989 Electricity Act; 
~ the major strategic developments within the Company between 1990 and 2000; 
~ the major managerial and structural changes that occurred within the Company 
during this period; and 
an assessment of the aims, objectives and causes of the specific strategies pursued 
during this time, although this latter aspect of Section 7.1 will be reviewed in 
Section 9.1 of this case study. 
The analysis and assessment of strategy in relation to Eastern Group, in Chapter's Seven 
and Eight, was derived from information provided by existing published sources. The 
extended analysis and verification of the observations and propositions to be undertaken 
within this chapter have been derived from a series of in-depth interviews with managers 
both inside Eastern Group, and within the wider energy industry. A list of aU of the 
primary source interviews conducted in conjunction with this research was presented in 
Section 1.4. From this list the key interviews utilised in this chapter were: 
~ UK002: of Eastern Group, October 1995; 
~ UK003: for Eastern Group, March 1998; 
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UK004: 
UK005: 
UK006: 
Trading, June 1998. 
for Eastern Group, April 1998; 
for Eastern Group, June 1998; and 
for Eastern Power and Energy 
Material provided by each manager will be referenced accordingly in the chapter 
references. The transcripts of each interview will be included in the Appendices to this 
thesis. The chapter also utilises secondary source material as necessary, as well as internal 
company documents, and will be referenced accordingly. As a condition for the granting 
of these interviews, personal confidentiality was assured. Consequently, reference will 
only be made to the job title of each manager quoted. 
9.1 Summary of Observations of Eastern Group 
As noted in Section 9.0, the first section of this chapter reviews the observations made of 
Eastern Group in respect of: 
~ the narrative presented in Section 7.1 of Chapter Seven; and 
~ its analysis, and resulting conclusions with respect to the Company presented in 
the various reporting sections of Chapter Eight. 
This brief're-telling' of Eastern's story is necessary for two main reasons: firstly, it 
provides the context for the following discussion and analysis; and secondly, because the 
conclusions reached at the end of this initial investigation provide the first 'point' of the 
triangulation process that this section is indented to perform. 
9.1.1 Strategy within Eastern Group 
Eastern was initially an organisation which was highly prescriptive, centrally managed, and 
aiming to achieve a fairly narrowly conceived set of operational objectives. These 
objectives were based upon organisational efficiency and cost effectiveness in their core 
distribution business, and a progressive market development approach in the secondary 
supply business. The Company's other businesses: appliance retail and contracting, were 
also expected to be run on the basis of organisational efficiency and cost effectiveness and 
to make a small but positive contribution to the Group's operational profitability. 
Eastern's continuing businesses, therefore, all subscribed to a similar initially cautious 
approach, but with the hope and expectation that its heightened capabilities in marketing 
and service quality would bring growth and enhanced profitability, in supply in particular. 
The Company also sought to engage in concentric diversification through its planned 
investment in generation. This investment was aimed at the dual objectives of profit 
-409-
generation and also of supporting its supply activity, by assuring a guaranteed source of 
wholesale energy at a lower price than that offered by the national generators. 
Initially, therefore, the strategy was cautious, rationalised, and based upon concentrated 
growth. Eastern, despite its size and reputation, was not at this early stage one of the 
more adventurous RECs. This changed in 1993-94 when the Company was subject to a 
strategic turnaround. This turnaround saw the introduction of a new organisational and 
competitive philosophy which was in tum more emergent and entrepreneurial. The new 
aim of the organisation's strategy was to seek opportunity wherever it existed, providing 
it was profitable and linked into the existing capabilities and skills of the organisation. As 
was noted earlier, the Company believed that it possessed enhanced capabilities, in 
particular in marketing and customer service. The re-orienting of the organisation in 
1993-94 suggests that it was seeking to maximise the potential of these superior 
resources, in order to seek superior organisational performance. This suggests the 
development of a more resource based outlook (Grant, 1991) on the part of Eastern, 
possibly seeking to enhance the more market focussed approach that the Company had 
adopted up to that point. This identification and exploitation of resources, competencies 
and capabilities was to be a recurring factor in Eastern's approach. 
The impact ofthis change saw the Company begin to more aggressively pursue business 
opportunity. In addition, greater responsibility was passed to managers closer to the 
actual operations. The function of the corporate centre was therefore changed from its 
prescriptive leading role, to a guiding role which empowered the entrepreneurial spirit of 
both business and functional managers. This change in emphasis brought some change 
even in the core distribution business, although the scope for change here was limited by 
the regulated nature of the industry. However, it brought the most change in non-
regulated activities. The supply businesses, electricity and gas, were encouraged to 
become much more aggressive in pursuit of market development opportunities, and began 
to utilise a full range of product development. The objective was to create a mass 
customer base through organic growth, utilising the Company's resource base of 
established marketing skills, relative financial muscle, and the innovative and 
entrepreneurial approach required of business and functional managers. Latterly, the 
realities of the industry, and in particular the difficulty of achieving fast growth through 
organic means, has led to the Company seeking growth by acquisition, in particular the 
takeover of the Norweb Energi supply business. The Company's generation business also 
set about building critical mass and market power through an acquisition approach which 
began in earnest following the takeover of Eastern by Hanson, adding further key 
capabilities to the Company's existing resource portfolio. This process has continued 
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under new owners TXU. Other businesses were run for profit, and if they failed to match 
the necessary levels of profitability, were divested. 
Ultimately, this freedom to compete has led to the Company changing its operational 
emphasis. The organisational logic followed this rationale: 
~ the focus upon building a strong supply business further justified the development 
of market power in generation, to provide the certainty of cheaper prices to the 
supply business and reduce risk; 
market power in generation came from increasing the generation portfolio, but 
also achieving backward integration into down-stream gas supplies; 
as the Company was now involved in both gas wholesale and retail, and electricity 
wholesale and retail, and was looking to minimise risk in all of these activities, this 
created the need to manage risk more effectively, leading to the development of 
an arbitrage capability to maximise the profit earning capability of the Company 
at all stages in the energy chain; which in tum 
led to the development of a capability in risk management which the Company 
now offers as a value adding service on a commercial basis. 
All of these developments combined to create an organisation which is now focussed upon 
the management of risk, through its energy trading business which drives its supply and 
generation businesses with the aim of maximising organisational profit. The Company's 
distribution business operates separately from this new focus, and continues to pursue the 
general 'operating rules' for its sector, by seeking to manage cost ever more effectively. 
This has lead it to its recent decision to seek to merge its business with that of London 
Electricity, forming 24seven. Clearly, Eastern looks like an organisation which 
approaches the question of strategy from a resource based, and largely emergent 
prospective. The growth of the Company has been based upon the maximisation of the 
potential of its resources, or the seeking of enhanced resources through the managed 
takeovers by Hanson and TXU. The risk management driven strategy has emerged from 
the entrepreneurial outlook the Company adopted in 1994, but despite having established 
this part of their business as the key driver the approach still appears to be fundamentally 
emergent although it is probably more focussed than before. The strategy of the 
distribution business appears to be largely prescribed. 
9.1.2 Influences on Strategy within Eastern Group 
Eastern began its independent life as one of the two largest RECs, and was consequently 
one of the companies with the greatest level of expectation placed upon it by external 
observers. At the beginning, however, the managers of the Company chose to pursue 
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what they felt was the appropriate strategy for Eastern, resulting in the more cautious 
beginning described above. The key early influences were those of the existing managers, 
and of the Regulator. The one area in which the early strategy departed from the norm 
was that of generation. However, this was also arguably not a radical step. The decision 
to invest in generation seems to have been taken as a result of an underlying trend among 
the RECs as a whole. This trend suggested that generation was a natural business for 
RECs to enter as it offered them a chance of obtaining a cheaper source of energy, and 
through the use of joint ventures, the whole exercise was relatively risk free. This was 
arguably therefore not the conscious long-term strategic decision it would later appear to 
be. 
The change that occurred in 1993-94 was a product of uncertainty with respect to the 
performance of the Company. Eastern had recognised a need for improvement in certain 
vital areas, as the then MD Devaney noted in 1993: "This was a year of major change. 
Our twin priorities were to reduce substantially the cost base of the business and to 
achieve a step change in service quality" (Eastern Electricity, 1993, p.7). This suggests 
that pressure for change had originated from the organisation's shareholders in recognition 
that the Company was not making the most of its opportunities. The reaction from the 
City was that Eastern had been under performing (Pearson, 1991 a). This judgement was 
based upon the twin influences of the initial performance expectations it was failing to 
meet and the performance of other RECs since privatisation, and it forced change, 
reflected in Devaney's comments. The focus upon the cost base was aimed to improve 
its performance in distribution, and upon its service quality to aid its performance in 
supply. 
However, following this exercise of external influence, the evidence suggests that the key 
influence on strategy within the Company once again became personal. In particular, the 
influence of John Devaney and the new Finance Director Anstee have been identified as 
being particularly important. Poor management had been highlighted as a contributory 
factor in the Company's earlier below par performance (Sychrava, 1992t). It is noticeable 
that concerns of this kind were reduced following changes in senior management. The 
earlier analysis continued by identifying Devaney as the key influence on strategy through 
until the takeover of the Company by Texas Utilities in 1998. Consequently, the view 
emerged that leadership had been more important than other influences in the case of 
Eastern Group. This, however, may have changed since the takeover by TXU, who may 
now be leading the strategic direction of the Company rather more than the current group 
of managers. 
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9.1.3 Observations Drawn 
While Section's 9.1.1 and 9.1.2 have alluded to the various conclusions drawn about the 
characteristics of Eastern Group over the course of the analysis conducted in Chapter's 
Seven and Eight, it is necessary to briefly reiterate them here. Eastern, as a Company, 
was: 
~ initially pursuing an approach focussed upon concentrated growth across all of its 
activities, but following a turnaround in 1993-94, became much more aggressive 
and expansionary in its outlook, pursuing market development in both supply and 
generation through a variety of different grand strategy combinations; 
following the turnaround, more decentralised in terms of decision making with the 
leaders providing guidance and inspiration: strategy as pattern, but leaving tactics 
to business and functional managers. The Company operates a divisional 
structure, but the integration of energy trading, supply and generation means that 
there is a much greater degree of consolidation than in many of its competitors. 
The Company may be establishing a new organisational archetype in advance of 
the rest of the industry; 
~ adopting an initially prescriptive, but latterly emergent, approach to strategy; 
~ adopting an initial strategic focus upon its industry, but has latterly become much 
more focussed upon its resource base; 
initially subject to key strategic influence from its leadership and the regulator, but 
its perceived under performance saw that influence switch to external forces. 
However, following the success of the turnaround, leadership again became the 
key influence driving a new strategy, with internal resource factors acting as an 
enabler; and 
finally identified as an analyzer, although there must be some concern that this 
description does not fully describe the key leadership role the Company plays 
within the industry. 
The above conclusions were based upon a three phased analysis: factual data from 
published sources; factual data from company sources; and opinion data from published 
sources. In so doing, the author argues that the process of triangulation discussed in 
Section 3.2.2 has been fulfilled, and that the author possesses a high degree of confidence 
in the findings reported above. 
9.2 Testing Propositions: Strategic Content and Combinations 
In pursuit of a resolution of Objective One of this research, Section 8.1.3 established a set 
of five propositions which sought to identify from the preliminary stage of the research 
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some of the key characteristics of the strategies of the sample companies. The aim was 
to suggest potential 'rules' for the content of strategy in either regulated or recently 
liberalised industries, which would be developed into formal hypotheses for empirical 
testing in later research. 
In the case of Propositions 1 to 5, therefore, this Chapter seeks to confirm the conclusions 
reached by the author in Chapter Eight, and to convey a higher degree of legitimacy to 
these conclusions by subjecting them to a further scrutiny, as represented by a second 
triangulation process. Each is therefore reviewed in its own section of this chapter, and 
all will adopt the same framework. The proposition will be repeated, and then evidence 
drawn from the in-depth interviews identified in Section 9.0 supporting or invalidating that 
proposition will be presented. The process will be summarised in Section 9.2.6. 
9.2.1 Legitimising Proposition 1 
Proposition PI stated that: 
"companies will employ a limited concentrated growth approach m ongomg 
operations within their regulated businesses" 
The view adopted in Chapter Eight was that Eastern, along with all of the other RECs, 
would have little option but to pursue a concentrated growth approach in regulated 
businesses in order to obtain maximum profitability. As the activity was regulated, and 
a monopoly, there was no scope for any other approach. However, it was still necessary 
to obtain the views of managers on the question of the management of cost, and the 
related issue of the integrity of the network, as implied by a concentrated growth 
approach. 
The then described the networks business, electricity distribution, 
as "a monopoly where we get squeezed every five years on costs .... it is not a growth 
business but it provides a lot of cash. It is comfortable" (Eastern Group, UK003, 1998). 
The then of Eastern (Eastern Group, UK002, 1995b) commented that this view 
reflected the fact that the whole regulatory system had been designed to drive costs down, 
which necessitated a concentrated growth approach on the part of the companies. The 
Regulator, he explained, had put in place a five yearly review. After the review, the 
maximum price a company could charge for its distribution services, based upon the RPI-
X formula, was established limiting its earning potential. Consequently "immediately after 
the review you must cut as much cost out of your operations to maximise your earning 
potential from this business" (Eastern Group, UK002, 1995b), in order that your income 
"does not decline as quickly as the Regulator would like it to decline" (Eastern Group, 
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UK004, 1998). Under regulation, he argued, there was not any possibility of a cost 
reduction programme harming service quality, as the levels of service quality were ring 
fenced by the regulator. 
This describes the practical realities of the strategic choice facing companies 10 
distribution. The price cap means little or no growth opportunity is available, so costs 
must be controlled: ie assets must be worked harder, while performance is maintained. 
The's response principally concerned the reduction of overheads and controllable 
costs, which could be interpreted as manpower reductions, and this certainly occurred as 
referred to in Section 7.1. However, the Company also evidenced a different aspect of 
the concentrated growth approach, in relation to the improvement in performance of the 
business. In an interview with the , the activities of 
the Company in improving the capability of its staff were discussed as the following 
statement explores: "5000 people have left the Company, and been replaced by 2000 new 
ones, with more appropriate skills .... a higher calibre person to take on wider roles. In the 
past, if you had a certain job done in the house you could have visits from about five 
people ... now you have one visit with one person doing everything that was required. So 
it has a lot to do with empowerment of staff, and widening skills. That is the way we have 
tried to develop" (Eastern Group, UK005, 1998). This example applies to both the 
distribution and supplies activities of the Company. 
Therefore, Proposition 1 is supported primarily because the companies have little scope 
for following any other approach. The key features of the concentrated growth approach 
are cost reduction, but also service quality improvement as this has been found to aid cost 
management measures at the same time as providing an enhanced service. The Company 
has, as discussed in Section 7.1, recently merged its distribution business with that of 
London. This indicates an extended concentrated growth approach widening the scope 
of cost reduction/service enhancement across two organisations and seeking synergy in 
the face of ever more squeezed operating profits. 
There must, however, be a degree of concern about the use of concepts like those used 
here in relation to the activities of a regulated industry. Can it be appropriate, for 
example, to make reference to a concentrated growth approach in an industry that does 
not grow? There is clearly an issue of the correct terminology to be addressed here, in 
distinguishing between regulated and non-regulated industries. It may be appropriate to 
describe the behaviour of regulated businesses as demonstrating behaviour which shares 
similar characteristics with a concentrated growth approach, albeit within a regulated, 
non-competitive arena. Examples of how this assessment affects the ongoing analysis will 
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be referred to throughout this and the following two chapters, and conclusions drawn in 
Chapter Twelve. 
9.2.2 Legitimising Proposition 2 
Proposition P2 stated that: 
"companies will seek to employ approaches to develop critical mass in most if not all 
of their continuing un-regulated businesses" 
The view developed in Chapter's Seven and Eight in relation to Eastern, and indeed their 
competitors in the supply industry, was that companies needed to develop a critical mass 
to remain viable in electricity supply. The general principles of this competitive aspect of 
the industry have been commented upon in a publication by the author (Ghobadian and 
Viney, 2000). The key views in support of this proposition have been derived from 
another of the field study chapters, Chapter Eleven, but the evidence drawn from the 
interviews with Eastern managers are equally compelling. Speaking in 1995 the then 
commented that in his opinion, and following the advent of competition in supply, there 
would probably be only four integrated utilities in England and Wales, and two in 
Scotland, in the long run (Eastern Group, UK002, 1995b). This clearly suggests that (a) 
companies will be looking to build critical mass and (b) that other companies will see the 
logic of retreating from the industry as economic reality hits home. This viewpoint 
therefore illustrates a dominant industry view that critical mass is a necessity for continued 
operations in competitive businesses. 
There is inevitably a logical side to this proposition. Supply, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
is a high turn over but low margin business. Therefore to make a meaningful contribution 
to Group profitability, critical mass is required to reduce the proportionate impact of 
overheads, and by spreading this aspect of cost, to improve the margin. Other evidence 
from interviewees supports the need for critical mass, and also discuss the process. The 
said "I think that the strategy was to double our 
customer base in the UK. You can't double your customer base within your franchise 
area. You can double your customer base relatively easily nationally ... so we grew to be 
an organisation that services 6 million customers from one that serviced 3 million 
customers originally" (Eastern Group, UK005, 1998) with greater expansion intended into 
Europe. The then noted the importance of gas to this strategy, 
when she commented that "we now have the largest independent gas business signing up 
more customers per week than anyone else" (Eastern Group, UK003, 1998). 
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However, the extent to which supply was a core activity to Eastern was and indeed 
remains uncertain, as discussed by the then . She notes that it is 
still very early in the day as far as domestic competition is concerned, and there is still 
uncertainty about the potential for shake out, perhaps not in terms of 'if" but rather in 
terms of 'who'. She notes the debate within the Company at the time of the interview 
(1998): "for us, the issue is what value does a retail customer base have within an 
integrated energy portfolio? Do we need to have individual customers. Or do we simply 
have a large supply contract for one of the other RECs who is happy to do the customer 
service thing? One of the most interesting things ... .is the notion that we might actually 
sell out of domestic electricity ... .its only one rather small part of what we do. I could very 
easily see, say after 2000, an Eastern that had sold its networks business, or an Eastern 
that had sold, or sub-contracted, its supply business. You don't necessarily need to do 
it yourself' (Eastern Group, UK004, 1998). This suggests the potential for the 
application of a dynamic network concept, as discussed in Section 2.4.2 (Miles and Snow, 
1992). The subsequent purchase ofthe Norweb Energi company would suggest that the 
move towards critical mass has continued within Eastern, and that this philosophical 
debate has been resolved, at least for the moment. 
Therefore, Proposition 2 is supported primarily because of the prevailing economics of the 
industry. Consumer's are fickle, and demand high quality and low cost or will move 
away. The enterprise carries certain cost overheads which are constant, and profitability 
per customer is low. Consequently, if you are going to stay within this sector of the 
industry, you must have critical mass (Ghobadian and Viney, 2000) to overcome constant 
flux in demand and to spread the cost of overheads. However, it is clear that the key 
word in Proposition 2 is 'continuing', and there will clearly be further shakeout within the 
industry in the coming years. As referred to earlier, this issue is described in greater detail 
in relation to the case presented in Chapter Eleven. 
9.2.3 Legitimising Proposition 3 
Proposition P3 stated that: 
"the approaches mentioned in P2 will of necessity involve a combined price and non-
price generic approach, so backing the arguments of a variety of authors against the 
conclusions of Porter (1980)" 
The view developed in Chapter's Seven and Eight in relation to Eastern, and once again 
in relation to all of their competitors in the supply industry, was that companies needed 
to develop an utility approach, based upon both price and non-price competitive weapons, 
to remain viable within the competitive portions of the industry. In addition, this utility 
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approach ought to be segmented, to reflect the different categories and locations of 
customers that a company is trying to reach: ie both domestic and commercial customers, 
across different parts of the country. The Company may therefore require a segmented 
utility focus approach if it needed to target particular clients or client groups. 
Support for this proposition was presented in Section 7.1, where Eastern's efforts in 
particular to present commercial customers with an attractive utility package were seen 
to be considerable. The Manager of Business Process Redesign describes the rationale 
underpinning this approach: "We have looked at all of our business processes from the 
customers point of view, baring in mind that we were becoming a competitive 
organisation. So we asked the customer what he wants: he wants 100% reliability of 
electricity supply, he doesn't want to pay too much, and when it does go off he wants it 
restored very quickly, and he also wants to be told when it is going back on" (Eastern 
Group, UK004, 1998). Once again, therefore, competitive reality has forced the hand of 
the Company. If it wishes to stay in supply, which the purchase ofNorweb Energi would 
suggest it does, it must match or better the price its competitors charge for supply - the 
order qualifier - and offer enhanced service - the order winner. In domestic supply, 
enhanced service takes the form of service reliability, prompt and accurate billing, a 
variety of payment and tariff options including green tariffs, dual fuel offerings, affinity 
programmes (Eastern has an affinity programme with Barclaycard), prompt and efficient 
customer service representatives and field operatives, and all of the above offered to a 
consistently high quality (Eastern Group, UK004, 1998). In commercial supply, this 
enhanced service takes the form of the sort of consultancy services identified in Section 
7.1, as the following extract from the Company's 1993 annual report, in relation to its 
approach to the opening of the 100kW market, shows: 
"We continued to target sales activity to business and industry through key account 
management, providing customers with a single named point of contact within the 
Company. We also continued to promote the more efficient use of energy and added 
value and environmental advantages of electricity by making our research facilities and 
technical expertise available to our customers. An excellent example is a process 
development project for the Ford Motor Company at Dagenham. The project 
demonstrated the benefits of electric infra-red preheating in parallel with conventional 
convective heat transfer, to accelerate the curing of high specification automotive paint 
systems resulting in increases of up to 30% in throughput. To help major business 
customers obtain the best value, we launched a unique computer software package called 
Appraise, which allows buyers to compare competitive bids for the supply of electricity 
on a like for like basis and overcomes the problems caused by supplier's bids which vary 
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in structure and price" (Managing Director's Review, Eastern Electricity 1993). 
The product offering made by Eastern has continued to evolve, as the competitive market 
developed. The following year's annual report drew attention to other value adding 
aspects of Eastern's service, such as "offering billing by electronic data interchange, half-
hourly monitoring, computer based appraisal systems and other energy management tools" 
(Chief Executive's Review, Eastern Electricity, 1994, p.9). As a consequence of the 
Company's approach, it increased its share of the 100kW market by 30% in its first 
competitive year, a figure which included retaining 90% of its existing customers. Among 
the new contracts achieved in this first year were agreements to supply 500 McDonald's 
restaurants, 200 Tesco stores, 300 Gateway stores, 47 MFI stores, and 50 branches of the 
National Westminster Bank (Eastern Electricity, 1994, p.9). By 1995, the company 
supplied 7200 sites in the competitive market, 2900 of which were outside of its own 
region (Eastern Group, 1995a, p.8). 
Consequently Proposition 3 is supported primarily because of the prevailing economic 
conditions within the industry. Competition has meant that customers have a choice, and 
to retain their custom the companies remaining within the industry are offering 
competitive prices and enhanced services: a utility approach which runs contrary to 
Porter's views on the exclusivity of generic strategies. However having argued thus, it 
is necessary to inject a note of caution: that the supply industry is still relatively immature 
as a market, and as noted there is an expectation that the present shakeout will continue. 
Whether this proposition continues to be valid when the industry reaches maturity is open 
to debate, as the author has noted in a forthcoming paper (James et ai, 2001). 
9.2.4 Legitimising Proposition 4 
Proposition P4 stated that: 
"'new core' businesses will evolve incrementally as compames take on the 
responsibility for identifying viable concentric diversification" 
The 'new core' businesses identified in this research are those of generation and gas. The 
earlier analysis of Eastern suggested that the Company identified both as being related 
diversifications that would enhance its business prospects and were then pursued with 
great vigour. The development of energy trading as the new core of the Company follows 
this pattern, but arguably defies the concept of the process as being incremental. The view 
of Eastern towards these 'new core' activities was explained by the then 10 
recounting how Eastern began to develop its generation capability. His predecessor, he 
argued, had intuitively understood the need for generation although this intuition was 
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based on his (the predecessor's) background in the CEGB. The noted the 
importance of this fact: that industry power under the old system had rested in generation, 
and that senior managers used to that environment inevitably sought generation as a means 
of building the power of the new companies (Eastern Group, UK002, 1995b). The 
strategic side of the decision had therefore emerged from this initial decision. 
The stated that Eastern's strategy, in 1995, was clearly based upon the achievement 
ofvertical integration and hence upon acquiring large scale assets: power stations and gas 
reserves, to achieve this objective (Eastern Group, UK002, 1995b). Vertical integration, 
he argued, was a necessity as the profitability of the industry resided at different locations 
within the supply chain at different times, and was thus very similar to the situation in the 
petroleum industry. Interviewees suggested that much of the initial conception of a 
vertically integrated approach came from early work conducted for Eastern by Bain and 
Company (Eastern Group, UK004, 1998), which justified the gut feeling of many within 
the Company who had experience of the industry. However, there is evidence that the 
consultants influenced the decision to enter gas: "the establishment of a gas business 
started off at about the same time as the generation business. I think the decision to do 
that was based more on the Bain thing than the experience of the Company. The 
alignment of the electricity and gas supply chain is a more recent phenomena" (Eastern 
Group, UK004, 1998). 
Gas therefore helps to validate the proposition. It was initially undertaken, as the above 
statement shows, because the Company saw the potential to generate income from 
utilisation of a resource it held: the management of customer billing operations for a utility 
service. Incrementally, this involvement was grown as gas became more important in its 
generation activity, but more importantly the gas industry was liberalised. The move 
towards driving the Company primarily from its energy trading activity was based upon 
the direction of thinking summarised as "why the hell should we be paying people margins 
for the supply of gas when we can go and buy gas ourselves" (Eastern Group, UK004, 
1998). In the early days of its gas generation business Eastern "was a complete price 
taker" (Eastern Group, UK004, 1998). By incrementally improving and enhancing its 
involvement in gas, the Company strengthened its position, and achieved the vertical 
integration it was seeking. 
Therefore, Proposition 4 is supported because within the industry the scope for change 
is on the one hand limited, but upon the other hand necessary. As was noted in relation 
to Proposition 1, the profits of regulated activities will be continually squeezed. All of the 
companies, even Manweb, recognised a need for non-regulated income streams. 
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However, the sort of areas that companies of this type consider to be 'core' to their 
business do not become so overnight, especially as within a regulated, or partially 
regulated, environment the effect of that regulation will be considerable: a defacto barrier 
to entry in addition to those erected by potential competitors. The evidence gathered here 
also suggests that the experimental nature of the privatisation meant that caution was 
important. Arguably, therefore, once the example has been set: either within an industry 
by a company prospecting or to an industry by the example of the UK experience, this 
proposition may be less valid. 
9.2.5 Legitimising Proposition 5 
Proposition P5 stated that: 
"companies will inevitably seek consolidation, either vertically or horizontally, 
regardless of the regulatory regime within the industry, supporting the work of Helm 
and Jenkinson (1997)" 
This proposition is related very closely to the preceding proposition in many respects, 
especially in relation to the then's comments about the Company's objective being 
vertical integration (Eastern Group, UK002, 1995b). Indeed, it may also be argued that 
it relates very closely to Proposition 2's concern for the achievement of critical mass. The 
attitude of Bain and Company perhaps reflects the wider view that organisation's that 
have an attitude focussed upon growth will seek to achieve consolidation. 
Eastern, through its new emphasis upon energy trading, presents an example of a different 
form of consolidation to that usually experienced. Eastern established a subsidiary 
company called Eastern Power and Energy Trading (EPET). EPET grew out of a 
function that every REC possessed at privatisation, which was an electricity purchasing 
department. The impetus behind the establishment of EPET was a move towards 
emphasising the importance of portfolio management and risk management in a 
commodities industry. The evolution of an approach based upon risk management came 
out of the decreasing distinctions between the electricity and gas industries. In short the 
thinking behind the change was the realisation that there was a supply chain that the 
company could profitably be engaged in at every stage, and the key to this supply chain 
was gas. The centrality of this new operation is shown in Figure 9.1, which is adapted 
from Eastern's, now TXU Europe's, own graphical representation of how its business 
works. 
EPET, as its significance developed and awareness of the potential it offered grew, took 
on a role driving the rest of the business forward. Or, if not driving it, then providing it 
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Figure 9.1: TXU Energy Chain 
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Gas Retail 
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of EPET indicates: "we describe it (the structure shown at Figure 9.1) as a kind of 
doughnut. If you like we are the yeast that expands the doughnut. It would be very 
difficult for us to operate without those physical assets. We can see the value of those 
physical options, and we understand them as a company. It's maximising the value that 
we are really doing. So we have asset positions, and if you like we are the yeast that 
blows them out, and makes them a bigger thing. So we are not sitting above, but it is 
sitting somewhat separate from them" (Eastern Group, UK006, 1998). 
This is therefore a different form of consolidation, one which has been made possible by 
vertical integration, through generation and owning gas supplies, and which can 
accommodate horizontal integration, through additions to the generation portfolio and 
buying Norweb Energi but which is effectively circular, and through the arbitrage 
possibility allows it to maximise its opportunity to take maximum profits, wherever profits 
may be located. 
Therefore Proposition 5 is supported because Eastern has clearly benefited from both 
vertical and horizontal integration, although the preferred model it offers is slightly at odds 
with the classical concept of consolidation. Perhaps more indicative of this sort of 
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behaviour is the merger of its distribution business with that of London, which occurred 
after this set of interviews took place. A small aside, but it is interesting to note that the 
distribution business does not appear in Figure 9.1, suggesting that the Company now very 
clearly sees a distinction between its regulated and unregulated activities. Before closing 
this section, however, it is nonetheless important to note once again the view of the then 
and her observation that there was a potential that the Company 
would disengage from supply ifit no longer appeared to fit the direction of their strategy, 
which as has been demonstrated is increasingly energy trading and risk management 
(Eastern Group, UK003, 1998). Clearly, the Company has moved away from the view 
that the classical form of consolidation is the only available avenue. 
9.2.6 Commentary 
Overall, therefore, this examination of Proposition's 1 to 5 based upon evidence gained 
from in-depth interviews with senior managers of Eastern Group would seem to support 
the conclusions earlier. Eastern does, however, present an interesting picture not so much 
in how closely it conforms to these propositions, but to how in some cases it is pushing 
back the boundaries of behaviour that these propositions describe. 
The propositions are naturally a syntheses based upon the experiences and observations 
of the twelve companies. Some of the propositions apply to limited numbers of the 
remaining RECs: Proposition 2 for example would not be applicable to companies that 
have left supply. Eastern, as an organisation that has not to date divested its interests in 
one of the 'core' businesses, should be able to legitimise or invalidate each of the ten 
propositions developed. It is interesting to note that with P4 and PS in particular, 
Eastern's activities have almost transcended the debate as established by the other 
companies within the industry. This issue, of Eastern as being different or the industry 
leader, will be returned to in Section 9.4. 
9.3 Testing Propositions: Strategic Drivers 
In pursuit of a resolution of Objective Two of this research, a series of observations with 
respect to strategic drivers evident within the sample was presented in Section 8.2. The 
author acknowledges that the patterns of behaviour identified in Chapter Eight, and 
derived from textual data, do not command a high enough confidence factor to be said to 
accurately reflect the relative importance of the five differing sources of influence on the 
strategy process identified earlier in the research. Section 8.2.4 set out, therefore, to 
establish a set of propositions which sought to describe the relative influence of each 
driver of strategy among companies in either regulated or recently liberalised industries. 
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These could potentially be tested empirically in later research. The structure adopted in 
Section 9.2 will once again be repeated. The process will be summarised in Section 9.3.6. 
9.3.1 Legitimising Proposition 6 
Proposition P6 stated: 
"that the influence of an industry regulator upon a company's strategy will depend 
upon the relative proportion of its profits generated from regulated activities" 
A senior manager's comments on the impact of the Regulator on Eastern are particularly 
enlightening, especially in the light of the view conveyed in the proposition which suggests 
that the impact of the Regulator has in some case been reduced: "The Regulator only has 
influence over certain parts of the business. This influence means that there will be no 
growth in our regulated profits. The trick is not letting them decline as quickly as the 
Regulator would like them to decline. All of our growth is expected to come in 
unregulated profits" (Eastern Group, UK004, 1998). The decision to seek a merger 
between Eastern's distribution business and that of London can perhaps be seen as 
evidence of the Company seeking to remain one step ahead of the Regulator. The 
opportunity for profit comes as a direct result of the existence of commercial risk, which 
under the market system undermines the necessity for a surrogate for competition. Hence, 
this suggests support for the view that as the level of competition rises, the importance of 
the Regulator diminishes. This is not to suggest that the Regulator has no power. 
Companies are weary of not upsetting the Regulator, who retains a 'picture' of how the 
industry should develop. As one manager put it "we don't want to do anything that upsets 
the Regulator. The Regulator is a human being as well, and if you do something in the 
generation business (that he doesn't like) and he can't do anything about it.. .. well he will 
just penalise you in the networks business. So you don't want to get on the wrong side 
of him" (Eastern Group, UK004, 1998). 
The key to the relationship is therefore perhaps a combination of 'testing' and 'petitioning' 
the Regulator. For some of the companies, and Eastern in particular, there appeared to 
be a degree of flexibility in their relations with the Regulator, and an attitude that 'if you 
don't ask, or don't try, you won't know what is possible' appears to have prevailed. 
Despite the concern voiced above for not offending the Regulator, other managers opined 
that Eastern's size made them more likely to be listened to than smaller companies. 
Additionally, if a company is sensible, it will endeavour to make a strong business case in 
dealings with the Regulator. One manager described the appropriate methods of 
managing the Regulator as follows: "If you are a little company that has been griping 
away about how bad the Regulator is, and how bad the regulation is, then I wouldn't have 
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said that the Regulator is going to take much notice of you. If you are pro-active, and put 
up a case, and at the same time you are looking for opportunities that the regulation 
allows you to look at then you are engaging in the process, and that was what the 
privatisation was all about. Regulation is not about the regulated business only. It's about 
the opportunities created in the unregulated business as well, and how you are managing 
these. I think we are a company that is very much listened to by OFFER and OfUAS, 
which helps when you get things wrong. A bit like the issue with our doorstep selling, 
where we have had some flak!. Well, we have managed that quite well. We've made 
some mistakes, but we have put our house in order, and OfUAS have not made an issue. 
It is only because of our credibility, and the way we deal with our business, the way we 
deal with things, we have been able to convince OfUAS that we are a credible company. 
We will hold our hands up and say 'sorry', if we have got things wrong" (Eastern Group, 
UK005, 1998). 
An example of Eastern's attempts to petition the Regulator can be observed in the 
Company's reaction to the second regulatory review of 1994-95. After the first review; 
which was portrayed as being kind to Eastern, the Company had announced significant 
investment in its infrastructure. The message was therefore 'we will invest profits in a 
better system'. However in 1995, the second review prompted by Northen Electric's 
defence of the hostile bid from Trafalgar House produced much more stringent price 
reductions. As a result John Devaney, then CEO, complained that the Regulator was not 
being consistent, and that that lack of inconsistency was making the business of running 
companies increasingly, and by implication needlessly, difficult. Devaney was quoted as 
saying "only a few months ago we agreed to a regulatory formula which was based on 
rigorous analysis by the regulator for more than a year. Since then all our future plans 
have been based on this formula. It is remarkable that OFFER might consider further 
tightening the controls which have already reduced our income by more than £350 million 
over the next five years. If this goes ahead our proposals to improve the network through 
massive investment will need to be reviewed" (Smith and Hollinger, 1995). This indicates 
that although the Regulator has an impact upon the business of the Company, the senior 
management of East em were not placed in a position where they meekly accepted rulings 
without comment. The above statement was perceived to be aimed at unseating the then 
During the trial period at the opening of the retail domestic gas market, in the SWEB region, Eastern 
were criticised over the behaviour of their door-to-door sales staff, who were accused of 'bullying' or 
unethical tactics to win customers. It is noticeable that following recent developments, Eastern has 
decided to cease door-to-door seIling operations and have switched their emphasis onto internet sales, and 
telephone marketing (Taylor, 1999c). However, this decision may have more to do with cost, than with 
public relations. 
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Regulator, clearly an attempt to assert power within the industry by Eastern. 
The balance of the relationship between company and Regulator will change as the 
industry changes. Already there is a single Regulator for electricity and gas, and further 
changes lie ahead in the near future. Globalization and competition are having clear 
impacts upon the power of regulators. If Eastern earned 50% of its profits outside of the 
UK, then consequently the significance of the Regulator would diminish. For a Company 
like Eastern, therefore, the Regulator acts as a potential check upon its more adventurous 
business activity, rather than a direct influence upon its corporate strategy. 
The above analysis would seem to support Proposition 6, which would identify Eastern 
as just the sort of organisation which due to the strength of its non-regulated activities 
witnesses less influence from the Regulator on its strategy. Earlier sections of this chapter 
examining the Company's strategy indeed noted that Eastern appears to be effectively 
divided in two: regulated and non-regulated. Arguably, therefore, the influence of the 
Regulator will be more pronounced in its distribution business than in its supply business. 
However, the above analysis did note that the Regulator has a set of views as to the 
correct operation of companies across the whole industry, and the potential, through his 
power over the regulated portions of a company, to punish it for perceived failings 
elsewhere. While Eastern remains in distribution, or while there is still an industry 
regulator, therefore, the Regulator will retain some influence over strategy, although 
clearly that influence will not be as strong as it would be if Eastern were only engaged in 
distribution activities. In relation to the impact of this particular strategic driver, and this 
particular company, the issue appears to be not how the impact is felt, but how it is 
managed. 
9.3.2 Legitimising Proposition 7 
Proposition P7 stated: 
"that companies pursuing a strategy across a range of sectors will be subject to 
influences from a variety of different drivers, but that the extent of the influence each 
exerts will be situational" 
In attempting to defend this proposition, it is necessary to consider which of the various 
influences, identified in Chapter Eight, have played a part in driving the Company's 
strategy. Among the most relevant potential influences are: the managers of the company 
itself; the attitude of its owners, initially expressed by the views of financial institutions 
and the City of London, but following takeovers by the new owners themselves; the 
actions of other RECs and other potential competitors; and the demands of their 
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customers. The influence of the Regulator was discussed in Section 9.3.2. In estimating 
which of these was the key influence in strategy formulation, the interviews suggest that 
the personality of key managers was initially predominant. However, given the nature of 
the industry and the recruitment approach of many of the companies, this meant that very 
often the key influence in the early years was the existing status quo, as represented by 
what may be described as 'CEGB think'. 
This, according to the senior managers interviewed for this research, was certainly the 
case in Eastern. One manager interviewed, who had been with Eastern for over twenty 
years, described the prevailing culture under the CEGB as follows: "to make your own 
decision was always very difficult because your authorisation level was always pretty low. 
You had a very strict audit regime, and if you went 'outside the box' immediately you 
were asked 'why did you buy this, why did you do that, why are you spending this money 
and so on" (Eastern Group, UK005, 1998). Within an environment of this kind, akin to 
a box approach to management (Farkus and Wetlaufer, 1996), it was perhaps no surprise 
that the first Chairman of Eastern - James Smith, who had been employed within the ESI 
since 1952 - was strongly influenced by the prevailing concerns of the former era. 
Smith has been directly associated with the early cautious approach of Eastern, and in 
particular the decision to enter generation. As already discussed, this decision has been 
attributed to the intuitive impulse of an engineer and industry veteran rather than a 
rationalised strategic decision (Eastern Group, UK002, 1995b). Interestingly, this is not 
a view universally held in the Company. A senior manager, who had been with the 
Company prior to privatisation sees the question of the Company's early strategy 
somewhat differently: "Jim Smith ... had quite a bit of vision, so in our energy marketing 
strategy ... he was very pro-active in pushing the regulation to the very limit. But we were 
still hide bound by bureaucracy, I think. The vision came with Jim Smith, but when John 
Devaney came, the empowerment came with him. That helped us achieve the vision, and 
to change that much more. The seeds were sown by the previous incumbents, but they 
have come to maturity" (Eastern Group, UK005, 1998). Despite this divergence of 
opinion in relation to the extent that the strategy was premeditated, it is clear that a 'jolt' 
was required to get Eastern moving in the right direction, and that Devaney provided that 
jolt. However, the signal that change was necessary had come from the City of London. 
The importance of the City of London in changing the organisation's approach was noted 
in Section 7.1, and again in Section 9.1. The noted the level of 
influence when she stated that "even if you look at organisations which have made radical 
changes the impetus has tended to come from outside, usually when the Stock Market 
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says 'this company is just not performing. Do something about it'" (Eastern Group, 
UK004, 1998). This is certainly the case with the change in approach of Eastern Group 
after 1993. The City's view led to change, but the direction and outcome of change was 
shaped by the new senior personnel. 
The stated that the "more innovative culture" of Eastern, and the 
heightened awareness of the demands of the new operating climate after 1995 were 
related directly to the 'principles and actions' of Devaney and Anstee (Eastern Group, 
UK003, 1998). The management style and approach of Devaney is captured in the 
following statement: "We think we are more innovative than anyone else. It has a lot to 
do with John Devaney's management style, which is very much 'if you deliver the bottom 
line (which is what the City is focussed upon) then I don't particularly care how you do 
it within the strategic framework that has been agreed'. So he doesn't box people in, and 
say 'that's your responsibility and don't think about anything else'. If someone comes up 
with a good idea, then he feels that they should be allowed to go and develop that. So we 
have a lot of initiative within other businesses. I'm the , but I don't 
determine and then tell everyone else what to do" (Eastern Group, UK003, 1998). 
Another interviewee summed it up as follows: "between 1947 and 1990, there had been 
very little change. Minor reorganisations and minor adjustments. We have now seen 
change upon change upon change, and change has become the norm" (Eastern Group, 
UK005, 1998). This suggests the appropriateness of a change approach to leadership, as 
defined by F arkus and Wetlaufer (1996). 
This more entrepreneurial approach ran in tandem with the pressure from the Regulator 
for the different activities of companies to be conducted in totally separate legal entities. 
This process began in earnest in Eastern in 1996. At the time of the interviews, Eastern 
had a variety of separate companies: Eastern Generation Ltd; Eastern Power and Energy 
Trading Ltd; Eastern Energy Retail Ltd; Eastern Electricity pIc and so on, which were all 
companies in their own rights, and each produced their own accounts, and each had their 
own boards of directors. Increasingly, these companies also started developing their own 
IT capabilities, HR functions, and business development teams "because they are 
companies and that is what companies do" (Eastern Group, UK004, 1998). Eastern 
emerged from this period with more of a holding company structure, replacing its former 
divisional structure. The corporate centre now performs more of a coordinating than a 
leading role. 
A side effect of the entrepreneurial culture has been a de-emphasis of procedures such as 
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planning. Planning, some managers feel, implies constraint and that runs counter to an 
entrepreneurial culture. This approach was attributed to the importance the City places 
upon immediate profitability and a consequent de-emphasis on assuring the future 
economic sustainability of the Company (Eastern Group, UK004, 1998). 
As clear as the managers were about the importance of their leadership, they were equally 
clear about the lack of attention Eastern paid to its competitors. Indeed, Eastern believes 
that it is the Company that everyone else is watching: "We probably don't pay a huge 
amount of attention to what they (the other RECs) do because we feel we have slightly 
left them behind. When you go to industry conferences you get the views from other 
RECs of what they see the market doing, and so on, and we have seen the emergence of 
common themes, which we would say we had initiated" (Eastern Group, UK003, 1998). 
Vertical integration was one such area. However, the felt there 
was a definite divergence of viewpoint between Eastern and the companies following it, 
and the multi-utilities like United Utilities, Hyder and ScottishPower which were 
developing a distinct strategic view. In essence, Eastern did not believe that the general 
public are ready for a 'bundle2' of products, while the multi-utilities do, or at least did3. 
Eastern were arguably the market leaders in realising that to prosper in the new 
environment, companies would need strategic allies. In the words of the 
, the defensive approach of some of the RECs in 1995, based upon the belief that 
they could retain independence, was "not a serviceable strategy" (Eastern Group, UK003, 
1998). This decision, the Company argued, reflected the facts of life in the industry at the 
time. Standing still meant that somebody would buy you, and Devaney and Anstee 
realised that it was preferable to find a partner that you could work with rather than being 
swallowed by a predator. The influence of the CEGB was to be found at the heart of the 
generally held but erroneous view of 'invulnerability', Eastern argued. Companies did not 
believe that they could fall victim to predators. 
The choice of Hanson as a partner came after the senior Eastern managers had been 
2 
A bundled product offering would see the same company offering the full range of utility services -
electricity, gas, water, telecoms, cable TV and so on, as a package. 
3 
Since 1998, when this interview took place, Hyder have withdrawn from energy altogether, and 
United Utilities have withdrawn from electricity and gas supply, seIling their supply business to 
Eastern. 
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'selling' their company very aggressively. The believes that this 
made the difference between Eastern and the rest: "There is no question that John 
Devaney and Eric Anstee went out selling Eastern, which was the sensible thing to do. 
If you know you are going to have to find a partner, or someone to take you over then 
you go out and you do the marketing and you say 'we are brilliant, we are the best, we 
are going to decide who is good enough for us, not the other way around'" (Eastern 
Group, UK003, 1998). In this way, the takeover was more akin to a strategic alliance, 
with the influence of the owners coming to be seen principally as that of an enabler; 
specifically through the provision offinancial resources to support the future development 
of the organisation's strategy. The alliance originated, however, in a clearly prescribed 
strategy of the senior managers of Eastern. It did not emerge as was the case with so 
many of their competitors. 
Hanson's influence over the day~to-day running of Eastern was limited, as this further 
extract from an interview with the shows: "The way the Group 
(Eastern in Hanson) was structured was that we got a sign on to our strategy, and we got 
a sign on to our management structure, and a sign on to making our own decisions vis-a-
vis capital and so on, which allowed the business to run pretty much as usual. There was 
an extra layer of management, which you didn't really notice until it came to financial 
reporting" (Eastern Group, UK003, 1998). Hanson's main demand upon the Group was 
for enhanced reporting systems to meet their reporting requirements. Apart from that, the 
impact was minimal. This arrangement, quite different to the perceived usual outcome 
when Hanson buys a company, came as a consequence of the strong negotiation 
undertaken by Eastern's leaders at the time of the takeover. 
As already stated, the interviews that form this analysis were undertaken and concluded 
immediately prior to the takeover by Texas Utilities, and consequently the impact of the 
new owners can not be adjudged from primary sources. It is possible to speculate 
however that very little has changed in terms of the strategy that the Company is pursuing. 
The evidence for this assertion comes primarily from the group structure, which closely 
matches that which was in place when Eastemffhe Energy Group was owned by Hanson. 
A counter argument would suggest that new owners and indeed a wholly new 
management team would have introduced considerably changed management and working 
practices, but it is not possible to verify this view at this time. 
Overall, therefore, this analysis of the influences on Eastern's strategy would seem to very 
largely support Proposition 7. Section 9.3.1 had noted the relatively limited influence of 
the Regulator on Eastern, but all of the other key influences appear to have played a part 
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at one point or another, since its privatisation. Not only that, but the balance of influence 
appears to have shifted over the period, and this requires further comment. 
The statements recorded above suggest that external factors impinge upon Eastern only 
in the sense of providing an opportunity through the 'failings' of competitors. As noted, 
Eastern almost takes pride in not paying attention to what other companies are doing, 
believe itself to be the market leader and hence with nothing to gain, or lose, from 
monitoring the behaviour of other RECs. In contrast, the search for competitive 
advantage appears to be driven mainly by internal factors: the various resources the 
company possesses which offer it greater flexibility, speed, and innovation than 
competitors, which will be discussed in greater depth in Section 9.3.4. The development 
of the importance of energy trading is a clear indication of the way in which its resources 
can drive its competitive approach. However, above all of these other factors, leadership 
appears to have been key for Eastern, and especially so during the period that Devaney 
was CEO of the Company. During this time, the philosophy of the organisation changed 
markedly, and established the entrepreneurial and innovative environment that has enabled 
Eastern to adopt its industry leadership position. Consequently, the Eastern case largely 
legitimises Proposition 7, but suggests that internal and leadership factors have had a 
greater impact. 
9.3.3 Legitimising Proposition 8 
Proposition P8 stated: 
"that organisational size will be a key factor in an organisation's management of its 
relationship with strategic drivers" 
To a large extent, this proposition has been addressed in part in the commentary 
accompanying Proposition's 6 and 7. In the commentary for Proposition 7, the extent of 
Eastern's 'lack of concern' for the actions of competitors was expressed, although the 
author has doubts about how universal the support for this statement would be from 
within the Company. It is very likely, for instance, that managers in the supply arm of 
Eastern would need to be aware of competitors behaviour, given the extreme nature of 
competition in this industry. Proposition 6 indicated that for a company like Eastern, with 
extensive non-regulated activities, the Regulator was less of an influence, albeit an 
influence nonetheless. Consequently here is the 'strongest' company in the industry, 
being influenced by both external factors and the Regulator. 
Ultimately Proposition 8 is tentatively supported, because it is the case that the evidence 
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presented suggest that Eastern, a large strong company, makes strategy with less reference 
to external and regulatory factors than other key factors. It's market strength may, 
therefore, prove this relationship but not conclusively. Reference to other cases is 
required before this proposition can be supported with a high degree of confidence. 
9.3.4 Legitimising Proposition 9 
Proposition P9 stated: 
"that companies will seek to develop greater control over the impact of strategic 
drivers by developing key internal capabilities to achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage" 
Eastern presents a strong example of an organisation where internal factors have played 
a key role in the development of strategy. As earlier commentary has shown, Eastern 
began the post privatisation period with a belief in the strength of its marketing and 
customer service capabilities, as well as an awareness of its relative financial power, and 
considered itself a market facing organisation. However, it is possible to argue that prior 
to the turnaround it experienced in 1993-94, it did not seek to maximise the value ofits 
internal resources, and instead pursued an industry focussed approach by following its pre-
privatisation line, in common with other RECs. Any advances the organisation achieved 
came after it sought to lead the industry, through innovation and maximising the use of 
its resources. 
Eastern presents a number of instances where internal factors have driven strategy, and 
so have sought to assume greater control over other drivers. It has already been noted 
that leadership has played a considerable part in strategy development: firstly, Smith and 
generation; secondly, Devaney and the development of an entrepreneurial culture, creating 
organisational adaptability which itselfis a valuable resource. Devaney also spear-headed 
the agreed acquisition of the Company by Hanson, after a realisation that independence 
was not a long-term option for the companies of the ESI, especially if they had ambitions 
to become wider ranging energy companies. The takeover by Hanson arguably marks the 
beginning of the period when resources became the key in the Company's strategy 
making. A first instance came with the expansion of Eastern's generation portfolio. 
Eastern now benefited from Hanson's capital and reputation in winning the contest for the 
generation plant divested by National Power and PowerGen. 
The entrepreneurial culture of Eastern, as was noted in respect of Proposition 2, saw the 
company seeking to double its base of supply customers (Eastern Group, 1998, UKOOS). 
The demands upon its adaptability are shown in these comments from the 
-432-
for EPET: (talking about the decision to try and double the 
customer base) "there was a conscious company decision to go for that rate of 
growth .... because you get one shot at this. I think we are the largest after Centrica now. 
We grew more than anybody. We planned for success as well as failure. We asked 
ourselves 'can we cope with a million or a million and a half new customers? Well 
probably not, but let's make the systems modular so that if things go bananas then we can 
add some more to them" (Eastern Group, UK006, 1998). Eastern's innovative culture 
also identified the capability it possessed in energy trading as a distinctive competence and 
led to it becoming the core business driving the non-regulated side of the Company's 
business (Eastern Group, UK006, 1998). This innovative culture has also allowed it to 
anticipate the potential of the industry, and saw the Company becoming its de/acto leader. 
However, after this focus upon internal factors it is important to note that one 
interpretation of the actions of Eastern in developing down-stream capabilities in 
generation and gas fields was to overcome the bargaining power of suppliers, and hence 
this part of the Company's approach was very much governed by external factors. In 
addition, while the Company claims that it does not pay much attention to competitors, 
it has paid clear attention to the needs of buyers (as discussed in Proposition P3), where 
it has established a competitive utility position to increase its customer base. 
Proposition 9 is therefore partially supported in the case of Eastern, although the 
importance ofleadership in 'unleashing' the full potential of internal factors like resources 
can not be underestimated. The leadership of an organisation creates or sustains a culture 
which permits the full exploitation of its resources. However, as this case also 
demonstrates, external factors will also impact upon the strategy making, and must be 
considered alongside leadership and internal factors. Mainly, therefore, this discussion 
further serves to strengthen the confidence that can be placed in Proposition P7, rather 
than fully offering support for P9. However, what is clear is that Eastern has sought to 
develop its internal resources to aid the achievement of competitive advantage, with the 
aim of mitigating the impact of other drivers of strategy. 
9.3.5 Legitimising Proposition 10 
Proposition PI 0 stated: 
"that ownership is the key influence over strategy" 
Chapter Eight saw a recognition of the growing importance of ownership in strategy 
formulation within the industry, and its inclusion in the drivers of strategy framework. 
The interviews conducted within Eastern Group were concluded immediately prior to the 
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takeover by TXU in 1998, and so little can therefore be added to the commentary 
presented in Section 7.1. However, it is possible to speculate upon the importance of the 
period of ownership of Eastern by Hanson. This analysis has to date acknowledged the 
autonomy that Hanson provided to Eastern following the takeover (Eastern Group, 
UK003, 1998). The day-to-day involvement in decision making in this case is therefore 
limited. This appears to have been a condition of the agreement, negotiated by the 
managers of Eastern during the early discussions with Hanson. It would, however, be fair 
to say that Hanson would have placed performance targets upon the Company, and that 
the degree of autonomy enjoyed by Eastern's managers would have been severely 
curtailed if it had not continued to meet its targets. Hanson's biggest impact upon Eastern 
was, as a manager recalled, its financial reporting requirements: "Hanson was still very 
strong on financial reporting, so we had to put in place management information systems 
which allowed us to meet their reporting requirements. But apart from that we were 
never really aware of the heavy hand of Hanson" (Eastern Group, UK003, 1998). 
Eastern was an integral part of the Energy Group which was de-merged from Hanson in 
1996, and took the Company even further away from the day-to-day control of its owners, 
although The Energy Group was "mainly ex-Hanson people". However "they (the ex-
Hanson people) struggle with the fact that they have two very independent subsidiaries 
(Eastern and Peabody Coal, the other integral part of The Energy Group), who make 
their own decisions about strategy and business development et cetera, and then tell The 
Energy Group 'this is what is happening'. They are much more used to the opposite 
situation" (Eastern Group, UK003, 1998). Clearly, therefore, Hanson's role in the 
Eastern story is as a facilitator, providing extra resources and extra opportunity, but not 
driving strategy. The nature of their relationship appears to have developed as a 
consequence of the tough initial negotiation between Eastern's managers and Hanson, and 
indicates that the relationship was closer to strategic alliance than takeover, albeit a 
strategic alliance where one partner owned 100% of the assets of the other. This case 
study can not, therefore, support Proposition 10 with any great degree of certitude. 
However, it is conceivable that the arrival of new owners, and the departure of old 
managers within Eastern has changed the basis of the relationship between owner and 
subsidiary. 
9.3.6 Commentary 
This case study provides evidence which strongly supports some but not all of the 
propositions. Eastern very clearly indicates an organisation where the key strategy drivers 
are internal: leadership and resources, rather than those which are predominantly external: 
regulation and the industry. However, Eastern also indicates that regardless of the power 
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of an organisation, it can not totally overcome the potential for external factors to impact 
upon its strategy. Eastern, as a case study, suggests that while all of the propositions 
presented here are to some extent legitimised, there is not the degree of certitude that was 
witnessed with Proposition's 1 to 5. This suggests that generalising about drivers is more 
difficult, as the relationship between a company and its strategic drivers is inevitably 
unique, and situational, whereas the range of viable strategic responses in such an industry 
is necessarily narrower and hence lends itself to generalisation. Possibly, therefore, 
Proposition's 6 to 10 role in future research should be as stimuli to prompt debate, leading 
to a wider understanding of the complex process of the exercise of influence and 
sustainable generalisation. 
9.4 Validity of Classification 
In Section 8.3, a series of classifications were presented based upon the analysis 
undertaken for each of the companies in Chapter's Five to Seven, and summarised in 
Chapter Eight. This section aims to consider the classification arrived at for Eastern 
Group, and to consider what the judgement reached in this case can tell about the wider 
validity of the classification system proposed by Miles and Snow (1978), in a regulated 
environment. 
9.4.1 Validity of Classification of Eastern Group 
In Table 8.9 of Section 8.3, the following classification's were made in relation to Eastern 
Group: 
~ that it was an integrated energy company by acquisition, utilising an utility 
approach in competitive markets; 
that it employed strategy combination Variant 3C in its distribution business, and 
Variant 5B in its supply business; 
that the key influences over its strategy making were a combination of external, 
internal, leadership and ownership factors; 
~ that the owner was pursuing 'hands on' strategic asset seeking investment; and 
~ that Eastern was in consequence an analyzer, using the Miles and Snow typology. 
Briefly, an analyzer is an organisation that is seeking to exploit new product and market 
opportunities revealed by the actions of a prospector organisation, while defending its 
core business area. It is a complex hybrid organisation, which will have differing 
objectives in its different areas of business, and consequently will be organised and 
managed differently to facilitate these contrasting demands. How well does the concept 
of the analyzer, explored in greater detail in Section 2.5.6.2.3, describe the reality of 
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Eastern Group? 
The dual domain nature of the analyzer clearly matches Eastern's experience. However 
Eastern's experience does not accord fully with the concept as developed by Miles and 
Snow. It is the case that in its distribution business, Eastern would act very similarly to 
the concept of the defender as developed by Miles and Snow with that archetype's 
emphasis upon cost management and efficiency. However, as Eastern's distribution 
business is a monopoly, it would not share the same concerns as a traditional defender in 
erecting baniers to entry. This is a criticism that can be applied to the model as a whole, 
and is especially important in attempting to analyse RECs that only retain an interest in 
regulated areas, and will be returned to in the following section. 
The principal difficulty, however, arrises in relation to the second part of the concept of 
the analyzer: the new product and market development activity which comprises "a 
second-in strategy whereby they imitate and improve upon the product offerings of their 
competitors" (Miles and Snow, 1986, p.54). Within the original model, the competitors 
referred to here would be prospector organisations. However, as Table 8.9 showed, there 
was no evidence ofa classical prospector organisation (as described in Section 2.5.6.2.2) 
within the industry. 
This observation suggests that there is something absent from the industry, namely the 
presence of a prospector. This issue will be returned to in the following section, and 
initiates a discussion in relation to Objective Three of this research which will be returned 
to in Chapter Twelve. In relation to the question of the validity of the classification 
applied to Eastern, it would appear to be insufficient. Eastern is not a classical analyzer, 
as for the most part it has not followed the lead of a competitor in the development of its 
new products and markets. Indeed, it itself has been the most active of the RECs in 
identifying new areas of product and market development. There is a clear need to amend 
this classification. 
9.4.2 Inductive Analysis of the Validity of Classifications 
The preceding analysis suggests that: (a) calling an organisation that engages in monopoly 
activity 'a defender' is potentially inaccurate; and (b) that the Miles and Snow (1978) 
model as it stands is insufficient to describe the observable characteristics of the ESI 
model. In relation to this second observation, this case study of Eastern Group has shown 
that innovation does occur, but not in the fashion, or to the extent, predicted by Miles and 
Snow in their model. The model does not appear to allow for an industry situation where 
outright prospecting is a non-viable activity and what prospecting that does occur must 
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be undertaken by any of the companies within the industry, certainly incrementally, and 
possibly across a wide range of companies, who in effect share the role. This case study 
suggests, therefore, the initiation of a new archetype, designated the cautious prospector 
or the innovative analyst, to overcome this deficiency. 
In relation to the first concern, whether a defender classification can be applied to the 
monopoly activities ofa REC, the following options for debate are proposed: firstly, that 
the classification be accepted with reservations; secondly, that the designation be changed, 
creating another label such as 'monopolist' to prevent any confusion with organisation's 
actually pursuing classical defender behaviour; and thirdly, that the system of classification 
not be used in relation to monopoly activities. The debate in relation to both of these 
perceived difficulties with the system of classification proposed by Miles and Snow will 
be rejoined in Chapter Twelve, following further contributions from the analysis of cases 
in Chapter's Ten and Eleven. 
9.5 Other Key Issues 
During Chapter Two, a variety of other key issues emerged in relation to strategic content 
and strategic drivers that have been alluded to during this chapter and the four that 
preceded it, but which have not necessarily been the core focus of attention. The aim of 
this section is to comment upon issues such as these, in order to provide extra depth to 
the discussion which has occurred above. The first such area is that of differing concepts 
of strategy in relation to the firm. 
9.5.1 Competitive Forces verses the Resource Based View 
In Section 2.2, the differences between authors adopting the competitive forces view, and 
those adopting the resource based view of strategy making in the firm were discussed. 
Throughout the analysis presented in this chapter, both of these views have been referred 
to as necessary, but an overall view of their validity in the context of the Chapter has not 
been presented. The objective of this section is to present this view. 
In Section 2.6, a model outlining the relationship of the various factors influencing 
strategy was presented, which argued that it was not practical to base a strategy on either 
a competitive forces approach, or a resource based approach in isolation and that for 
superior performance they needed to work in tandem. This was the basic argument 
developed by Grant (1991), in proposing a greater emphasis upon resources and is the 
view shared by the author. This case study provides considerable support for this view. 
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Throughout this case study, the relationship between the differing views has been made 
clear. In the early period, Eastern was predominantly adopting a competitive forces view, 
orienting itself to its industry and pursuing relatively predictable traditional strategies that 
did not take into account the potential advantages its unique capabilities may present to 
it. Nevertheless, and despite the negative tone adopted here in relation to this period, the 
key decision to undermine the bargaining power of suppliers, by starting the process of 
backward integration, was undertaken during this period as was the beginning of a 
customer facing and customer focussed organisation. 
The Company did, however, become more effective when it combined an awareness of 
the value adding potential of its resources to this market facing attitude. The development 
of an entrepreneurial, innovative and adaptive culture, allied to strong financial resources 
and visionary leadership allowed the organisation to become a market leader. The author 
argues that therefore Eastern presents a strong example of the sort of organisation which 
has followed the arguments of the resource based view, to strengthen its performance in 
its chosen market places. This is not to underestimate the impact of external forces upon 
the strategy process, which have also been considerable. The key is to establish congruity 
between the two. 
9.5.2 The Impact of Process 
Throughout the chapter, reference has been made to the extent to which certain strategic 
decisions have been either prescriptive or emergent, following the discussion in Section 
2.1.2.2. Overall, it is necessary to make two observations: 
~ firstly, that the objective of senior managers in pursuing either predominantly 
prescriptive or emergent strategic objectives has changed over time; and 
secondly, that there would appear to be different approaches at work in different 
parts of the organisation. 
In relation to the first observation, it is necessary to reiterate the concern expressed by 
Mintzberg that pursuing either process in a 'pure' form would damage an organisation 
(Mintzberg, 1990a). All of the evidence and analysis developed thus far in this case would 
suggest that Eastern adopted a more prescriptive approach to strategy making in the 
period immediately following privatisation. Evidence emerges from one manager's 
description of a "vert strict audit regime" where "your authorisation level was always 
pretty low", a command and control culture which is indicative of a prescribed view of 
strategy, and one that is no longer common in the Company (Eastern Group, UK005, 
1998). There was evidence of 'high level thinking within the Company under Smith, 
when he would gather directors together and ask questions like "where are we going 
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guys? What are our big challenges? What are our priorities? And that kind of thing. 
Devaney is not so much in favour of that" (Eastern Group, UK004, 1998). 
Another manager, who joined Eastern shortly after the turnaround in Company strategy 
and culture, illustrates the debate by discussing the issue of strategy and planning with 
reference to the management style of the then CEO: "It has a lot to do with Devaney's 
management style, which is very much 'if you deliver the bottom line .... then I don't 
particularly care how you do it within the strategic framework that has been agreed'. We 
have a lot of initiative being exercised within our businesses" (Eastern Group, UK003, 
1998). She continued by saying "we don't actually have a strategy .... each business has 
their own business development function" and implicitly they are left to drive their 
business as they feel appropriate, although there is conflict from time to time (Eastern 
Group, UK004, 1998). Despite the lack of a formal strategy, as defined by the' strategy 
as plan' viewpoint (Mintzberg, 1987b, and Section 2.1.1.1), the Company adopts the view 
that there are two 'chains' in its non-regulated activity, the electricity and the gas chain 
as illustrated earlier at Figure 9.1. All managers are empowered to assist in the 
maximising of benefit from these two chains. 
Although this description makes Eastern sound like a unitary body, there are inevitably 
operational divisions, as running an organisation of 7000 people without such divisions 
would be logistically difficult (Eastern Group, UK004, 1998). Hence there are operational 
targets, strategic and operational rivalry, and hence conflict can arrive. Eastern to a large 
extent therefore reflects the benefits, as well as the dangers of a more emergent strategic 
process. 
It is also clear that different strategic process are at work in different parts of the 
organisation. As noted previously, the distribution business now operates totally 
separately from the non-regulated activities, for operational as well as regulatory reasons. 
Indeed, as the distribution business has now been merged with the London Electricity 
distribution business, the only shared area among the different parts of the Group is its 
common ownership. Clearly, also, the regulated distribution business would benefit from 
a more prescriptive approach, given its focus upon efficiency and effectiveness, and its 
non-commercial focus. The non-regulated businesses, as discussed above, adopt a much 
more emergent approach. It is worth speculating, however, that as a dominant model has 
recently emerged, based around the TXU Energy Chain illustrated at Figure 9.1, the need 
for more prescription in the Company's approach has developed. This suggestion equates 
an emergent approach with industry uncertainty, or rather that the prescriptive approach 
is more usual in predictable industries (Mintzberg, 1990a). Unfortunately, given the 
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timing of the interviews, it is not possible to be more precise about the current strategic 
thinking within TXU Europe, and this issue is one for future research. 
9.5.3 Strategy Making at Different Levels 
Eastern presents clear evidence to support the views of Buzzell and Gale (1987) that 
strategy making occurs at different levels of the organisation. This reflects the evidence 
presented in the preceding section in relation to emergent strategy, and the degree of 
autonomy SBU and functional managers have in determining business level strategy. One 
interesting statement which illustrates the degree of autonomy came from the 
ofEPET, who said when asked how success was judged within 
Eastern said: "Money. Bottom line, that's when you know you are succeeding. We tell 
the Board how much we can conceivably deliver, and they say 'done'" and they leave us 
to achieve it" (Eastern Group, UK006, 1998). Another manager, when describing the 
change in attitude pre and post 1994 said that, post 1994, "the management's view is that 
if it is adding value, then we will leave it to you to determine whether you should spend 
money on it" (Eastern Group, UK05, 1998). These comments, allied to the comments 
reported in Section 9.5.2 show a clear picture of a dominant coalition establishing a 
guiding pattern of strategy at the corporate level, and undertaking domain selection, while 
lower level managers determine the competitive strategy as appropriate and as based upon 
their perceptions of the demands of their markets. This equates to the 'strategy as pattern 
approach' (Mintzberg, 1987b) of an umbrella strategy (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). 
9.5.4 Leadership 
Once again, throughout this narrative, the impression of different leadership styles has 
emerged. While the leadership of Eastern initially exhibited signs of a 'strategy approach' 
or possibly a 'box approach' (Farkus and Wetlaufer, 1996); the author's uncertainty as 
to the precise description of the chosen approach probably reflects the reality that the 
approach was somewhere in between, after 1994 it was clearly a 'change approach'. The 
dominant coalition of Devaney and Anstee created an environment which challenged the 
existing recipe and provoked uncertainty, but also established an entrepreneurial 
environment which rewarded initiative. It also, crucially, established a consensus. Once 
agai n, the timing of the interviews precludes the development of a view on the current 
dominant approach but it is likely that the need for a change approach has reduced, for the 
reasons given in Section 9.5.2 and 9.5.3, leading to the development ofa 'strategy' or a 
'human-assets approach' among the new leaders of Eastern. 
Largely, it can be argued, Eastern has witnessed transformational leadership (Bums, 
1978), rather than transactional leadership, reflecting the more emergent, value and vision 
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based nature of strategy within the Company for most of the period under study. 
Interestingly, the key members of the dominant coalition appear to have been the CEO and 
the Finance Director, a combination which would usually be associated with a defender 
organisation rather than the analyser/cautious prospector organisation identified in Section 
9.4. The formulation established by Miles and Snow (1978), therefore, does not hold in 
this instance. This almost inevitably reflects the aim of the , and the fact that 
appointments made during this period were intended to sustain the entrepreneurial culture 
of the Company. The , when interviewed for this research, identified that he had 
appointed around 20 people in key positions within the organisation, to "provide a 
scattering of necessary experience", and had removed 'less good managers' during this 
process (Eastern Group, UK002, 1995b). This suggests that there was also an element 
ofa 'human-assets' approach (Farkus and Wetlaufer, 1996), establishing satellite CEO's 
who were' on message', to certain aspects of dominant coalition behaviour. 
9.5.5 The Impact of Structure 
Section 7.1, in discussing the question of culture within Eastern, concluded that structure 
initially followed the Company's strategy, but that as it developed, the structure emerged 
alongside the prevailing strategy. Eastern's structure is now that of a holding company, 
although there is much greater cohesion and integration among the non-regulated parts 
of the business than in other companies adopting similar structures. While the distribution 
business is run completely separately for operational and regulatory reasons, following the 
introduction of the Utilities Act 2000 (James et ai, 2001), the non-regulated businesses 
are also run separately but with a common objective. Referring once again to Figure 9. 1, 
it is clear that there is a relationship between energy trading, generation and gas and 
electricity supply. Energy trading has removed the commercial risk from both of the other 
activities, by assuming and managing its risk on their behalf. The result is a hybrid 
structure which is neither functional, nor divisional, but akin to the internal network 
structure, described by Miles and Snow (1992, and Section 2.4.2), and extending their 
matrix conception (Miles and Snow, 1986). Its aim is "to gain competitive advantage 
through shared utilisation of scarce assets" (Miles and Snow, 1992, p.65), or rather to 
provide value adding services to each other's operation: management of commercial risk 
by EPET on behalf of supply and generation, dual-fuel arbitrage possibilities opened for 
EPET by the operations of supply and generation, through close interrelatedness. 
9.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter's primary objective was to continue the process of verification of the ten 
propositions developed during the preliminary stage of this research, through a series of 
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in-depth interviews with senior managers of Eastern Group. In so doing, the process of 
providing solutions and outcomes for Objective's One and Two of this research was 
continued, headway was also gained in relation to Objective Three, and the legitimation 
of the propositions continued the work of Objective Four of the research. In addition, 
other relevant commentary on the transformation of this organisation over the time period 
was provided and conclusions drawn. 
The summary of the progress made with respect to Proposition's 1 to 10 will be presented 
in Chapter Twelve, but at this point it is possible to say that: 
~ in general, the case study provides support and legitimation for all of Proposition's 
1 to 5; but 
while some support for Proposition's 6 to 10 is also provided, the degree of this 
support is not as conclusive as for Proposition's 1 to 5, and the author wishes to 
reappraise the content of these proposition's in Chapter Twelve. 
The support, or otherwise, for Proposition's 1 to 10 represents the confidence currently 
held in the observations made thus far in respect of Objectives One and Two. Concern 
was also expressed with respect to observation's made in relation to Objective Three, 
which will also be discussed in Chapter Twelve. 
Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief consideration of another key issue identified 
in Section 2.6: Miller's contention that qualitative research opens up the possibility of 
identifying 'organizing themes' (Miller, 1996). Miller argued that certain influences 
placed "a marked emphasis upon some tactics and a supportive co-alignment among many 
others" (Miller, 1996, p.507), establishing the organizing themes and allowing multivariate 
analysis to be undertaken to establish these themes. The author identifies the 
establishment of these themes as a key outcome of this research, and their multi-variate 
analysis (as part ofa wider sample) as a key aim offuture research. This case study, and 
the research in general, has established a relationship between the various influences upon 
strategy, and in this case between leadership, resource base and external influences in 
particular, to contribute towards this objective. The nature of this relationship is further 
discussed in Chapter's Ten and Eleven, and summarised in Chapter Twelve. 
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Chapter Ten 
10.0 Introduction 
Case Study of Seeboard 
wholly owned subsidiary of Central and South Western Corp., 
of Dallas, Texas 
The aim of this chapter is to continue the investigation into the content and drivers of 
strategy, following on from the analysis presented in Chapter Eight. This chapter is the 
second of three chapter's presenting case studies based upon in-depth interviews 
conducted with a representative sample of the RECs. Once again, the core focus of this 
chapter are the ten tentative propositions identified in Chapter Eight: five in relation to 
strategy content, five in relation to strategy drivers, and the aim is either to verify or falsify 
these propositions, and amend as necessary. The chapter also presents other data of 
relevance and interest to other aims of this research, and also addresses the question of 
classification in advance of the discussion in Chapter Twelve. In common with all of the 
cases, it aims to present a richer illustration of the relationships identified and discussed 
in Chapter Eight. 
As with the preceding chapter, this case study does not feature an extensive biographical 
section on Seeboard, as that function has been performed in the separate case study of the 
Company presented in Section 7.3, which readers are referred back to. That case study 
presented: 
~ detail of Seeboard' s operational area under the 1989 Electricity Act; 
~ the major strategic developments within the Company between 1990 and 2000; 
~ the major managerial and structural changes that occurred within the Company 
during this period; and 
an assessment of the aims, objectives and causes of the specific strategies pursued 
during this time, although this latter aspect of Section 7.3 will be reviewed in 
Section 10.1 of this case study. 
The analysis and assessment of strategy in relation to Seeboard in Chapter's Seven and 
Eight was derived from information provided by existing published sources. The extended 
analysis and verification of the observations and propositions to be undertaken within this 
chapter have been derived from a series of in-depth interviews with managers both inside 
Seeboard, and within the wider energy industry. A list of all of the primary source 
interviews conducted in conjunction with this research was presented in Section 1.4. 
From this list the key interviews utilised in this chapter were: 
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US002: 
UK007: 
1997 
UK008: 
1997 
UK009: 
UKOlO: 
1997 
UK011: 
UK012: 
, Dallas, October 1996 
for Seeboard, Crawley, February 
for Seeboard, Crawley, March 
for Seeboard, Crawley, June 1997 
for Seeboard, Crawley, June 
for Seeboard, Crawley, June 1997 
for Seeboard, Crawley, August 1997 
Material provided by each manager will be referenced accordingly in the section of chapter 
references!. The chapter also utilises secondary source material as necessary, as well as 
internal company documents, and will be referenced accordingly. As a condition for the 
granting of these interviews, personal confidentiality was assured. Consequently, 
reference will only be made to the job title of each manager quoted. 
10.1 Summary of Observations of Seeboard 
As noted in Section 10.0, the first section of this chapter reviews the observations made 
of Seeboard in respect of: 
~ the narrative presented in Section 7.3 of Chapter Seven; and 
~ its analysis, and resulting conclusions with respect to the Company presented in 
the various reporting sections of Chapter Eight. 
This brief 're-telling' of Seeboard's story is necessary for two main reasons: firstly, it 
provides the context for the following discussion and analysis; and secondly, because the 
conclusions reached at the end of this initial investigation provide the first 'point' of the 
triangulation process that this section is intended to perform. 
10.1.1 Strategy Within Seeboard 
The initial approach developed by Seeboard was very similar to that developed by Eastern. 
Seeboard was also initially an organisation which was highly prescriptive, centrally 
managed, and aiming to achieve a fairly narrowly conceived set of operational objectives. 
Once again, these objectives were based upon organisational efficiency and cost 
effectiveness in their core distribution business, and a progressive market development 
The transcripts of these interviews have not been included in the Appendices to this thesis. 
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approach in the secondary supply business. Seeboard was possibly expecting more than 
the small but positive contribution to the Group's operational profitability expected by 
Eastern in its appliance retail and contracting business: it spoke of having a "strategy to 
achieve improvements in the financial performance of the appliance retailing 
business ..... and aims to improve the current level of profitability of the electrical 
contracting business" (Kleinwort Benson, 1990, p.536). 
Of the businesses that Seeboard carried forward into the new era, therefore, the initial 
approach was certainly cautious but there was an expectation that the Company's 
experience and skills would enable it to prosper in the new environment. In supply, the 
Company was keen to develop its customer base, and was among the more aggressive of 
the RECs at the opening of the IMW supply market. The Company announced at the 
same time that it was considering the possibility of investing in generation, but only if such 
a venture's profitability was assured, and only then with a suitable joint venture partner. 
In relation to other possible areas of investment, the Company was reticent. While stating 
that it would seek to invest in and develop other trading activities where competitive 
advantage could result from its existing skills and range of activities, there was no 
expectation that these activities would be substantial in the short term (Kleinwort Benson, 
1990, p.564). 
Initially therefore, and in common with Eastern, the strategy was cautious, rationalised, 
and based primarily upon concentrated growth. Seeboard was therefore among the larger 
group of RECs which was not seeking to diversify away from their core businesses, at 
least at this early stage. As the analysis presented in Section 7.3.1 shows, this situation 
did not change markedly over the intervening years. Seeboard has effectively adopted a 
narrow focus upon its business activities, and limited those activities to its traditional core 
distribution business, its supply, retail and contracting businesses, and to the 'new core' 
businesses of gas and generation. However within some of these businesses, it engaged 
in more adventurous activities such as horizontal integration in contracting, and market 
and product development in gas supply, while seeking greater market development in 
electricity supply. It also became a member of a number of consortia. 
The Company's focus upon a concentrated growth approach ran throughout its 
operations. Therefore, cost management and quality service were of vital importance. 
In 1993-94 the Company set about re-focussing itself upon these strategic essentials. In 
this year, Seeboard fundamentally reassessed its objectives, and announced a new 
organisational mission: to be the best utility in the industry. This intention effectively 
signalled two basic principles that the Company would now adhere to: firstly, that cost 
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control and service quality needed further improvement, and secondly that there was 
categorically no possibility for diversification within this approach. Seeboard therefore 
reaffirmed that it was to seek to become the epitome of a sound, reliable utility 
investment. 
The Company at around the time of the takeover by CSW in 1995 was seen as being the 
most efficient of the RECs, with high quality customer service, and an effective marketing 
approach which was bringing growth in its supply businesses. The takeover by CSW did 
not change much, with the possible exception that Seeboard was now expected to reach 
even more demanding growth targets in its supply businesses. As part of the process of 
achieving these objectives, the Company increased its involvement in consortia, and in 
strategic alliances aimed at growing these businesses. There was a greater emphasis upon 
gas, and an increased emphasis upon generation, as the new owners saw greater potential 
in the 'new core' businesses. The principle of narrow focus was reinforced by the decision 
to divest the Company's appliance retail interests in the recent past; one of the last RECs 
to do so. The future for Seeboard is, however, uncertain following CSW's merger with 
AEP, another US utility which is the current owner of Yorkshire Electricity. The 
Company appears to have been a close adherent to the concept of positioning yourself in 
relation to your market in an attempt to win competitive advantage rather than adopting 
a more resource based view. 
10.1.2 Influences on Strategy within Seeboard 
Seeboard did not begin the period with the same level of expectation placed upon it by 
industry analysts as for example Eastern Electricity had. However, as was noted in 
Section 7.0, the Company was based in the affluent South East of England and was 
therefore not predicted to struggle to adapt to the new environment. Economic activity 
and domestic demand were presumed to be relatively strong and the Company was not 
expected to face the sort of threats as were companies from the industrial north, for 
example. The initial result of this combination of factors was very similar to that 
witnessed with Eastern: senior managers schooled in the CEGB seeking to continue the 
work begun during the state owned era by managing their core businesses as effectively 
and as efficiently as possible. In Seeboard's case, the aversion to diversification was even 
stronger than it was initially in Eastern, and its plans for related areas such as generation 
not so advanced. 
Seeboard, as with a number of other RECs, paused to reflect upon its strategic 
development in 1992-1993. As with Eastern Group, there had been disquiet within the 
City about the progress that the Company had made since privatisation. However, this 
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disquiet was different in nature from that which affected Eastern. The City'S perspective 
on Seeboard was that it was not going far enough to maximise the benefits from its 
perceived core capabilities: ie of being an effective public utility. The new corporate 
objective, of being the best REC, stemmed from this reassessment based upon City 
concerns that the Company should be a higher quality service organisation, with lower 
operating costs. This contrasts to the City'S view of Eastern: that it should be innovative 
and the market leader, and amply demonstrates that the City perceived the companies of 
the sector to be different, or at least to be capable of achieving different levels of 
performance. 
As stated before, the author adopts the view that the reason for differing perspectives 
emerging from the City of London with respect to the different companies in the sector 
reflects differing levels of expectation from shareholders. It may be argued that 
shareholders held Seeboard shares because they wanted a stable, undynamic company that 
performed well in its core businesses. In contrast, it may be argued that shareholders held 
shares in Eastern because they expected the company to be dynamic and to earn returns 
above the industry norm. 
Arguably, therefore, the key influences upon Seeboard have been those of its owners: 
shareholders seeking risk averse investment opportunities, and managers who have heeded 
the expectations of their shareholders and operated the Company accordingly. Seeboard, 
as a low cost, high quality organisation, was always a particular favourite of the 
Regulator, as his concerns and the Company's actions happily converged. This leaves the 
question of his influence upon the Company in question: either he could not be said to 
have strongly influenced the strategy development because he agreed with its focus, or he 
could be said to have been an influence because the Company adopted this focus to avoid 
a confrontation. The situation does not appear to have changed markedly with the change 
of ownership in 1995. 
CSW are one of the group of new US owners who have not sought to significantly alter 
the aims, objectives, practices or management of their purchase. CSW purchased 
Seeboard because of its attributes and saw no cause for altering the recipe developed since 
privatisation beyond setting new, and higher, operating targets. Symptomatic of this 
satisfaction is the fact that Jim Ellis, CEO since 1992, is still the CEO despite five years 
of US ownership. The demands of Seeboard's original owners appear to have coincided 
with their new owners. The future impact of ownership is likely to be considerable, 
especially if Seeboard merges with Yorkshire Electricity following the merger of their 
respective parent companies. Throughout this period, however, owners, managers and 
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the Regulator have predominated. 
10.1.3 Observations Drawn 
While Section's 10.1.1 and 10.1.2 have alluded to the various conclusions drawn about 
the characteristics of Seeboard over the course of the analysis conducted in Chapter's 
Seven and Eight, it is necessary to briefly reiterate them here. Seeboard, as a company, 
had: 
~ initially pursued an approach focussed upon concentrated growth. However, 
following a review of the less than fulsome success of its initial approach, the 
Company decided that its efforts had to be redoubled in pursuit of this initial 
approach. Consequently, it became even more focussed upon this core strategy, 
and even less inclined to pursue diversification; 
a very 'command and control' oriented culture, with strategy driven very much 
from the Head Office. Over time this culture has changed, as the Company has 
sought to develop a more market driven approach, but its culture can not be said 
to have developed in the same fashion as has Eastern over this period; 
an initial approach to strategy that was prescriptive, and remains largely 
prescriptive; 
a strategic focus which has remained principally upon the industry, as witnessed 
by its desire to be the 'best utility', reflecting its orientation to its environment 
rather than its resources; 
always been influenced strongly by the expectations of its owners, although its 
new owners have adopted a relatively 'hands off approach. The industry, its 
leadership and the Regulator have all been crucial to the Company throughout the 
period since privatisation; and 
the Company was initially identified as a defender, although as the period has 
progressed it has been identified as an analyzer. Seeboard has never adopted an 
industry prospector role to any great extent. 
The above conclusions were based upon a three phased analysis: factual data from 
published sources; factual data from company sources; and opinion data from published 
sources. In so doing, the author argues that the process of triangulation discussed in 
Section 3.2.2 has been fulfilled, and that the author possesses a high degree of confidence 
in the findings reported above. 
10.2 Testing Propositions: Strategic Content and Combinations 
This section continues the work of the legitimisation of Proposition's 1 to 5 as begun in 
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Section 9.2. These propositions sought to describe key characteristics of the strategies 
of companies in either regulated or recently liberalised industries, which would be 
developed for wider empirical testing in later research. The analysis throughout follows 
the framework established in Chapter Nine. 
10.2.1 Legitimising Proposition 1 
Proposition PI stated that: 
"companies will employ a limited concentrated growth approach m ongomg 
operations within their regulated businesses" 
As was stated in the corresponding section of Chapter Nine, companies had very little 
option but to pursue a strategy of this kind in its continuing regulated activities, as "the 
infrastructure business is always going to have some form of regulation on it" (Seeboard, 
UK007, 1997). The effect of this regulation was to prescribe the strategy that the 
Company was to follow: "we have a twin approach: essentially focussed upon driving as 
much value as we can out of our existing businesses, primarily distribution ... and having 
a very controlled approach to developments in other areas. Now, we believe that it is 
important to focus on the first one from the point of view that until we are running our 
core activities as efficiently and as effectively as we can then we are kidding ourselves that 
we can go into other areas and run those more effectively than they might be running at 
the moment" (Seeboard, UK007, 1997). He also noted in respect of distribution that the 
prevailing demands of regulation led to a strategy where "we have taken out large chunks 
(of costs). There is still more to come out, but inevitably there is a natural limit" 
(Seeboard, UK007, 1997). 
Clearly, therefore, a concentrated growth approach. However, the then 
went on to state that Seeboard was "looking at other 
activities .... (with the intention oj} ... . getting involved in those that either make use of our 
core skill's and capabilities, or that add direct synergy's to what we are already doing" 
(Seeboard, UK007, 1997). Within most of the RECs, this statement would be interpreted 
as being related to non-regulated activities. However, there is evidence that Seeboard has 
been one of the more enterprising RECs in relation to market development primarily 
within its regulated business. The Company has identified that among these core skills are 
its "network management skills, and capability in running distribution systems" (Seeboard, 
UK008, 1997) and a willingness to utilise them was shown by its winning of a contract 
to manage the distribution system for London Underground Ltd. 
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This represents an extended core concentrated growth approach, which despite showing 
a variation in the identified 'normal' behaviour within the industry, does not contradict 
Proposition 1. Evidence emerges from the interviews of an at the time novel strategy 
aimed at improving the effectiveness of the core distribution business further within the 
concentrated growth approach. The distribution business was, at around 1997, subject 
to re-structuring aimed at introducing a client-provider framework (Seeboard, UKO 1 0, 
1997), similar to Miles and Snow's internal network concept (Miles and Snow, 1992). 
The potential for this process, of "devolving responsibility in decision making down into 
the organisation", was not seemingly promising in an organisation which, due to the 
nature of its role, did not generally allow for individual decision making. However, the 
potential for the creation of subsidiary activities, such as the "separation of metering as 
a separate product offering, and within metering data collection, data aggregation from 
meter operator services" and so on was being explored (Seeboard, UKO 10, 1997f 
Proposition 1 is therefore supported, although Seeboard evidently employed a more 
advanced version of the approach. 
10.2.2 Legitimising Proposition 2 
Proposition P2 stated that: 
"companies will seek to employ approaches to develop critical mass in most if not all 
of their continuing un-regulated businesses" 
The desire to focus "upon driving as much value as we can out of our existing businesses" 
(Seeboard, UK008, 1997), was discussed in Section 10.2.1, and refers equally to 
Seeboard's non-regulated businesses. However the interviews demonstrate an interesting 
aspect of See board's approach to supply in particular which was obviously a contentious, 
and revealing, issue at the time that the interviews occurred. The 
described a scenario where the Company's initial approach to supply had been to 
aggressively, even recklessly, seek to create market power. This approach had created 
an entrepreneurial culture which condoned the pursuit of opportunity by supply managers, 
with the result that there had developed "a degree of conflict at that level (of senior 
operational manager) with some lack of coordination about priorities and objectives, 
some evidence of the trading people keeping finance at arms length" and so on with the 
result that "the operational staff that were running the processes were not really in tune 
with what was happening elsewhere" (Seeboard, UKO 11, 1997). The preferred 
2 
The actions of the Regulator in seeking to separate metering from distribution companies, due to its 
potential to equate to an abuse of monopoly power, has forced the hands of many of the RECs in this area. 
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prescriptive approach had therefore been lost. The result was that a General Manager role 
was created, to oversee and control the activity of the separate functions within supply 
and to resolve the developing conflict. As the General Manager was a finance manager, 
this gave the accurate impression of a reigning in of the Company's market development 
activity in this area. 
The interviews reveal that Seeboard was arguably a little behind the rest of the industry 
in establishing a coherent supply strategy. This, it was felt, was due to the 'sheltered' 
nature of its business, consisting as it did of a large number of mainly low demand 
domestic users, the liberalisation of whose market did not occur until 1997/98. The 
interviews as a whole did not reflect the pressing need for the development of critical 
mass, and this must be seen in part as a reflection of this initial lack of threat, and in part 
as a consequence of the timing of this set of interviews. 
However, and despite concerns for commercial confidentiality, a senior manager did reveal 
the following about Seeboard's strategy: "Seeboard is taking a view, and that view is 
determined by a number offacts. Firstly, for example that ScottishPower has taken over 
Southern Water. .... Southern Water covers a million of Seeboard' s two million franchise 
customers. Also, in 1997, the Southern trials for gas take off, so that's nearly all of 
Seeboard's customers who will be targeted for gas, so you can see the risk there ...... all of 
the RECs will be in there to get gas customers, and British Gas will try and retain them. 
Seeboard is out there now marketing gas to Seeboard customers. Obviously aimed at 
retention and expanding the business" (CSW, US002, 1996). The inference is clear. 
Seeboard feared a loss of custom from competitors who were already hovering predatorily 
over its territory. Its approach had to that date been defensive and its strategy, as the 
discussion in Section 10.2.3 will show, favoured an emphasis upon concepts supporting 
a concentrated growth approach. Seeboard's initial concern, therefore, was defending its 
territory rather than developing critical mass. 
However, as acknowledged earlier, this view was expressed before the full impact of 
competition took hold. Moreover, as the analysis presented in Section 7.3.3 showed, the 
Company has maintained a closely controlled concentrated growth approach in its supply 
business, preferring risk averse approaches like membership of a variety of consortia, to 
attempting to develop critical mass. Proposition 2, therefore, is not strongly supported 
by the example of Seeboard, at least in relation to electricity. The Company appears to 
favour a more focussed approach, centred upon its own area and immediate surrounding 
areas rather than attempting to establish a nationwide presence. This also goes some way 
to explaining the restraint placed upon its market seeking activities, as described earlier. 
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It also suggests once again that the desire to generalise in respect of behaviour does 
require that the existence of unique characteristics needs to be accounted for which may 
weaken the ability to generalise. However, as Miler and Dess noted (1993), an awareness 
of possible deficiencies or 'trade offs' is crucial in any attempt to generalise behaviour. 
Within Seeboard, that unique characteristic is the composition of its supply business. 
10.2.3 Legitimising Proposition 3 
Proposition P3 stated that: 
"the approaches mentioned in P2 will of necessity involve a combined price and non-
price generic approach, so backing the arguments of a variety of authors against the 
conclusions of Porter (1980)" 
Seeboard's focus upon becoming 'simply the best' utility investment relied very heavily 
upon the type of combined price and non-price utility (Chrisman et aI, 1988) generic 
approach, described within the proposition. As part of this strategy, the Company 
identified three core areas: being the best at customer service; having the highest share 
price within the industry; and offering the lowest prices to customers (CSW, US002, 
1996). These, at the time the interviews were conducted, were generally the positions the 
Company occupied3 in the respective performance tables. 
The Company had clearly adopted the view early in its preparations for domestic 
competition, and probably as a reflection of their experiences in the commercial markets, 
that "people aren't buying on price anymore, they are buying on value, so best value is 
what you should look for, and that is what the customer will go for" (CSW, US002, 
1996). Speculating on the future for the competitive supply market, the US manager 
argued that while there would inevitably be people choosing new suppliers, and a block 
who will never change, "there will be a block who become more sophisticated in their 
buying and that's where the multi-utility (or dual fuel offering) comes in. That's the 
product that Seeboard will be selling" (CSW, US002, 1996). 
The structure that Seeboard developed was arguably less than conducive for a coordinated 
utility approach in supply. The Company had taken the view early in the new era that 
customer service would be a separate division, sitting alongside both the core distribution 
and supply businesses. However the devolution of such a vital role, especially in the 
3 
There are different performance measures, and in a segmented industry, different tariffs offered, but 
overall the Company claimed these objectives were meet (CSW, US002, 1996). 
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service dependent supply industry, to a third party creates the potential for logistical 
problems, especially ifthere is a breakdown in communication. One manager relates just 
such an instance: "as we come towards '98 we are having to ask ourselves again the 
question about the role of customer services, which is a semi-autonomous business with 
a rather vague relationship to distribution and supply, whose remit is effectively 
independently agreed by the executive, much as distribution and supply is. We on the 
supply side are saying 'well, hang on a minute, this appears to be quite an important part 
of our market offering and didn't we ought to have a bit more say in this?' and that doesn't 
necessarily mean control but it means more influence through more formal mechanisms 
than have currently existed. Whereas up 'till now, we have been the recipient ofX% of 
their costs in return for which they have largely decided, within the broad framework their 
own operational policies. Timing of campaigns on direct debits has been a customer 
services activity and we have had the experience of them launching a campaign a matter 
of a week or two before we announced we had increased the level of direct debit discount, 
so we then had to scrap all the stationary, because it all said 'you can get £4 off your bill, 
and we knew we were about to announce we were putting it up to £8'. Conversely, of 
course, there are commercial opportunities for customer service as a true business, that 
we haven't exercised to date, and that may point one perhaps more towards the 'yes it is 
a separate business activity, but with a much more formal relationship', of service level and 
charging to its customers" (Seeboard, UKO 11, 1997). The final relationship was "being 
worked out as we speak" (Seeboard, UKO 1 0, 1997), was not determined prior to the 
conclusion of the interviews and hence can only be commented on with reference to 
Company publications. 
The latest financial report (Seeboard, 1999, p. 7-8) addresses the reorganisation of 
customer services, but not the relationship to the Company's other activities. However, 
as the function is reported separate to the other businesses, it may be reasonable to assume 
that the function's separate nature has been retained, and some form of formal 
understanding, or contractual relationship has been put into place. Despite this potential 
logistical handicap, the case study of Seeboard would appear to offer validation for the 
proposition. 
10.2.4 Legitimising Proposition 4 
Proposition P4 stated that: 
'''new core' businesses will evolve incrementally as compames take on the 
responsibility for identifying viable concentric diversification" 
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The initial caution that Seeboard employed in relation to any form of diversification has 
already been discussed, and is summarised by this view from the 
: "(early in the period) people wrote in saying 'would you be 
interested in investing in XYZ?', and I think initially we went off and started looking at 
a large range of them, but there was no sort of coordinated approach, so we said 'hold on 
a moment. There needs to be some sort of focus'. So we only looked at things that were 
suitable. But compared to some companies ... some of them deliberately set out to go into 
non-core areas very early on. And we as a company definitely decided that that was a 
wrong thing to do" (Seeboard, UK008, 1997). 
Seeboard, in a move consistent with its cautious approach, established a body called the 
Corporate Strategy Directorate in 1989. Within this new directorate was a small team 
responsible for new business development. It was this team's responsibility to: (a) identify 
possible areas of diversification/investment; and (b) make a business case for that 
investment. The perspective of Seeboard in relation to investment in generation at the 
time was described as follows: "we firstly wanted to know before we made an investment 
(in generation), would it make sense from a power purchasing point of view, because all 
of the new REC stations involved a long term contract to buy (from the new plant). That, 
from our perspective, had to make sense from the perspective of our purchasing portfolio: 
did a long term contract at that sort of price make sense? If it did, are we going to make 
an adequate return on the investment? And so on. The approach was driven from this 
perspective" (Seeboard, UK007, 1997). He adds that "we eventually did go ahead with 
a station, and it was driven from that perspective rather than the 'investment opportunity' 
approach adopted by some of the others" (Seeboard, UK007, 1997). This suggests that 
within Seeboard Proposition 4 is valid, at least in relation to the new core generation 
business, but that the motivation for the investment was in support of its core 
concentrated growth approach in supply rather than the simple establishment of a 'new 
core' activity. 
The Company's approach to the 'new core' gas market appears to have been relatively 
similar, and again based upon driving their existing business harder, and finding a means 
of exploiting their core skills and capabilities: "we started looking at gas, because selling 
gas is very similar to selling electricity, and with the break up of British Gas in the early 
1990's, there was now an opportunity emerging, and we put our toe in the water in early 
1993 to exploit the opportunities that were arising in the industrial market" (Seeboard, 
UK007, 1997). This new venture was undertaken through a joint venture with US gas 
company Utili corp, a further indication of the Company's innate caution. 
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Seeboard's current involvement in gas is through a company called Beacon Gas, a venture 
jointly owned with Amoco. Within this venture, Amoco provides the gas and Seeboard 
the market expertise and customer service skills. These examples from Seeboard therefore 
provide very strong support for Proposition 4, and especially so in relation to gas which 
has clearly become a core business area for the Company. The extent of the growth of 
both areas and assimilation into Seeboard was made clear in Figure 7.4, of Section 7.3. 
10.2.5 Legitimising Proposition 5 
Proposition P5 stated that: 
"companies will inevitably seek consolidation, either vertically or horizontally, 
regardless of the regulatory regime within the industry, supporting the work of Helm 
and Jenkinson (1997)" 
This review of See board has shown that while confidence in the validity of Prop osition's 
1 to 5 remains high, there are some areas where variations can be observed. One of these 
is in relation to Proposition 5. The analysis presented in Section 7.3 showed that 
Seeboard had not engaged as intensely in consolidation activity in any of its core 
businesses as had other RECs, although an exception can be identified in relation to the 
backward vertical integration by joint venture implied by its entry into the generation and 
gas industries. Other subsidiary ventures in appliance retail and contracting had seen 
horizontal integration, but the large scale integrations witnessed in other REC's core 
businesses has not been seen. 
The relationship between any investment in generation and the Company's ongoing 
business has been demonstrated in Section 10.2.4, and clearly shows a decision based 
upon backward integration. However, in comparison with other REC's activities in this 
area, it is severely limited and it would be hard to qualify it as consolidation. Similarly, 
as Section 10.2.2 has demonstrated, the Company has sought to defend its existing supply 
base, rather than engage in the consolidation that is increasingly the mark of this sector 
of the industry (James et aI, 2001). In the case of Seeboard, therefore, Proposition 5 is 
not supported. However, the author suggests that in much the same way that continued 
independence proved untenable in the long run following a paradigm shift, so failure to 
consolidate may also prove similarly untenable following a further paradigm shift. That 
is to argue that the increased maturity of the supply industry makes it increasingly non-
viable for companies lacking critical mass, or vertical or horizontal consolidation. 
10.2.6 Commentary 
Overall, therefore, this examination of Proposition's 1 to 5 based upon evidence gathered 
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from in-depth interviews with senior managers of Seeboard would seem to support the 
conclusions reached earlier but not with the same degree of confidence in all aspects of 
the analysis as the author would have predicted. In much the same way as the preceding 
Eastern case study was pushing at the boundaries of the general conclusions, so the 
findings of the Seeboard case also push at the boundaries, albeit in the opposite direction. 
That is, while Eastern appeared to be moving to the next stage of the evolution of strategy 
within the industry, so Seeboard has yet to fully arrive at this stage. In particular this is 
true of its approach to questions of consolidation, and the achievement of critical mass, 
both of which the author identified as distinguishing components of one of the REC 
archetype strategies which emerged at the end of the analysis in Chapter Eight. This 
perhaps reflects the difference between an integrated energy company by organic growth 
(Seeboard) and an integrated energy company by acquisition (Eastern) as defined in 
Section 8.4.1. 
Once again, the proposition's can be seen to reflect their nature as synthesis of the 
behaviour of the various companies within the industry which do not necessarily reflect 
the experience of anyone company entirely. It also indicates that even at a stage in the 
development of the industry where commonality was perceived to be greater than at any 
time since privatisation, as discussed in Section 8.4.1, differences of approach are still 
evident. 
10.3 Testing Propositions: Strategic Drivers 
In pursuit of a resolution of Objective Two of this research, a series of observations with 
respect to strategic drivers evident within the sample was presented in Section 8.2. Once 
again, the author acknowledges that the identification of patterns of behaviour presented 
in Chapter Eight, and derived from textual data, can not be said to with a high enough 
confidence factor to accurately reflect the relative importance of the five differing sources 
of influence on the strategy process identified during the research. Section 8.2.4 set out, 
therefore, to establish a set of propositions which sought to describe the relative influence 
of each driver of strategy among companies in either regulated or recently liberalised 
industries. 
10.3.1 Legitimising Proposition 6 
Proposition P6 stated: 
"that the influence of an industry regulator upon a company's strategy will depend 
upon the relative proportion of its profits generated from regulated activities" 
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Seeboard has always, if the testimony of the managers interviewed is an accurate 
indication, been an organisation wary of offending the Regulator. There was throughout 
the interviews a clear feeling that the Regulator, if provoked, could harm the objectives 
of a company, and that "in many respects they are more powerful than we (the RECs in 
general) are" (CSW, US002, 1996). Hence, Seeboard has always sought to 
constructively co-exist with the Regulator, and seek to work as closely as possible with 
him. This concern perhaps reflects the priorities of an organisation which for most of its 
life has relied predominantly upon the profits of its regulated business, over which the 
Regulator has much greater influence. 
The extent of this desire to co-exist with the Regulator is further demonstrated by the 
following statement with respect to the' Seeboard ethic', a wider concept reflecting the 
Company's desire to acknowledge all of the stakeholders in its operational environment: 
"the Seeboard ethic is to consult with the customer, consult with the Regulator, to work 
with these organisations rather than against them, and actually try ... to gain competitive 
advantage by setting and agreeing ground rules. There are those who did exactly the 
opposite, and flew in the face of the Regulator. They will lose" (CSW, US002, 1996). 
The theme of dialogue reflecting the importance of the Regulator is again addressed in 
these comments, with respect to the need to understand the new drive for efficiency and 
effectiveness in distribution: "we needed to see what in our view was the scope for 
improving efficiency ... because unless we knew that ourselves it would be very difficult to 
have a sensible debate with the Regulator" (Seeboard, UK008, 1997). 
The importance of meeting the needs of the Regulator is demonstrated by the evocative 
language used in the following statement: "when the Regulator did his review of economic 
purchasing, we were able to demonstrate to him that before we signed that long term 
contract we had looked at alternatives, and we had had discussions with generators. And 
we were able to furnish him with information on that, and to demonstrate that we had 
satisfied our economic purchasing obligations" (Seeboard, UK007, 1997). The impression 
given by interviewee's is of an organisation which pays great heed to the views of the 
Regulator, and identifies an obligation to perform well against all of the performance 
criteria the Regulator establishes. 
The Regulator is clearly an important driver of Seeboard's strategy. As the Company has 
limited non-regulated earnings, the importance of regulated earnings are consequently 
greater, and therefore confidence in the Proposition is found to be legitimate in this case. 
However, a deeper confidence will only come as a result of a comparison with the other 
factors influencing Company policy. 
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10.3.2 Legitimising Proposition 7 
Proposition P7 stated: 
"that companies pursuing a strategy across a range of sectors will be subject to 
influences from a variety of different drivers, but that the extent of the influence each 
exerts will be situational" 
Seeboard began the new era as a highly conservative company, suggesting that some of 
the drivers had a proportionately much greater impact upon its strategy than others at this 
early stage. A senior Seeboard manager attributes the initial conservative approach to the 
views of the first Chainnan: "He (Squair) had been brought up in the industry and felt that 
we didn't want to go head long into new activities, and we certainly needed a period of 
consolidation to get to grips with being a pIc" (Seeboard, UK008, 1997). Initially, 
therefore, the Company concentrated upon what it knew best although it is arguable if this 
decision had been fully rationalised within the Company. In this early period, the 
Company also had to get to grips with the City whose impact could be ambiguous and 
confusing. The same manager remembered that "we had to deal with the City, and all 
these analysts, and all these people out there who seemed to want to know what we were 
doing, and wanting to understand where we wanted to take the business. We'd never had 
to deal with this before, and therefore having to put together presentations for the City, 
and to think through the company approach, rationalise and explain it to all these outsiders 
was all very new, and I think looking back we tended to listen too much to the 
City ... because we were still learning ... because they tended to have a particular view at any 
one time of what companies ought to be doing, and then six months later they might have 
a different view" (Seeboard, UK007, 1997). 
The combination of leadership, and the expectations of the City were to prove crucial to 
Seeboard. The key advance made by leadership came early in the period, and represented 
an 'awakening' as to the implications of the change through which they had lived. The 
managers of Seeboard had initially expected that the new industry would be as predictable 
as the old ESI. They had a "naive expectation that after a couple of years things will start 
to settle down" and that they could start planning for the future (Seeboard, UK007, 
1997). However, this was not the case. "I think around 1992, about a year and a half to 
two years in, we started to realise that not only wasn't the external environment going to 
settle down, but in fact things were becoming increasingly uncertain. As we were about 
to enter the first of numerable price reviews by the Regulator, we needed to have a much 
better focus of the Company and where it was going" (Seeboard, UK008, 1997). This 
need was compounded by the fact that Seeboard was not highly rated by the City at that 
time. Management's realisation of the impact of change, plus a rising awareness of the 
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need to appease the City shaped the Company's approach. 
This change in Seeboard' s approach, or more accurately the greater focus placed upon 
core businesses, coincided with the retirement of Squair, and his replacement as CEO by 
Ellis. 1£s responsibility was effectively to provide direction and vision, where previously 
it had been lacking. This change in leadership and approach marks the replacement of a 
more intuitive conservative strategic approach, with a more rationalised corporate 
strategic approach. Ellis initiated a review of operations to assess what change was 
necessary and why, and resulted ultimately in a new structure and new business strategy. 
An interviewee noted that although Ellis could have imposed a new structure and new 
approach he chose to conduct a review, which was inclusive, and which was aimed at 
reassuring all stakeholders in the Company that the agreed changes were rational and well 
thought through (Seeboard, UK007, 1997). The change resulted in the establishment of 
three separate businesses, and the development of the client provider relationship, or 
internal network, to encourage greater entrepreneurial spirit among the companies. 
This review of the interviews with senior managers suggests that of the various influences 
shaping Seeboard's strategy external factors have been important, but that the role of 
company managers has been even more so. It is also clear from the interviews that the 
Company believed that the City of London was subject to marked fluctuations in what was 
considered appropriate behaviour among the companies ofthe industry. While Seeboard 
was influenced by the market early on, the initial impetus for the re-focussing which 
occurred in 1993 came from internal sources, and in particular from senior managers' 
growing understanding of the direction that the industry was moving in. After taking what 
they considered the appropriate decisions, and establishing a set of guiding principles and 
objectives early in the new era, the Company has not varied far over the intervening 
period, despite being taken over. This suggests that the key to external pressure is not a 
RECs size but rather its confidence in its decision making, and the 'success' of the chosen 
approach. If the City has confidence in a company, it may not seek to affect its progress, 
and if an approach is perceived as being successful - even if it does not conform to the 
developing trends within the industry - then managers will have the strength of conviction 
to push on. 
The impact of resources on strategy appears to be that of an influence, albeit only with a 
limited range. Earlier, the Company's desire to exploit its core capabilities was identified, 
but its definition of what it was capable of doing was rather limited, and focussed primarily 
upon the core distribution business, or "which added direct synergies to what we are 
already doing" (Seeboard, UK007, 1997). Resources are therefore clearly of some 
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importance, although with leadership lacking a desire to seek to deploy them widely, it is 
possible to argue that their influence was more that of constraint upon, than driver of, 
strategy. 
Seeboard presents a contrasting case to that of Eastern, in that its strategy has 
intentionally been much less expansive and its interaction with its strategic drivers 
somewhat different. The case does demonstrate that there will be an hierarchy among 
influences, and the structure of that hierarchy will be situational. Seeboard was subject 
to the influences of the same set of drivers, but its response was largely different to that 
of Eastern. In particular in relation to its internal drivers, Seeboard appears to have been 
constrained whereas Eastern has been empowered, by the potential offered by its resource 
base. This case therefore offers support for Proposition 7. 
10.3.3 Legitimising Proposition 8 
Proposition P8 stated: 
"that organisational size will be a key factor in an organisation's management of its 
relationship with strategic drivers" 
As referred to above, Seeboard presents a quite different case to that of Eastern presented 
in Chapter Nine. It has clearly sought to operate a less ambitious approach within the 
industry, and so arguably possesses less market power. This maya product of its lesser 
organisational size, although making such an assertion would require confirmatory 
evidence. What is clear is that external and regulatory influences playa greater role in 
determining its strategy, as suggested by the analysis accompanying Proposition 6 noted. 
The debate perhaps centres upon a question of perception: to what extent is a company 
able to control external influences, and indeed can it be necessarily assumed that allowing 
external forces to drive strategy is a good or a bad thing? Seeboard has reacted to certain 
external influences, but not others. While it has not reacted to defuse the bargaining 
power of suppliers in the same way as Eastern, for example; as it has not developed 
extensive backwardly integrative assets, it has played close attention to the bargaining 
power of customers, in its drive to become the 'best' utility. Similarly, and despite the 
Company's claim that it paid relatively little attention to the actions of its competitors 
(Seeboard, UK007, 1997), the actions of developing its' simply the best' strategy could 
not have been undertaken in isolation, as being the best relies upon a judgement relative 
to other companies. 
Overall, therefore, this proposition is supported but is principally a factor of the nature of 
the Company's relationship with the Regulator. The reliance upon regulated earnings, and 
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the need to develop competitive earnings streams to reduce this reliance, meant that 
Seeboard's focus was largely external and was a product of the configuration of their 
revenue streams, which can be portrayed as relative 'market weakness'. However, as 
consideration of the next proposition shows, much of Seeboard's strategic direction and 
processes emerged largely as a result of the influence of internal factors, which is reflective 
of organisational size. 
10.3.4 Legitimising Proposition 9 
Proposition P9 stated: 
"that companies will seek to develop greater control over the impact of strategic 
drivers by developing key internal capabilities to achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage" 
The interviews revealed that internal forces were integral in shaping its competitive 
approach, and that the Company was keen to develop capabilities that would lead to 
competitive advantage. In particular this refers to the development of a concept that the 
Company described as 'the client provider contract model'. This model originated within 
Seeboard's retail operations, but has most prominently been utilised within its networks 
business. Testimony from interviewee's suggest that the restructuring and strategic 
development of the Company's retail business was actively identified as a test case for the 
Company as a whole (Seeboard, UKO 1 0, 1997) and effectively led future change. In this 
model, the client runs the assets of the Company, and receives a service from the provider, 
who initially would also be expected to be within the Company. However, the 
interviewees speculated that this approach would eventually develop to include the 
potential for external suppliers to bid for contracts under this sort of relationship. In the 
future, therefore, parts of the Company may lose contracts to cheaper or better quality 
external bodies. This would mark the planned evolution from an internal network 
organisation, to a dynamic network organisation as envisaged by Miles and Snow (1992, 
and Section 2.4.2). As part of this arrangement, the client specifies what they expect from 
the provider which become the effective quality standard within the transaction. This in 
effect mimics a 'real' market transaction and, it is hoped, introduces market rigour to 
internal transactions with the result that performance is enhanced (Seeboard, UK007, 
1997). 
The concept's aim was therefore a solution to the need, identified by senior managers, to 
"get a grip on what the business was all about, what it was there for, what it was actually 
contributing, what its purpose was in terms of supporting Seeboard's overall corporate 
objectives" (Seeboard, UK01 0, 1997). The model developed out of a thrust to shift the 
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responsibility for decision making away from the corporate apex, down into the functional 
core of the business. The philosophy and model have been applied across the whole 
organisation. However, applying the model in distribution has proved to be more difficult 
than, for example, in supply. Supply, like retail, is very obviously a commercial activity, 
while distribution is not. However, aspects of the distribution business have been 
susceptible to change, and the establishment of particular product offerings has proven 
possible. These have included "separation of metering as a separate product offering, and 
within metering data collection, and data aggregation from meter operator services" and 
so on mentioned earlier (Seeboard, UKOI0, 1997). The process itself produced more than 
just a model, as other benefits developed alongside. Among these positive side effect were 
that the process pointed the way towards ever increasing commercial freedom, and 
organisational accountability. 
Another benefit following this process was the creation of 'business awareness' among 
smaller operational units within the Group. Units tendering for Seeboard contracts may 
find that they can also tender for non-Seeboard contracts, and thus generate unrelated 
income from other customers which will benefit the Group as a whole. The model 
therefore offers both internal cost effectiveness and the potential for external profit 
generation through the transferability of existing skills and competencies. Such units 
would therefore "become almost small businesses in their own right" (Seeboard, UK007, 
1997). In distribution, if this approach was thought successful, the result could be that 
the Company would just be the owner of the long life assets and small service providers 
would support that operation in areas such as building and maintaining the network and 
so on. Consequently, this approach is akin to a resource based view of how a Company 
may exploit its capabilities outside of their normal operational envelope. 
The concept was initially developed within appliance retail. The success identified here 
was further applied to electrical contracting, as the Company launched its Business Group 
division in 1993-94. Following this further testing of the concept, the idea was rolled out 
in the core distribution and supply companies (Seeboard, UKO 1 0, 1997). During the 
interviews conducted for this research, a consensus developed that the introduction of the 
concept of financial accountability was the most crucial spin-off of the whole process 
(Seeboard, UKOll, 1997). The whole process also reinforced the corporate identity of 
each business, so for instance people felt that they worked for Seeboard Retail, rather than 
Seeboard per se. This was vital, it was argued, as without this micro level identification, 
people could not identifY their actions with the overall performance of the Company. The 
development and testing of the model initially in retail enabled a higher acceptance level 
when rolled out in other parts of the business, leading to a relatively smooth introduction: 
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"people could see the point of what was happening, could see the model, and say 'OK, 
I can see why were are doing this'" (Seeboard, UK011, 1997). 
The core thrust of Proposition 9 is therefore supportable, but it should be noted that this 
effort to develop core capabilities must be viewed alongside the general conclusions that 
the Company was heavily influenced by external factors. The development of core 
capabilities in this way therefore arguably reflects a response to the impact of external 
drivers: as in 'we must locate ways in which our various operations maximise their 
revenue generating capacity in order to offset the increasing demands placed upon us by 
external factors'. Developing unique internal capabilities to achieve competitive 
advantage may be portrayed as a means by which a company can overcome the presumed 
advantages that organisational size conveys upon an organisation. 
10.3.5 Legitimising Proposition 10 
Proposition PI 0 stated: 
"that ownership is the key influence over strategy" 
The core focus approach that Seeboard pursued after 1992 was identified as one of the 
key reasons the US utility CSW bought the Company. The similarity of operating 
objectives has also influenced the relationship between owner and subsidiary. Because 
CSW was also a company with a core focus, and because of the trust and understanding 
which developed between the two companies at the time of the takeover, CSW felt able 
to take a very 'hands otT' approach in terms of the day-to-day management of the 
Company. Their relationship sees CSW agree Seeboard's overall plans, including 
performance targets and capital expenditure, and letting the existing management get on 
with implementation (CSW, US002, 1996). Their view was that they (CSW) did not 
know how to run a REC, whereas the UK managers did, so why change a working 
scenario? In the view of the US manager, Seeboard had continued to improve under 
CSW's ownership (CSW, US002, 1996), but that the relationship was cooperative rather 
than dictatorial. 
A senior Seeboard manager identified three main reasons why the takeover had occurred. 
These were, he felt, that: 
~ the ESI offered better returns for the money invested than a similar investment in 
the US industry; 
the ESI offered a learning opportunity and exposure to new market conditions; 
and 
that the ESI was a good base from which to springboard international 
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developments (Seeboard, UK007, 1997). 
Of these, however, the first has been widely agreed to have been the underpinning 
consideration. It is possible to argue, therefore, that in comparison with other RECs, the 
decision made by CSW to invest in Seeboard conforms very closely to the concept of an 
'arms length' strategic asset seeking investment, as discussed in Section 8.3. As such the 
owners influence is inevitably tangible, but not as overt as in other instances. The leaders 
of the Company are empowered by the support they receive from the owners, who also 
determine what 'success' means in the Company's terms. Should the existing leadership 
begin to fail to meet their objectives, then the balance may shift. As has been noted, this 
set of interview data addresses a period of Seeboard' s existence between 1996-1998, and 
it can not be argued conclusively that the views developed here are still an accurate 
picture of the situation within the Company today. However, the fact that Ellis remains 
the CEO of See board, and as discussed in Section 7.3.2, has done so since 1992, it would 
suggest that little change of any great substance has occurred during the intervening 
period in respect ofCSW's concern for driving Seeboard's strategy. In this instance, at 
least, Proposition lOis not fully supportable, and suggests that the influence of ownership 
is at least situational. 
10.3.6 Commentary 
This examination of the strategic drivers influencing Seeboard clearly identify the 
Company as being subject to a distinctly different configuration of influence when 
compared to Eastern in the preceding case study. Whereas Eastern's strategy was a 
product primarily of internal factors: of leadership and resources, Seeboard's strategy 
appears to be a product of all of the factors identified in Section 8.2.3. External factors 
like the Regulator and the actions in particular of competitors, and the demands of 
suppliers and customers impact upon the Company, as does its leadership and its resource 
base. An argument can also be made for the influence of the owners, but this is less 
pronounced. It is possible, therefore, that a pattern is emerging, and it is related to a 
concept that may be determined as 'market strength'. This pattern; of strong companies 
being driven predominantly by internal factors and middle ranking companies like 
Seeboard being driven by a combination of factors, would be completed if smaller 
companies, such as SWEB, were more influenced by external factors, and will be 
discussed in Chapter Eleven. 
10.4 Validity of Classification 
In Section 8.3, a series of classifications were presented based upon the analysis 
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undertaken for each of the Company's in Chapter's Five to Seven, and Chapter Eight. 
This section aims to consider the classification arrived at for Seeboard, and to consider 
what the judgement reached in this case can tell about the wider validity of the 
classification system proposed by Miles and Snow (1978), in a regulated environment. 
10.4.1 Validity of Classification of Seeboard 
In Table 8.9 of Section 8.3, the following classification's were made in relation to 
Seeboard: 
~ that it was an integrated energy company by organic growth, utilising an utility 
approach in competitive markets; 
that it employed Variant 1 in its distribution business, and Variant 5A in its supply 
business; 
that the key influences over its strategy making were a combination of external, 
internal, leadership, regulatory and ownership factors; 
that the owner was pursuing 'arms length' strategic asset seeking investment; and 
that Seeboard was in consequence an analyzer, using the Miles and Snow 
typology. 
The assessment of See board as an analyzer, defined in Section 2.5.6.2.3, argues that it is 
possesses the same characteristics as Eastern. However, the preceding analysis argued 
that they were essentially different types of organisation. How accurate, therefore, is this 
classification? The first point to make concerns Eastern Group's classification as an 
analyzer, which was cast in some doubt by the analysis in Section 9.4.1. If correct, this 
would explain any difference between the companies. 
A second point concerns the nature of the analysis presented by Miles and Snow, and its 
relationship in general to companies of the ESI. If for example a REC is involved in both 
distribution and supply, it is automatically identified as an analyzer, as one of these 
industries requires a company to defend while another generally requires it to seek new 
product and market opportunities. This explains this decision on the labelling of 
Seeboard. If however the view adopted of Miles and Snow's work is that each separate 
organisation within a group is to be judged in terms of classification, then a different 
picture emerges. It is entirely possible for a company therefore to be both a defender in 
distribution, and a defender in supply: the example of Man web (Section 5.1), or London 
before its takeover by EdF (Section 7.2) come to mind. Arguably, Seeboard may also fit 
this profile. 
However, and despite this final observation about the possibility of identifying Seeboard's 
supply business as being a defender, the author adopts the view that the original 
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classification of Seeboard as an analyzer is appropriate. The activity of Beacon Gas, 
Seeboard's gas supply subsidiary, is not that ofa defender and so the author believes that 
Seeboard's approach in supply is that of an analyzer. The Miles and Snow model, 
therefore, holds in relation to the example of Seeboard. Caution should, however, be 
placed upon a simple use of the typology assuming that the REC environment is an 
homogeneous one. Clearly, in any analysis of the appropriate nature of the model, a 
distinction must be drawn between distribution, and supply, and hence two classifications 
are required for those RECs remaining within both of these industries. 
10.5 Other Key Issues 
This section continues the work begun in Section 9.5 in examining the variety of other key 
issues identified throughout this research, but which have not been the core focus of 
attention. The first of these considers what the case of Seeboard can contribute to the 
debate on the differing concepts of the firm. 
10.5.1 Competitive Forces versus the Resource Based View 
The author believes that throughout this case study of Seeboard, there has been clear 
evidence that the Company has adopted a predominantly competitive forces approach, by 
orienting itself and its strategic outlook to its industry, and pursuing what could be 
identified as relatively predictable traditional strategies, that did not take into account the 
potential advantages of its unique capabilities. However, this view should be qualified 
with reference to some of Seeboard's actions to: (a) exploit its distinctive competencies; 
and (b) develop distinctive competencies to enhance its ability to achieve superior 
performance. 
The references to 'core skills', and the desire to exploit these core skills for competitive 
advantage runs throughout the interviews (Seeboard, UK007, 1997). In particular, the 
ability to operate network systems is identified as a key resource, and enabled the 
Company to win a contract to manage the distribution network and supply for the London 
Underground. In addition, the emphasis placed upon establishing the 'client provider' 
model (Seeboard, UK007, 1997, Seeboard, UKOI0, 1997) identifies a internal process 
which the Company believed could be turned into a core competence and used to 
encourage superior performance. 
These moves clearly show an awareness of the benefits the exploitation of distinctive 
competencies can have on organisational performance. However, it would be difficult to 
argue that Seeboard adhered to the same 'joined up' approach as Eastern. In the case of 
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Seeboard, resources appear to have acted more as a constraint, rather than as an enabler, 
of business opportunity. Seeboard, as the above analysis showed, took the view that its 
resources were better suited when focussed upon related businesses. They were learning 
from the experiences of companies like EME, which had adopted a much wider 
perspective and had been 'punished' by poor performance as a consequence. However, 
the Company had not, certainly at the time of the interviews, taken on board the view 
championed by Eastern that resources could be enabler's if focussed upon clearly related 
market development or diversification activities. A final point that needs to be made here 
is, however, that the very considerable differences in the magnitude of resources held by 
Eastern and Seeboard, especially following the former's takeovers by Hanson and TXU, 
may explain the difference. Eastern may simply have done more with its resources 
because it possessed a stronger resource base. 
10.5.2 The Impact of Process 
In some respects, the case of Seeboard mirrors that of Eastern presented in the preceding 
chapter. But there is an initially distinct starting point. Whereas Eastern appears to have 
had, more or less, a prescriptive approach to strategy from the outset, Seeboard appears 
not to have possessed a cogent strategy for up to three years after privatisation. After that 
time there is greater similarity, as: 
~ firstly, strategies have tended to become more emergent over time; and 
~ secondly, that there would appear to be different approaches at work in different 
parts of the organisation. 
The first point to make in relation to this issue is that there is some evidence to suggest 
that Seeboard's strategic approach was arguably neither prescriptive nor emergent at the 
beginning of the period. Interviewees describe the creation of a department called the 
Corporate Strategy Directorate (CSD), which was established in recognition that strategy 
was now an important aspect of the Company's new incarnation as a pIc. However, 
having established the CSD, the Company were clearly unsure of the role that it was to 
perform. One manager commented that "I think one of the reasons for establishing the 
CSD was because there was an ex-Electricity Council director who was looking for a job, 
whose previous responsibilities had been in energy forecasting ..... not typical strategy but 
in that sort of area and I think .... the way in which the CSD was formed and the 
responsibilities it held was partly a result of someone saying 'well, we've got quite a good 
guy, can we give him a portfolio that will fit his skills?'" (Seeboard, UK008, 1997). 
The development of the CSD was therefore partly circumstance and partly need 
(Seeboard, UK008, 1997). It set out to manage issues like strategic forecasting, 
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electricity forecasting, corporate planning, the overall strategy process, and business 
development. However, the managers interviewed appear to indicate that this process 
was not systematic, and this in part reflected the innate conservatism of the original 
Chairman "who was brought up in the industry and felt that we didn't want to go 
headlong into new activities, and believed we needed a period of consolidation to get to 
grips with being a pic" (Seeboard, UK008, 1997). As such, radical action in the strategic 
area was not a priority, and a period of 'strategic drift' appears to have occurred. This 
was not evidence of an emergent strategy but rather of the absence of strategy. 
This situation changed when a new CEO took over in 1992, when the Company 
undertook a form of turnaround following a series of realisations about the nature of the 
new operating environment: "we started to realise not only that the external environment 
wasn't going to settle down, but in fact things were becoming increasingly uncertain ..... we 
needed to start to have a much better focus on the company" (Seeboard, UK008, 1997). 
The new CEO set out to achieve two objectives: to fundamentally reevaluate the structure 
of the Company; and to try and develop an overall mission, some objectives and a clear 
strategy for the Company (Seeboard, UK008, 1997). This he set out to do by initiating 
a series of consultative meetings among senior executives. 
The result of these consultations was the mission of becoming 'simply the best' utility 
described above. The structural and cultural changes put into action have also been 
described with reference to the 'client-provider' concept which began to pervade all of the 
operations of the Company. In this way, a more emergent 'strategy as pattern' approach 
can be seen to have developed, even within the monopoly distribution business, although 
as preceding sections have shown, the extent to which this objective can be achieved in 
such industries is limited. Seeboard, therefore presents an example at some variance with 
that of the preceding case study, but primarily this variance is due to: (a) a slower 
realisation of the need for a realistic and responsive strategy; and (b) the degree to which 
an emergent strategy has been allowed to develop. The author believes that the evidence 
presented in the last two chapters show Eastern as an organisation where more managerial 
autonomy has been provided within the' strategic pattern', and hence suggests a more 
entrepreneurial culture. 
10.5.3 Strategy Making at Different Levels 
The discussion of the 'client provider' model in Section 10.3.4 demonstrates the extent 
to which strategy making occurs at different levels of the organisation, and provides 
further support for the views of Buzzell and Gale (1987). In essence, the concept of the 
'client-provider' model requires each separate part of the business to be viewed as a cost 
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centre, and to transact with other costs centres on a commercial basis. Initially, this 
transaction would have been of a surrogate nature, a theoretical commercial transaction. 
However, the intention of the developers of the model and of the leaders of the 
organisation was that after the model had been bedded down, the transactions would 
become actual, rather than theoretical. In such a way a strategic vision would be 
established at the corporate level, and the details of how that vision is achieved would be 
left to business level and operational managers. This issue will be returned to when the 
question of structure is addressed in Section 10.5 .. 5. 
10.5.4 Leadership 
As with the preceding chapter, different leadership styles appear to have been evident 
within Seeboard over this time period. The preceding section described the initial period 
of drift that the Company experienced following privatisation. It is clear from the 
comments of interviewee's that during this period the existing 'transactional' style of 
leadership which dominated the pre-privati sed days was in place. The emphasis was 
clearly on a command and control, hierarchically oriented managerial structure where 
responsibility resided in the senior managers: "it was probably true to say that the only 
person who was responsible for the bottom line figure was the Chief Executive. Because 
it was functional" (Seeboard, UKO 11, 1997). The Company had its engineers, its 
commercial people, its accountants, its personnel managers, and they all only saw their 
own function and did not appreciate the wider picture, reflecting "an inherited attitude of 
parochialism" (Seeboard, UKO 11, 1997). This is clearly evident of a 'box approach' 
(Farkus and Wetlaufer, 1996) to leadership where functions were strictly controlled, and 
the organisation operated with all of the potentially debilitating characteristics of a 
Mintzberg's (I996b) machine organisation. 
The turnaround in 1992-1993 brought about a change in attitude, prompted by and 
reflected in the development of a more transformational approach to leadership. This 
change was prompted by the introduction of the 'client provider' model which enabled the 
leaders of the organisation to delegate responsibility, but at the same time provide the 
necessary guidance to prevent business level managers from straying too far from 
organisational goals. As the analysis presented in Section 10.2.2 showed, Seeboard did 
not want to allow too entrepreneurial an environment to develop and hence the model 
applied was seen to be proportionate. It is clear that all of the issues addressed here: 
exploitation of key assets, delegation of autonomy in decision making, a more emergent 
strategy process, the development of transformational leadership, and the altered 
structural configuration to be discussed in Section 10.5.5, are all very closely interlinked. 
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10.5.5 The Impact of Structure 
Section 7.3.2 commented upon the opening structure of Seeboard, and observed that it 
had been criticised for being neither an effective functional structure, nor an effective 
divisional structure, based as it was upon geographical divisions rather than product 
divisions. As analysis presented throughout Chapter's Five to Eight suggest, the 
consensus within the industry was strongly suggestive of the need for product based 
divisions in recognition of the very real differences in the needs of the core businesses 
within the group. Companies, like SWEB (Section 6.4) and Yorkshire (Section 5.4), 
acted early in the period to improve their structural alignment, but Seeboard were one of 
the last to make this connection and to move away from an organisational structure that 
was functional in its management hierarchy and geographical in its operational 
configuration. An comment made by the shows, firstly how 
far Seeboard were lagging behind industry thinking on structure, and secondly that 
structure was indeed following strategy rather then emerging with it at this stage in the 
development of the Company: "regulation gave us the stimulus to do that (split the 
distribution and supply businesses), because although I think on day one perhaps we 
regarded the distribution and supply split as somewhat artificial. The supply business only 
really carne into full existence in 1994 when the market started to open up much more to 
competition. Actually, the more we began to work within it (the split), the more it began 
to make sense to us" (Seeboard, UK011, 1997). This is a full four years after SWEB and 
Yorkshire formally divided their core businesses, taking the Regulator's requirement for 
separate reporting of the businesses as an indication that the businesses should therefore 
be formally split. 
The Company clearly prospered from the division as loyalty to SBU began to develop 
over loyalty to Group: "undoubtably the people at the office at Portland Road (where 
See board Supply is based) regarded themselves as working for the supply business, and 
there is a strong sense in which they regard success or failure as relating to supply, not 
Seeboard. They probably have no idea how much profit distribution makes. But they 
know how much profit supply makes, and they get the message time and again that 'that's 
important', and I don't think you can do that in an amorphous organisation like we had 
before. It just doesn't work" (Seeboard, UK011, 1997). Seeboard's divisional structure 
therefore offered the Company a more responsive framework within which to conduct 
business, and an identity for its workers. Clearly, the client-provider model that has been 
discussed on serval occasions throughout this chapter extends the concept, and identifies 
Seeboard as an organisation where structure is increasingly emerging alongside strategy. 
When all of these concepts are linked together, it presents a picture of an organisation 
which has moved a considerable distance from its original functional, hierarchical, 
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transactional origins. 
10.6 Concluding Remarks 
As with the preceding chapter, this case study of Seeboard was intended to continue the 
process of verification of the ten propositions developed during the preliminary stage of 
this research. On so doing, Objective's One, Two and Four of this research were to be 
addressed, and some headway gained in relation to Objective Three. Additionally, other 
relevant commentary was to be provided and conclusions drawn. 
The summary of the progress made in respect to Propositions 1 to 10 will be presented 
in Chapter Twelve, but at this point it is possible to say that: 
~ in general, the case study provides support and legitimation for all of Proposition's 
1 to 5 but that this support is more qualified than that offered by Chapter Nine. 
In some areas, Seeboard can be seen to be operating differently to the industry 
norm; but that 
while some support for proposition's 6 to 10 is also provided, the degree of this 
support is not as conclusive as for Proposition's 1 to 5, and the author wishes to 
reappraise the content of these proposition's in Chapter Twelve. 
The support, or otherwise, for Proposition's 1 to 10 represents the confidence currently 
held in the observations made thus far in respect of Objectives One and Two. Concern 
was also expressed with respect to observation's made in relation to Objective Three, 
which will also be discussed in Chapter Twelve. 
Finally, and as with Chapter Nine, the chapter enables a further opportunity to comment 
upon Miller's 'organizing themes' (Miller, 1996). This case study has identified a 
possible theme, related to the relationship between 'market power' and the importance of 
influences. Noting the relationship evident in Chapter Nine: a 'strong' company being 
influenced by mainly internal factors, this chapter has suggested that medium ranked 
companies may be influenced fairly evenly by all of the possible factors. By extrapolation, 
therefore, nominally weaker companies will be more clearly influenced by predominantly 
external factors. This final aspect of the potential organising theme will be addressed in 
Chapter Eleven. 
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Chapter Eleven Case Study of Western Power Distribution 
11.0 Introduction 
formerly South West Electricity, wholly owned subsidiary of 
the Southern Company and the Pennsylvania Power and 
Light Corporation 
The aim of this chapter is to continue and conclude the investigation into the content and 
drivers of strategy, following on from the analysis presented in Chapter Eight. This 
chapter is the final of three chapter's presenting case studies based upon in-depth 
interviews conducted with a representative sample of the RECs. Once again, the core 
focus of this chapter are the ten tentative propositions identified in Chapter Eight: five in 
relation to strategy content, five in relation to strategy drivers, and the aim is either to 
verify or falsify these propositions, and amend as necessary. The chapter also presents 
other data of relevance and interest to other aims of this research, and also addresses the 
question of classification in advance of the discussion in Chapter Twelve. 
As with the preceding chapter, this case study does not feature an extensive biographical 
section on SWEB1, as that function has been performed in the separate case study of the 
Company presented in Section 6.4, which readers are referred back to. That case study 
presented: 
~ detail of SWEB' s operational area under the 1989 Electricity Act; 
~ the major strategic developments within the Company between 1990 and 2000; 
~ the major managerial and structural changes that occurred within the Company 
during this period; and 
an assessment of the aims, objectives and causes of the specific strategies pursued 
during this time, although this latter aspect of Section 6.4 will be reviewed in 
Section 11.1 of this case study. 
The analysis and assessment of strategy in relation to SWEB, in Chapter's Six and Eight, 
was derived from information provided by existing published sources. The extended 
analysis and verification of the observations and propositions to be undertaken within this 
chapter have been derived from a short series of in-depth interviews with managers both 
SWEB, or Soutll Western Electricity, changed its name to Western Power Distribution (WPD) in 1999. 
References to the Company before 1999 tllerefore title it SWEB, and after 1999, WPD. 
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inside SWEB, and within the wider energy industry. A list of all of the primary source 
interviews conducted in conjunction with this research was presented in Section 1.4. 
From this list the key interviews utilised in this chapter were: 
~ US003: , North America Group of Southern Company, 
Atlanta, November 1999; and 
UK013: of Western Power Distribution, 
Bristol, February 2000. 
Material provided by each manager will be referenced accordingly in the section of chapter 
references2• The chapter also utilises secondary source material as necessary, as well as 
internal company documents, and will be referenced accordingly. As a condition for the 
granting of these interviews, personal confidentiality was assured. Consequently, 
reference will only be made to the job title of each manager quoted. 
11.1 Summary of Observations ofSWEB 
As noted in Section 11.0, the first section of this chapter reviews the observations made 
of SWEB in respect of: 
~ the narrative presented in Section 6.4 of Chapter Six; and 
~ its analysis, and resulting conclusions with respect to the Company presented in 
the various reporting sections of Chapter Eight. 
This brief're-telling' of SWEB's story is necessary for two main reasons: firstly, it 
provides the context for the following discussion and analysis; and secondly, because the 
conclusions reached at the end of this initial investigation provide the first 'point' of the 
triangulation process that this section is indented to perform. 
11.1.1 Strategy within SWEB 
As with the two preceding case studies of Eastern and Seeboard, SWEB began the new 
era cautiously. Distribution was again identified as the core business that would drive the 
Company forward, while supply was expected to be an important but minor contributor 
to Group profits. SWEB was more like Eastern than Seeboard in respect of its attitude 
towards generation, and had already taken the significant step of investing in Teeside 
Power by the time of the issue of the pathfinder prospectus in 1990 (Kleinwort Benson, 
1990, p.696). The Company also initially expected to remain active in the other 
traditional businesses of appliance retail and contracting. As such, SWEB initially pursued 
2 
The transcripts of these interviews have not been included in the Appendices to this thesis. 
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what could be identified as an archetypical set ofREC strategies. 
Initially therefore, the strategy was cautious, rationalised, and based upon a concentrated 
growth approach. However there was early criticism that SWEB was not as effective in 
controlling its costs as some ofthe other RECs. The Company itself stated that its unique 
service area - a peninsula with the jointly disadvantageous features of a small and disparate 
population, and a greater exposure to inclement weather - explained its higher cost base. 
SWEB was of the view that there was little it was able to do to counteract these 
characteristics of its operating area. SWEB was, therefore, one of the RECs in a centre 
group who were not aggressively exploring diversification opportunities (such as East 
Midlands, Norweb or Yorkshire), but who were not adopting a solely core focus (such 
as Seeboard, Manweb and London). It was among a small group of RECs who had 
developed a divisional structure early in their operational life following the realisation that 
formal business separation and transparency was on the Regulator's agenda, and that such 
a structure was much more appropriate for an organisation entering a newly competitive 
era. 
In the period prior to its takeover, SWEB sought to improve its performance in the key 
concentrated growth areas of controllable costs and operational effectiveness. While these 
concerns dominated this early period, and SWEB made improvements, it was never 
identified as being a leading REC, and the Company would argue, was unjustly punished 
because of the particularly demanding service area it inhabited. In short, SWEB sought 
to operate as effectively and efficiently as possible in its core businesses, while making the 
by now traditional investments in generation and gas supply that most of the other RECs 
were making. It also engaged in some small scale concentric diversification into telecoms, 
but mostly conformed to the REC archetype approach: not doing anything wrong in 
particular, but not one of the market leaders. In the supply arena, it was one of the RECs 
more concerned with retaining its existing customer base, and in particular its domestic 
customer base, principally through attempting to offer a high quality service. 
To an extent, this approach was dictated to SWEB as a result of its prevailing hostile 
climate, and made customer service much harder than for many of its peers. Before its 
takeover, SWEB was among the RECs with the worst performance record according to 
the Regulator'S statistics. The Company was more aggressive in gas supply, but this 
approach was again largely the product of circumstance rather than strategy. The South 
West region was chosen as the home of the first competitive trials in the commercial and 
domestic gas industry with the result that the market was immediately highly competitive, 
and survival was based upon aggressive market development. 
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Following the takeover by Southern Company, there was a shift in emphasis as the new 
owners sought to increase the importance of, and SWEB' s market share in, the supply 
industry. In particular the new SWEB aimed to be harder on controllable costs, a very 
high quality and responsive public utility, much more aggressive in its electricity and gas 
supply activities, and an increasing power in generation. Basically, the new owners 
intended to use the base of the original organisation to grow all of its operations in areas 
that offered growth, and to work its assets harder in areas where income growth was 
expected to fall. 
Southern's aim in purchasing SWEB was principally to obtain the opportunity for rapid 
profit growth outside of its traditional sector. SWEB offered access to the UK industry, 
which Southern saw as potentially profitable in its own right, and also a stepping off point 
for mainland Europe. This meant that for Southern the key development areas within 
SWEB were its competitive business in supply and generation. These areas offered the 
possibility for growth, while the networks business just offered a steady, but diminishing, 
return and so was to be managed as effectively as possible. Consequently, SWEB initiated 
a step improvement in customer service and of the competitiveness of the supply business, 
an aggressive acquisition policy in generation, and swingeing cost reduction in 
distribution, while overseeing the divestment of other businesses which did not fit its 
concept of its core activities. 
However, the plans of SWEB's new owners3 were disrupted by a number of setbacks 
which prevented these objectives from being realised. SWEB's aggressive growth 
strategy in supply was held back by their inability to find an appropriate partner, or 
takeover target, having concluded that growth by organic means was unrealistic. Its 
aggressive growth strategy in generation was also held back, this time by Government 
intervention rather than by the actions of competitors. Its organic growth plans in 
generation were halted by the new Labour administration's placing of a moratorium on 
new build gas power stations, while the outgoing Conservative administration had 
prevented the initial attempts by Southern Company to take over National Power. The 
only area where SWEB was advancing to plan, therefore, was in relation to its core 
distribution business. Consequently, the attempts to grow two of its three core businesses 
were baulked. 
3 
Which now included PP&L, another US utility to whom Southern had sold 51% of SWEB, while 
retaining overall operational control. 
-475-
Given this situation, it is perhaps of little surprise that the Company decided to sell its 
supply business and retain only its monopoly distribution business in the UK. Southern, 
when faced by seemingly insunnountable obstacles to its strategy, decided that retreat was 
a better policy than continuing to seek success under unfavourable conditions. These 
setbacks have led to a refocusing of Southern's activities, and it has turned its attentions 
to Germany, where it perceives that the opportunities denied to it in the UK may be 
available. However, the decision to retain the SWEB distribution business, subsequently 
renamed Western Power Distribution (WPD), signals the Company's intention to remain 
a significant player in the UK industry. WPD's recent victory in the takeover battle with 
Nomura for the distribution business of multi-utility Hyder indicates that the concentrated 
growth approach ofWPD will be extended by horizontal integration with its contiguous 
neighbour as a means of driving even greater value out of its investment. It is interesting 
to note that the SW ALEC distribution business is perhaps the closest in tenns of its 
operating conditions to that ofWPD, and so the potential benefits for sharing experiences 
and expertise in difficult conditions is provided to the new company. 
11.1.2 Influences on Strategy within SWEB 
As with Seeboard, SWEB did not begin the period subject to the same level of expectation 
as had, for example, Eastern Group. Indeed, the situation with SWEB was entirely the 
opposite. There was considerable speculation that SWEB would be among the RECs 
least likely to prosper in the new environment. This was due primarily to its relative size, 
and its difficult operating environment. Initially, the Company's prospects were viewed 
as 'hard to call' (pearson, 1990d), and concerns with respect to the 'agricultural boards' 
have already been discussed (Holmes, 1992, and Chapter Six). When its first operating 
results came through, observers were impressed but sceptical in equal measure (Lascelles, 
1992c, Smith, 1993 e). In part, this nagging doubt was a result of the expected difficulty 
the Company would experience at the 1995 regulatory review of distribution prices 
(Smith, 1994e). However, SWEB appears to provide an example of how negative 
perceptions, based upon no good economic rationale, can prejudice the prospects of an 
organisation. 
This was summarised by Smith in 1995, at around the time of the bid by Southern 
Company: "Since privatisation in 1990, SWEB has generally been rated by investors 
around the middle of the pack of 12. While it has made no obvious wrong moves, the view 
in the City is that it has failed to shine. Like other RECs, it has far outperformed 
government expectations of its ability to increase profits and dividends since 
privatisation ..... The company is financially strong with £61 million net debt at the March 
year-end and gearing of about 12 per cent. SWEB's plans to enhance profits include a 
-476-
further staff cut - from 2,900 in the core businesses to 2,400 by the end of the decade -
and expansion into gas supply, generation and telecommunications. But all of this is quite 
normal for a rec. The problem for SWEB is that its management, led by Mr John Seed, 
the chief executive who joined the industry in 1957 as an engineer, is regarded as 
unexceptional. 'Fundamentally SWEB is very dull,' said one analyst. 'It does not have a 
strong fan club like other RECs.'" (Smith, 1995d). 
This suggests a number offactors impacted upon the strategy of the Company. Firstly, 
the importance of the demands of the new market combined with the demands of the 
operating environment can not be understated. The new environment of commercial 
independence placed greater demands on all companies. However, the demands placed 
on companies like SWEB, which operated within a much more demanding region of the 
UK, can be seen to be even greater. Secondly, the influence of company managers would 
also appear considerable. The above statement draws attention to the fact that the 
Company was predominantly led by engineers, and that is not surprising given that the 
demands of its operating environment emphasised engineering skills. It also explains the 
concern for a core focus upon distribution. Thirdly, a hostile City would have pushed 
SWEB harder than other RECs who may have had less trouble fulfilling City expectations. 
Seeboard may be seen to fall into that category, although Eastern suffered the opposite 
fate. Finally, and because ofthe demands upon its network, the impact of the Regulator 
on strategy would have been considerable. The operational effectiveness of the network 
and the level of service provided would have been issues of particular interest in an area 
of the country where failures were perhaps more likely to occur. All things being equal, 
the development of a relatively narrow core focussed strategy is not surprising. 
However, after the takeover by Southern Company the location of influence changed 
dramatically. Initially, the influence of strategic direction became the new owners, who 
very clearly sought to increase the intensity and scope of the strategies being pursued. 
The new owners placed in Bristol managers who were charged with driving the Company 
forward and hence they were also important to strategy making, but the main impetus was 
found in Atlanta. However, this aggressive and expansive approach was later curtailed, 
and the principal influences behind this change in direction were external. As noted in 
Section 11.1.1, obstacles were placed in SWEB's path by competitors and by the 
Government who both actively opposed SWEB' s strategic intentions and led to a change 
in strategic direction. Latterly, the key influence on Western Power Distribution can again 
be seen to be its owners, especially in the decision to bid for the SW ALEC distribution 
business, although it should be noted that for a Company solely engaged in distribution 
the influence of the regulator will also be considerable. The influence of managers on 
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strategy in solely distribution businesses will be reduced, as the scope for strategic 
decision making is inevitably lessened. 
11.1.3 Observations Drawn 
While Section's 11.1.1 and 11.1.2 have alluded to the various conclusions drawn about 
the characteristics of SWEB over the course of the analysis conducted in Chapter's Six 
and Eight, it is necessary to briefly reiterate them here. SWEB, as a company, had: 
.. initially pursued an approach focussed upon concentrated growth across all of its 
activities, but following its takeover in 1995 had become much more aggressive 
and expansionary in its outlook, pursuing market development in both supply and 
generation through a variety of grand strategy combinations; 
established a divisional framework immediately prior to privatisation and did not 
venture far from this framework until the sale of its supply business. However, 
efforts were made to make the Company more entrepreneurial after 1995; 
.. an initial approach to strategy that was prescriptive, but latterly emergent; 
.. an initial strategic focus which was upon its industry, but increasingly the elements 
of the Company were encouraged to be more independently entrepreneurial and 
hence the Company began to follow a more resource focussed approach which has 
sustained despite the decision to leave supply, albeit at a much lower level; 
key strategic influences originating externally, and where the Regulator in 
particular was influential. Following its turnaround, its strategy was heavily 
influenced by its owners, and the new leaders put in place by the owners, but then 
heavily constrained once again by external factors: the regulator, the government 
and its competitors. Currently, the key influence are those of the Regulator and 
its owners; and 
consequently SWEB was finally identified as a defender, as it is now simply a 
monopoly asset management organisation. 
The above conclusions were based upon a three phased analysis: factual data from 
published sources; factual data from company sources; and opinion data from published 
sources. In so doing, the author argues that the process of triangulation discussed in 
Section 3.2.2 has been fulfilled, and that the author possesses a high degree of confidence 
in the findings reported above. 
11.2 Testing Propositions: Strategic Content and Combinations 
This section continues the work of the legitimisation of Proposition's 1 to 5, which were 
developed in Section 8.1.3, as begun in Sections 9.2 and 10.3. These propositions sought 
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to describe key characteristics of the strategies of companies in either regulated or recently 
liberalised industries, which would be developed for wider empirical testing in later 
research. The analysis throughout follows the framework established in Chapter Nine. 
11.2.1 Legitimising Proposition 1 
Proposition PI stated that: 
"companies will employ a limited concentrated growth approach 10 ongoing 
operations within their regulated businesses" 
SWEB had established an Operations Division immediately prior to privatisation to 
manage its regulated distribution business (WPD, UK013, 2000). The early move to place 
its monopoly enterprise on a sounder business footing perhaps marks SWEB out as an 
organisation which adopted a slightly different approach in this area. The evidence gained 
from interviewees suggests that while the Company did pursue a concentrated growth 
approach, there were some aspects where there was a degree of difference. The emphasis 
within SWEB was always to attempt to achieve income growth. The structure of 
operations in the distribution business was altered in 1992-93 to encourage lower costs 
and higher levels of customer service, as a process of rationalisation was launched to 
improve the effectiveness of the core concentrated growth approach. Consequently, a 
number of smaller businesses were established as SBUs, to create potential income 
streams. This approach is an extension of the client-provider model attempted by 
Seeboard. Metering, training, even their helicopter fleet, were established as SBUs, within 
the wider distribution business, and required to seek external contracts to subsidize their 
financial impact upon the distribution business. The aim was greater cost effectiveness. 
The need for this move was signalled even more forcefully around the time of the takeover 
when the first regulatory review in 1994, which cut the distribution business's income by 
14%, was followed by the second review which cut a further 11% (WPD, UKOI3, 2000). 
There followed an intense period of cost reduction: "within distribution we reduced our 
staffing levels by about 21-22% over 1996 ... knowing as we did approximately what the 
income level was likely to be, to maximise profits" (WPD, UK013, 2000). In addition, 
SWEB started to become involved in regional development programmes to encourage 
more businesses to the South West. This was felt to be the only form of market 
development activity that was available to the Company's monopoly distribution business 
(Southern Co., US003, 1999). 
WPD has become the third REC to engage in extending its limited concentrated growth 
approach by engaging in horizontal integration, although unlike the first and second RECs: 
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Eastern and London, it has achieved this through a takeover rather than a merger. It's 
takeover of SW ALEC was presaged by the comments made by the 
, who said in relation to horizontal integration of this kind: 
"clearly one possibility is that if there are developments of the joint venture kind like 
London and Eastern, there will be another 'cliff face'. The Regulator will do the 
comparisons he does and will say 'the frontiers of efficiency are the London's and 
Eastern's of this world. And I know you are not joint ventured, Western Power, but sorry 
you are still going to lose your income because you could have been'. It is certainly 
something that we are alert to and need to look at the possibility for" (WPD, UK013, 
2000). Clearly, as the takeover of SW ALEC occurred within 6 months of the interview. 
Proposition 1 is, therefore, largely supported by the SWEB case, but does demonstrate 
the limited range of options that are available to companies to extend their core approach. 
Market development opportunities are available through regional development 
programmes, there are some opportunities in what might loosely be called product 
development or concentric diversification (such as establishing core activities as separate 
subsidiary businesses), but primarily cost reduction and improved efficiency are the core 
aims of such a business, and increasingly are required to be sought through horizontal 
integration. 
11.2.2 Legitimising Proposition 2 
Proposition P2 stated that: 
"companies will seek to employ approaches to develop critical mass in most if not all 
of their continuing un-regulated businesses" 
The interviews with SWEB managers present the most clear indication of the importance 
of critical mass to supply industries to emerge during the field research stage, and suggests 
the questionable viability of remaining within the industry if this critical mass is absent. 
When Southern Company arrived, their view of S WEB's supply business was that it was 
uncompetitive. The previous managers had decided that they were going to be the most 
profitable REC "so in the competitive business they were basically going out of business. 
Their prices were so high that nobody was buying from them. All they were doing was 
running the franchise until it ended" (Southern Company, US003, 1999). The new owners 
sought to tum the activity around by improving quality of service, and more importantly, 
trying to get the cost per customer down. 
While they believed that they had succeeded in both of these objectives, the cost of sales 
remained too high. The delivery of the service carried with it certain core costs, like for 
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example the cost of maintaining the billing infrastructure, which could not be reduced in 
absolute terms, but which could be reduced marginally, as a proportion of the cost per 
customer: "so the only way to get the cost per customer down was to get more 
customers" (Southern Company, US003, 1999). The new managers of SWEB 
rationalised that there were three possible ways to do this: organically; by acquisition; or 
by joint venture. 
The first option was the present and continuing solution that was not providing them with 
the numbers they required due to the competitive nature of the market. The Company's 
attention switched to buying critical mass, by taking over the customer base of a rival. 
SWEB's experience of the gas trails in the South West had provided some experience of 
the cost of such an approach. During these gas trials, they estimated that a single new 
customer would cost on average £100 to 'buy', but would only generate £15 profit per 
year. Consequently, the customer had to be held for a minimum of seven years to 
guarantee a profit. Customers under the new system could change supplier every 28 days, 
and consequently the growth by acquisition approach was deemed both too costly, and 
too risky. 
The Company then explored the possibility of a joint venture with a competitor, and had 
discussions with several companies: Southern Electric, but they were too busy merging 
their business with that of Scottish Hydro; Midlands, but they soon sold out to National 
Power; and SW ALEC, before they were sold on to British Energy. They would have 
talked to others, but were increasingly uncertain as to the position being taken by the 
government with relation to the sale of supply businesses: would further sales be 
permitted? Ultimately, having not found a suitable partner, and not being anywhere near 
the 4-5 million customers they believed necessary for the business to remain viable, they 
divested the SWEB supply business to LondonlEdF (Southern Company, US003, 1999). 
This case therefore clearly supports Proposition 2, and also shows unequivocally the 
difficulties of successfully achieving that target. 
11.2.3 Legitimising Proposition 3 
Proposition P3 stated that: 
"the approaches mentioned in P2 will of necessity involve a combined price and non-
price generic approach, so backing the arguments of a variety of authors against the 
conclusions of Porter (1980)" 
Despite no longer remaining within the competitive part of the industry, the SWEB case 
does present evidence in support of Proposition 3. The comments made in Section 11.2.2 
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regarding the situation that Southern Company discovered when taking over SWEB, 
where "their prices were so high that nobody was buying from them" (Southern Company, 
US003, 1999), indicates the importance of price in any supply transaction. However, as 
noted in Section 11.2.1, the Company also sought to improve customer service standards. 
A SWEB manager noted that, prior to the takeover, the Company had been the "worst 
back in 1995" in relation to customer complaints per 100,000. By the time of the sale, a 
total reverse had occurred and SWEB was first in 1998 and 1999 "so we had had 
tremendous uplift in customer service across a whole range of measures" (WPD, UK013, 
2000). They had one of the highest rated call centres in the country, and argue that the 
very high price received from LondonlEdF; at £235 million it was considerably higher than 
the prices received for Midland's or SW ALEC's supply businesses which were sold at 
around the same time, was as a consequence of the goodwill they had developed with their 
customers. 
The importance of a competitive price, and of a high added value level of customer 
service, is further revealed by the fact that the Company enjoyed the lowest loss rate of 
business and domestic customers for the middle period following privatisation. The new 
managers required an across the board improvement in service quality with each employee 
taking responsibility for improving customer service where possible, a commitment which 
continues in the monopoly business to this day. Despite, therefore, no longer operating 
within the competitive business, SWEB does provide strong support for Proposition 3, 
although it does also suggest that even with a successful utility based approach, success 
is not guaranteed within the industry. 
11.2.4 Legitimising Proposition 4 
Proposition P4 stated that: 
"'new core' businesses will evolve incrementally as compames take on the 
responsibility for identifying viable concentric diversification" 
SWEB clearly did become involved in both gas and generation, but the extent to which 
either business was ever a 'core' business is questionable. As Section 6.4 demonstrated, 
SWEB was relatively late in developing a gas business, and while its investments in 
generation came early, they were never of the same magnitude as others in the industry. 
Up until the takeover, however, the Company's investments in these areas, and others like 
telecoms, were certainly incremental. 
Upon taking over, Southern announced that it would be seeking to expand its generation 
capacity, equating as it did generation capability with market power. This strategy was 
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based upon two main business decisions: to seek building consents for new generation 
capacity, and to buy existing generation capacity. The latter decision was perhaps the 
most significant as the target that Southern sought to purchase was the largest UK 
generation company, National Power. In April of 1996, Southern Company approached 
National Power to request talks about a formal merger between the two companies 
(WPD, UK013, 2000). This was rejected by National Power and speculation arose that 
an hostile bid would be forthcoming. National Power was at the time attempting to take 
over Southern Electric in a bid which was subsequently blocked by the Regulator (as 
discussed in Section 7.4). It's view was that a merger with Southern Electric, one of the 
larger RECs, made more operational sense than merging with SWEB, one of the smallest. 
However, external forces were soon in play to prevent SWEB/Southern Company's 
interest from leading to an hostile bid. The Government announced that it had placed a 
block upon any prospective takeover of either of the national generator's, by retaining its 
golden share in both National Power and PowerGen. It argued that such a move was 
necessary to protect the infant generation industry from the anti-competitive threats that 
such a merger would provide, in terms of the potential for vertical integration (Becket, 
1996). The senior manager from WPD attributes the decision to more overt political 
motivation and suggests that Southern Company was warned off by the then Conservative 
administration that was approaching a general election and was worried by the political 
ramifications of approving such a takeover. It was his belief that "it was mainly a political 
decision, taken in the run up to an election, based upon the potentially adverse PR for the 
Government of selling off a key UK asset, so it actually wasn't allowed to happen. It was 
a significant source of frustration for Southern Company at the time" (WPD, UK013, 
2000). 
Generation would have aided the objective of building critical mass in supply, as discussed 
in Section 7.2.2. As has been indicated earlier, SWEB/Southern was putting considerable 
effort into that business objective, and at the time making an operating loss. More 
generation capability, allied to its existing supply channels, equalled vertical integration 
and cheaper operating costs and cost of sales. This setback alone may not have caused 
the retreat from supply, but a further setback occurred which had an equally detrimental 
effect. Southern was reported to be considering a variety of other options in generation, 
including approaching Eastern Group to discuss a joint venture which would see Southern 
taking a stake in its operations, or possibly operational control of its assets. This did not 
come to pass, so Southern switched its attention to building its own capacity. Southern 
had already obtained a planning consent to build a CCGT plant in the North of England. 
However, this consent was later blocked by the incoming Labour Government which 
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imposed a moratorium upon new build gas stations, in order to safeguard the interests of 
the UK coal industry (WPD, UK013, 2000). 
This third setback, allied to those involving National Power and Eastern Group, 
significantly contributed to the retreat from supply. WPD still owns an interest in Teeside 
Power, and Southern Company continues to invest in individual projects within the UK, 
but the plan to create a vertically integrated organisation with a presence at all stages of 
the energy chain had now gone. Clearly, this analysis ofSWEB's activities would seem 
both to support and oppose Proposition 4. An incremental approach was evident at the 
beginning of the period, and also during this time. However, it is clear that the new 
owners viewed a step change as being necessary to establish real market power in 
generation at least. This suggests that the concept of incrementalism is appropriate up to 
a certain point when that approach fails to meet the aims and objectives of the 
organisation. As SWEB's aims and objectives changed after the takeover, so the 
acceptability of an organic, incremental approach diminished. This does not, however, 
diminish the legitimacy of Proposition 4 which is accordingly supported. 
11.2.5 Legitimising Proposition 5 
Proposition P5 stated that: 
"companies will inevitably seek consolidation, either vertically or horizontally, 
regardless of the regulatory regime within the industry, supporting the work of Helm 
and Jenkinson (1997)" 
The evidence presented earlier in Section 11.2 would appear to justify and validate this 
proposition. The sections above have seen how SWEB sought to consolidate both 
vertically and horizontally throughout this period: horizontally through a joint venture in 
supply, and the takeover ofthe SW ALEC distribution business, and vertically by seeking 
to develop its generation capability. Proposition 5 is therefore supported by this case. 
11.2.6 Commentary 
Once again, therefore, the case appears to provide support for Proposition's 1 to 5, and 
for the analysis presented in earlier chapters. It also demonstrates that there will be 
instances of variation at the margin of each of the propositions. In SWEB's case, it was 
pursuing an extended concentrated growth approach in distribution from an early stage, 
and has presented one model for the extension of this approach into a newer, more 
demanding regulated regime. SWEB also provided a clear conceptualisation of the 
process of concentration that all of the companies faced, and which Proposition's 2 and 
5 sought to capture. 
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SWEB's principal interest in this research is that while it has actively conformed to all of 
the five proposition's, it is the first of the RECs to be examined in this extended field 
analysis to have experienced major setbacks, insofar as the strategy pursued by the 
Company has not succeeded in fulfilling its aims. SWEB' s case therefore suggests that 
success is not merely a product of pursuing the 'right' strategy in an industry like the ESI, 
but that there are other key determinants of success. This issue will be addressed in the 
following analysis. 
11.3 Testing Propositions: Strategic Drivers 
In pursuit of a resolution of Objective Two of this research, a series of observations with 
respect to strategic drivers evident within the sample was presented in Section 8.2. Once 
again, the author acknowledges that the identification of patterns of behaviour presented 
in Chapter Eight, and derived from textual data, can not be said to with a high enough 
confidence factor to accurately reflect the relative importance of the five differing sources 
of influence on the strategy process identified during the research. Section 8.2.4 set out, 
therefore, to establish a set of propositions which sought to describe the relative influence 
of each driver of strategy among companies in either regulated or recently liberalised 
industries. 
11.3.1 Legitimising Proposition 6 
Proposition P6 stated: 
"that the influence of an industry regulator upon a company's strategy will depend 
upon the relative proportion of its profits generated from regulated activities" 
It is clear that throughout the period, the Regulator played a crucial part in the 
development of strategy within SWEB. The observations made by SWEB managers 
therefore goes some way to suggest the validity of Proposition 6. During the research 
process, companies were frequently reluctant to talk directly about the procedures they 
have in place 'to manage' their relationship with the Regulator, but from what was 
revealed it is clear the importance the Regulator enjoys in SWEB's strategy process. As 
has already been noted, SWEB has one of the most difficult region's of the UK to manage 
due to the frequent inclemency of its weather and the demands that inclemency places 
upon the network, as well as the widely dispersed nature of its customers. SWEB's 
network management challenge is therefore more demanding than for most other RECs, 
and centred upon its ability to fulfil the demands of the Regulator. This has led in the past 
to the Company lobbying the Regulator quite strongly in relation to the special 
requirements of its region, asking for some form of special dispensation to account for 
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these extra demands. The importance of the Regulator to WPD is also very clear as, with 
the sale of its supply business, the Company has very few non-regulated income streams 
to call upon, with the result that the Regulator oversees virtually all of their profit 
generating activities. 
The first regulatory review, in 1994, was widely perceived as a triumph for SWEB. In the 
words of the then CEO, the Company "was pleased that this (reView) recognised the 
exceptional challenges and costs that we face in the South West" (Seed, in SWEB, 1995, 
pA). The outcome was the result of diligence on the part of the management team, and 
their efforts aimed at raising the Regulator's awareness of those 'exceptional challenges'. 
The City had been expecting a much harsher review of SWEB' s performance and shows 
how tenaciously the managers of SWEB paid attention to the Regulator's particular 
concerns in operating their business. Yet, as noted above, the review saw a 14% 
reduction in the Company's income in its distribution business. 
When SWEB was taken over by Southern, the Company's approach to its management 
of the Regulator appears to have become if not more aggressive, then certainly more 
focussed. It is safe to say that the incoming managers of SWEB were not impressed by 
the UK regulatory system, which they perceived to be overtly pro-customer at the expense 
of the companies, and to possess an large degree of business risk due to a lack of 
certainty. The view from Atlanta was that the Regulator had been captured by the 
customer lobby, and was not helping the companies. The Company's concern was based 
upon what they saw as a lack of consistency within the process. The Regulator when 
engaging in a review, they argued, tends to consider the actions and performance of each 
company from the beginning of the period; that is to say 1990, at every review, rather than 
since the last review was concluded, for example 1995. To Southern this is illogical. 
They hold that a review should be upon the basis of what has happened over the period 
under review, and nothing else. As one manager described it "we had a regulatory base 
in '95. What we ought to say is 'OK, that is the regulatory asset base. Now what have 
you added and what have you retired? But don't go back and revisit all of this. That was 
very worrisome to us" (Southern Company, US003, 1999). 
The latest price review led to a requirement for WPD to cut its prices by a further 20% 
(WPD, UK013, 2000). Clearly, the Company has concerns that cuts of this order are 
making the profitability of their business unnecessarily risky, especially as it now has no 
other income streams. However, the decision to sell its supply business has at least 
removed the threat to income streams offered by the proposed business separation 
legislation which WPD privately regards as 'crazy'. However, the power of the Regulator 
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over its business means that the Company has little choice but to make representations to 
the Regulator at the consultative phase in any review, and then try to develop the most 
advantageous implementation process available to it once the policy developed by the 
Regulator has been clarified. 
One clear area of conflict between SWEB and the Regulator was that of the Windfall Tax. 
While the tax was not imposed by the Regulator, the incoming managers from Southern 
blamed the Regulator to a large extent for permitting the original 'excesses' that the tax 
was intended to remedy, or penalise. SWEB under Southern believed it had been 
punished for the actions of others, as it believes that its own record of public service and 
corporate responsibility has been impeccable. SWEB was active in leading a protest 
against the tax, but recognised that the new Labour administration had been mandated to 
levy it, and that the RECs could do little about it. The impact of the tax was identified as 
being equivalent to "two year's of net income wiped out" (WPD, UK013, 2000), and was 
arguably the final setback that the Company received which triggered its decision to 
partially retreat from the industry by seiling its supply business. 
The windfall tax, therefore, allied to the actions of Regulator and Government in halting 
the Company's plans in generation, and the reluctance of other RECs to join forces in 
supply has played a very significant role in the Company's strategy development in the last 
five years. These external forces have actively, and effectively, constrained the 
organisational goals of the Company's owners and present an example of how external 
forces can have a profound impact. This finding is unlike those of the earlier case studies, 
and can be seen to illustrate the apparent lack of consistency in the area of strategic 
influences in the sector. It also in some ways undermines the argument that strong 
companies can ignore external influences, as Southern Company and PP&L combined are 
probably stronger in terms of financial capability than any of the other owners ofRECs 
within the sector. 
This analysis therefore provides tentative support for Proposition 6. While the influence 
of the Regulator at the present time is beyond question, it was also significant when the 
Company was operating in a variety of other non-regulated areas, and had less of a 
reliance upon regulated earnings. This suggests that a direct correlation between the 
Regulator's influence and the importance of regulatory profits is not proven and that, in 
some cases certainly, the Regulator is a key influence regardless of the reliance upon 
regulated income. It is, however, possible to argue that the actions that the new owners 
ofSWEB proposed to undertake were as a consequence of the weakness of non-regulated 
earnings, suggesting that the Company was one of the RECs that had never been able to 
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reduce the influence of the Regulator on its strategy. 
11.3.2 Legitimising Proposition 7 
Proposition P7 stated: 
"that companies pursuing a strategy across a range of sectors will be subject to 
influences from a variety of different drivers, but that the extent of the influence each 
exerts will be situational" 
SWEB presents an interesting case as, unlike either of the two preceding RECs, it has 
sought to pursue a definitely expansive strategy, but has been rebuked. Even more 
interesting is that this rebuke has followed a seemingly favourable alignment among its 
strategic drivers. In the case of the Company's supply and generation strategies, SWEB 
had: (a) identified market opportunity; (b) developed the appropriate resource base to 
pursue that opportunity; (c) possessed a leadership committed to the strategy; and (d) was 
assured of the support of the owners of the Company. What appears to have happened 
is that in the generation business, the regulatory-legislative influence proved to be greater 
than the influence exerted by the other drivers, and combined to constrain the Company's 
strategy, while other external drivers, such as competitors, contrived to halt the strategy 
in supply. 
The proposition is seen to be valid therefore, but principally in relation to the observation 
that the hierarchy of influences is situational. It also suggests that some organisations will 
have difficulty overcoming the influence of legal-regulatory drivers if circumstances do 
not favour them. What form those unfavourable circumstances take will be discussed in 
relation to Proposition 8. 
11.3.3 Legitimising Proposition 8 
Proposition P8 stated: 
"that organisational size will be a key factor in an organisation's management of its 
relationship with strategic drivers" 
The discussion in Section 11.3.2 appears to suggest a scenario where a smaller company, 
or one with relatively limited market strength, has not been able to overcome the influence 
of external and regulatory factors in pursuing its chosen strategy, despite a favourable 
alignment of other external and internal factors. This situation appears to be the very 
opposite of the situation observed with Eastern Group, in Chapter Nine. Does the 
evidence gained from the SWEB case support this assumption upon deeper investigation? 
The discussion looks separately at the cases of generation and supply. 
-488-
Firstly, generation. SWEB/Southern's plans in generation: to horizontally integrate 
through acquisition and organic development, were halted by act of regulator and act of 
government. However, there is little in the analysis which suggests that a larger, or more 
'powerful', company would have had much more success. The decisions in both cases 
were politically expedient, and SWEB was not alone in suffering from the government's 
decision to place a moratorium on new build combined cycle gas turbine plants when it 
arrived in power in 1997. As for the decision to block the takeover of National Power, 
this was both politically expedient and, according to the Regulator, potentially anti-
competitive. The official explanation was that as SWEB was a generator, albeit a small 
one, taking over National Power would have the net effect of there being one less 
generator, and hence reduced competition. The Company takes a differing perspective 
and blames the impending election, and the political consequences of: (a) a national 
generator being owned by Americans and (b) the impact of reduced competition as 
mentioned earlier (WPD, UK013, 2000). Market power is unlikely to have had an impact 
in this case, therefore. 
However, the same could not be said for SWEB's experience in supply although the 
impact of leadership is also crucial here. SWEB wanted to form a partnership with 
another REC to increase critical mass in supply, as its leaders were not prepared to pay 
the necessary premium to buy critical mass. There is little doubt that a company of 
Southern's resources could afford to buy, for example SWALEC, Midlands, or Norweb's4 
supply businesses, they just did not see the economic rationale. Eastern, on the other 
hand, did see the rationale and purchased Norweb Energi. Being unwilling to buy market 
share, the Company was unable to convince a competitor to join it in an alliance of some 
description. Size or Market power is unlikely to have made a difference here either, as 
the industry has yet to witness the joining of two supply businesses without a change in 
ownership. This suggests that any reluctance on the part of potential partners was based 
upon divergent strategic views, rather than a question of market power. Companies who 
wanted to remain within the industry wanted to do so on their terms, which involved total, 
rather than shared, control of their assets. Consequently, once again organisational size 
is not the key factor in this case, although more so than was the case in generation. 
Organisational size was not, therefore, the determining factor in SWEB' s relationship with 
external factors after 1995, and hence Proposition 8 is not supported. However, the story 
is slightly different prior to 1995. Section 6.4 explored the relationship that SWEB 
4 
The other three REC supply businesses to have been divested. 
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enjoyed with, for example, the City of London prior to its takeover, and concluded that 
the City's low expectation of SWEB was a based in part upon its low market power 
resulting from its small size, and that that constrained its ability to pursue its chosen 
strategy. Proposition 8 is therefore identified as a useful debating point, which may add 
value in future extensions of this research. 
11.3.4 Legitimising Proposition 9 
Proposition P9 stated that: 
"that companies will seek to develop greater control over the impact of strategic 
drivers by developing key internal capabilities to achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage" 
The preceding sections, 11.3.2 and 11.3.4, have demonstrated that in the case of SWEB 
the nature of the intended strategy was indeed a product of internal factors: the 
marshalling of the necessary resources by committed leaders enjoying the support of the 
owner in pursuit of recognised market opportunity. However, in certain circumstances 
the fact of such a positive alignment can not overcome strong external constraints, like 
regulatory bodies operating to prevent what they perceive as anti-competitive behaviour, 
or with political motivations. Regardless of this, however, the nature of the intended 
strategy within SWEB was indeed a product of internal factors, and clearly SWEB was 
intending to build upon what it perceived to be its unique capabilities and resources to 
achieve competitive advantage. 
SWEB's confidence in the uniqueness of its capabilities and the ability of its resources to 
add value were largely a product of the takeover, which was viewed as having enhanced 
both considerably. SWEB's view that it was an effective customer service organisation 
was made true by the cultural change following the takeover, although its ability to 
manage a huge increase in its supply customer base has to be in question. The 
interviewee's noted both the antiquity of the existing supply side infrastructure (Southern 
Co., US003, 1999) and the failure of the CROESO computer network joint venture with 
SW ALEC (WPD, UK013, 2000) although both interviewees believed the Company's call 
centre operations were of the highest order. Similarly, its financial capability shaped its 
confidence that it could operate a major generation portfolio, a large supply business, or 
an effective distribution company. The retreat from competitive businesses has not 
diminished this view, and the Company now identifies its network management capabilities 
as adding value to its recently expanded distribution business. 
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Proposition 9 is therefore supported in this case, but the author notes that there is a 
considerable difference between determining the nature of the strategic approach, and 
enabling its success. 
11.3.5 Legitimising Proposition 10 
Proposition P10 stated that: 
"that ownership is the key influence over strategy" 
SWEB presents a very clear example of ownership becoming a key influence over 
strategy, although it also suggests that the impact of ownership, like many other factors, 
is situational. The takeover by Southern Company changed SWEB' s outlook completely. 
Prior to the takeover, the Company performed within the middle ranks of the industry, and 
was possibly viewed as being among the weakest of the companies. After the takeover, 
it was transformed into one of the more aggressive companies, with a expansive strategy 
aimed at establishing it as a key player within the industry. However, as the preceding 
narrative shows, even this positive alignment offactors was not sufficient to overcome the 
constraints that developed between 1996 and 1998. Ownership remains a key factor 
within the new WPD, and the takeover of SW ALEC distribution shows that there is still 
a desire to expand within the industry, albeit in a narrower segment than previously 
envisaged. At present within SWEB, the key influences are probably ownership running 
equal in importance with that of the Regulator, reflecting WPD's reliance upon regulated 
income. Proposition lOis therefore partially supported. 
11.3.6 Commentary 
Once again, as with the studies of Eastern and Seeboard, there would appear to be a 
different configuration of strategic drivers evident within this case. SWEB appears to 
have been particularly susceptible to the influence of the Regulator, and to other external 
factors. In particular, the 'contest' between strong owners and the Regulator has shown 
the particular importance of the influence of the latter. This is in contrast to the situation 
of Eastern Group; more influenced by internal factors, and Seeboard; influenced by all of 
the possible factors. The SWEB case suggests that the pattern, whose existence was 
suggested in Section 10.3.6, may indeed be evident. This is an issue that will be returned 
to at the conclusion of this chapter and in Chapter Twelve. 
11.4 Validity of Classification 
In Section 8.3, a series of classifications were presented based upon the analysis 
undertaken for each of the Company's in either Chapter's Five, Six or Seven, and Chapter 
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Eight. This section aims to consider the classification arrived at for SWEB, and to 
consider what the judgement reached in this case can tell about the wider validity of the 
classification system proposed by Miles and Snow (1978), in a regulated environment. 
11.4.1 Validity of Classification of SWEB 
In Table 8.9 of Section 8.3, the following classification's were made in relation to SWEB: 
~ that it was a local service provider, with no involvement in competitive markets; 
~ that it employed Variant 2B in its distribution business; 
~ that the key influences over its strategy making were a combination of regulatory 
and ownership factors; 
that the owner was pursuing 'arms length' strategic asset seeking investment; and 
that SWEB was in consequence a defender, using the Miles and Snow typology. 
The assessment of SWEB as a defender, as defined in Section 2.5.6.2.1, argues that it 
possesses different characteristics from those of Eastern and Seeboard. However, and 
with reference to the discussion presented in Section 10.4, is it not possible to argue that 
SWEBIWPD's behaviour and characteristics are similar to either or both of Eastern and 
Seeboard's distribution businesses? 
SWEBIWPD's classification as a defender was based upon its singular involvement in a 
regulated business which does not permit particularly aggressive domain extension 
activity. However, it is clear from the preceding analysis, and that presented in Section 
6.4, that SWEB is anything but a defender, and indeed is arguably an innovative company 
in its distribution business, insofar as its takeover of SW ALEC's distribution business has 
augmented its existing market development activity. Consequently, it is arguable that 
SWEBIWPD is an analyzer in distribution (following the cautious prospecting undertaken 
by Eastern and London in this sector), and not a defender at all. 
The case ofSWEBIWPD would therefore seem to confirm that: (a) the fact ofa singular 
involvement in a regulated industry should not be assumed to be evidence of only one 
form of behaviour; and (b) that the case presents further support for the argument that 
separate classifications are required for each of the major businesses an organisation is 
engaged in, be they involved in both supply and distribution or, as in the case of 
SWEBIWPD, only in distribution. This case therefore suggests that a degree of deeper 
clarification is required in order to understand the applicability of this model to an industry 
like the ESI. This issue will be returned to and considered in Chapter Twelve. 
-492-
11.5 Other Key Issues 
This section continues the work begun in Section's 9.5 and 10.5 in examining the variety 
of other key issues identified throughout this research, but which have not been the core 
focus of attention. The first of these considers what the case of SWEB can contribute to 
the debate on the differing concepts of the firm. 
11.5.1 Competitive Forces versus the Resource Based View 
The author believes that there are possibly three distinct periods during this case study: 
1989-1995; 1995-1999; and 1999 onwards, during which the Company's emphasis 
appears to have swung, as interpreted by the competing concepts of the firm. Initially, the 
Company was following a strategy best understood by a competitive forces approach, 
orienting itself and its strategic outlook to its industry, and pursuing what could be 
identified as relatively predictable traditional strategies. While the Company may have 
argued they possessed unique capabilities, they were only latterly attempting to exploit 
them as a series of resources conferring the potential for competitive advantage. The 
decision to establish a variety of functional areas as not just profit centres, but as separate 
subsidiary holdings; the increasingly familiar internal network configuration (Miles and 
Snow, 1992) can be seen as evidence of a resource based view gaining ground. 
Following the takeover, this developing emphasis was more central to the organisation 
although the approach was also combined with a very industry facing approach. While 
entrepreneurialism continued to be encouraged, the emphasis of the Company was based 
very firmly upon the market and through developing market power. The middle period 
saw a more balanced approach which the case study of Eastern identified as being the 
idealised response from a company in this sort of situation. The final period perhaps 
shows the same sort of relationship, but on a much reduced scale. The separate subsidiary 
network still exists, but the loss of the main competitive businesses has reduced the scope 
of the potential for a resource based approach to thrive. The regulated industry focus 
clearly favours an industry facing approach, although as with all concepts that are applied 
to the distribution business, care needs to be exercised when using terms 10 
acknowledgement of the lack of competition. This issue, the validity of the competitive 
forces concept in a non-competitive arena and the need for modification of terminology, 
is discussed in Chapter Twelve. 
11.5.2 The Impact of Process 
SWEB appears to have had a more definite strategy than did Seeboard, as discussed in the 
preceding chapter, in the very early years following privatisation. The early decision to 
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establish a divisionalized, business focussed structure gives the impression of a company 
with a clear awareness of the requirements of the new environment and hence of the need 
for a strategy. The emphasis, as discussed in Section 11.5.1, was initially upon the 
traditional areas conducted by a REC, and primarily in distribution. The evidence gained 
in the interviews would suggest that initially the Company pursued a more prescriptive 
approach, deeded necessary because of the scrutiny the Company was subject to in its 
difficult distribution franchise, and lack of emphasis upon its supply business. 
As the potential within the industry became more apparent, so the Company began to 
pursue a more emergent approach to its strategy. The structure for a more decentralised 
approach already existed, and gradually the management structure evolved to maximise 
the benefit the Company could obtain from this structure. Each of the different divisions 
were headed by a Managing Director, and responsibility for business level strategy was 
increasingly passed to them. This ran in tandem with the establishment of separate profit 
centre/subsidiary undertakings, whose mandate was to be entrepreneurial, and all of whom 
managed their own profit and loss accounting (WPD, UK013, 2000). The organisational 
and managerial structure stayed the same during the period following the takeover, but 
the philosophy changed slightly. The new owners disliked the concept of a divisional 
company, as it implied actual 'division', which did not fit their philosophy. They preferred 
a team concept, where everyone was working towards a common goal, and where 
responsibility was shared. This development can not be seen to have returned SWEB to 
a more prescriptive strategic approach, but it is certainly the case that the US owners had 
a more defined concept of where the Company was going in terms of its strategy in supply 
and generation, and so while the concept of 'strategy as pattern' was still in place, the 
detail of the pattern was clearly more well defined under the new ownership than 
previously. The subsidiary undertakings were, however, still encouraged to pursue new 
opportunities for non-regulated revenue generation, and in these areas it is possible to 
identify a more emergent process. 
Following the sale of the supply business, and the reversion of the generation business to 
a simple asset managed for profit rather than the planned strategically integrated 
enterprise, the Company has reverted to a more prescriptive approach, as befits a 
regulated, stable, and non-competitive business, which operates a unified functional 
structure (WPD, UK013, 2000). Once again, the exception to this observation are found 
in the subsidiary businesses which follow a more emergent path, at least when they are not 
contractually obliged to provide services for the main group. 
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11.5.3 Strategy Making at Different Levels 
As discussed throughout this chapter, the decision to establish a divisionalized structure 
in 1988 allowed for the potential for strategy making at different levels to become 
commonplace. The establishment of separate managing directors for each of the six initial 
divisions, and the encouragement of entrepreneurial attitudes among the subsidiary 
businesses, which fit very closely to Buzzell and Gale's SBU concept, extended this 
process. While the takeover by Southern appears to have resulted in a more centralised 
strategic objective, the devolution of responsibility for some aspects of strategy was 
undoubtably retained. The Company now operates a functional structure, but one where 
the layers of management have been reduced from the original seven layers, to "far fewer". 
The emphasis is upon responsiveness and proportionality in staffing, and in order to 
deliver effective service to its customers, the bulk of the remaining employees at WPD are 
consequently in the field. There is a hierarchy in place, with fixed reporting lines, but 
inevitably a degree of autonomy is also evident within the structure. In the main, the 
remaining employees ofWPD are engineers, focussed upon specific tasks which are aimed 
at maintaining the integrity of the network (WPD, UK013, 2000). They are not called 
upon to make competitive judgements, but rather to perform a particular task as 
effectively as possible. The Company's geographical area is divided up between teams, 
who are tasked with ensuring this integrity. The current business and structure probably 
allows operational decision making to be devolved, rather than business level decision 
making which is of less importance in a non-competitive industry. 
11.5.4 Leadership 
As was observed on both of the preceding chapters, different leadership styles appear to 
have been evident within SWEB over this time period. Once again, the differing styles of 
leadership appear to broadly coincide with the different phases the Company experienced, 
as identified in Section 11.5.l. During the first phase, when the organisation operated 
under a more prescriptive strategy regime, the leadership appears to have been more 
transactional, emphasising hierarchy and control mechanisms. However, the more 
entrepreneurial attitude which became evident within the Company as it moved towards 
the second phase reflects the development of more transformational leadership: a process 
which was completed with the arrival of the new US owners. However, and as has been 
noted throughout this section, the extent of the transformational leadership evident within 
SWEB was never as great as was evident in, for example, Eastern Group. The approach 
of the new dominant coalition within SWEB suggests what Farkus and Wetlaufer (1996) 
identify as a human-assets approach, wherein a 'corporate way of doing things' IS 
inculcated by the example of senior managers. 
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The interviews provided a notable example of this human-assets approach, in relation to 
customer service. A senior WPD manager describes the impact of the new CEO on 
improved service quality in this area: "If a customer complaint came to the Chief 
Executive's office, prior to takeover typically that would get passed to the appropriate 
department to deal with. The new Chief Executive from the States took it upon himself 
personally to deal with any complaints that came through to his office. It was taking up 
ages. But you know that phrase they use 'for change to be effective it needs to be seen 
to happen at the top', as well as all the way through the organisation. You think, well that 
is one of those phrases you see in business books. But it was true. It had an immediate 
effect. If the Chief Executive is ringing through to a team manager or a distribution 
manager in one of the localities and saying 'I've got this complaint and I want you to find 
out the reason and come back to me this afternoon so I can ring up this customer in order 
to speak personally to him or her', something like that very quickly has an impact 
throughout the organisation" (WPD, UK013, 2000). 
The sale of the Company's supply business has seen a move back towards a more 
transactional style ofleadership, albeit across fewer layers of management than before the 
takeover. However, the Company still retains the human-resources approach to 
leadership as the best way to perpetuate the dominant philosophy of the owners of the 
Company. 
11.5.5 The Impact of Structure 
The structure of SWEB has been discussed throughout this chapter. It has been noted 
that the Company was among the first to move towards a divisionalized structure, in a 
decision that anticipated the demands of the new era. The impact of this more business 
oriented structure was not immediately felt, as the Company was not initially particularly 
entrepreneurial. However as the period progressed, the divisional structure provided the 
framework for the development of a more entrepreneurial attitude throughout the 
Company. As described earlier, the new owners disliked the concept of divisions, and 
preferred to emphasise the unity of the organisation in an attempt to create a team ethos. 
An interviewee describes the new owners thinking as follows: "In terms of divisional 
structure, following the takeover, one of the first decisions taken was to do away with the 
word 'division'. Southern Company ethic was to focus very much on the 'Team'. Now 
that wasn't the ethic in old SWEB. Their opinion was 'we shouldn't have the word 
division. That implies divides. We are actually team players. We should run it as a team 
from the top. The Chief Executive did not look at an HR guy to input only on HR 
aspects, or an operations guy on operations aspects, he wanted a broader business view, 
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from a team approach. So one of the first things we did when changing the organisation 
was getting rid of the word 'division'. Focus in upon team playing and mutual support 
within the organisation" (WPD, UK013, 2000). What happened was therefore more of 
a cosmetic change, to reflect the owners style of management. The extent to which the 
Company had never operated a divisional structure which pennitted autonomy, and indeed 
where a more prescribed approach to strategy was pursued (as discussed in Section 
1l.5.2) is demonstrated by this comment from the same manager: "we were organised 
functionally but if you like on a departmental basis rather than on a divisional basis" 
following the takeover (WPD, UK013, 2000). After the sale of the supply business, the 
operating logic of the remaining monopoly distribution saw the return to a functional 
structure. 
11.6 Concluding Remarks 
As with the preceding two chapter's, this case study of SWEBIWPD was intended to 
continue the process of verification of the ten propositions developed during the 
preliminary stage of this research. On so doing, Objective's One, Two, and Four of this 
research were to be addressed, and some headway gained in relation to Objective Three. 
Additionally, other relevant commentary was to be provided and conclusions drawn. 
The summary of the progress made in respect to Propositions 1 to 10 will be presented 
in Chapter Twelve, but at this point it is possible to say that: 
~ the case study provides support and legitimation for all of Proposition's 1 to 5, 
and indeed that support is greater than for the preceding cases. SWEB appears, 
therefore, to be more representative of the majority ofRECs if this analysis is seen 
to be accurate; but that once again 
while some support is offered for Proposition's 6 to 10, the degree of this support 
is not as conclusive as for the earlier five propositions. However, it is possible to 
argue that the degree of support is greater in this case than in either of the 
preceding cases. 
The support, or otherwise, for Proposition's 1 to 10 represents the confidence currently 
held in the observations made thus far in respect of Objectives One and Two. Concern 
was also expressed with respect to observation's made in relation to Objective Three, 
which will also be discussed in Chapter Twelve. 
Significantly, the chapter also offers a further opportunity to comment upon Miller's 
concept of 'organising themes' (Miller, 1996). This case study appears to provide further 
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support for the view that degree of 'market power' is related directly to the influence that 
is key in driving organisational strategy. At no point during its existence has SWEB 
exercised a high degree of market power, and as a possible consequence it has been 
subject to the pervasive influence of external factors. If this is indeed the case, then the 
research would appear to identify just such an organising theme. However, some degree 
of caution is required, as other factors, and in particular the initial, arguably 'intuitive' 
perception of the prospects of each company based upon the geographic locations of each 
company as discussed in Section 3.4.2 may also have been important. This issue will be 
returned to in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Twelve Evaluating Propositions and Classification 
12.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the progress made towards the resolution of the 
key objectives of this thesis during the field stage of the research, as reported in the 
preceding Chapter's Nine to Eleven. The investigation undertaken during the field stage 
was intended to explore in more detail, and aim to verify, the various conclusions drawn 
at the end of the preliminary stage of the research, as reported in Chapter Eight. The aim 
of this chapter is therefore to extend the analysis presented in Chapter Eight, and to 
ascertain the legitimacy, and hence the confidence, that can be placed in the findings 
reported to date. The success or otherwise of this part of the process will have a direct 
impact upon the contribution that this research can be said to have made to the wider 
literature, and upon the direction of future research. 
Both the questions of contribution, and the direction of future research will be addressed 
in the final chapter of this thesis. This chapter addresses the following elements of the 
research: 
~ firstly, a summary evaluation of the legitimacy of the ten propositions identified 
in Chapter Eight, and discussed throughout Chapter's Nine to Eleven. In 
presenting this evaluation, Objectives One, Two and Four of this research are 
resolved; 
Secondly, a summary evaluation of the relevance of a variety of existing 
managerial concepts and models to an industry like the ESI which does not 
operate in a typical free - market paradigm. In presenting this evaluation, 
Objective Three of this research is resolved; and 
Thirdly, and taking into account the review presented in relation to Objective 
Three, a discussion based around Supporting Objective One, wherein the author 
discusses some of the deficiencies identified in the application of existing concepts 
and models to an industry like the ESI and suggests tentative amendments to these 
concepts and models which (a) may help improve their applicability and (b) are 
then required to be tested further. 
12.1 Evaluating and Amending Propositions 
The purpose of this Section is to evaluate the ten tentative propositions identified in 
Chapter Eight, and ascertain whether they are valid or in need of amendment prior to their 
-499-
application and use in future research. The author's aim in this exercise is to justify the 
elevation of the tentative propositions to the position offormal hypotheses to be applied 
in forthcoming research. Before beginning this assessment, it is perhaps appropriate to 
reiterate the reasoning behind the development of the propositions. Objectives One and 
Two of the research originated in the assumption that the RECs would have: (a) 
developed different strategies and (b) been subject to different drivers in developing these 
strategies, despite being roughly similar at the point of their creation (the privatisation of 
the ESl in 1989). The author believed that the patterns that could be expected to emerge 
from the ESl could also be expected to emerge from industries sharing a variety of similar 
characteristics to the ESI. However in order to ascertain the similarity or dissimilarity of 
companies experiences, some form of quantifiable measure was required. The 
propositions were therefore devised to: (a) describe the key conclusions that developed 
out of the analysis of the behaviour of companies within the ES1; and (b) provided a 
means of comparison. This assessment of the validity of the propositions is divided, as 
has all of the analysis to date, between the propositions associated with strategic content, 
and strategic drivers. 
12.1.1 Validity of Proposition's 1 to 5 
Proposition's 1 to 5 were established in Section 8.l.3 based upon existing published data, 
and further tested in each of Chapters Nine to Eleven using primary data developed from 
in-depth interviews as part of the process of triangulation discussed in Section 3.2.2. The 
extent to which they accurately describe the reality of strategic content among the sample 
companies is now discussed: 
~ Proposition 1: that companies will employ a limited concentrated growth approach 
in ongoing operations within their regulated businesses, is strongly supported. 
Evidence from the preliminary and primary stage research shows that companies 
have relatively few options outside of a concentrated growth approach, identified 
as working its assets as hard as possible, due to the nature of regulation. 
Examples of extended approaches did emerge, which usually involved market 
development, through regional development schemes (Northern, Section 5.3) or 
wining large scale network management contracts (Seeboard, Chapter Ten). 
However the actions of two of the case study companies: Eastern (Chapter Nine) 
and SWEB (Chapter Eleven), provided evidence of more advanced thinking, albeit 
within the range of a limited concentrated growth approach, when their regulated 
business either merged with, or took over, the assets of another company. This 
behaviour, the author concludes, will become the norm within the industry, and 
accurately describes the options available to companies remaining within regulated 
industries. Its adoption unchanged as an hypothesis is therefore recommended; 
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Proposition 2: that companies will seek to employ approaches to develop critical 
mass in most if not all of their continuing un-regulated businesses, is also 
supported, but more conditionally that Proposition 1. Evidence from the 
preliminary stage, and especially from Chapter Eleven of the primary stage 
research, shows that once again companies have relatively little option but to seek 
critical mass in non-regulated areas, particularly in supply, as these industries 
mature and the economic realities of continued participation in each become clear. 
This behaviour, the author once again concludes, is becoming the norm within the 
industry and recent events1 suggest this. However, the evidence from Chapter Ten 
is that some companies do not appear to subscribe to this belief, and are seeking 
to manage their existing share of the market without overt attempts to develop 
critical mass. From this the author concludes that the industry has yet to reach full 
maturity, and much greater consolidation in search of critical mass will occur over 
the course of the current period. Nevertheless, and despite this qualification, its 
adoption unchanged as an hypothesis is therefore recommended; 
Proposition 3: that the approaches mentioned in P2 will of necessity involve a 
combined price and non-price generic approach, is strongly supported. All of the 
companies were faced with the need to develop low cost-high quality product 
offerings in each of their competitive areas of business, as consumer expectations 
were raised by the actions of the Regulator, and by the intensity of competition. 
Indeed the same is also true of their non-competitive businesses, but that was 
solely the product of the actions of the Regulator. The author, in a recent article 
(James et aI, 2001), has questioned whether this use of a segmented or 
unsegmented utility approach is an inevitable feature of the industry, or whether 
it will be a feature of the immature industry which will alter when maturity is 
reached? However, at the current time this proposition is indisputable, and its 
adoption unchanged as an hypothesis is therefore recommended; 
Proposition 4: that 'new core' businesses will evolve incrementally as companies 
take on the responsibility for identifYing viable concentric diversification, is 
supported but again with certain qualifications. The evidence from the secondary 
research suggested that the companies all sought to gradually develop new core 
businesses, which in this industry were gas supply and generation. However, later 
analysis during the field research, and in particular in Chapter's Nine and Eleven, 
suggested that incrementalism was a product of the available resources rather than 
As shown by the takeover of four supply companies, and the collapse of Independent Energy (See 
Chapter Four). 
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a cautious attitude. New owners of Eastern Group and SWEB sought to achieve 
step growth in generation: successfully in the case of Eastern, which reflects the 
influence of their greater financial resources post takeover. However, as the 
proposition attempts to describe behaviour at the beginning of a process: 
identifying viable concentric diversification, rather than attempting to achieve 
critical mass, the proposition is supported, and its adoption unchanged as an 
hypothesis is therefore recommended; and 
Proposition 5: that companies will inevitably seek consolidation, either vertically 
or horizontally, regardless of the regulatory regime within the industry, is once 
again supported with qualifications. A dominant theme within the industry since 
the expiration of the Government's golden shares in 1995 has been consolidation, 
which has been especially clear as a number of large groups begin to appear as 
supply and generation interests in particular are divested. However, and in 
common with the observations made of Proposition 2, some companies have yet 
to appreciate what the author identifies as a growing theme emerging as the 
industry matures, and have not followed this impulse. However, and despite this 
qualification, the proposition is supported, and its adoption unchanged as an 
hypothesis is therefore recommended. 
In general, therefore, all five proposition's related to strategic content have been 
supported, and will be carried forward into future research. This suggests that insofar as 
Objective One of the research is concerned, there is a clear element of similarity running 
through the content of each remaining REC's strategy. This the author identifies as 
indicating the existence of a 'REC archetype' strategy, or at least of certain key elements 
which are likely to be evident in all REC strategy to some extent. This does not suggest 
that all strategies are identical, although the analysis in Chapter Eight does suggest that 
the more radical departures from a archetypical utility approach have now been eradicated. 
However, the field analysis did suggest that the differences between companies do remain 
significant and that a deeper difference of opinion as to the future direction of the industry 
exists. Companies like Eastern are adopting a less utility focussed approach, by 
developing capabilities more akin to a city commodity trading organisation, and are 
pushing against the limitations of the archetype. Companies like Seeboard are arguably 
not yet at the stage of rationalizing that they need to adapt their existing strategies to 
effectively compete in the evolved energy industry. 
Overall, however, the analysis of the field study data would seem to support the 
conclusions reported in Chapter Eight, and to illustrate that while companies did pursue 
divergent strategies at the beginning of the period, there is a much greater degree of 
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homogeneity in terms of core principles of strategy, if not the precise content of each 
company's strategy itself. Whether this pattern can be identified within other similar 
industries is an issue for future research. 
12.1.2 Validity of Proposition's 6 to 10 
Proposition's 6 to 10 were established in Section 8.2.4 based upon existing published data, 
and further tested in each of Chapter's Nine to Eleven using primary data developed from 
in-depth interviews as part of the process of triangulation discussed in Section 3.2.2. The 
extent to which they accurately describe the reality of the impact of strategic drivers 
among the sample companies is now discussed: 
~ Proposition 6: that the influence of an industry regulator upon a company's 
strategy will depend upon the relative proportion of its profits generated from 
regulated activities, is generally supported. The evidence reviewed in Chapter 
Eight may be interpreted as suggesting that the influence of the Regulator was in 
some cases limited within this industry. However, the evidence gathered in field 
work would suggest that the Regulator remains a key influence, even for those 
organisation's which have developed extensive non-regulated revenue streams, 
such as Eastern Group. The conclusions from the field research is that the 
Regulator is perhaps the key influence, but that inevitably the degree of influence 
will be tempered by the extent that an organisation relies upon regulated earnings. 
While the new evidence supports the continued influence of the Regulator, it in no 
way contradicts the proposition, which is supported, and its adoption unchanged 
as an hypothesis is therefore recommended; 
Proposition 7: that companies pursuing a strategy across a range of sectors will 
be subject to influences from a variety of different drivers, but that the extent of 
the influence each exerts will be situational, is again generally supported. The case 
studies provided evidence, particularly in the case of Eastern Group, that wide 
ranging strategies required an organisation to have a clear understanding of the 
external environment and the opportunities and constraints it offers, its internal 
capabilities, and strong leadership support and initiative. The Eastern case, where 
leadership has identified as the crucial driver, also exhibits support for the view 
that the hierarchy of influences is situational. The Seeboard case illustrates the 
impact that a different hierarchy of influence can have upon strategic content. The 
Company arguably was not as certain of its resource capability and was led by 
managers who adopted a different outlook to Eastern. The impact of the 
Regulator was crucial. The SWEB case illustrated that even with the necessary 
positive drivers in place: opportunity, resources, leadership and strong owners, 
external factors can constrain strategy. This issue, of the nature of external factors 
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and the question of why their impacts can differ in different situations, will be 
discussed below. While the cases illustrate that differences can occur, this 
strengthens the validity of the proposition, which is supported, and its adoption 
unchanged as an hypothesis is therefore recommended; 
Proposition 8: that organisational size will be a key factor in an organisation's 
management of its relationship with strategic drivers, appears to be strongly 
supported although through a subjective interpretation rather than from clear 
evidence. In the analysis of Proposition 7, the issue of why external and 
regulatory factors impact upon different companies in different degree was 
touched upon. One interpretation of the evidence presented in the field work is 
that there are other factors at work which determine whether an approach works 
for one company, but not for another. As the analysis in Chapter's Nine to Eleven 
would appear to suggest, and has been suggested by the author as presenting 
evidence of an 'organising theme' (Miller, 1996), the relationship between 
organisational size, market strength and strategy would appear to be significant, 
and as a consequence the adoption of the proposition as an hypothesis unchanged 
is therefore recommended. This issue is discussed further below; 
Proposition 9: that companies will seek to develop greater control over the impact 
of strategic drivers by developing key internal capabilities to achieve sustainable 
competitive advantage, is generally supported. The field work presented in 
Chapter Nine clearly shows an organisation which has focussed upon the 
capability of its resources as a means of deVeloping competitive advantage. 
Chapter Ten arguably shows an organisation which voluntarily constrained its 
strategy based upon its resources: Seeboard had faith in the quality of its 
resources, but did not see them as being appropriate for pursuing a strategy similar 
to that favoured by Eastern. Only Chapter Eleven, where post takeover SWEB 
certainly held considerable resources and was seeking an expansive strategy but 
was constrained by external and regulatory factors, would appear to falsify the 
proposition. However, and despite this concern, the author believes that the 
proposition presents series of useful debating points such as: if internal factors are 
not able to overcome external factors, can they be said to uniquely capable?; why 
are apparently capable resources proving unable to overcome external factors? 
And so on, and as a consequence the adoption of the proposition as an hypothesis 
unchanged is therefore recommended; and 
Proposition 10: that ownership is the key influence over strategy, is also 
tentatively supported. One fundamental observation emerging from this research 
has concerned the considerable impact of new owners upon behaviour within the 
industry post 1995. These observations have argued that new owners have tended 
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to either enable (in the case of Eastern and SWEB), or protect (in the case of 
Seeboard), but to a greater or lesser extent have impacted strongly upon strategy. 
The extent to which new owners are the key influence is debatable, as the case of 
SWEB shows. However, and as with the preceding proposition, the author 
concludes that the proposition presents a useful debating point: will the impact of 
ownership evolve over time?; to what extent are global patterns developing within 
the wider industry?, and as a consequence the adoption of the proposition as an 
hypothesis unchanged is therefore recommended. 
In general, therefore, all five proposition's related to strategic drivers have been supported, 
although some more tentatively than others, and will be carried forward into future 
research. This suggests that there is less similarity evident among the influences exerted 
upon companies, and the core elements of content that are increasingly appearing. This 
is not unexpected, but does create a real question that requires future analysis: is there any 
relationship between organisational characteristics and the intensity of impact that a 
variety of influences have upon organisations? Which characteristics in particular make 
an organisation more susceptible to the influence of the Regulator, or other external 
factors, for example. The author is particularly interested in the relationship between 
regulatory regimes and corporate strategy and this area in particular is targeted for future 
research. All of the above discussion suggests that, in relation to Objective Two of this 
research, it is very clearly the case that different factors influence different companies in 
different ways. The extent of this difference is great and requires further research. It is 
also necessary to propose that further research of this nature be extended to other 
industries to see ifit is possible to identify patterns across the regulated utility sector. The 
impact of the Regulator would, however, appear to be crucial, and this point is returned 
to in Chapter Thirteen. 
12.1.3 Evaluating Impacts of Different Drivers 
In Section 2.6.2, a framework for the evaluation of the impact of possible drivers was 
established. Throughout this research, all of these drivers have been discussed, but not 
in relation to the model, which was presented in Figure 2.5. The author now wishes to 
briefly review the debate in relation to this model. The research to date would seem to 
validate the model, but does suggest that there will be differences between companies in 
the precise nature of the relationships that the model predicts. The author argues that all 
of the various relationships that the model predicts are valid, and have been demonstrated 
to be valid throughout. However, and closely linked to the work on organising themes 
which will be discussed in Chapter Thirteen, this model requires further analysis. It may 
be possible to determine a dynamic model enabling a company to better understand the 
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potential impact and importance of each factor in its strategy process. However, the 
development and testing of this model is beyond the immediate capability of this thesis, 
and is an issue for future research. 
12.2 Evaluating Existing Theory 
Objective Three of this research was concerned with attempting to classify the strategies 
identified in Objective One and analysed in Objective Two against existing generic 
management typologies. During the preliminary and field stages of the research, this 
objective was widened to include considering how robust a variety of existing 
management theories were if 'tested' in an environment like the ESI, which was not a 
traditional free market. The rationale underpinning this decision was based on the view 
that such an extension was necessary to enable the proposed classification to be 
meaningful by enabling the commentary conducted here to have a wider application, and 
that existing theories contributed components to the classification process. As such, 
throughout the analysis presented in Chapter's Five to Eleven the following issues were 
addressed: 
~ the validity of both the competitive forces and resource based view's of strategy 
making in the firm; 
~ the impact and significance of the chosen strategic process; 
~ the existence and impact of strategy making at different levels of the firm, and its 
significance; 
~ the impact and significance of the chosen mode of organisation leadership; 
~ the impact and significance of the chosen organisational structure; and ultimately 
therefore the validity of available classification systems. The outcome of this final 
issue was to have a bearing upon the pursuit of Supporting Objective One. 
Each of these issues is therefore addressed in tum in this section. Firstly, the different and 
competing versions of strategy making in the firm. 
12.2.1 Competitive Forces and Resource Based Views 
In each of the case study chapters, an assessment was made as to whether a company has 
demonstrably sought to orientate their strategic choices towards: (a) their industry; (b) 
their resources; or ( c) both their industry and their resources. The analysis conducted in 
Section 2.2, which involved an attempt to understand the debate in terms of the key 
drivers associated with each of these views, concluded that some form of dual orientation 
was the preferred option. Under this dual orientation, an organisation would pay attention 
to both its industry, characterised by the external drivers, and to its resource capability, 
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characterised by its internal drivers. 
The research reported here appears to suggest that most of the organisations had tended 
to heed the influences of all of the strategic drivers, but that as the previous section has 
discussed, the extent to which these drivers impacted upon each company was situational. 
Within the three cases, arguably Eastern clearly orients itselfin relation to both its industry 
and its resources, and benefits as a result. Seeboard arguably has oriented itself principally 
towards the competitive forces it faces, but is showing an increased awareness of its 
resource capability, and it was argued in Chapter Ten that this awareness was 
characterised by a concern for the strength of the resources, which constrained the 
strategy rather than enhanced it. This outcome remains valid as an outcome of a resource 
based view, although it tends to run counter to the generally positive view of the ability 
of resources to expand a company's operational capability. As for SWEB, it would 
appear that the Company has been influenced by both external and internal factors over 
the period. The Company clearly had a deeper resource base after the takeover, and were 
clearly intent upon utilising these new resources to broaden the market share of SWEB, 
albeit within the existing industry context. The failure of this approach suggests that the 
possession of resources alone does not inevitably lead to success. 
This final point perhaps enables this research to make an interesting contribution to this 
debate. The general thesis of the resource based view is that resources are important to 
the achievement of competitive advantage, and authors believe that companies need to 
first define their key resources and then build strategies around them (Collis and 
Montgomery, 1995, Grant, 1991). These authors note that possessing valuable resources 
in one arena does not imply success if those resources are applied to a corresponding 
arena (Collis and Montgomery, 1995, p.127). However, they further note that 
'leveraging' their resources appropriately can bring high rewards (Collis and Montgomery, 
1995, p.128). In other words, as discussed in Section 2.2.3.2, a resource based outlook 
may become a gateway for a company into a new industry. The research reported here 
supports the initial interpretation, but suggests that the opportunity to achieve leverage 
of the kind envisaged may be limited in an industry like the ESI. At issue is what sort of 
resources are available, and whether the resources naturally occurring within one industry 
can find applications elsewhere. It may also be a question of the scale of the proposed 
diversification. 
Certainly, in the period leading up to the expiration of golden shares in each company, 
RECs who strayed away from using their resources in related areas were punished, as the 
analysis ofEME in Section 6.1 showed in particular. Even following the expiration, and 
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the widespread change of ownership, the companies have not strayed far from their 
existing and related areas of interest. While investments in telecoms, gas marketing and 
generation indicate a wider use of different types of resources: telecoms using the existing 
network infrastructure as a resource, gas marketing the existing customer service 
capability, and generation indicating the use of financial resources, they are all closely 
related to the traditional networked/public service/public utility industry that the 
companies have served all along. Even the most radical move identified in this latter 
period~ Eastern's move towards establishing itself as more of a commodity trading 
organisation, is related. However, in some situations: such as London Electricity and call 
centre operations (Section 7.2), and SWEB and helicopters (Chapter Ten), leveraged use 
of resources in new areas of business can be identified. At this stage in the development 
of the companies, therefore, it would appear that the opportunity to expand a business's 
horizons envisaged by some proponents of the resource based view is not widely available 
to companies like the RECs suggesting that the view itself may have a limited application. 
As the companies develop, and seek to diversify away from an ever more competitive, or 
regulated, environment, this position may of course change. 
12.2.2 Importance of Process 
The research reported here has suggested that there has been evidence of a variety of 
approaches utilised within the industry but that in general the findings have tended to 
support the views emerging from the literature. The process adopted has tended to be 
dependent upon: (a) the industry; and (b) the attitude of the dominant coalition. The 
research has seen that there is almost inevitably a more prescriptive approach adopted by 
the regulated, engineering based distribution business, and a more emergent approach 
developing among the more competitive businesses. However, this apparent association 
of a more control focussed approach within regulated businesses and of a more 
entrepreneurial approach within competitive businesses, is not the end of the discussion. 
Some managers, like those of Seeboard and SWEB, have sought to inculcate more 
adventurous, and emergent, processes within regulated activities as discussed within 
Chapter's Ten and Eleven. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter Ten, the managers of 
Seeboard felt it necessary to restrain the emergent activities of its supply business 
managers because they were being too entrepreneurial. The new managers of SWEB, as 
discussed in Chapter Eleven, felt it necessary to reinstate more centralised processes while 
attempting to encourage an entrepreneurial culture: a hybrid approach which reflected the 
leadership/structure/process configuration or recipe that they had developed in their home 
industry. Only Eastern, which after 1992-1993 pursued a wholly emergent process, 
presents a classical approach to the issue. 
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Clearly, process is situational and determined by a variety of factors, the most important 
of which is most likely to be leadership. However, and returning to a theme developed 
earlier, there is also clearly a relationship between other issues, like market power, 
industry maturity and company ownership, which shapes the opinion arrived at by 
dominant coalitions, which may lead to different recipes, and different outcomes. EME' s 
arguably emergent processes between 1990 and 1994 had a very different outcome from 
Eastern's emergent processes from 1994 onwards. What factors shaped this outcome? 
Can a distribution business witness entrepreneurial behaviour, or will the Regulator seek 
to restrain such behaviour as he has done with the case of metering services?2 One 
interpretation that can be reached, and for which some evidence is available from this 
research is that emergent strategy may be more of a benefit in immature industries, but 
more prescriptive approaches can be more effective in more mature industries. Issues of 
this kind, which touch upon the debate about the suitability of certain forms of 
configurations at certain times in an industries development (Section 2.5.6.2.6), require 
future investigation, and are identified as future areas for the extension of this research. 
12.2.3 Strategy Making at Different Levels 
The research has clearly suggested strong support for the view that strategy making 
occurs at all levels of the case study organisations, itself an indication that a more 
emergent, less prescriptive approach to strategy process has been evident. Throughout 
the case studies, the dominant coalitions of organisation's have clearly been engaged in 
pursuit of approaches which conform to the strategy as pattern approach, even in 
regulated environments. This is not the case with all of the RECs, and for example the 
earlier case study of Manweb (Section 5.1) showed a more prescriptive, top down 
approach. However, the emergence of more divisionalised structures as the norm among 
the companies, and the establishment of separate business units as companies moved, and 
indeed were moved by the Regulator, from unitary organisations made such a 
development almost inevitable. An interesting contrast to this perceived situation is 
perhaps presented by SWEB, in the period following its takeover but prior to the 
divestment of its supply business. During this time, an approach which more closely 
resembles a 'strategy as perspective' approach (Section 2.1.1.5) was evident, as the new 
managers flattened the structure, and sought to establish a team based concept, a shared 
view, that overcame notions of divisional demarcation. This involved managers taking 
decisions at their own level, but the tone and direction of their thinking was heavily 
2 
Metering services (instillation and reading) have traditionally been performed by distribution companies 
and hence were monopoly activities. The Regulator has viewed this as being anti-competitive and has 
moved to separate metering services from distribution companies and to encourage a free market. 
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influenced by the general vision for the company established by the leaders. The 
difference is based in the fact that the new owners of SWEB had a vision for the company, 
while companies following a strategy as pattern approach were more concerned with 
establishing operational perimeters defined by financial and market related goals. 
12.2.4 Concepts of Leadership 
Clearly, as discussed throughout Chapter's Nine to Eleven, many of these latter issues are 
closely linked. Style of leadership is closely linked to process, structure, devolved 
decision making and so on. It is therefore not surprising that the evidence gathered 
through this research identifies an increasing trend towards transformational leadership 
style, as decision making become mores devolved, and processes more emergent. 
Transformational leadership appears to be related to emergent strategy, which itself is 
linked to operating a divisional structure, to autonomy in strategy making, and may often 
be linked to an approach which adopts a more resource based view. On the other hand, 
transactional leadership appears to be related to prescriptive strategy, to a functional 
structure, to more top down decision making and an approach more closely focussed upon 
the industry that the company operates within. All of the evidence presented within the 
cases suggests that a transformational approach is more appropriate to the current 
direction of the industry. Even within more regulated businesses, leaders are seeking a 
more entrepreneurial approach, establishing SBU's or cost centres where there had 
formerly been a unitary structure, and enabling business and functional level managers to 
seek opportunity within the wider organisational plan. 
However, as the analysis also showed, there was some evidence of different styles of 
management within companies, as defined by Farkus and Wetlaufer (1996). Some RECs 
did employ generally transformational approaches, but adopted box style management in 
regulated areas. Other companies appear to have developed 'strategy', 'human-assets' 
or 'change' style approaches. What is clear from this analysis is that leadership is a crucial 
aspect of industrial and organisational transformation, and that a variety of variations have 
been witnessed within the industry. What has not been witnessed to any great extent is 
the development of the type of strategic leadership that was discussed in Section 2.3.3. 
Some elements of the necessary conditions are evident in all of the companies, but no 
evidence emerged that any of the case study companies were approaching the issue from 
a position heavily influenced by this new conceptualising of the issue. 
A further exploration of leadership style and its impact would be of interest and is to be 
included among the future aims of this research. In addition, the issue of the relationship 
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between the composition of the dominant coalition, and the direction of strategy has not 
been fully developed. In one case, that of Eastern, the membership of the dominant 
coalition between 1994 and 1998 completely contradicts Miles and Snow's (1978) 
expected outcomes. This situation is in all probability linked to the non-traditional nature 
of the industry, and the fact that the potential for the wholesale application of their 
concepts is constrained, as will be discussed in Section 12.3.2. This is, however, an area 
of real interest and one that needs to be returned to in future research. 
12.2.5 Importance of Structure 
The case study companies provide a good example of how the RECs started with differing 
perspectives on the question of structure, but have developed towards a consensus. Of 
the three case study companies, SWEB began the period divisionally structured, Eastern 
functionally structured with a geographical focus, while Seeboard inhabited a very linear 
functional structure. As the industry matured, and the influence of the Regulator came 
to bear, all of the companies have moved towards divisional structures, and now as 
business separation takes effect, some have moved towards holding company structures. 
Largely, therefore, structure has emerged alongside strategy, although as the earlier 
analysis shows it has sometimes been the case that a company's structure has had to be 
amended to take account of strategic developments. 
As the period has progressed, there has been evidence of more complex matrix structures 
and configurations emerging in multi-industry companies. Eastern, as Chapter Nine 
explored, has developed a complex network structure which allows its commodity trading 
business to drive most of its other interrelated activities, but which is clearly not a 
traditional functional structure. Other companies that remain within distribution, supply 
and generation for example, operate more traditional divisional structures, while 
companies with a single, regulated, industry focus are reverting to functional structures, 
but with an added aspect of innovation, to encourage entrepreneurialism. Throughout the 
research, the development of internal networks, and even the beginning of development 
of dynamic networks, has been increasingly evident. 
12.2.6 Organising Themes 
As discussed in Section 2.5.3, there is an expectation that qualitative research aimed at 
developing classification systems will endeavour to produce organising themes. The 
concept of organising themes, as discussed by Miller (1996), imagines that relationships 
between elements wilt emerge in any classification system, which identify its characteristics 
and at the same time explain the rationale underpinning any distinction set out in the 
system of classification itself. Work towards this thesis's contribution to this debate was 
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presented throughout the case study chapters, but the author believes that it would be 
appropriate to consider this aspect of the research after the next section, which deals with 
the appropriate nature of the chosen systems of classification applied throughout this 
research. Comments on organising themes are therefore presented in Chapter Thirteen. 
12.3 Systems of Classification 
In Chapter Eight, the key objectives to be pursued through the field studies in relation to 
Objective Three were outlined. These were that the core Miles and Snow organisational 
typology which was employed to classify the RECs at the end of Chapter Eight should be 
further explored to ascertain whether it was suitably robust for this task. In particular, 
following the analysis presented in Chapter Eight which identified the absence of a variety 
of key functions within the industry (see Section 8.4.3), where in the context of the model 
these missing functions were to be located, and how the model itself would need to be 
amended to accommodate these missing functions. This section aims to resolve this 
Objective, and Supporting Objective One to which it is related. Before moving on to 
attempt this stage of the research, however, it is briefly necessary to comment upon the 
robustness of the other systems of classification employed throughout the research. 
12.3.1 The Research Framework 
During the research, a variety of established frameworks were used to identify and classify 
the content of strategy in support of Objective One of this research. Principal among 
these were Pearce and Robinson's (1994, and Section 2.5.4) system of grand corporate 
level strategies, Porter's (1980, and Section 2.5.5.2) three generic strategies and Chrisman 
et aI's new competitive business strategy classification scheme (1988, and 2.5.5.4). 
Throughout the preliminary and field stages of the research comments were made as to 
the robustness of each and these comments are summarised here. 
12.3.1.1 Corporate Level Systems 
Generally, the Pearce and Robinson (1994) system of classification was found to be both 
comprehensive and useful throughout this analysis. The principal criticism remains that 
raised in Section 2.6.3: that Pearce and Robinson's view that each grand strategy can 
separately form the basis of a successful corporate strategy is not valid. The author 
remains ofthe view that all successful strategies will be based upon concentrated growth, 
and hence identified the need for formal combinations, some of which were suggested by 
the author in Section 2.6.3, and tested throughout the analysis. Another minor qualm 
about the validity of the system of classification concerns the use of the concentrated 
growth strategy in a regulated environment. For example, is it appropriate to utilise a 
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concept that includes within it commitments to 'increase rate of product obsolescence', 
'advertising other uses', 'giving price incentives', or emphasising the importance of 
marketing in its definition (Pearce and Robinson, 1994, p.239). Any use of the concept 
in a regulated environment needs to be qualified and to emphasise the centrality of 
effective management of assets which is implied, but less well developed in their definition. 
Without this necessary distinction, and in particular the necessity of acknowledging 
effective management discussed in Section 2.5.4.1, the model would have less value. It 
may be necessary simply to develop a new designation for regulated industries, like for 
example 'concentrated growth - monopoly', or using the phrase 'characteristics similar 
to those in a concentrated growth approach' to distinguish between competitive and non-
competitive situations. Overall, and despite this concern, the framework was suitable to 
the chosen task. This is particularly so as the other grand strategies, such as market 
development, were found to be equally applicable within regulated and non-regulated 
sectors, albeit to a lower extent. 
12.3.1.2 Business Level Strategies 
Proposition 3, as discussed in Section 12.l.1 above, sought to critically appraise the 
Porter (1980) generic strategy model, and ended by suggesting that Porter's argument that 
one specific approach was to be exclusively pursued was not supportable. This research 
therefore supported a criticism of the approach developed by a variety of authors within 
the literature. Instead a model proposed by Chrisman et al (1988) was established as the 
preferred framework, as it overcame this deficiency of the Porter model, by allowing for 
a recognition not only that combined price and non-price weapons; an utility approach, 
could and were used, but also that companies could adopt differing approaches in the 
various different segments within which they operated. The analysis found that this extra 
functionality of the Chrisman et al model enabled it to fulfil the tasks required of it, 
although in truth the breadth of these tasks were not considerable. 
The analysis established that the particular conditions prevalent in the main areas of 
business that the companies of the sample engage in: distribution and supply, dictate the 
business level strategy. In distribution, the companies do not engage in competition and 
hence do not have a business level strategy. Their behaviour is close to that associated 
with, and sharing similarity with, cost leadership but the author decided to avoid possible 
confusion and has argued against the identification and classification of business level 
strategies in the distribution business. 
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Within supply, due to the relationship between customer expectation, the Regulator, and 
the current immature state of the market, the only feasible business level strategies are 
those of the segmented utility, or segmented utility focussed variety as identified by 
Chrisman et al. As the evidence presented throughout this analysis has argued, all 
customers, whether business, commercial, agricultural or domestic, expect low costs and 
some form of added value service as an incentive to buy from a supplier. Other options, 
for example SWEB pre-takeover was pursuing a benefit approach emphasising quality but 
charging a premium for that quality; which caused a situation where "their prices were so 
high that nobody was buying from them (Southern Company, US003, 1999), have failed 
within the industry. Other evidence provided by interviewee's concluded that added value 
was crucial, and that a focus cost approach alone would not succeed (CSW, US002, 
1996). Partially, it may be argued, this was as a consequence of the fact that most RECs 
were offering very low tariffs as well as added value so a focus cost approach alone was 
not competitive. The only variations to the dominance of the segmented utility approach 
is that of the segmented utility focus approach, which recognised that certain RECs had 
specific targets: either whole markets or individual customers, requiring specific and 
enhanced product offerings. Reference to this phenomena was made in Section 5.5.1. 
Overall, therefore, the Chrisman et al system of classification was suitable to the chosen 
task. 
12.3.2 Organizational Models 
Objective Three ofthe research, as noted above, was to test existing generic management 
typologies in a regulated environment. While the corporate and business level systems of 
classification reviewed in Section 12.3.1 constituted part of this process, the main aim of 
Objective Three was to explore the applicability of organisational models, as discussed in 
Section 2.5.6. In particular, the Miles and Snow generic strategy typology (1978, and 
revised in 1986, 1995) was selected. The choice of Miles and Snow's model was based 
upon the 'explicit links' it proposed between strategy, environment and process (Miller 
and Dess, 1993), which concurred with the linking objectives of this research. It was also 
well established, and although the subject of debate, widely regarded and frequently 
tested. It had, however, not been tested within a regulated environment. Section 8.3 
featured a series of classifications for each of the RECs using the Miles and Snow 
concepts, both over the whole period (see Table 8.10), linking elements of strategy and 
drivers to explain and provide an 'organising theme' to the classification. Three of these 
classifications were then examined in the field study chapters, and conclusions as to the 
validity of the approach drawn. 
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To reprise this latter part of the analysis, the following criticisms were developed; 
~ does the appellation 'defender' appropriately and adequately describe the 
characteristics witnessed within the regulated distribution business of the REC, as 
assumed in the analysis in Chapter Eight?; 
does the typology as a whole describe the way in which innovation occurs within 
an industry where various factors prevent the operation and indeed existence of 
the classical 'prospector' organisation described by Miles and Snow (Section 
2.5.6.2.2), and how should the conduct of this role - vital to the validity of the 
typology - be explained?; 
does the typology allow for and adequately describe organisations which operate 
within either (a) more than one market or (b) a market with more than one 
segment, and which exhibit different characteristics in some or all of each of these 
markets/segments?; and 
should the system be used at all in regulated environments, or do regulated 
environment's require a wholly new system of classification? 
Arguably, therefore, the Miles and Snow typology as devised by the authors in 1978 and 
revised over the intervening period is not wholly suited to application in a regulated 
environment for the reasons given above. The model does not allow for the accurate 
classification of the behaviour identified throughout this research, and hence Objective 
Three is not resolved. As noted in Section 1.3 therefore, Supporting Objective One, 
which seeks to "make observations about the use of generic strategies in a regulated 
environment and suggest any amendments which may be necessary" comes into force. 
Supporting Objective One will be considered in the following section. 
12.4 Supporting Objective One 
The aims of Supporting Objective One were discussed in Section 12.3.2, as were the 
deficiencies identified with the existing Miles and Snow typology as applied to a regulated 
environment, and readers are referred back to that section. Within this section, the aim 
is to suggest a revised version of the model takes into account the particular conditions 
of the ESI, and which may be tested across a wider sample of similarly regulated industries 
in future extensions to this research. This debate will be illustrated by evidence derived 
during the course of this research, and is structured as follows: the implications of the 
deficiencies identified in Section 12.3.2 and some suggested amendments to accommodate 
these implications are discussed in Section 12.4.1; the proposed revised model is 
presented in Section 12.4.2; and the outcome of the use of the proposed new model on 
the current RECs is presented in Section 12.4.3. 
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12.4.1 Implications of Deficiencies 
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, the ESI exhibits a number of differences which distinguishes 
it from a traditional free market. Principally, these differences centre upon the existence 
of regulation, which following the introduction of competition into supply can only be said 
to directly impact upon the distribution sector, but clearly does have an impact upon all 
companies operating in other sectors of the industry, as the field study chapters have 
demonstrated. Readers are referred back to Section's 9.3.1, 10.3.1 and 1l.3.1 for further 
illustration. Consequently the author suggests that company behaviour within the industry, 
or industries, that have been the focus of this research can not be adequately explained by 
the Miles and Snow model without some form of amendment. 
As discussed above, there are three fundamentals reasons, which are discussed with 
reference to relevant examples derived from the analysis: 
.. the industry does not lend itself to prospecting. Within the Miles and Snow 
model, there was an explicit assumption that advances within an industry would 
be made by a prospector company (Section 2.5.6.2.2) which would fulfil the need 
for innovation within an industry, but having developed a new product/service 
would not possess the capability to sustain that product offering over the long 
term. The UK energy industry needs to innovate, but there are no prospectors, 
as narrowly defined by Miles and Snow, within the industry. The case studies 
provided evidence of this assertion. Eastern Group has been described as the most 
innovative of the RECs: firstly in establishing itself as the third largest non-nuclear 
generator; secondly in being one of the first of the RECs to establish itself as a 
supplier of gas and electricity on a national level; and thirdly by establishing its 
energy trading activity as a core business. However, Eastern is clearly not a 
prospector company in the classical sense. Eastern has not sought to innovate at 
the expense of efficiency, and it has undertaken its innovation with the express 
intention of sustaining and building upon its advances and becoming the market 
leader. A classification describing this activity, of innovating without prospecting, 
is not contained with the model, and consequently the model is found to be 
deficient; 
the industry experiences regulation. Within the Miles and Snow model, there is 
an explicit expectation that companies are in direct competition with each other. 
In the UK energy industry, companies are in direct competition in some industries 
but not in others but the existence of the Regulator impacts upon all of the 
companies within the industry, as discussed above. The testimony of managers 
from Seeboard and SWEB were particularly revealing in this respect. One 
possible solution to this problem is to formally recognise the two core businesses 
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within the industry: distribution and supply, as separate businesses altogether and 
devise separate classification systems. This is one option that will be considered 
below. However, at this stage in the process, it is necessary to say that the fact 
of regulation and the existence of monopoly businesses is unfulfilled by the model, 
which is consequently further deficient; and 
the industry is not a single product/market, but is multi-product and segmented. 
The Miles and Snow model does allow for differences in products and markets: 
as the existence of the analyzer concept (Section 2.5.6.2.3) clearly indicates, but 
it is questionable whether the model accounts for the fact that part of a company's 
activities may occur within a regulated environment. 
In addition, a further reason emerges as a consequence of the nature of the industry and 
its core constituency: 
~ the industry does not permit the same degree of business failure that would be 
permitted within a more traditionally competitive market environment. Energy is 
a strategic industry. The fact that regulation exists both constrains excessive 
behaviour (either in terms of earning profits or encountering risk) but also ensures 
profitability (in at least the monopoly distribution business, and through the 
encouragement of competition/restriction of anti-competitive processes it at least 
enables an organisation to make profits in supply). Therefore, there is some doubt 
in the author's mind that the classification 'defender' is sufficient to describe the 
'less well defined' activity that is occurring within the industry. 
In short, therefore, there is a clear need for the following within any revision of the 
existing model: 
~ a classification that acknowledges that incremental innovation can occur; 
~ a classification, or set of classifications, which account for the existence of the 
monopoly sector within the industry; 
an acceptance that different classifications can be evident within the same 
company as it attempts to serve different market segments or industries; and 
a classification which enables the distinction between reactor type behaviour, and 
behaviour which is more appropriately described as follower behaviour. 
12.4.2 Suggested Revisions 
The suggested revisions to the model aim to make it applicable in a regulated, or partially 
regulated environment. The author's intention is to retain the original features of the 
model as much as possible and only to suggest change which is deemed to be a real 
necessity. The result is the revised model presented at Table 12.1 which has five basic 
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archetypes, although these five archetypes expand to incorporate a further three 
archetypes to account for the existence of monopoly activities. Each of these archetypes 
are therefore briefly discussed, with an emphasis placed upon how they interrelate and 
how they address the deficiencies identified above. 
Table 12.1: Organizational Classifications in a Regulated Environment 
12.4.2.1) The Cautious Prospector 
12.4.2.1.1) The Cautious Prospector (Monopoly) 
12.4.2.2) The Analyzer 
12.4.2.2.1) The Analyzer (Monopoly) 
12.4.2.3) Defender 
12.4.2.4) Monopolist 
12.4.2.4.1) Monopolist-Reactor 
12.4.2.5) Follower 
12.4.2.1 The Cautious Prospector 
As discussed above, there is a need for an archetype which undertakes the role of the 
prospector in pursuing innovation and identifying opportunity, but which does not 
encounter the same degree of risk as the prospector would expect in the original Miles and 
Snow model. In addition, there is a need for the archetype to acknowledge that having 
innovated, the company will aim to remain within the new area of business, product or 
service rather than voluntarily or forcibly retiring from that new area, product or service. 
The author therefore suggests the designation 'Cautious Prospector', which would have 
the following features: 
~ a dual core focus, wherein one part of the company would be engaged in seeking 
new opportunity through incremental market development activity or innovation, 
while the other part would continue to seek effective and efficient management of 
ongoing business activities. It is more likely that a cautious prospector will be 
seeking market development or innovative opportunities within related business 
areas; and 
an intention to integrate any new business development through successful 
innovation into its core business area, to be managed using a concentrated growth 
based strategy aimed at seeking effectiveness and efficiency into the new area in 
the shortest possible time. 
The cautious prospector therefore differs from the classical prospector in that it will 
endeavour to erect barriers to entry around its new areas of business activity, through 
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rationalising the processes and outcomes, with the intention of integrating the new area 
within its core, whereas the classical prospector will not possess such capabilities and will 
soon be forced out of the new market/product/service by analyzer organisation's which 
will improve the effectiveness of its processes. In effect, the cautious prospector is closest 
to the classical analyzer organisation but takes on the new product development itself, 
rather than mimicking the advances of others. The cautious prospector's actions will still 
be mimicked by analyzer's if it can not erect effective barriers to entry, and so it does 
perform the role of the prospector in pushing the industry forward. It is just that that is 
not it's specialist role in an industry. 
Because it does not specialise in innovation, and because there is unlikely to be any 
companies performing that role, the author contends that there are likely to be more than 
one cautious prospector within an industry, so sharing the role. The industry provides a 
variety of examples to support this contention. In gas marketing and supply, Midlands 
Electricity and Eastern Group were the first RECs to develop interests, swiftly followed 
by all but one of the other RECs. In generation, the partners in the Teeside Power 
project: including Northern, SW ALEC, SWEB were among the first to enter this new 
area. In telecoms, the cautious prospectors were Yorkshire and Northern, while 
Yorkshire were also cautious prospectors in cable television. EME's entry into security 
was also cautious prospecting, although ultimately less successful than the others 
mentioned here. Throughout the period, the companies have further shared innovative 
activities: Eastern into ownership of gas reserves, Midlands into overseas investments, and 
so on. 
Companies will therefore be cautious prospectors in certain aspects of their business, but 
may adopt a different archetype in others. Clearly, for an organisation involved in a 
variety of sectors: distribution, supply, generation, telecoms and so on, there is the 
potential to inhabit several archetypes, and these different archetypes may not simply be 
explained by the differences between regulated and non-regulated activities. 
12.4.2.1.1 The Cautious Prospector (Monopoly) 
All of the elements captured in the concept of the cautious prospector are also evident in 
the related archetype - the Cautious Prospector (Monopoly). Regulated activities, in the 
same way as non-regulated activities, require innovative organisations to push them 
forward, and to develop new opportunity. However the extent of the ability to innovate 
is inevitably less profound in a regulated environment, which explains the identification 
ofa supporting classification. Cautious prospector's (monopoly) will be concerned simply 
with finding new ways in which to improve the performance of their monopoly businesses, 
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which as has been observed during the preliminary and field stage analysis inevitably 
involves limited market development in support of a concentrated growth strategy. 
To illustrate the difference between classifications, and demonstrate the need for a 
cautious prospector even within a regulated environment, a number of examples from the 
preceding research are quoted. The activities of Northern and SWEB in particular show 
how a cautious prospector (monopoly) can engage in market development within a 
distribution business, as does Seeboard's activities in buying and operating the distribution 
network of London Underground. More dramatically, Eastern and London's decision 
to merge their distribution businesses, and SWEBIWPD's decision to purchase the 
distribution business of SW ALEC are all examples of similar behaviour. Indeed, these 
latter two decisions are equally as dramatic as some ofthe examples provided in Section 
12.4.2.1, except that manage their businesses more effectively as an option in seeking 
greater market share, is not open to companies operating within this sector. 
12.4.2.2 The Analyzer 
The concept, and importance, of the analyzer in the proposed revised model is identical 
to the concept of the Analyzer discussed in Section 2.5.6.2.3. Consequently, it is not 
intended to explore it in great depth at this time. However, it is necessary to reiterate that 
analyzer's will be seeking to adopt successful innovation's identified by cautious 
prospector's within the non-regulated business area, and, if possible, to improve upon the 
product/service in order to more effectively compete. The examples of this behaviour 
from the preceding analysis are numerous. All of the RECs which followed Midlands and 
Eastern into gas, for example, exhibit analyzer behaviour. All of the RECs which sought 
to increase their market share of the wider electricity supply business, while defending 
their home territory, also exhibited analyzer tendencies. A striking example is provided 
by all of the companies, of which SWEB as discussed in Chapter Eleven is a prime 
example, who have followed Eastern Group's route into the area of electricity trading. 
Eastern identified a new area of business, through cautious prospecting, and now a variety 
of the other RECs are seeking to obtain market share in that new area, having accepted 
from the example of Eastern Group that the opportunity is both real and available. 
12.4.2.2.1 The Analyzer (Monopoly) 
The relationship between the analyzer and the analyzer (monopoly) follows that of the 
cautious prospector and its monopoly counterpart. Advances by cautious prospector's 
(monopoly) will be adopted by analyzer's (monopoly) in order to improve their own 
organisational performance. It should once again, however, be noted that the lack of 
competition in the monopoly businesses means that the objective of companies adopting 
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this characteristic would be to improve organisational effectiveness and efficiency rather 
than increase market share. There are currently few examples of this kind of behaviour 
within the industry, reflecting perhaps the limitations that operating within a monopoly 
industry places upon its inhabitants. Nevertheless, as discussed previously in relation to 
Proposition 5, the author argues that in distribution there will be an increasing tendency 
towards consolidation which will see the remaining RECs becoming analyzer (monopoly) 
organisations, and following the lead of companies like Eastern, London and WPD. 
12.4.2.3 The Defender 
The concept, and importance, of the defender in the proposed revised model is identical 
to the concept as discussed in Section 2.5.6.2.1. Consequently, it is not intended to 
explore it in great depth at this time. However, it is necessary to reiterate that defender's 
will be seeking to manage their core businesses as effectively and efficiently as possible, 
and in that respect there is no difference between the regulated and the non-regulated 
sectors. Defenders, in the classical sense, will not be looking to incorporate new business 
activities into their operations, and in the context of the ESI therefore will have remained 
focussed upon supply and distribution throughout the period. 
It has been noted, however, that the ESI is a segmented industry and therefore it is 
possible to argue that this debate needs to be widened. Some RECs, for example 
Seeboard, have adopted a defender like approach in its supply activities - that is to say it 
has concentrated upon retaining and protecting its existing electricity supply customers. 
However in gas, it has been more of an analyzer, following the leads of cautious 
prospectors in trying to enter and build market share within that industry. Eastern, on the 
other hand, has been more of a cautious prospector in each aspect of its supply business: 
in offering improved product development to existing customers, attempting to win new 
customers through innovative utility based approaches, and seeking to develop a presence 
in the new market of gas. 
12.4.2.4 Monopolist 
The choice of the classification 'monopolist' as opposed to 'defender (monopoly)', which 
would appear to conform to the pattern established with earlier archetypes, is deliberate. 
The author argues that there are two forms of this archetype: the monopolist, and the 
monopolist-reactor, which require distinction and mitigate against the use of the 'defender 
(monopoly)' appellation. The monopolist is identified as a company which pursues 
assiduously the concentrated growth approach identified in Section 2.5.4.1 and discussed 
throughout. This therefore is the archetypical monopoly company, under regulation. It 
manages its monopoly assets for maximum profitability, but also meets all of its quality 
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and public service obligations. It does not seek to develop into new areas of market or 
product development, and is epitomised by companies like Manweb, and London 
Electricity, prior to each's takeover. It is interesting, of course, to speculate as the author 
has done in relation to Proposition 5, that as regulation becomes ever more demanding 
then this position may become less and less tenable, as more and more distribution 
companies adopt cautious prospector (monopoly) or analyzer (monopoly) approaches. 
The approach does, however, at least possess the potential to maximise the profitability 
of its operations under present conditions. 
12.4.2.4.1 Monopolist - Reactor 
The same can not be said for the monopolist-reactor. In Section 4.2.1, the tendency of 
SOE's to produce reactor-like organisations: organisations which either had poor strategy, 
which were wedded to outdated strategy or had no strategy at all, was noted. In the early 
days after privatisation, there was certainly evidence of companies continuing to operate 
along these lines, and failing to grasp the opportunities offered to them by the changed 
paradigm. This charge could be placed at the door of some surprising companies, among 
them Eastern Group as Chapter Nine discussed. The possibility ofmonopolist-reactor's 
existing within the current electricity industry is extremely remote. The actions of the 
Regulator, and in particular the five-yearly reviews, make the chance of companies 
persisting with a failing approach extremely unlikely. However, given the ultimate 
objective of using this revised framework with other industries, it is necessary to include 
it for the sake of comprehensiveness. 
12.4.2.5 Follower 
The final classification identified within the model is that of the follower. The decision to 
avoid the use of the term reactor was taken to reflect the fact that in a closed, 
homogenous, and regulated industry like the UK energy industry, it is unlikely for 
companies to be true reactors. As the previous section discussed in relation to 
monopolist-reactors, the correctness of recipes emerging from the actions of cautious 
prospectors in both regulated and non-regulated arenas will eventually cause companies 
that have been lagging behind to follow their lead. This is not identified as reacting 
because, as this research has clearly demonstrated, the companies eventually do get to the 
right strategies, and are not simply reacting or firefighting in order to attempt to remain 
competitive. The designation also reflects the possibility that a company will decide, after 
some time and accumulating evidence, to follow their peers into a particular industry. The 
example of London Electricity and generation falls into this category. 
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Ultimately, the follower is again a classification that is more likely at the beginning of a 
privatisation than at its end. If the privatisation is rolled out as was the case with UK 
energy, as described in Section 4.2, companies are provided with time to work out their 
strategic positions which would nominally allow followers to develop an appropriate 
strategic model before any such failure to do so would result in a threat to their existence. 
The same may not be the case in industries exhibiting a different approach to privatisation 
and the introduction of competition. London was arguably a follower in the area of 
electricity supply until its first takeover, and now it operates one of the larger supply 
portfolio's within the industry. If its predominantly domestic customer base had been 
open to competition in 1990, this may not have been the case. 
Table 12.2: Reclassification of the Sample 
Company Separate Classifications Overall Classification 
EME, owned by Distribution: Monopolist AnalyzerlMonopolist (PowerGen) 
PowerGen Supply: Analyzer 
Generation: Analyzer 
Eastern Distribution: Cautious Prospector (Monopoly) Cautious Prospector 
Supply: Cautious Prospector 
Generation: Cautious Prospector 
London Distribution: Cautious Prospector (Monopoly) Cautious Prospector 
Supply: Cautious Prospector 
Manweb, owned by Distribution: Monopolist Cautious ProspectorlMonopolist 
ScottishPower Supply: Cautious Prospector (ScottishPower) 
Generation: Analyzer 
Midlands Distribution: Monopolist Monopolist 
Norweb, owned by Distribution: Monopolist Monopolist 
United Utilities 
Northern Distribution: Monopolist AnalyzerlMonopolist 
Supply: Analyzer 
Seeboard Distribution: Monopolist AnalYl.erlMonopolist 
Supply: Analyzer 
Southern, part of Distribution: Analyzer (Monopolist) Analyzer 
Scottish and Supply: Analyzer 
Southern Energy Generation: Analyzer 
SWALEC Not Applicable Not Applicable 
SWEB Distribution: Cautious Prospector (Monopoly) Cautious Prospector (Monopoly) 
Yorkshire Distribution: Monopolist DefenderlMonopolist 
Supply: Defender 
12.4.3 Reclassifying the RECs 
The model presented above allows a different classification of the remaining RECs than 
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that presented in Table 8.9. The reclassification of the sample takes into account the new 
appellations identified above, and also the concern that as many of these classifications as 
are necessary to achieve accuracy are employed, even if this leads to separate 
classifications for the company's main businesses, and joint classifications in some of the 
companies engaged in more segments of the industry. 
The classifications of the companies presented above, in Table 12.2, show a quite marked 
difference from that presented in Table 8.11. The principal differences rest with the 
number of companies formerly identified as analyzers who are now re-classified as 
cautious prospectors, and the number of defender companies which are now recognised 
and distinguished as monopolists. The classification's presented in Table 8.9 did not allow 
for innovation to occur within the industry, and the proliferation of the new cautious 
prospector classification shows not only how innovation occurs, but also suggests that 
within an industry like the UK energy industry the responsibility for innovation is shared 
among a variety of companies. The re-classification suggests that at this particular 
moment Eastern, London, and ScottishPower are driving the supply industry forward (a 
case may arguably also be made for PowerGen and National Power in this respect), while 
Eastern, London and SWEB, and arguably Southern and Scottish Energy, are driving the 
distribution industry forward. 
In Table 8.11, there was a proliferation of companies identified as defenders principally 
because of their sole involvement in distribution. However, as noted above, the author 
believes that classifying a monopolist as a defender is not necessarily a valid assumption. 
The re-classification presented in Table 12.2 suggests that there are now very few 
defender organisations within the industry, although there are still several monopolist 
organisations which adopt defender-like characteristics. The re-classification presented 
in Table 12.2 has considerable significance in the light of Proposition's 2 and 5 in 
particular which estimate that increasingly organisation's will need to consolidate to 
prosper within the industry. This inevitably implies that companies will either need to 
become more pro-active and seek consolidation opportunities, or risk being taken over 
by predatory organisations themselves seeking consolidation. 
12.5 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this chapter, as discussed in Section 12.0, was to evaluate the progress made 
towards the resolution of the key objectives of this thesis during the field stage of the 
research, following on from the earlier preliminary stage work. In particular, this chapter 
has sought to: 
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verify the ten tentative propositions identified in Chapter Eight, to be used as 
hypotheses in future research; and 
address the issue of whether a selection of existing management models and 
theories are applicable within a regulated environment. The outcome of this latter 
objective produced a series of suggestions for the amendment of a well established 
management model, which will itself require testing in future research. 
In short, therefore, this chapter has concluded the initial objectives of this thesis, which 
were to explore, understand, and begin to develop theory about the behaviour of newly 
formed organisations in a transformation situation, when that transformation was as a 
result of the privatisation of a former nationalised industry. This initial exploration was 
undertaken with reference to the UK electricity industry, about which a substantial 
analysis has been presented, and deep understanding developed. The analysis presented 
within this thesis creates a platform from which the author intends to extend the research 
into other similarly nationalised industries within the UK: in particular water, gas, 
telecoms and rail, and outside the UK where the lessons of the UK electricity experiment 
are still being applied. 
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Chapter Thirteen 
13.0 Introduction 
Summary, Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
The aim of this chapter is to pull together the results of the analysis presented in the 
previous chapters. In particular, this chapter focusses upon the extent to which the aims 
and objectives of the research, established in Chapter One, have been met, and in so doing 
the contribution that this study makes to extending the wider strategy literature. This 
chapter also seeks to outline any deficiencies or concerns that the author has in respect of 
the validity of the research, and provides an opportunity to explain how these have been 
overcome. Furthermore, the chapter also considers the impact that the research, identified 
earlier as applied research, necessarily has for practical management application in a series 
of recommendations for utility managers. The chapter concludes with the author's 
estimation of the future direction of the research, as identified throughout the thesis. 
13.1 The Aims and Objectives and the Extent That They Were Met 
The overall aim of this research was to develop an understanding of the transformation 
of the ESI following its privatisation in 1989, in respect to the strategic behaviour of the 
Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) created by the legislation. This broad objective 
was identified as an exploratory study, with the longer term aim of enabling a wider 
review of corporate transformation among all of the companies created by the various 
privatization's around this time. A suitable and appropriate research design was identified, 
and secondary and primary data was successfully collected, reported and analysed. At the 
beginning of the study, four key objectives were defined: 
Key Objective One: To identify viable corporate and business levels strategies within 
a regulated environment. This objective involves understanding 
the nature of the strategies developed. It also involves 
understanding how different corporate and business levels 
strategies can be combined to provide an effective overall strategy, 
and the relationship between an organisation's strategy and its 
structure; 
Key Objective Two To identify the factors driving the strategic direction of the RECs, 
as identified in Objective One, and to understand the nature of 
their impacts; 
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Key Objective Three An evaluation of the effectiveness of existing generic management 
typologies in explaining the strategic content identified in 
Objective One.; and 
Key Objective Four To elaborate a set of hypotheses that capture the key elements of 
the outcomes of the above objectives, for future development in 
subsequent research. 
The author argues that these key objectives have been meet. Identification of viable 
corporate strategies and strategic drivers was presented and summarised in Chapter's 
Eight and Twelve, the process of classification summarised in Chapter Twelve, and the 
development of a set of propositions also presented in Chapter Twelve. 
In addition, there was one supporting objective, concerned with suggesting a possible 
solution to any problem experienced in relation to Key Objective Three, in relation to the 
application of existing systems of classification within a regulated environment. Thus: 
Supporting Objective One Subject to the outcome of Key Objective Three, to make 
observations about the use of generic strategies in a 
regulated environment, and to suggest any amendments 
which may be necessary to make any established 
approaches identified in Objective Three more useful for 
the classification of regulated industries. 
The demands of Supporting Objective One was met in Chapter Twelve, and contribute 
towards the further direction of research to be discussed below. Other elements, which 
were related to but not intrinsic to the resolution of the objectives, emerged inductively, 
and these will be discussed in due course. 
13.2 Summary of Key Findings 
Many of the key findings resulting from this research have been presented during the 
course of the thesis. Therefore, in summarising these findings, the author has chosen to 
provide a brief reprise of the substantive findings, and to refer the reader back to the 
relevant section of the work. In essence, there are five key findings to report, and these 
are presented in the following sections. 
13.2.1 The Existence of Strategies and Combinations 
Objective One aimed at establishing whether the companies of the study had developed 
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distinct strategies since privatisation. The analysis has clearly shown, as reported in 
Chapter Eight, that distinct strategies have been evident, but that the extent of the 
distinction between differing strategies has tended to narrow as the industry has matured 1. 
While the companies engaged in a degree of strategic experimentation at the beginning of 
the period, making formal classification difficult, a series of archetypical strategy 
formulations have become emerged from the industry over this period. These were: 
~ the local service provider; 
~ the integrated energy company by organic growth; and 
~ the integrated energy company by acquisition. 
The local service provider described an organisation which had retreated from the 
competitive sectors of the industry, and was focussing upon its core distribution industry. 
Companies of this type were characterised by their concern for cost control, and their 
strategic content was most strongly influenced by the industry regulator. The other two 
archetypes described organisations which continued to pursue both competitive and 
regulated businesses; a multi-industry combination of supply, generation and distribution. 
However, the scope of their engagement with the industry was determined by their 
attitude towards the question of growth: organic growth companies sought growth 
incrementally, while acquisition companies sought growth more dramatically. In addition, 
it was commonly the case that integrated organic growth companies tended to have a 
national focus, while integrated acquisition companies tended to have a regional or 
international focus. A fourth archetype, the multi-utility, was also identified but was 
increasingly becoming less viable as companies returned to more of a core focus. The 
genesis of these archetypes was described in more detail in Section 8.1.1.1. 
The designation of these archetypes is tentative, reflecting the fact that the UK, European 
and global industries are still in a stage of flux, and hence the archetypes are subject to 
change and refinement. However, the evidence in Chapter Eight suggests that patterns 
of grand strategy have developed to support the distinct classifications developed above, 
suggesting the emergence of the sort of organising theme: of an interrelationship between 
strategic direction, strategic content and strategic drivers, as discussed by Miller (1996). 
The qualitative development of this system of classification requires further investigation 
through multivariate analysis, again as per Miller's formulation. 
As noted throughout this study, there is a need to distinguish between broad strategy making: domain 
selection and navigation, where similarities have emerged, and tactics, which may vary significantly 
within strategy frameworks which are ostensibly similar. 
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13.2.2 The Existence of Key Drivers 
Objective Two aimed at establishing the identity of the key drivers of strategy within the 
industry, in order firstly to contrast them with those evident in traditional market models, 
and secondly to enable an understanding of how the strategic content of the companies 
was arrived at. The discussion in Chapter Twelve suggested that different factors affected 
different companies in different ways, but that once again some possible organising themes 
were appearing from the research that require further attention. Specifically, the field 
work Chapter's Nme to Eleven suggested that the lower an organisation's reliance upon 
regulated income, the lower would be the impact of regulatory factors upon the company. 
There was also a probable relationship between an organisation's size, and its ability to 
manage the impact of the variety of external factors. 
These findings are, to a certain degree, both predictable and logical. If the following 
definition of market power is used: 'a possibly nebulous concept, but intended to convey 
the influence over the industry held by a company, expressed through its market share, 
record of innovation, net worth et cetera', then it is clear that external influences: 
competitors, buyers, suppliers et cetera, will have a lesser impact simply because 
possessing market power enables a company to overcome such influences. More 
interestingly, perhaps, is the finding that market power within the ESI equates roughly to 
the extent to which a company has remained involved in non-regulated activities, with the 
result that companies with market power are less influenced by the industry regulator. 
The precise impact of the Regulator upon strategy is a very important issue, and is a key 
area that the author wishes to explore in future research. 
Overall the author concluded that the influence of the Regulator was strong, even within 
those parts of the industry that were outside of his jurisdiction. It was perhaps the key 
influence, of even greater importance than that of a company's owners; an influence which 
increased in magnitude within the industry after 1995. The author was also able to 
comment upon the significance of the drivers contained within the 'competitive forces' 
versus 'resource based view' debate. The findings tended to support the view of Grant 
(1991) who argued that strategic decisions should be driven both by an awareness of 
competitive forces, and an organisation's own resources base. The findings also 
suggested that the role of the leadership of an organisation was crucial. 
13.2.3 The Suitability of Models and Techniques 
The analysis presented in Chapter Twelve indicated that caution needed to be exercised 
when seeking to employ a variety of widely known and regarded management models 
upon organisations which operate within a regulated environment. The analysis concluded 
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that organisations operating in both regulated and non-regulated sectors will almost 
inevitably have to develop a divisional structure to provide the appropriate skills and 
support to each activity: partially to acknowledge regulatory requirements, and partially 
as a result of the differing skill mix required in competitive and non-competitive 
environments. This fact needed to be acknowledged in the use of models, to the extent 
that a model, like Porter's (1980) generic strategy model, could not be applied to a 
company ifit was engaged in different sectors. Other models, like Pearce and Robinson's 
(1994) model of grand strategy needed to acknowledge that companies in regulated 
environments exhibited 'concentrated growth' -like strategy, rather than a pure version of 
concentrated growth. 
However, the general conclusion reached was that with the judicious use of caution in 
application of specific labels, and the use of model's like that of Chrisman et al (1988), 
which through its intended homogeny does allow for organisations operating in differing 
sectors, several existing models were of value in the analysis of behaviour in a regulated 
or partially regulated environment. The one exception to this view was the 'organisational 
systems' model of Miles and Snow (1978). The Miles and Snow approach was intended 
for use in associating a variety of factors for individual groups of firms and within 
industries: strategy, structure, process, environment, leadership et cetera. The findings 
of the research suggested that the 1978 model and subsequent amendments were not 
wholly applicable in a regulated or partially regulated environment, as discussed in 
Chapter Twelve. Accordingly Supporting Objective One was required to be pursued. 
13.2.4 Suggested Amendments to Models and Techniques 
The analysis and suggested amendments developed under Supporting Objective One were 
presented in Section 12.4. This section explored the deficiencies identified by the author, 
and their implications for the use of the model in a regulated environment, and a series of 
suggested revisions. These suggested revisions took the form of the addition of several 
new classifications, and the amendment of several old classifications, to result in the 
following model: 
~ The Cautious Prospector, and the Cautious Prospector (Monopoly) 
~ The Analyzer, and the Analyzer (Monopoly) 
~ The Defender 
~ The Monopolist, and the Monopolist-Reactor 
~ The Follower 
The proposed revisions make, in the authors view, the model suitable for application in 
a regulated or partially regulated environment. The validity of the proposed amendments 
require further analysis and empirical testing in later research. 
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13.2.5 Establishing a Set of Hypotheses 
Objective Four of the research represented a method by which the analysis conducted in 
Objective's One and Two could be transformed into a state suitable for empirical testing. 
Consequently, a series of tentative propositions were established in Chapter Eight, 
following directly on from and seeking to summarise the observations made in Chapter's 
Five to Seven. There were to be ten propositions, five addressing inductively identified 
behaviour in relation to strategic content, and five in relation to strategic drivers. The 
tentative propositions were then subjected to further testing by examination during the 
field work section of the thesis, Chapter's Nine to Eleven. The whole process and validity 
ofthe ten propositions were discussed, and their legitimacy debated in Chapter Twelve. 
The aim of this process was to develop a set of working hypotheses that could be 
employed by the author in future research which would (a) have been developed using a 
robust research methodology, and hence which were internally valid, and (b) which would 
have a resonance among companies which operated under the same or similar conditions 
since their privatisation. The assessment of their legitimacy in Chapter Twelve reached 
the following conclusions: 
~ that while all of the propositions developed could not be said to apply in all of the 
cases, they did resonate with the experiences of the sample companies; and 
consequently 
the ten were all accepted unamended at this stage, and could be used in further 
confirmatory research across a wider spectrum of privatised public utilities. 
The author therefore proposes that the following ten hypotheses be accepted for use in 
future research: 
HI companies will employ a limited concentrated growth approach in ongoing 
operations within their regulated businesses 
H2 companies will seek to employ approaches to develop critical mass in most if not 
all of their continuing un-regulated businesses 
H3 the approaches mentioned in H2 will of necessity involve a combined price and 
non-price generic approach, so backing the arguments of a variety of authors 
against the conclusions of Porter (1980) 
H4 'new core' businesses will evolve incrementally as companies take on the 
responsibility for identifying viable concentric diversification 
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H5 companies will inevitably seek consolidation, either vertically or horizontally, 
regardless of the regulatory regime within the industry, supporting the work of 
Helm and Jenkinson (1997) 
H6 that the influence of an industry regulator upon a company's strategy will depend 
upon the relative proportion of its profits generated from regulated activities 
H7 that companies pursuing a strategy across a range of sectors will be subject to 
influences from a variety of different drivers, but that the extent of the influence 
each exerts will be situational 
H8 that organisational size will be a key factor in an organisation's management of its 
relationship with strategic drivers 
H9 that companies will seek to develop greater control over the impact of strategic 
drivers by developing key internal capabilities to achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage 
HI0 that ownership is the key influence over strategy 
The author argues that the above hypotheses provide a potentially significant opportunity 
to understand the nature of strategic content, and the impact of strategic drivers, in a 
regulated environment. The initial deficiency identified in the literature suggested that not 
enough knowledge had been obtained with respect to how companies adapting to strategic 
reorientation following privatisation, and ofthe need for this knowledge as the experience 
of privati sat ion spreads across the global economy. This set of propositions, developed 
from a single industry study, allow for the development of an understanding about the 
options and constraints facing companies in these situations, which can conceivably have 
a wide application. 
The author acknowledges that further 'testing' or 'piloting' is necessary before they be 
applied to a wider sample. This necessary next step is intended to further provide 
assurances oftheir inherent validity. However, as the next stage of research is intended 
to be a more quantitative process, involving the development and testing of a research 
instrument, this activity will be undertaken as part of the traditional questionnaire 
development process. 
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13.2.6 Summary of Incidental Findings 
This study has sought not only to resolve the four key objectives outlined above, but has 
also sought to provide a degree of commentary upon a number of other issues which have 
emerged during this study. These issues, while peripheral to the original aims, still 
represent areas where knowledge has been extended, and hence a contribution made, and 
the author therefore wishes to place these on record. There are a number of such areas. 
(i) The issue of whether the companies have' a strategy' or do they tend to exhibit 
'a network of partial strategies', was raised in Section 2.1.2.1, in relation to work 
by Feurer et al (1995). The research has clearly suggested that the latter scenario 
is certainly true for the vast majority of companies over this period. While at the 
beginning of the period, discussion of 'the strategy' may have been appropriate, 
latter developments towards divisional structures, strategy making at different 
levels within the finn, and business separation have clearly shown the existence of 
networks of partial strategy. The development of internal or dynamic networks 
(Miles and Snow, 1992) among a number companies strengthen's the authors 
conviction that this is indeed the case; 
(ii) The impact of organisational structure was raised in Section 2.4. The research has 
shown a general movement away from functional structures towards more 
complex divisional structures, as will be discussed immediately below. The 
research also suggested that structure has tended to emerge alongside strategy, 
although in a number of companies in the early part of the period structure 
followed strategy, which was interpreted as evidence of an organisation reacting 
to changes in, rather than seeking to manage, its environment; 
(iii) The existence of network organisations, was raised in Section 2.4.2, and has been 
very considerably supported by the research presented to date. Many of the RECs 
have identified an internal network as a viable structural configuration which 
encourages flexibility alongside cost effectiveness and efficiency. It is interesting 
also to note that some companies have used the perceived success of their 
emergent internal networks to consider 'upgrading' to the next step, the more 
dynamic networks envisaged by Miles and Snow (1992); 
(iv) The industry has tended to witness a variety ofleadership styles, with transactional 
forms more common initially. However, these more 'command and control' forms 
ofleadership have tended to become less prevalent as companies evolved internal 
or dynamic networks to enhance their ability to offer superior performance. 
Consequently, more transformational forms have emerged, with Eastern Group 
presenting the most definite example. However, as companies have moved away 
from the more competitive sectors of the industry, developing the local service 
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provider archetype discussed in Section 13.2.1, transactional fonns have tended 
to reemerge. As discussed in Section 13.6, exploring the question of leadership 
has been identified as an area for future research. 
13.3 Conclusions 
The author concludes that the pnmary alms of the study have been successfully 
accomplished. Furthermore, the possible limitations upon the validity of the study 
identified in Section 1.6 have not resulted in any lowering of confidence in either the 
methodology and findings of the enterprise. The author has striven throughout the 
research process to acknowledge possible limitations, acceptable resolutions to possible 
limitations, and areas where caution is required in respect of the applicability of the 
research presented here. Consequently, the author has confidence in the findings 
presented here, and in the value of the contribution this research has made to the intended 
field. The precise nature of the contribution will be examined in the following section. 
It is perhaps appropriate at this point to comment upon and critically evaluate the 
robustness of the chosen research methodology. Readers are reminded that the chosen 
methodology was: 
~ essentially phenomonological, and hence interested in the perceptions and views 
of actors involved in the complex relationships the research was intended to 
understand; and was consequently largely qualitative, in that this investigation 
employed case studies rather than more quantitative methods of investigation and 
analysis; and 
initially inductive, but increasingly deductive in that the author began the analysis 
by adopting the view that decisive factors or conclusions would emerge from an 
initial preliminary stage (which used a fonn of content analysis, combined with 
other forms of textual analysis and data triangulation) to develop a series of 
concepts which would then be deductively explored in the field work stage. 
Overall, the research was identified as exploratory, leading to the development of 
a number of key themes, or concepts, which would be tested in future 
confirmatory research. 
The author considers that the chosen research methodology has proven wholly appropriate 
for the intended objectives of this research. At no point in this exploratory study have 
major methodological difficulties emerged which have caused the author in any way to 
doubt the veracity of the process or outcomes, and this confidence is reflected in the 
confidence expressed above in relation to the successful achievement of the thesis' aims 
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and objectives. The author notes the concerns with respect to more qualitative 
approaches to research, as discussed extensively in Chapter Three. However, while not 
agreeing with the view that quantitative approaches are necessarily inherently superior to 
qualitative approaches; having argued that the essential aims and objectives of this 
research were better served by the chosen approach, the author concurs that the proposed 
next stage of research would benefit from a more quantitative approach, if only to provide 
an opportunity to enhance the process of triangulation undertaken throughout by offering 
an alternate approach to data collection and analysis. Subjecting the qualitatively 
determined conclusions of this research to quantitative analysis in extended research 
would also help to satisfy more of the conditions of the use of scientific methods, and 
strengthen the confidence that could be placed in the outcomes. 
13.4 Contributions 
In Section 1.4, the intended contributions that this research sought to make were outlined. 
This section aims to comment upon the extent to which these contributions have been 
achieved. The study'S principal contribution to knowledge rested with its attempt to 
overcome the deficiency in the literature identified in Section 1.1, and further explored 
throughout Chapter Two. The author argued that the privatised industries of the UK are 
of considerable strategic importance, and as a consequence establishing an understanding 
of the process of strategic choice, and the availability of viable strategic options open to 
these companies should have commanded greater attention from management theorists. 
This was especially the case in the light of the position of the UK as a test-bed for 
privatisation, and as a continuing source of guidance and example to privatisation 
processes across the world. 
The author argues that a much improved understanding of the process of industrial 
transformation, and strategic realignment among the companies created by the 
privatisation has resulted from this research. The analysis has presented a wide range of 
strategic archetypes: both successful and unsuccessful, which explain the process of 
strategic development during the evolution of the industry since privatisation. The author 
argues that the research has demonstrated the rationale that underpins such archetypes, 
and that the process has fully related this research to the wider academic literature, so 
providing a clear and grounded understanding of what has transpired. 
The research has also provided a clear analysis of why the industry has developed in the 
fashion that it has. Throughout the work, emphasis has been placed upon the key drivers 
of strategy, and through this analysis a contribution has also been made to the on-going 
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question of relevance and importance of alternate views of strategy making within the 
finn. As will be seen in the section of this chapter dealing with intended extensions of the 
research, the author views this aspect of the research as only partially completed, and has 
established this area as a key objective for the future development of the on-going 
research. 
Finally, the research has provided a further opportunity to subject existing management 
models and concepts to testing, and in particular has contributed by conducting this 
analysis within an industrial setting that is uncommon within the literature. As Section 
12.3 showed, many existing conceptual models have been seen to perform well in 
regulated environments, it: that is, caution is exercised in the definition of terminology and 
their application. However, Section 12.3 suggested a variety of amendments to one long-
established approach in particular which the author believes can add an extra degree of 
utility to the conceptual understanding of the dynamic relationship between companies in 
regulated, or partially regulated, environments. This contribution, like others noted above, 
does however require rigorous testing to ensure the validation of the conclusions drawn. 
13.5 Recommendations 
Early in the thesis (Section 3.1.4), the author indicated that he considered the work 
presented here to be applied research, as opposed to pure research or consultancy. 
Inevitably, therefore, the work is intended to have value for organisations experiencing 
similar conditions to the companies studied. The purpose of this section is to make some 
tentative recommendations to fulfil this requirement of the research process. The 
recommendations will be based upon the conclusions drawn from the preceding work, 
which is based upon an observation often year's of industrial transformation within the 
ESI. Inevitably, some caution needs to be taken in making, and indeed following, these 
recommendations. Without verification from other industrial sectors, which forms a 
significant element of the directions of future research, it is necessary to acknowledge that 
these recommendations can only be said to apply directly to companies which have 
undergone the same evolutionary process as the RECs. However, and despite that 
concern, the author believes that the findings of the research still provide some valuable 
general lessons for the managers of organisations attempting to identify viable strategic 
positions in a post-privatisation industrial setting. The author initially suggests four 
principal recommendations: 
13.5.1 Understand the Objectives of Industry Regulation 
The study has shown that under conditions similar to the ESI, regulatory influences are 
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considerable. Furthermore, even companies that have developed considerable market 
power are inevitably influenced by the industry regulator, while the research has suggested 
that companies with low market power are influenced extremely heavily. Additionally, 
the range of objectives a regulatory regime may attempt to fulfil are also considerable, as 
the analysis presented in Section 1.2 demonstrated. Consequently, any assumption 
without verification of the objectives of a regulator may lead a company to pursue 
strategies that will ultimately conflict with the regulator, creating the potential for discord. 
This is not to argue that some form of disagreement and negotiation with a regulator is 
unhealthy. The evidence presented during the case studies shows organisations that were 
willing and able to petition regulators to make a case for their particular interests. 
However, the cases also show that very often the regulator works to his own agenda, and 
that even powerful organisations like Eastern Group can run into conflict. 
The particular case of the ESI presents two fundamental lessons for organisational 
decision makers. These are to be both efficient and effective. The ESI's regulator saw 
the promotion of efficiency leading to lower prices, and maintenance of service quality 
while prices were lowering, as his ultimate goals. Therefore, to succeed within the 
industry cost reduction was an inevitability, and the failure to achieve cost reduction 
would be punished by the regulator, as was a failure to maintain service quality standards. 
Inevitably, as the influence of the regulator has diminished; or rather as competition has 
spread and organisations have established alternate income streams, the regulator's ability 
to punish has reduced, but the importance of cost reduction and service quality have 
remained. 
13.5.2 Understand the Objectives of Other Stakeholders 
The study has indicated that former regulated utilities arguably do not have the same 
degree of autonomy in decision making as companies with more well established 
commercial pedigrees. The research has suggested that many of the companies under 
investigation found themselves in a position where their initial strategic decisions were 
effectively turned around under the influence of their key stakeholders. In many cases, 
and despite the comments registered in Section 13.5.1, these key influences came from the 
financial institutions of the City of London. EME (Section 6.1), Eastern (Chapter Nine), 
and Seeboard (Chapter Ten) are all examples of organisation's whose strategies were 
constrained by unfavourable reactions from the City of London. Other RECs, like 
Norweb (Section 5.2), London (Section 7.2), and SWEB (Chapter Eleven), all 
experienced changes of strategic emphasis following their takeovers. 
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Essentially, the recommendation made here is that managers in enterprises which have 
undergone what Ogden and Glaister describe as strategic reorientation (Ogden and 
Glaiser, 1996); which the author argues limits the options available to a new enterprise as 
the levels of existing expectation will be much greater than for a completely new 
organisation, need to conduct an audit of the particular aims and obj ectives of important 
stakeholders. Inevitably this involves the recommendation made in Section 13.5.1, but 
also includes other key stakeholders like owners, customers, and competitors. An early 
appreciation of the 'permitted boundaries' of organisational strategy will lead to less 
constraints upon strategy later in the process. 
13.5.3 Understanding of the Value of Resources 
The study has shown very clearly that organisations that base their strategies upon their 
resources, or more specifically upon the effective exploitation of their resources, can 
develop an advantage. In an industry like the ESI, as the study has further indicated, 
establishing innovation is not a straightforward process. While it can and does occur, it 
tends to be incremental and related, which makes it very difficult for that innovation to be 
defended by the innovator. The level of immitability tends to be high. Consequently, 
achieving real advantage through step changes is difficult. Organisations have, however, 
been able to benefit from the effective exploitation of unique capabilities: examples are 
evident from Eastern's market leadership in energy trading, London's in customer service, 
and United Utilities's in project management through its Vertex subsidiary. 
This recommendation therefore suggests that companies prosper if they both understand 
the demands of their industry, but at the same time are able to exploit the potential offered 
by their resource base. In this study, therefore, the evidence tends to support the views 
put forward by Grant (1991) in respect of the centrality of resources in superior strategy 
making. It is less supportive of the views of Ramel and Prahalad (1994) in respect of the 
gateway to opportunity in other industries that resources offer, suggesting that utility 
companies tend to prosper in related situations. 
13.5.4 The Importance of Delegation 
This review of the industry has identified a number of key business practices which have 
become common among all of the companies. One such development is the importance 
of establishing an organisational structure which permits delegation of responsibility for 
decision making within a strategy as pattern approach. The industry witnessed a move 
away from functional, command and control type structures, towards more fluid, flexible 
divisional and delegated approaches. This was partially as a result of regulatory impulse, 
and partially evolutionary. More complex network structures are increasingly prevalent, 
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as the RECs realised the importance of instilling a more business focussed attitude among 
its SBU's - even those in regulated environments where such concepts were formerly 
alien. The importance of efficiency and effectiveness, as discussed above, were found to 
benefit from such structural change. The ESI can now be said to provide a variety of 
working organisational models for companies beginning to experience similar 
transformational demands. In particular, the work of companies in this industry in areas 
such as the creation of internal and dynamic networks provide a potential 'short cut' for 
organisations faced with similar demands. 
13.6 Direction of Future Research 
Throughout the thesis, a wide variety of possible extensions to the current research have 
been suggested, and delineated. The author argues that the importance of the concept of 
privatisation, as discussed in Section 1.2, means that the work conducted here should be 
built upon in pursuit of some if not all of these possible extensions. This section aims to 
bring these various potential extensions together to form what is in effect an agenda for 
future research in the field. While a considerable number of areas have been suggested, 
the author believes it is important to impose an hierarchy upon this agenda to identify the 
most pressing areas and guide the process. To this end, the author has identified the five 
most significant extensions to the research as being: 
(a) The testing of the concepts developed here: this research has been identified as 
exploratory, in that it was seeking to identify a research framework from a single industry 
study that could be expanded to include all UK companies that have undergone similar 
experiences/industrial transformations. Consequently, the most pressing need for future 
research involves moving to the confirmatory stage which involves:-
.. the creation of a research instrument based upon the 10 hypotheses established 
here, and other key issues which have emerged; 
its circulation to all of the companies created by the privatisations of electricity, 
gas, telecoms, water, rail in the UK since 1979 (including companies that have 
entered the industry(ies) after Iiberalisation; 
.. rigorous statistical analysis; and 
.. the drawing of conclusions leading to the establishment of potential governing 
laws which can influence the debate in this area. 
The aim here is to narrow the many variables identified through qualitative analysis during 
this research, to allow for more quantitative analysis to be performed, as discussed in 
Section 3.0.1. In such a way, an alternate methodology would be employed to provide 
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additional confidence in the initial findings of the research, as well as helping in the 
veri£cation of the extended objectives of the research. The proposed direction of future 
research maintains the author's commitment to triangulation through alternate sources of 
data collection and analysis, to validate and legitimise the ongoing conclusions. 
(b) The extension of understanding of the relationship between regulatory regimes 
and strategy: this research has established a real need for analysis of the relationship 
between regulation and strategy. The interviews conducted in the UK and US have 
demonstrated that there is some discrepancy between the aims of regulatory systems in 
different countries. This will have an impact upon the scale and scope of corporate 
strategy. The author believes that the questions raised by this relationship have yet to be 
fully explored, and a further aim of this research is to seek to develop an understanding 
of this impact. The need for this research has been made clear during this thesis, and in 
particular by the problems encountered by some US companies seeking to operate in the 
UK market, but finding their strategies constrained by a regulatory regime whose aims and 
objectives they do not fully understand, or concur with. The author believes that as the 
energy industry becomes increasing global in scope, the possibility of the emergence of 
similar problems of this kind increases, and creates the need for the research. 
(c) An assessment of the dynamic model of strategic drivers developed during the 
research: Figure 2.5, in Section 2.6.2, presents a model which the author believes can 
help with the ongoing discussion regarding the relative merits of the competitive forces 
and resource based views of strategy making within the firm. The model is an attempt to 
establish a dynamic framework within which the two views may be reconciled, and help 
in the creation of a wider framework which authors like Grant (1991) and Lynch (2000) 
continue to argue is missing from the emergent resource based view. The author's interest 
in pursuing this new direction is heightened by the development throughout the thesis of 
an organising theme, itself requiring additional analysis, which equated organisational size/ 
power with the impact of external factors upon strategy making. Intrinsically, this future 
research would involve an attempt to establish whether any direct relationship exists 
between the archetypical strategy formulations and the patterns of influence exerted by 
the various strategic drivers identified throughout this research. The author believes that 
the model can help in this process and is keen to explore the potential it offers as a tool 
to aid in the process of strategic analysis and choice. In addition, as has been noted 
throughout this research, there is a need to ascertain whether there is continuity between 
the portfolios of influences which are crucial in both competitive and regulated 
environments, and to understand how any difference in importance impacts upon the 
strategic processes in each. 
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(d) The impact of dominant coalition composition on strategy in regulated 
environments: the research has suggested that Miles and Snow's (1978) analysis of the 
impact of dominant coalition composition upon the direction of strategy in a regulated 
environment needs to be reconsidered. The author has already made an initial excursion 
into this area (Ghobadian et ai, 1997) and it is an area to which further attention should 
be given. The research also earlier established a need to understand the relationship 
between types of leadership, as determined by Bums (1978) and Farkus and Wetlaufer 
(1996), and strategic configurations. While this has to a certain extent been accomplished: 
in Section 12.2, the author believes this issue could benefit from a more formal 
examination. 
(e) Further exploration of the concept of strategy combinations: the author suggested 
earlier, Section 2.6, that the work of Pearce and Robinson (1994) in respect of grand 
strategies may be extended through the creation of a variety of grand strategy 
combinations, which were presented in Figure 2.6. These concepts have been utilised 
throughout the research, and the author is confident of their validity. However, it would 
be instructive if the concepts developed earlier could be further tested (a) in the proposed 
extension of this research work described above and (b) through application in a non-
regulated environment to ascertain whether the conditions assumed in their creation can 
be said to have universal application. 
13.7 Predictions 
At the outset of this research, in Section 1.2.4, the author's intention to make some 
predictions with respect to the future shape of the global energy industry, and the ESI's 
position within it, was established. Part of this objective has been fulfilled by a recent 
article co-written by the author (James et ai, 2001), but this objective remains to be 
fulfilled. The article noted the current trend towards consolidation, which is a theme 
which has been evident throughout this research and which was captured in Proposition, 
now Hypothesis, 5. While the article concentrated upon consolidation within the UK 
industry, the author further argues that this trend is already evident across the global 
energy industry, and will continue to predominate. 
The centrality of competition to the UK privatisation has not been evident in many other 
privatization's, or at least not to the same extent. Consequently, in many other situations 
market power has been concentrated in large, financially resourceful, and inherently secure 
megaliths such as France's EdF. Organisations of this kind possess the financial power, 
and global ambitions, to grow networks of subsidiaries in all of the key markets, some 
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times utilising strategic asset seeking investment, other times natural resource seeking or 
market seeking investment approaches (Dunning, 1993). This process can only continue, 
as competitive reality makes it harder for smaller companies like those in the UK to 
compete with national champions. The position within the UK, therefore, is for increased 
consolidation and extended overseas ownership: very much the picture evident at the 
present time but arguably with the potential to become even more consolidated. 
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Appendix One Interview Framework 
This appendix provides a copy of some of the framework's used to interview managers 
throughout the research. The following framework was set to case study companies in 
advance of a first meeting, in this case with Eastern Group. It forms the content of 
Interview UK003, as featured in Appendix Two: 
Attachments: Topics and Questions 
We are interested in looking at the process by which Eastern has adapted to the changed demands of its 
new operating environment. Part of this process involves understanding how the company has changed 
structurally since privatisation, and also how the mechanics of decision making have changed. 
To this end, we would like to discuss the following questions 
1) How has the internal structure of the Group developed, including the questions 
* How was the group structured before privatisation? 
* How is it structured now? 
* Has the process been evolutionary or revolutionary? 
* Have any individuals been significant in the development of the process? 
* How much autonomy has been ceded to separate businesses? 
* How does the company ensure the continued suitability of its operational structure? 
2) How the mechanics of strategy formulation have developed, including the questions 
* How was strategy developed before privatisation? 
* How is it developed now? 
* Has the process been evolutionary or revolutionary? 
* Have any individuals been significant in the development of the process? 
* Does the strategy formulation process differ among the separate businesses in the group? 
* Have any special groups been instigated in order to manage or lead radical or evolutionary 
change? 
In addition, we would like the opportunity to develop an understanding of how Eastern has responded to 
the challenges of the new environment in relation to three problems that face companies responding to 
changed circwnstances. These are tile entrepreneurial, the engineering and the administrative problems. 
3) Entrepreneurial Problem: How the company came to decide upon the product/market mix that 
it now offers in the post-privatisation market place; 
4) Engineering Problem: How the company has developed operational answers to the solution 
developed from the entrepreneurial problem; and 
5) Administrative Problem: How the organisation adapted to take account of the solutions 
developed to resolve the entrepreneurial and engineering problems. 
We recognise that there will inevitably be a degree of overlap between the questions of company structure 
and strategy fonnulation, witIl tile entrepreneurial, the engineering and the administrative problems. As 
such, I have not included detailed lists of questions but would develop them later in the process. 
-564-
If any of the above is unclear, I would be happy to expand upon it. 
Attachments: People 
You mentioned the possibility of meeting with others of your colleagues who might be interested in taking 
part in the research project. 
It would be of considerable help to me to be able to speak to someone from 
• The supply side of Eastern Electricity; 
• The distribution side of Eastern Electricity; 
and possibility if it is not too inconvenient 
• Eastern Generation; and 
• Eastern Natural Gas 
The following framework for discussion was sent to the same interviewee at a follow up 
interview, and determined the content ofInterview UK004. 
Attachments: Topics and Questions 
How has the internal structure of the Group developed, including the questions 
* How was the group structured before privatisation? 
* How is it structured now? 
* Has the process been evolutionary or revolutionary? 
* Have any individuals been significant in the development of the process? 
* How much autonomy has been ceded to separate businesses? 
* How does the company ensure the continued suitability of its operational structure? 
How the mechanics of strategy fonnulation have developed, including the questions 
* How was strategy developed before privatisation? 
* How is it developed now? 
* Has the process been evolutionary or revolutionary? 
* Have any individuals been significant in the development of the process? 
* Does the strategy fonnulation process differ among the separate businesses in the group? 
* Have any special groups been instigated in order to manage or lead radical or evolutionary change? 
This set of interviews was followed by interviews with managers in the field. The 
following structures were utilised to form the content ofInterview's UK005 and UK006. 
Proposed Agenda for Meeting: 
I would like if possible to discuss the relationship between product and service offerings, and developing 
the appropriate support structure and company culture to effectively deliver these products and services. 
Therefore 
J) How did your organisation arrive at the current product offering, and what is the process by 
which new product development is undertaken? 
TIllS may include consideration of the market you are aiming to reach and the internal process 
by which you decide whether the current product offering is appropriate for your existing 
strategy. 
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2) How your organisation arrived at the appropriate support structure to deliver your product 
offering? 
This may include a brief explanation of the internal structure of the business, and how it has 
changed over time and why. What are the operational considerations of these decisions? Are 
you doing anything differently to other organisations within the group, or has a common model 
developed within the group as a whole? 
3) How your organisation arrived at the appropriate management culture to deliver your product 
offering? 
This may involve a brief explanation of the management structure of the business, and how it 
has changed over time and why. Do you recruit people from different sources than previously, 
and do you expect tllem to be differently skilled? How different is your organisation to others 
within tile group? 
I realise that there is considerable cross over between these issues, and if you would prefer to approach 
the meeting on tile basis of a general discussion that touches upon tllese points tllen I am happy to pursue 
such an approach. 
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